Disclosure of Evidence in International Criminal Trials - An Historical Overview by Büngener, Lars & Safferling, Christoph Johannes Maria (Prof. Dr.)
 Disclosure of Evidence in International Criminal Trials - 
An Historical Overview 
 
 
Inaugural-Dissertation 
zur 
Erlangung der juristischen Doktorwürde 
 
dem 
 
Fachbereich Rechtswissenschaften  
der Philipps-Universität zu Marburg 
 
vorgelegt von 
 
Lars Büngener 
 
Staatsanwalt aus Detmold 
 
 
Marburg 2012 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Vom Fachbereich Rechtswissenschaften der Philipps-Universität Marburg als Dissertation 
 
angenommen am:    15. April 2013 
 
Berichterstatter:    Professor Dr. Christoph Safferling, LL.M. (LSE) 
Mitberichterstatter:    Professor Dr. Dr. h.c. mult. Gilbert Gornig 
 
Tag der mündlichen Prüfung:  7. Juni 2013 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
Table of Contents 
 
1 Introduction ......................................................................................................... 1 
1.1 Definition and clarification of terms ......................................................... 5 
1.1.1 Disclosure/Discovery ....................................................................................... 5 
1.1.1.1 Disclosure in the ‘procedural sense’ ................................................................ 6 
1.1.1.2 Disclosure in the ‘material sense’ .................................................................... 6 
1.1.2 The person concerned ...................................................................................... 7 
1.2 Comparative Considerations ..................................................................... 8 
1.2.1 The Anglo-American System ........................................................................... 8 
1.2.2 The Romano-Germanic System ..................................................................... 10 
1.2.3 International Proceedings ............................................................................... 12 
1.3 The Purpose of Disclosure ...................................................................... 12 
1.3.1 The Human Rights Aspect – Fair Trial Rights .............................................. 12 
1.3.1.1 Rights to Information and Defence Preparation............................................. 13 
1.3.1.2 Right to an Adversarial Trial.......................................................................... 17 
1.3.1.3 Equality of Arms ............................................................................................ 19 
1.3.1.4 Adversarial Trial / Equality of Arms in favour of the Prosecution? .............. 20 
1.3.1.5 Right to an Expeditious Trial ......................................................................... 29 
1.3.1.6 Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 30 
1.3.2 The Judicial Economy or ‘Procedural Management’ Aspect ........................ 30 
1.3.3 The Truth-Finding Aspect .............................................................................. 31 
1.4 Exceptions to Disclosure ......................................................................... 36 
1.5 Conclusion ............................................................................................... 37 
 
2 The development of disclosure in national systems until 1945 ...................... 38 
2.1 England ................................................................................................... 38 
2.1.1 Early Statutory and Case Law until the End of the 19th Century ................... 40 
2.1.2 The first half of the 20th century ..................................................................... 46 
2.1.3 Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 47 
2.2 The United States of America – From the beginning until the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure (1946) ....................................................... 48 
2.2.1 Prosecution Disclosure ................................................................................... 48 
II 
 
2.2.2 Defence Disclosure ........................................................................................ 59 
2.2.3 Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 59 
2.3 Conclusion ............................................................................................... 60 
3 The Nuremberg IMT ......................................................................................... 61 
3.1 Overview and Legal Framework ............................................................. 61 
3.1.1 The Making of the Legal Provisions .............................................................. 62 
3.1.1.1 The IMT Charter ............................................................................................ 62 
3.1.1.1.1 The Memorandum for President Roosevelt ................................................... 63 
3.1.1.1.2 The San Francisco Draft................................................................................. 64 
3.1.1.1.3 The Revised Draft, 14 June 1945 (‘London Draft’) ....................................... 67 
3.1.1.1.4 The London Conference ................................................................................. 68 
3.1.1.1.4.1 The American position ............................................................................ 69 
3.1.1.1.4.2 The Soviet Position ................................................................................. 71 
3.1.1.1.4.3 The French Position ................................................................................ 73 
3.1.1.1.4.4 The British Position ................................................................................. 74 
3.1.1.2 The Rules of Procedure .................................................................................. 77 
3.2 The Content of the Provisions ................................................................. 78 
3.3 The Practice of the IMT .......................................................................... 79 
3.3.1 Disclosure by the Prosecution ........................................................................ 79 
3.3.1.1 Pre Trial Disclosure........................................................................................ 80 
3.3.1.2 Disclosure during the trial .............................................................................. 81 
3.3.2 Disclosure by the Defence ............................................................................. 91 
3.4 Conclusion ............................................................................................... 96 
 
4 The Development of Disclosure in National Systems after 1945 ................... 99 
4.1 England ................................................................................................... 99 
4.1.1 Prosecution Disclosure ................................................................................... 99 
4.1.1.1 From 1945 to the Attorney General’s Guidelines 1981 ................................. 99 
4.1.1.2 From the Attorney General’s Guidelines to the CPIA ................................. 105 
4.1.1.3 The Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act .......................................... 110 
4.1.2 Defence Disclosure ...................................................................................... 114 
4.1.3 Conclusion ................................................................................................... 115 
4.2 The United States of America ............................................................... 116 
4.2.1 Prosecution Disclosure ................................................................................. 117 
4.2.1.1 State v. Tune ................................................................................................. 123 
4.2.1.2 Roviaro v. United States .............................................................................. 129 
4.2.1.3 Jencks v. United States ................................................................................. 131 
4.2.1.4 Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States ................................................ 135 
III 
 
4.2.1.5 Napue v. Illinois ........................................................................................... 136 
4.2.1.6 Brady v. Maryland ....................................................................................... 139 
4.2.1.7 Dennis v. United States ................................................................................ 140 
4.2.1.8 Giglio v. United States ................................................................................. 142 
4.2.1.9 United States v. Agurs .................................................................................. 143 
4.2.1.10 United States v. Bagley ................................................................................ 148 
4.2.1.11 Kyles v. Whitley ............................................................................................ 152 
4.2.1.12 The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure .................................................... 154 
4.2.2 Defence Disclosure ...................................................................................... 158 
4.2.2.1 Williams v. Florida ...................................................................................... 158 
4.2.2.2 United States v. Nobles ................................................................................ 163 
4.2.2.3 The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure .................................................... 164 
4.2.3 Conclusion ................................................................................................... 167 
4.3 Conclusion ............................................................................................. 167 
 
5 Disclosure of Evidence at the Ad Hoc Tribunals .......................................... 169 
5.1 Overview and Legal Framework ........................................................... 169 
5.2 Disclosure by the Prosecutor ................................................................. 172 
5.2.1 Rule 66 (A) RPE .......................................................................................... 173 
5.2.1.1 Supporting Material ..................................................................................... 174 
5.2.1.2 Prior Statements of the Accused .................................................................. 178 
5.2.1.3 Prior Statements of prosecution Witnesses .................................................. 181 
5.2.1.4 Audio Recording, December 1996 – November 1997 ................................. 191 
5.2.1.5 Language Requirements ............................................................................... 192 
5.2.1.6 Time Limits .................................................................................................. 192 
5.2.1.7 Limiting Provisions ...................................................................................... 196 
5.2.1.7.1 Rule 69 ......................................................................................................... 196 
5.2.1.7.2 Rule 53 ......................................................................................................... 199 
5.2.1.7.3 Rules 50 and 75 (SCSL) ............................................................................... 202 
5.2.1.7.4 Rule 66 (C) ................................................................................................... 203 
5.2.2 Rule 66 (B) RPE-ICTY/R / Rule 66 (A) (iii) RPE-SCSL ............................ 206 
5.2.3 Rule 68 RPE ................................................................................................. 209 
5.2.3.1 Sub-rule (i)/(A) ICTY/ICTR ........................................................................ 214 
5.2.3.2 Sub-rule (ii)/(B) RPE-ICTY/RPE-ICTR ...................................................... 216 
5.2.3.3 Subjection to Rule 70; Sub-rule (iii)/(C) ...................................................... 217 
5.2.3.4 Sub-rule (iv)/D ............................................................................................. 218 
5.2.3.5 Sub-rule (v)/E ............................................................................................... 218 
5.2.3.6 SCSL ............................................................................................................ 218 
5.2.4 Rule 94 bis ................................................................................................... 219 
IV 
 
Excursus: Pre-Trial Regulations (Rules 65 ter, 73 bis, ter RPE) ................................. 222 
Rule 94 bis (continued) ................................................................................................. 225 
5.3 Disclosure by the Defence .................................................................... 226 
5.3.1 Rule 67 ......................................................................................................... 226 
5.3.2 Rule 94 bis ................................................................................................... 243 
5.4 Exceptions and limitations to Disclosure .............................................. 243 
5.4.1 Rule 66 (C) ................................................................................................... 243 
5.4.2 Rule 69 ......................................................................................................... 243 
5.4.3 Rule 70 ......................................................................................................... 244 
5.4.4 Rule 97 ......................................................................................................... 253 
5.5 Disclosure ‘via the Chamber’ – Rules 54/98 ........................................ 255 
5.6 Violations of Disclosure Obligations .................................................... 257 
5.7 Conclusion ............................................................................................. 259 
 
6 Disclosure of Evidence at the ICC ................................................................. 260 
6.1 Introduction ........................................................................................... 260 
6.2 General Overview over the Legal Framework – Applicable Law ........ 261 
6.2.1 The Rome Statute ......................................................................................... 261 
6.2.2 The Rules of Procedure and Evidence ......................................................... 264 
6.2.3 The Regulations ........................................................................................... 265 
6.2.4 Jurisprudence of the Ad Hoc Tribunals? ...................................................... 268 
6.3 The Making of the Legal Provisions ..................................................... 269 
6.3.1 The Rome Statute ......................................................................................... 269 
6.3.1.1 The 1993 Draft ............................................................................................. 271 
6.3.1.2 The 1994 Draft ............................................................................................. 275 
6.3.1.3 The PrepCom Report 1998........................................................................... 280 
6.3.1.4 The Rome Conference.................................................................................. 290 
6.3.1.5 Conclusion ................................................................................................... 293 
6.3.2 The Rules of Procedure and Evidence ......................................................... 294 
6.3.2.1 The Australian Proposal ............................................................................... 298 
6.3.2.2 The French Proposals ................................................................................... 301 
6.3.2.3 The further developments ............................................................................ 307 
6.3.2.3.1 Rules 76 to 83, Rule 121 .............................................................................. 307 
6.3.2.3.2 Rules 73 and 84 ............................................................................................ 310 
6.3.2.3.3 Rules 129, 130 .............................................................................................. 311 
6.4 Disclosure by the Prosecutor ................................................................. 312 
6.4.1 Rule 76 RPE-ICC: Pre-trial disclosure relating to prosecution witnesses ... 313 
6.4.2 Prior Statements of the accused?.................................................................. 318 
V 
 
6.4.3 Rule 77 RPE-ICC: Inspection of material in possession or control of the 
Prosecutor .............................................................................................. 320 
6.4.4 Art. 67 (2) ICCSt, Rule 83 RPE-ICC: Exculpatory Evidence ..................... 324 
6.5 Disclosure by the Defence .................................................................... 332 
6.5.1 Rule 78: Inspection of material in possession or control of the defence ..... 334 
6.5.2 Rules 79 (1)-(3): Notice of alibi/grounds for excluding criminal 
responsibility according to Art. 31 (1) .................................................. 335 
6.5.3 Rule 80: Grounds for excluding criminal responsibility under Art. 31 (3) .. 340 
6.5.4 Rule 79 (4): Other Evidence as ordered by the Chamber ............................ 344 
6.6 Exceptions and Limitations to Disclosure ............................................. 346 
6.6.1 Rule 81 RPE-ICC: Restrictions on Disclosure ............................................ 347 
6.6.1.1 Rule 81 (1): Internal Documents .................................................................. 350 
6.6.1.2 Rule 81 (2): Possible Prejudice of Ongoing Investigations ......................... 351 
6.6.2 Confidentiality provisions of the Rome Statute in conjunction with 
Rule 81 (3)/(4) RPE-ICC ...................................................................... 353 
6.6.3 Art. 68 (5) ICCSt, Rules 81 (5)/(6) RPE-ICC .............................................. 355 
6.6.4 Art. 54 (3)(e) ICCSt, Rule 82 RPE-ICC: Confidentiality Agreements ........ 357 
6.6.5 Rule 73 RPE-ICC: Privileged communications and information ................ 364 
6.7 Continuing requirement to disclose and Rule 84 .................................. 368 
6.8 The Role of the Chamber ...................................................................... 370 
6.8.1 Pre-confirmation disclosure ......................................................................... 371 
6.8.2 Pre-trial disclosure ....................................................................................... 386 
6.9 Disclosure and Victims ......................................................................... 391 
6.9.1 ‘Disclosure to Victims’ ................................................................................ 392 
6.9.2 Disclosure by Victims .................................................................................. 394 
6.9.3 ‘Disclosure of Victims’ ................................................................................ 396 
6.10 Sanctions for non-compliance ............................................................... 396 
6.11 Conclusion ............................................................................................. 399 
7 Conclusion ........................................................................................................ 401 
 
Bibliography ................................................................................................................ 407 
  
Preface 
The present thesis is the result of several years of research. It is not so much an analytical 
work on international criminal law or procedure, but shall rather serve as what the title 
suggests: a (descriptive) overview. 
Scholarship and jurisprudence have been taken into account as of autumn 2012. 
Many people have contributed to this thesis. I would like to thank Professor Henning Radtke, 
judge at the Federal Court of Justice, as well as the Max-Planck-Institute for European Legal 
History in Frankfurt, for giving me the opportunity to work and conduct research at the 
International Research and Documentation Center for War Crimes Trials (ICWC) at the 
University of Marburg and providing financial funding. I thank my colleagues at the ICWC 
for their support, friendship and for widening my perspective on international criminal law, its 
history and its implications on different societies, particularly Axel Fischer, who provided me 
with a constant flow of information concerning the Nuremberg IMT practice. Heartfelt thanks 
go to Juliana Rangel and Marc Schiethart of the Library of the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) in The Hague for providing access to the original Minutes of Closed Sessions of the 
Nuremberg IMT and for their kind additional support. I thank Eleni Chaitidou, Legal Officer 
at the Pre-Trial Division of the International Criminal Court (ICC) for her invaluable advice, 
suggestions and clarifications concerning the jurisprudence of the ICC as regards disclosure, 
and for her compassion. I also thank Professor Gilbert Gornig of the University of Marburg, 
who delivered the second revision of the thesis in no time. 
A special thanks goes to my parents, family and friends, for their support and understanding. 
Finally, and above all, I am forever indebted to Professor Christoph Safferling, a wonderful 
teacher and dear friend, for his never-ending and patient support through all of these years, 
and for encouraging and helping me to bring this work to an end, when time and again I was 
close to desperation. Thank you very much. 
 
Frankfurt, February 2014 
 
  
 
1 
 
1 Introduction1 
More than 60 years have passed since, for the first time in history, some of those most 
responsible for gross violations of international and international humanitarian law were 
held responsible before an international court of justice. The International Military 
Tribunal of Nuremberg (IMT) marks a fundamental step in the history of international 
criminal law and its enforcement worldwide. In its aftermath, thousands of other trials 
on the national level were held against Axis war criminals of a lower rank, some until 
this day. 
It took humanity nearly 50 years to agree on something similar to Nuremberg: the Ad-
Hoc Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda as well as the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone were, as Nuremberg, installed in the face of atrocities which had just 
happened (or, in the case of the former Yugoslavia, were indeed still happening), in the 
somewhat desperate try to give a judicial answer to grave human rights abuses. 
In the wake of this development, the old dream of establishing a permanent 
international criminal court was taken up again. Surprisingly for many, in 1998, the 
plenipotentiaries of a large number of states who had gathered in Rome agreed on a 
statute for a new permanent International Criminal Court, the ICC, which became 
operational in 2002 and has, as of autumn 2012, engaged in the prosecution of 
international crimes in seven different situations, with sixteen persons having appeared 
before the Court; one person has been convicted, trial proceedings against four more are 
ongoing.  
The substantive international criminal law which is applied by the Ad-Hoc Tribunals 
and the ICC today can be traced back to Nuremberg. The crimes contained in the 
Nuremberg Charter, crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity, can, 
in principle, be found in the Rome Statute of the ICC today, and at least partially in the 
Statutes of the Ad-Hoc Tribunals. Even though many details have been and still remain 
under discussion, the peoples of the world have obviously more or less agreed on what 
should be punishable under international law. Until today, modern practitioners of 
international criminal law refer to and rely on jurisprudence related to crimes committed 
in World War II; there is no book on the matter in which one would not find 
reminiscence to Nuremberg. 
                                                 
1  Note: Excerpts of the following thesis form part of Büngener, Disclosure of evidence. 
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The procedural law to be applied in the enforcement of this substantive law, in turn, has 
changed and developed dramatically since 1945. The Rules of Procedure of the 
Nuremberg IMT comprised as few as 11 rules; the Tokyo International Military 
Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) had only 9 rules of procedure. The modern UN-
Tribunals, in turn, have more than 150 rules (counting the bis, ter and quater Rules), 
which the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICC even exceed (225 Rules).  
Relatively few people seem to concentrate their research on the development of 
international criminal procedure. On the one hand, this is undoubtedly due to the very 
fact that it is hard to find a ‘thread’ in the development of international criminal 
procedure which would be comparable to substantive international criminal law. 
Furthermore, one must see that the substantive criminal law relates to concrete crimes 
committed by ‘real people’, and thus draws much more interest, particularly by the 
public, than criminal procedure, which is perceived as rather technical, bureaucratic and 
complicated. From a legal practitioner’s point of view, on the other hand, the 
importance of criminal procedure cannot be underestimated. However, the way or 
method to proceed against a person in order to find out whether he2 is guilty or not, is 
subjected to a fundamental dispute between the two leading legal systems of the world: 
the Anglo-American common law and the continental European Romano-Germanic 
legal system (often referred to as ‘civil law’) with their respective adversary and 
inquisitorial criminal procedures. Overall, one can state that all international(ized) trials 
for crimes under international law have always had and still have elements of both 
systems, initially with a strong preponderance towards adversary (Anglo-American) 
procedure, which however lately has shifted considerably towards a more inquisitorial 
(Romano-Germanic) approach. 
In recent years, one aspect of international criminal procedure has proven to be of 
particular concern to international criminal lawyers: the disclosure of evidence. This 
term refers to a procedure which is rooted in the adversary system: the uncovering of 
collected evidence or other material by a party of the trial, usually to the other party, but 
occasionally also to the court or the public. In the Roman-Germanic criminal procedure, 
the term is unknown. Here, the prosecutor prepares a dossier containing all relevant 
evidence, incriminating as well as exculpatory. This dossier is handed to the defendant 
as well as to the Court, meaning that all participants of the trial have (ideally) the same 
level of information. 
                                                 
2  To facilitate the readability of the text, references to persons will mostly be given in the masculine 
form. 
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In international justice, the procedural feature of disclosure of evidence has existed from 
the first day up until now. This is remarkable in at least two ways. First and foremost, in 
1945, statutory rules of disclosure were, with few exceptions, inexistent in national 
jurisdictions. The traditional jurisprudence in the United States and Great Britain (being 
the two most influential countries for the development of the Rules of Procedure for the 
IMT) was of the view that there was, under common law, no strict legal obligation of 
any of the parties in criminal trials to disclose anything to the other party and could thus 
not be obliged by the court to do so. It thus comes as a surprise that, at least to some 
extent, the IMT Rules of Procedure put the prosecution, and (at least at first, as we will 
see) the prosecution alone, under an obligation to disclose to the defendants all 
documents accompanying the indictment 30 days before the trial. The second surprise 
may be seen in the very existence of a complex disclosure regime in the Rules of 
Procedure and evidence of the International Criminal Court (ICC). As mentioned, one 
can observe a clear shift of international criminal procedure towards the Roman-
Germanic inquisitorial system. Admittedly, the procedure of the ICC still has various 
adversary elements. Yet with the Prosecutor being committed to the (material) truth and 
obliged to investigate incriminating and exonerating circumstances equally (Art. 54 (1) 
(a) ICCSt), it would have meant but a small step to give up the complex disclosure 
regime and introduce an arguably simpler dossier approach. However, this was not 
done. 
The following thesis shall give an overview of the history of disclosure of evidence in 
international criminal courts. It will start with a general introduction and clarification of 
terms. Concerning the international criminal courts and tribunals, the thesis will follow 
a chronological order. Starting with Nuremberg, the statutory rules and their respective 
genesis will be analyzed, as well as the practice of the IMT concerning disclosure issues 
and the subsequent changes of the trial’s disclosure regime.  
The Tokyo IMTFE, being the other international tribunal related to World War 2, will 
not be covered. For one, the sources are not as well accessible as the ones pertaining to 
Nuremberg. Second, it must be observed that, probably not least due to this relative lack 
of documentation, Tokyo has never had the same impact on the judicial and political 
development of international criminal law as a whole. An analysis of the procedure of 
the IMTFE must therefore be left to future research.  
The major part of the thesis will be dedicated to the recent history of the contemporary 
tribunals and the ICC. We will analyze the genesis and particularly the development of 
the disclosure regime of the Ad-hoc Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda 
(ICTY/ICTR), as well as the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL). The development 
of the Rules of the Ad-hoc Tribunals is particularly interesting. Since they are drafted 
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by the Judges of the Tribunals themselves, they can be easily amended; and the Judges 
have made extensive use of their right to amend the Rules – as of spring 2012, the Rules 
of the ICTY have been revised 46 times. Since the amendments are made by the judges, 
the analysis of the development must entail the related jurisprudence of the Tribunals, 
too. Also, although the Rules of the ICTY, ICTR, and, to a certain extent, the SCSL 
started from very similar wordings, they have developed differently. We will analyze 
the respective differences and their consequences.  
Finally, we will take a look at the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICC. As 
already mentioned, they are even more detailed than the Rules of the Ad-Hoc Tribunals 
– and in contrast to those, they are crafted and promulgated by the Assembly of States 
Parties of the ICC, acting as a purely legislative body. These Rules are also subject to 
change, yet cannot be amended as easily as the Rules of the Ad-Hoc Tribunals. The 
Rules of the ICC as a permanent institution and, particularly its jurisprudence relating to 
procedural matters must therefore be considered as ‘trend-setting’ for the future of 
international criminal procedure, and might for their part serve as a source of experience 
and comparative law for national legislators. 
Before we start the analysis of the history of disclosure in international courts, however, 
it is indispensable to take a look at the beginnings and the development of disclosure in 
national systems until 1945. Given the fact that the United Kingdom and the United 
States of America were the two common law countries involved in crafting the 
procedural rules at Nuremberg, it makes sense to concentrate on these. 
The same holds true for the time between Nuremberg and the Ad Hoc Tribunals. On the 
national level, the development of disclosure made considerable progress in the course 
of the 20th century both in England and in the United States. The latter were partially 
influenced by the development in England as concerns their disclosure law; and we 
even find proof that the Nuremberg experience may have had an indirect influence here. 
The ICTY’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence, in turn, bear the clear handwriting of the 
United States; no other country made a larger and more significant contribution as to 
their drafting. The Rules of the ICTY, finally, became a role model for the Rules of the 
other Ad-Hoc Tribunals and the ICC. 
In the course of our analysis, we will find that disclosure both on the national and 
international level took a development towards a considerable liberalization. This is 
particularly due to the fact that courts became more and more audacious with regard to 
obliging both prosecution and defence to a ‘cards-on-the-table’ approach, blurring the 
traditional adversarial/inquisitorial dichotomy. This was done not least, it is held, with a 
goal to enhance truth-finding in criminal trials. 
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The thesis will conclude with a short evaluation of what has been achieved and whether 
a further development of disclosure appears desirable. 
 
1.1 Definition and clarification of terms  
1.1.1 Disclosure/Discovery 
The term ‘disclosure’ can generally be described as the uncovering of evidence and 
other information between the parties of legal proceedings before and during these 
proceedings. The term ‘discovery’ is primarily used in North American jurisdictions. In 
a sense, it is the “inversion” of disclosure, meaning that discovery by one party signifies 
disclosure by the other – i.e. ‘defence discovery’ would equal ‘disclosure by the 
prosecution’, whereas ‘prosecution discovery’ means ‘disclosure by the defence’.3 In 
England, the term ‘discovery’ was apparently originally used to refer primarily to civil 
procedures;4 however, according to the Civil Procedure Rules 19985, the term disclosure 
is now also generally used for civil proceedings.6 Most authors, as a matter of fact, use 
the terms ‘disclosure’ and ‘discovery’ synonymously.7  
In international criminal jurisdictions, as we shall see, the disclosure of evidence has 
developed into something which must be understood more broadly, for it includes not 
only the parties, but the court as well. This has to do with the purposes of disclosure, 
which, it is held, lie not only in the protection of human rights of the person concerned, 
but also imply aspects of ‘procedural economy’ or ‘trial management’ and truth 
finding.8 In order to avoid (or at any rate: reduce) ambiguities, it therefore appears 
sensible to at least theoretically differentiate between something we might call 
‘disclosure in the procedural sense’ and ‘disclosure in the material sense’. 
                                                 
3  Compare Ambos, Confidential Investigations (Article 54(3)(e) ICC Statute) vs. Disclosure 
Obligations, at 561. 
4  Matthews/Malek, Disclosure, mn. 1.01. 
5  1998 No. 3132 (L.17). 
6  See part 31 of the Civil Procedure Rules. It should be noted, however, that the term ‘disclosure’ has a 
narrower meaning in the context of these rules, in that in means only the information about the 
existence of a document (s. 31.2: “Meaning of disclosure: A party discloses a document by stating that 
the document exists or has existed.”); this would be followed by a “right to inspection” by the other 
party (s. 31.3). 
7  Compare Matthews/Malek, Disclosure, ibid.; Comment (Charles Reich), Pre-Trial Disclosure in 
Criminal Proceedings, note 2; Lynch, Closure and Disclosure in Pre-Trial Argument, at 291. 
8  See as to the purposes of disclosure 1.3 below. 
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1.1.1.1 Disclosure in the ‘procedural sense’ 
By ‘disclosure in the procedural sense’, we mean the procedural ‘feature’ of disclosure. 
It is a phase within criminal proceedings as it exists the Anglo-American9 and 
international criminal procedure, which takes place after the indictment (or a document 
containing the ‘charges’10, for that matter) is issued and before the trial, but can refer 
also to an ongoing process when the trial has already started. When scholars and 
practitioners refer to ‘disclosure’, they usually utilize the term in its procedural 
meaning. In the following, whenever we speak of disclosure without further 
explanation, we will mostly refer disclosure in the procedural sense. 
 
1.1.1.2 Disclosure in the ‘material sense’ 
There is, however, also a material aspect of disclosure, which implies what the word 
‘disclosure’ actually says: the material or ‘physical’ uncovering of information towards 
other participants of the trial proceedings. In this understanding, disclosure is not the 
‘procedural feature’, but the material handing over of information or evidence to 
another participant in the course of criminal proceedings, which does not necessarily 
take place between the parties (inter partes), but can also be done to or via the court 
and/or via the access to a dossier containing the evidence. Indeed, in this understanding, 
disclosure does not even require the existence of ‘parties’ in a procedural sense; and is 
thus not limited to the Anglo-American procedural system, but the term can also be 
applied to Continental European systems. As a matter of fact, especially in the context 
of the human rights aspect of disclosure, the procedural rights of the accused contained 
in the relevant human rights treaties must be respected regardless of the given 
procedural tradition. Thus, the accused may have a ‘right to disclosure’, even though 
‘disclosure’ as a procedural feature does not exist in his procedural system. To be sure, 
the most relevant underlying reasons for exceptions to and limitations of disclosure, 
such as the protection of national security information and the protection of victims and 
witnesses, must also be dealt with regardless of the procedural tradition. It is thus 
somewhat misleading to say that ‘disclosure does not exist in the Continental European 
system’: It may not exist as a procedural feature or phase, but it nevertheless exists in a 
material sense. As mentioned, in the following, if not stated otherwise, we will utilize 
                                                 
9  As to some comparative considerations, see 1.2 below. 
10  Compare Art. 61 Par. 3 (a) ICCSt. 
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the term in the technical or ‘procedural’ sense of the word; however, it is important to 
keep in mind that substantially it could be applied to any legal system. 
 
1.1.2 The person concerned 
In the following, for obvious reasons, we will oftentimes refer to the person against 
whom criminal proceedings have been initiated. There are quite a number of different 
terms to name this person, according to the jurisdiction of the proceedings as well as for 
the procedural phase he finds himself in. In American courts, the person will usually be 
called ‘suspect’ during the investigation phase, and ‘defendant’ once the indictment is 
filed with the court;11 the German Code of Criminal Procedure uses the word ‘accused’ 
as a general term together with special terms according to the particular procedural 
phase;12 in other contexts, the person will be referred to as the ‘accused’ or the 
‘charged’13; in the international criminal courts and tribunals, we speak of the 
‘suspect’14, ‘accused’, ‘person concerned’15 or sometimes just ‘person’.16 Hereinafter, we 
will mostly refer to this person as the accused. It appears to be the most general term 
available without sounding overly artificial; furthermore, in most cases, disclosure in 
the procedural sense normally takes place after the indictment is confirmed, which is 
why the term is also technically correct in most instances.17 
 
                                                 
11  Ambos/Miller, Structure and Function of the Confirmation Procedure before the ICC from a 
Comparative Perspective, p. 339 with further references. 
12  See German Code of Criminal Procedure: “Section 157. [Definition of the Terms "Indicted Accused" 
and "Defendant"]: 
 Within the meaning of this statute, 
 the indicted accused shall be an accused person against whom public charges have been preferred, the 
defendant shall be an accused person or indicted accused in respect of whom there has been a decision 
to open the main proceedings.” 
13  Safferling, Towards an international criminal procedure, passim, e.g. pp. 136, 140. 
14  See, e.g., Art. 18 ICTYSt. The ICC nomenclature, in turn, does not know the term ‘suspect’. 
15  See, e.g. Art. 17 ICCSt. 
16  See, e.g. Art. 55 ICCSt. 
17  With the exception of the ICC, where we must distinguish between pre-confirmation and pre-trial 
disclosure, see 6.2.1 infra. See for instructive remarks on the terminology generally Ambos/Miller, 
Structure and Function of the Confirmation Procedure before the ICC from a Comparative 
Perspective, p. 339 et seq. 
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1.2 Comparative Considerations 
In order to address the issue of disclosure (in the procedural sense) in an international 
legal context properly, it is necessary to describe, very briefly, some of the main 
differences between the two most dominant procedural systems as regards criminal 
procedure, which are the ‘Anglo-American’ system on the one hand, and the ‘Romano-
Germanic’18 one on the other. This is warranted because disclosure as a procedural 
‘feature’, as just mentioned, is rooted and existent only in the adversary trial of the 
Anglo-American tradition. The following overview will focus on the protagonists of the 
proceedings and their respective roles within them.19 
 
1.2.1 The Anglo-American System 
The following (simplifying and ‘idealising’)20 overview may help to illustrate the basic 
procedural functioning of the Anglo-American system: 
                                                 
18  Often also referred to as ‘common law’ and ‘civil law’, respectively. These terms, however, appear to 
be somewhat inaccurate, since ‘common law’ is a specific source of law within the Anglo-American 
system, whereas ‘civil law’ will often refer to civil law as opposed to criminal or public law. 
Hereinafter, we will stick to the terms Anglo-American and Romano-Germanic; the latter will also at 
times be referred to as ‘Continental European’. 
19  See on the comparison of the two major legal systems generally Damaška, The Faces of Justice and 
State Authority, as well as Damaška, Structures of Authority and Comparative Criminal Procedure; 
Zweigert/Kötz, Einführung in die Rechtsvergleichung. For a concise comparative overview see Orie, 
Accusatorial v. Inquisitorial Approach in International Criminal Proceedings Prior to the 
Establishment of the ICC and in the Proceedings Before the ICC, as well as Safferling, International 
Criminal Procedure, p. 52 et subs. 
20  To be sure, for example, many trials in modern Anglo-American legal systems are conducted without 
a jury. The ‘ideal’ form of the adversarial trial, however, is fundamentally based on the existence of a 
jury. See, also on the present decline of the importance of the jury, Jackson/Doran, Judge without 
jury, p. 1 et subs. 
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As may be seen from the illustration, the trial in the Anglo-American system is 
adversarial in nature. The main protagonists are the parties, Prosecution and Defence. 
They are the ones who collect evidence and present it in court. The parties are supported 
by investigators; in the case of the Prosecutor, they are ‘official’ and public 
investigators, such as the police; the defence is free to employ its own investigators as it 
desires. The judge, in turn, plays a rather passive role and serves as a kind of ‘referee’. 
Indeed, legal procedures in Anglo-American systems have been compared to ‘games’ or 
‘fights’, which is probably also one of the reasons why expressions such as ‘equality of 
arms’21 ever emerged. As Pollock and Maitland put it: 
The behaviour which is expected of a judge in different ages and by different 
systems of law seems to fluctuate between two poles. At one of these the model is 
the conduct of the man of science who is making researches in his laboratory 
and will use all appropriate methods for the solution of problems and the 
discovery of truth. At the other stands the umpire of our English games, who is 
there, not in order that he may invent tests for the powers of the two sides, but 
merely to see that the rules of the game are observed. It is towards the second of 
these ideals that our English medieval procedure is strongly inclined. We are 
                                                 
21  See 1.3.1.3 below. 
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often reminded of the cricket-match. The judges sit in court, not in order that 
they may discover the truth, but in order that they may answer the question, 
'How's that ?' This passive habit seems to grow upon them as time goes on and 
the rules of pleading are developed.22 
One can also compare the judge to a ‘filter’ as concerns the evidence: the jury may only 
consider the evidence that was allowed by the judge and has thus bypassed him.23 The 
jury finally hands down the judgment as concerns guilt or innocence. It remains for the 
judge to decide on the penalty imposed upon the defendant. 
Disclosure, the main topic of this thesis, takes place between the parties, with disclosure 
obligations of the prosecution usually being more extensive than those of the defence. 
 
1.2.2 The Romano-Germanic System 
The Romano-Germanic system may be illustrated as follows: 
 
This overview, inspired by the German system, is again somewhat oversimplifying and 
not applied in actual jurisdictions without at least some modifications. It aims at 
                                                 
22  Pollock/Maitland, The history of English law before the time of Edward I Vol. 2, p. 670 et seq. 
23  Walpin, America's Adversarial and Jury Systems: More Likely to Do Justice, at p. 176: “Evidentiary 
Traffic Warden”. 
11 
 
demonstrating that the trial in the Romano-Germanic tradition revolves around the 
judge, who plays a very active role and, during the trial, takes the evidence himself. The 
Romano-Germanic system is therefore often referred to as ‘inquisitorial’. The 
accused/defence and the prosecutor, at least as far as the trial phase is concerned, play a 
much more passive role. It is important to note that, at least in the traditional 
understanding of the procedural system, there are no actual parties in the proceedings. If 
one were to define a party, it would be the defendant and the defendant alone.24 The 
prosecutor is not a party, but (ideally) merely acts as a ‘neutral’, as opposed to partisan, 
administrator of justice and is obliged to lead the investigation in an objective manner, 
collecting all evidence related to a case, be it incriminatory or exculpatory.25 The police, 
as controlled by the public prosecutor, submits the evidence it has collected to the 
prosecutor (or, in some jurisdictions, such as France, an investigating judge) who 
prepares a dossier, which, in principle, contains all the evidence. If he decides to indict 
the suspect, he must submit the entire dossier to the court together with the indictment, 
and, if the defence requests him to do so (which it usually does), to the defence. On the 
basis of the dossier, the court decides whether it opens the trial or not; it can also oblige 
the prosecutor to collect more evidence. If the defence is of the opinion that more 
evidence should be collected, it can make a motion to the prosecutor or, in the trial 
phase, the court. If the court grants the motion, it will oblige the prosecutor or the 
investigators directly to collect the requested evidence; in some cases the court will 
even collect the evidence itself, e.g. by calling a witness or an expert ex officio. At trial, 
all participants, judge, prosecutor and defence, who share knowledge of the same 
dossier, should have, in principle, the same level of information. In such a system, there 
is obviously no need for disclosure in a procedural sense between the parties. Disclosure 
in the material sense, however, can still be an issue, for example in cases of evidence 
containing intelligence information or protected/anonymous witnesses. 
 
                                                 
24  See also 1.3.1.4 below. 
25  See, e.g., Section 160 of the German Code of Criminal Procedure:  
 [Investigation Proceedings]  
 (1) As soon as the public prosecution office obtains knowledge of a suspected criminal offense either 
through a criminal information or by other means it shall investigate the facts to decide whether public 
charges are to be preferred. 
 (2) The public prosecution office shall ascertain not only incriminating but also exonerating 
circumstances, and shall ensure that such evidence is taken the loss of which is to be feared. 
 (3) The investigations of the public prosecution office should extend also to the circumstances which 
are important for the determination of the legal consequences. For this purpose it may avail itself of 
the service of the court assistance agency. 
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1.2.3 International Proceedings 
International proceedings have always combined elements of the adversary system of 
the Anglo-American tradition and the inquisitorial system of the Continental-European 
one.26 Their rules have oftentimes been described as a ‘mix’ of the two systems.27 
Indeed, as mentioned above, disclosure in international trials has always existed as a 
procedural feature, and has increasingly become an element which does not only 
involve the parties, but the court as well. As we shall see, it appears that the concepts of 
what we call disclosure in the procedural sense and disclosure in the material sense are 
converging, and that the separation between them is increasingly blurred, which makes 
it necessary to understand the concept of disclosure in international criminal 
proceedings more widely.  
 
1.3 The Purpose of Disclosure 
The purpose of disclosure of evidence in criminal proceedings appears to have been 
evaluated differently over time. We can differentiate at least three aspects concerning 
the purpose of disclosure: the human rights aspect, the procedural or trial management 
aspect, which relates to the efficiency of the proceedings, and the truth finding aspect. 
We shall take a brief look at these issues in the following. 
 
1.3.1 The Human Rights Aspect – Fair Trial Rights 
Today, disclosure in criminal proceedings tends to be seen primarily in relation with the 
protection of the accused’s rights as regards criminal trials, i.e. with his fair trial 
guarantees.28 Most authors and human rights bodies relate disclosure to the accused’s 
rights of information and the facilities for the preparation of the defence. However, the 
                                                 
26  In Nuremberg and Tokyo, the Judges were, in contrast to the usual practice in the Anglo-American 
systems at the time, allowed to ask questions to the witnesses, and made use of this right; there were 
also no technical rules of evidence. These features were kept and widened at the Ad Hoc Tribunals 
and still expanded at the ICC. These issues will be discussed in more detail in the respective chapters. 
27  See, e.g. Ambos, The Structure of International Criminal Procedure: ‘Adversarial’, ‘Inquisitorial’ or 
Mixed? with further references; see also Kreß, The Procedural Law of the International Criminal 
Court in Outline: Anatomy of a Unique Compromise; Picker, International Law’s Mixed Heritage: A 
Common/Civil Law Jurisdiction, at p. 1087 et seq.; as well as Safferling, Towards an international 
criminal procedure, p. 219. 
28  See, e.g., Brady, Disclosure of Evidence, at 403.  
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disclosure of evidence is also oftentimes linked to the accused’s ‘right to an adversarial 
trial’ and/or the principle of ‘equality of arms’.  
 
1.3.1.1 Rights to Information and Defence Preparation 
Art. 6 (3) (a) and (b) of the European Convention on Human Rights29 state: 
3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights:  
(a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, 
of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; 
(b) to have adequate time and the facilities for the preparation of his defence. 
Almost verbatim,30 Art. 14 (3) (a) and (b) of the International Covenant of Political 
Rights and Civil Liberties31 provide: 
3. In the determination of any criminal charge against him, everyone shall be 
entitled to the following minimum guarantees, in full equality:  
(a) To be informed promptly and in detail in a language which he understands of 
the nature and cause of the charge against him; 
(b) To have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence [...]. 
As a matter of fact, neither of the two mentioned human rights documents is directly 
applicable to the international criminal courts and tribunals, since none of them is party 
to the underlying treaties.32 In the case of the ICC, however, one could be of the opinion 
that at least the ICCPR could be viewed as an “applicable treaty” in the sense of Art. 21 
Par. 1 (b) of the Rome Statute33.34 To be sure, the right to a fair trial has been recognized 
by the ICTY as a requirement of customary international law.35 
                                                 
29  Convention for the Protection on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, hereinafter: ECHR. 
30  In fact, Art. 14 (3) (b) ICCPR was modelled after Art. 6 (3) and (b) ECHR; see Nowak, UNO-Pakt 
über bürgerliche und politische Rechte und Fakultativprotokoll, Art. 14,mn.42; see as to the genesis of 
Art. 14 (3) (b) ICCPR the overview at Bossuyt, Guide to the ''travaux préparatoires'' of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, p. 296. 
31  Hereinafter: ICCPR. 
32  See Safferling, Die EMRK und das Völkerstrafprozessrecht, p. 157. 
33  Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, hereinafter: ICCSt. 
34  See McAuliffe de Guzman in: Triffterer, Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court: Observers' Notes, Article by Article, Art. 21,mn.10. 
35  Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, ICTY Case No. IT-95-14/1-A, Judgment, Appeals Chamber, 24 March 
2000, par. 104. 
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Be that as it may – all of the international criminal courts and tribunals echo the said fair 
trial guarantees in their basic legal documents to a larger or lesser extent. Already in the 
Charter of the Nuremberg IMT36, which was of course passed before the named 
international human rights treaties, we find a related provision: 
Article 16. 
In order to ensure fair trial for the Defendants, the following procedure shall be 
followed:  
(a) The Indictment shall include full particulars specifying in detail the charges 
against the Defendants. A copy of the Indictment and of all the documents 
lodged with the Indictment, translated into a language which he understands, 
shall be furnished to the Defendant at reasonable time before the Trial. [...] 
Similarly, Art. 9 of the IMTFE Charter for the Tokyo Tribunal provided: 
Article 9 
Procedure for Fair Trial. In order to insure a fair trial for the accused the 
following procedure shall be followed: 
(a) Indictment. The indictment shall consist of a plain, concise, and adequate 
statement of each offence charged. Each accused shall be furnished, in adequate 
time for defence, a copy of the indictment, including any amendment, and of this 
Charter, in a language understood by the accused. 
The modern tribunals, for their part, have practically incorporated the said provisions of 
the modern human rights treaties. Article 21 (4) (a) and (b) of the Statute37 of the 
International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia38, Article 20 (4) (a) and (b) of the 
Statute39 of the International Tribunal for Rwanda40, Article 17 (4) (a) and (b) of the 
Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone41 as well as Article 16 (4) (a) and (b) of the 
Statute42 of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon43 cite the above mentioned provisions of 
                                                 
36  London Charter of the International Military Tribunal, decreed on 8 August 1945 as an annex to the 
London Agreement, International Military Tribunal, Trial of the Major War Criminals before the 
International Military Tribunal : Nuremberg, 14 November 1945 - 1 October 1946 (hereinafter: IMT) 
vol. I, p. 10-16.  
37  Adopted by UNSC Resolution 827 (1993), 25 May 1993, hereinafter: ICTYSt. 
38  Full title: International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, 
hereinafter: ICTY. 
39  Adopted by UNSC Resolution 955 (1994), 8 November 1994, hereinafter ICTRSt. 
40  Hereinafter: ICTR. 
41  Hereinafter: SCSLSt and SCSL, respectively. 
42  Adopted by UNSC Resolution 1757 (2007), hereinafter STLSt. 
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the ICCPR verbatim, the only difference being that the latter includes, presumably for 
reasons of equal gender treatment, the respective female form. The Khmer Rouge 
Tribunal44 took a different approach by simply making explicit reference to Art. 14 
ICCPR in Article 13 of the Agreement between the UN and Cambodia45:  
1. The rights of the accused enshrined in Articles 14 and 15 of the 1966 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights shall be respected 
throughout the trial process. Such rights shall, in particular, include the right: 
[...] to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his or her 
defence; [...] 
The International Criminal Court46, in Article 67 (1)(a) and (b) of the ICC Statute also 
echoes Art. 14 (3)(a) and (b) Art. 14 (3)(a) and (b) ICCPR, adding a right to information 
of the content of the charge and formulating in a gender neutral manner: 
In the determination of any charge, the accused shall be entitled to [...] the 
following minimum guarantees, in full equality: 
(a) To be informed promptly and in detail of the nature, cause and content of the 
charge, in a language which the accused fully understands and speaks; 
(b) To have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of the defence [...].  
In addition to that, the ICCSt contains, as a somewhat unique47 feature among the other 
international courts, an explicit right to disclosure as concerns exculpatory evidence. 
Art. 67 Par. 2 provides: 
In addition to any other disclosure provided for in this Statute, the Prosecutor 
shall, as soon as practicable, disclose to the defence evidence in the 
Prosecutor's possession or control which he or she believes shows or tends to 
show the innocence of the accused, or to mitigate the guilt of the accused, or 
which may affect the credibility of prosecution evidence. In case of doubt as to 
the application of this paragraph, the Court shall decide. 
The rights to information as concerns the charges and adequate time and facilities for 
the preparation of the defence, are usually cited when it comes to disclosure issues. In 
                                                                                                                                               
43  Hereinafter: STL. 
44  Full title: Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes 
Committed during the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, hereinafter: ECCC. 
45  Agreement between the United Nations and The Royal Government of Cambodia Concerning the 
Prosecution under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic 
Kampuchea, 6 June 2003. 
46  Hereinafter: ICC. 
47  While the other courts and tribunals do have similar provisions, they are not contained in their 
respective statutes but only in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. 
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relation with disclosure, some authors appear to stress the first provision (information of 
the accused),48 while many merely cite the second one (adequate time and facilities for 
the preparation of the defence).49 The two provisions are obviously closely linked to 
each other: a proper preparation of the defence is impossible without knowing the 
charges in detail; the same is true if the charges are known but the defence lacks the 
time and facilities for preparation.50 However, disclosure stricto sensu is indeed more 
closely linked to the facilities for the preparation of the defence, whereas the 
information on the charges refers more to the indictment or charges, meaning a 
statement of the facts and circumstances the defendant is accused of – disclosure usually 
takes place after the charges are formulated and refers to pieces of evidence and factual 
information which go beyond the contents of an indictment.51 In fact, the right to 
information ‘serves’ the right to preparation.52 Obviously, there is also a close link with 
the time granted for the preparation of the defence, for a disclosure of evidence which 
does not take place sufficient time before the hearing is relatively useless. 
In their jurisprudence and comments, the relevant international human rights organs 
have also related disclosure issues to the right to prepare one’s defence.  
In its General Comment on Art. 14 ICCPR, the UN Human Rights Committee states 
that “facilities must include access to documents and other evidence which the accused 
requires to prepare his case”.53 In O.F. v. Norway, the HRC, though declaring the case 
inadmissible, also indicated that it saw the right to access to material documents as 
falling under Art. 14 (3)(b) ICCPR. At the same time, it held that the right to access 
does not entail the right to actually receive the relevant documents, i.e. that they be sent 
to the accused.54 In Haase v. Germany, the European Commission of Human Rights 
likewise related access to documents to Art. 6 (3)(b) ECHR.55 
                                                 
48  Zappalà, Human rights in international criminal proceedings, p. 119. 
49  See, e.g. Stavros, The Guarantees for Accused Persons under Article 6 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, pp. 178 et subs., 182; Rzepka, Zur Fairness im deutschen Strafverfahren, p. 63; 
Safferling, Towards an international criminal procedure, pp. 194 et subs.; Frowein/Peukert, 
Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention, Art. 6, mn. 185. 
50  See also Stavros, The Guarantees for Accused Persons under Article 6 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, p. 168. 
51  See also ECommHR, Ofner v. Austria, Application No. (524/59), 3 Yearbook 322, 19 December 
1960.  
52  See also Frowein/Peukert, Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention, Art. 6, mn. 175. 
53  HRC General Comment No. 13 (Art. 14), par. 9. 
54  O. F. v. Norway, Communication No. 158/1983, 26 October 1984, par. 5.5. 
55  ECommHR, Haase v. Federal Republic of Germany, Application No. 7412/76, Report 12 July 1977, 
par. B (a), p. 27. 
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In Jespers v. Belgium, the ECommHR held: 
In particular, the Commission takes the view that the “facilities” which 
everyone charged with a criminal offence should enjoy include the opportunity 
to acquaint himself, for the purpose of preparing his defence, with the results of 
investigations carried out throughout the proceedings.56 
Disclosure certainly serves the right of the accused to prepare himself adequately for the 
trial, and it appears that disclosure is best placed into the ambit of this right. However, 
other authors and indeed also international courts place relate disclosure to other fair 
trial rights. 
 
1.3.1.2 Right to an Adversarial Trial 
More often than not,57 disclosure has also been linked to the ‘right to an adversarial 
trial’. This term is not to be found explicitly in the ECHR, but has been recognized by 
the European Courts of Human Rights. In Brandstetter v. Austria, the Court stated that 
The principle of equality of arms58 is only one feature of the wider concept of a 
fair trial, which also includes the fundamental right that criminal proceedings 
should be adversarial […]. The right to an adversarial trial means, in a criminal 
case, that both prosecution and defence must be given the opportunity to have 
knowledge of and comment on the observations filed and the evidence adduced 
by the other party.59 
What the ECtHR calls the ‘right to an adversarial trial’ is, at least, very similar to what 
would be called the ‘right to be heard’60 in the Continental European legal tradition.61 
                                                 
56  Jespers v. Belgium, Application no. 8403/78, Report, 14 December 1981, par. 56. The case was 
declared inadmissible by the Commission on 15 October 1980, and thus never made it to the ECtHR. 
57  See, e.g., Harris/O'Boyle/Bates/Buckley, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights, pp. 254 
et subs.; Ovey/White, European Convention on Human Rights, pp. 156 et subs.; see also 
Trechsel/Summers, Human rights in criminal proceedings, pp. 92 et subs. 
58  See as to the equality of arms 1.3.1.3 below. 
59  Brandstetter v. Austria, Series A no. 212, Judgment, 28 August 1991, paras. 66 & 67. 
60  As, e.g., in Art. 103 (1) of the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany (Grundgesetz): “In the 
courts every person shall be entitled to a hearing in accordance with law.”; see also § 33 German Code 
of Criminal Procedure (Strafprozessordnung):  
 [Hearing the Participants] 
 (1) A decision of the court rendered in the course of the main hearing shall be given after hearing the 
participants. 
 (2) A decision of the court rendered outside a main hearing shall be given after a written or oral 
declaration by the public prosecution office.  
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Indeed, the Court has indicated to this conclusion in, e.g., Kamasinski v. Austria, when 
it equalled the English term “right to be heard” with the French term “le principe du 
contradictoire”: 
Nevertheless, in conducting the factual inquiry the Supreme Court did not 
observe the principle that contending parties should be heard (le principe du 
contradictoire), this being one of the principal guarantees of a judicial 
procedure […].62 
This right also implies rights to information, in order to be able to make an informed 
decision as to whether one should aim to actively influence the decision of the court and 
how. Also, the ‘right to access to the dossier’ as known in the Continental European 
legal tradition, which for its part forms the ‘Continental counterpart’ to disclosure and 
indeed entails disclosure in the material sense, is oftentimes, at least partially, derived 
from this right to be heard.63 
Not explicitly related to the ‘right to an adversarial trial’, the Court held in Edwards v. 
UK: 
The Court considers that it is a requirement of fairness under paragraph 1 of 
Article 6 (art. 6-1), indeed one which is recognised under English law, that the 
prosecution authorities disclose to the defence all material evidence for or 
against the accused and that the failure to do so in the present case gave rise to 
a defect in the trial proceedings.64 
Later, in Jasper v. UK and Rowe and Davis v. UK, both judgments handed down on the 
same day and with identical wording in the respective passages, the Court, apparently 
combining the above cited holdings in Brandstetter and Edwards, held that 
                                                                                                                                               
 (3) If a decision has been given pursuant to subsection (2), another participant shall be heard before 
facts or evidentiary conclusions in respect of which he has not yet been heard are used to his 
detriment. […] 
61  Compare also Trechsel/Summers, Human rights in criminal proceedings, p. 89. See for a comparison 
of the right to be heard with the principle of equality of arms for Germany also Safferling, Audiatur et 
altera pars - die prozessuale Waffengleichheit als Prozessprinzip?. 
62  Kamasinski v. Austria, Application no. 9783/82, Judgment, 19 December 1989, par. 102. See also 
Esser, Auf dem Weg zu einem europäischen Strafverfahrensrecht, p. 406. 
63  BVerfGE 18, 399 (405); 62, 338 (343); Schäfer, Die Grenzen des Rechts auf Akteneinsicht durch den 
Verteidiger, p. 204; in this sense apparently also Trechsel/Summers, Human rights in criminal 
proceedings, ibid. 
64  Edwards v. UK, Application no. 13071/87, Judgment, 16 December 1992, par. 36; Rowe and Davis v. 
UK, App. no. 28901/95, Judgment, 16 February 2000, par. 60. 
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It is a fundamental aspect of the right to a fair trial that criminal proceedings, 
including the elements of such proceedings which relate to procedure, should be 
adversarial and that there should be equality of arms between the prosecution 
and defence. The right to an adversarial trial means, in a criminal case, that 
both prosecution and defence must be given the opportunity to have knowledge 
of and comment on the observations filed and the evidence adduced by the other 
party […]. In addition Article 6 § 1 requires, as indeed does English law […], 
that the prosecution authorities disclose to the defence all material evidence in 
their possession for or against the accused.65 
 
1.3.1.3 Equality of Arms 
The principle of ‘equality of arms’ which, just as the right to an adversarial trial, is not 
explicitly contained in the human rights treaties, has nevertheless been constantly 
recognized by the ECommHR and the ECtHR. It is a central element of the principle of 
fair trial,66 derived from the Roman principle of audiatur et altera pars,67 and seems to 
have first appeared in the case of Pataki & Dunshirn v. Austria.68 The ECommHR based 
the equality of arms on the general right to a fair trial contained in Art. 6 (1) ECHR.69 
Some scholars rather ground it on the general equality of persons before courts and 
tribunals as expressly mentioned in Art. 14 ICCPR.70 
As stated, since the right to equality of arms is not expressly mentioned in the 
procedural rights catalogues of the international criminal courts and tribunals, it is not 
directly applicable; the ICTY Appeals Chamber, however, has stated that 
The principle of equality of arms between the prosecutor and accused in a 
criminal trial goes to the heart of the fair trial guarantee. The Appeals Chamber 
finds that there is no reason to distinguish the notion of fair trial under Article 
20(1) of the Statute from its equivalent in the ECHR and ICCPR, as interpreted 
by the relevant judicial and supervisory treaty bodies under those instruments. 
                                                 
65  Jasper v United Kingdom (2000) 30 EHRR 441, par. 51. 
66  Grabenwarter, Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention, § 24, mn. 61; the same/Pubel in 
Grote/Meljnik/Allewedt, EMRK/GG, p. 690. 
67  Fawcett, The application of the European Convention on Human Rights, p. 137. 
68  Applications no. 596/59 and 789/60; Report, 28 March 1963. 
69  Ibid., p. 49. 
70  See, e.g., Gollwitzer, Menschenrechte im Strafverfahren: MRK und IPBPR, MRK Art. 6/Art. 14 
IPBPR, mn. 59. 
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Consequently, the Chamber holds that the principle of equality of arms falls 
within the fair trial guarantee under the Statute.71 
As seen above in the cases of Pataki & Dunshirn72 as well as Brandstetter,73 the 
ECommHR and the ECtHR see the principle of equality of arms as, like the adversarial 
trial, part of the broader concept of a fair trial. Some authors state that the right to an 
adversarial trial is, on the contrary, for its part contained in the principle of equality of 
arms, which they treat as the broader concept.74 Others, albeit without any explanation, 
want to base the principle of equality of arms (in the case of an arrest) on Art. 5 (4) 
ECHR.75 
Be that as it may, substantially, the principle of equality of arms, meaning a ‘fair 
balance’ between the parties, implies that 
[…] each party must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present his case - 
including his evidence - under conditions that do not place him at a substantial 
disadvantage vis-à-vis his opponent.76 
Indeed, we note that the concepts of right to an adversarial hearing and equality of arms 
are closely related. Audiatur et altera pars, meaning “the other side is to be heard also”, 
shows the relation between the two principles. This said, it is not particularly surprising 
that some authors, for their part, link the disclosure of evidence to the principle of 
equality of arms.77 
 
1.3.1.4 Adversarial Trial / Equality of Arms in favour of the Prosecution? 
As was just mentioned and as we will see in more detail below, all jurisdictions which 
know the procedural feature of disclosure in the formal sense, i.e. all Anglo-American 
and all international jurisdictions, also impose disclosure duties upon the defence.  
                                                 
71  Prosecutor v. Tadić, ICTY Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Judgment, Appeals Chamber, 15 July 1999, 
par. 44; reiterated in, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kordić & Čerkez, ICTY Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Appeals 
Judgment, Appeals Chamber, 17 November 2004, par. 176. 
72  See fn. 68 above. 
73  See fn. 59 above. 
74  Rzepka, Zur Fairness im deutschen Strafverfahren, pp. 85 et seq. 
75  Kempf, Die Rechtsprechung des EGMR zum Akteneinsichtsrecht und §§ 114, 115 Abs. 3, 115a Abs. 3 
StPO, at p. 217. 
76  Dombo Beheer v. Netherlands, Application no. 14448/88, Judgment, 27 October 1993, par. 33. 
77  Cryer/Friman/Robinson/Wilmshurst, An introduction to international criminal law and procedure, no. 
17.9.3, p. 381. 
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Particularly in the jurisprudence of the Ad-Hoc Tribunals,78 some defence disclosure 
obligations not explicitly foreseen in the respective legal sources, i.e. the Statutes and 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, have been based on the principle of equality of arms, 
invoked in favour of the Prosecution.79  
At least some of the judges did see, however, that this could not just be done offhand. In 
an early separate opinion handed down in the proceedings against Tadić, citing mainly 
ECtHR jurisprudence, Judge Vorah stated: 
It seems to me [...] that the application of the equality of arms principle 
especially in criminal proceedings should be inclined in favour of the Defence 
acquiring parity with the Prosecution in the presentation of the De-fence case 
before the Court to preclude any injustice against the accused.80 
In the most fundamental decision concerning this point, however, the Appeals Chamber 
of the ICTY, also citing some of the above-mentioned ECtHR jurisprudence, argued, 
though without a useful explanation, that the Prosecution can also rely on the principle 
of equality of arms to defer procedural rights from it: 
This application of the concept of a fair trial in favour of both parties is 
understandable because the Prosecution acts on behalf of and in the interests of 
the community, including the interests of the victims of the offence charged (in 
cases before the Tribunal the Prosecutor acts on behalf of the international 
community). This principle of equality does not affect the fundamental 
protections given by the general law or Statute to the accused and the trial 
proceeds against the background of those fundamental protections. Seen in this 
way, it is difficult to see how a trial could ever be considered to be fair where 
the accused is favoured at the expense of the Prosecution beyond a strict 
compliance with those fundamental protections.81 
Indeed, as we have seen above, the ECtHR does say that  
[B]oth prosecution and defence must be given the opportunity to have 
knowledge of and comment on the observations filed and the evidence adduced 
by the other party […].82 
                                                 
78  See as to disclosure at the Ad-Hoc Tribunals Chapter 5 below. 
79  See for a number of references Tochilovsky, Jurisprudence of the international criminal courts and the 
European Court of Human Rights, p. 278. 
80  Prosecutor v. Tadić, Separate Opinion of Judge Vohrah on Prosecution Motion for Production Of 
Defence Witness Statements, ICTY Case No. IT-94-1-T, Trial Chamber, 27 November 1996, p. 7. 
81  Prosecutor v. Aleksovski et al., ICTY Case No. IT-95-14/1-AR73, Decision on Prosecutor’s Appeal 
on the Admissibility of Evidence, Appeals Chamber, 16 February 1999, par. 23, footnotes ommitted. 
82  Edwards v. UK; Rowe and Davis v. UK, see fn. 64 supra. 
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In the mentioned case of Jespers v. Belgium, the ECommHR also stated: 
The equality of arms would cease to exist if the defence could inspect the special 
file of the Public Prosecutor's Department, while the latter cannot and has no 
wish to inspect the personal files of the defence.83 
This implies that in the view of the ECommHR the principle of equality of arms works 
in favour of the prosecution as well. At the same time, it is to be noted that all of the 
mentioned cases dealt with applications of accused persons to the ECommHR/ECtHR, 
not prosecuting authorities. Art. 34 ECHR establishes that: 
The Court may receive applications from any person, non-governmental 
organisation or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by 
one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention or 
the protocols thereto. 
Even though legal persons can thus, in principle, also apply to the Court, they must be 
somewhat ‘remote’ from state power.84 As a matter of fact, to imagine, say, the English 
Crown Prosecution Service going to Strasbourg to claim an infringement of its right to 
equality of arms vis-à-vis the accused has a somewhat comical note to it. 
Concerning the mentioned ICTY decision in Aleksovski, it can be noted that the ICTY 
Appeals Chamber, while expressly basing the right of the prosecution to disclosure on 
the principle of equality of arms, refers to the fact that the ICTY prosecutor acts “in the 
interest of the victims of the offence charged” and “on behalf of the international 
community”, which in this context is also a little cryptical because it hints to the 
conclusion that indeed the Chamber does not simply refer to the thought that the 
Prosecution can, as it were, ‘automatically’ invoke its right to equality of arms for the 
mere fact of being a party to the proceedings. 
It must be questioned generally whether the view that the Prosecution can base own 
procedural rights on the principle of equality of arms can be upheld from a systematic as 
well as functional85 and normative viewpoint. 
Systematically, the fair trial-rights are basic human rights, which are rooted in the idea 
that persons have certain rights vis-à-vis the state, a thought which goes way back to the 
enlightenment. They are therefore predominantly defensive rights of persons against 
                                                 
83  Jespers v. Belgium, Report, fn. 56, par. 51, taking over the argument of the Belgian Government cited 
by the Commission in its inadmissibility decision Jespers v. Belgium, application no. 8403/78, 
Decision of 15 October 1980 on the admissibility of the application, 15 October 1980, p. 124. 
84  Grabenwarter, Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention, § 17, mn. 5. 
85  By functional, we mean the specific role the participant plays within a criminal justice system as a 
whole. 
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state power, which means that the procedural guarantees of the relevant human rights 
convention benefit the accused, and, prima facie, no one else.86  
From a normative point of view, this is also justified, since the state, i.e. in a criminal 
case the prosecuting authorities, are in a much stronger position as compared to the 
accused, enjoying massive powers with regard to investigation which the accused does 
not have, and this manifest disequilibrium needs to be balanced. 
Functionally, one will have to differentiate according to the role which the prosecutor 
takes within a procedural framework vis-à-vis the accused. The accused is both subject 
and object of a criminal trial, which devolves around the question of whether he is 
guilty of the crime charged or not. Since, as we have seen, he is the one who must 
defend himself against the allegations made by the state (and thus arguably against the 
state as such), he must enjoy certain procedural rights and safeguards. The accused must 
always be considered to be a party, and not merely a participant, of the proceedings. 
The role of the prosecution, in turn, is not quite so clear. Can the prosecution be 
considered a party meaning it to be allowed to pursue partisan interests, and does that 
mean by implication that it can invoke own procedural rights based on general human 
rights? 
As we have briefly seen at the beginning of this chapter, in the Anglo-American 
procedural tradition, the prosecution is considered a party. This is certainly due to the 
fact that, originally, there was no public prosecution in England, and the prosecution of 
criminal offences used to be a private matter, which was therefore treated more or less 
equally to private litigation.87 Today, virtually all prosecutions are carried out by public 
prosecutors, i.e. the state.88 Here, the prosecution is committed to the truth and therefore 
not entirely partisan; it is occasionally described as a ‘minister of justice’.89 We must 
                                                 
86  See, once again, e.g. Art. 6 (3) ECHR: “Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following 
minimum rights […]”, emphasis added. As to the question whether the basic human rights ‘as a 
whole’, understood as a ‘constitutional instrument of public order’, merit a different conclusion, see 
below. 
87  See Safferling, Towards an international criminal procedure, p. 9; in fact, a public prosecution service 
was not installed in England until the creation of the post of Director of Public Prosecutions in 1879, 
see Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England Vol. 1, p. 501. 
88  Since the establishment of the Crown Prosecution Service in England in 1986, the police is not a 
prosecuting authority anymore, see Slapper/Kelly, The English legal system, p. 481. 
89  Plater, The Development of the Prosecutor's Role in England and Australia with Respect to its Duty 
of Disclosure: Partisan Advocate or Minister of Justice?, at 111 states that this role of the prosecutor 
“can be traced back at least to the early 1800s”. While in theory this may be true, looking at the 
history of judicial practice, it remains doubtful. See, on the other hand, the clear wording of the 
landmark decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in R v Stinchcombe, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326, where 
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conclude that it is indeed allowed to pursue its own interests, in the sense that it may, in 
principle, actively seek the prosecution and conviction of the accused, regardless of 
exonerating facts – it may be obliged to disclose them, but need not actively search for 
them. In the Continental European tradition, this is not the case, since regularly the 
prosecution is considered to be a somewhat ‘neutral’, certainly not partisan instance, 
which is obliged to investigate both incriminating and exonerating circumstances.90 The 
prosecution in these jurisdictions is therefore generally not considered to be a party of 
the proceedings.91 This also entails that, at least lately, it appears to be relatively 
undisputed that prosecution authorities cannot claim infringements of their ‘right’ to 
equality of arms, or, for that matter, their ‘right’ to be heard, before human rights 
bodies.92 
At the international criminal tribunals, the picture is somewhat unclear. To be sure, all 
of the relevant provisions of these courts and tribunals speak of “parties” referring to the 
defence and the prosecution. However, at the ICC, the Prosecutor is considered an 
(although independent and “separate”) organ of the Court (Art. 42 (1) ICCSt), obliged, 
[i]n order to establish the truth, [to] extend the investigation to cover all facts 
and evidence relevant to an assessment of whether there is criminal 
                                                                                                                                               
the Court held: “The Crown has a legal duty to disclose all relevant information to the defence. The 
fruits of the investigation which are in its possession are not the property of the Crown for use in 
securing a conviction but the property of the public to be used to ensure that justice is done.”, as well 
as the 1871 decision of the Supreme Court of Michigan in People v. Davis, 52 Mich. 569, 18 N.W. 
362, Mich. 1884, pp. 573 et subs.: “[The prosecutor] was, on the other hand, a sworn minister of 
justice, whose duty it was, while endeavoring to bring the guilty to punishment, to take care that the 
innocent should be protected. […] [T]he state has no interest in interposing any obstacle to the 
disclosure of the facts, unless it is interested in convicting accused parties on the testimony of 
untrustworthy persons. But surely the state has no such interest; its interest is that accused parties shall 
be acquitted, unless upon all the facts they are seen to be guilty; and if there shall be in the possession 
of any of its officers information that can legitimately tend to overthrow the case made for the 
prosecution, or to show that it is unworthy of credence, the defense should be given the benefit of it.” 
See for U.S. federal jurisprudence also Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 55 S.Ct. 340, U.S. 1935, at 
p. 112: “[The due processs requirement] cannot be deemed to be satisfied by mere notice and hearing 
if a state has contrived a conviction through the pretense of a trial which in truth is but used as a 
means of depriving a defendant of liberty through a deliberate deception of court and jury by the 
presentation of testimony known to be perjured.” 
90  See, e.g., once again Section 160 (2) of the German Code of Criminal Procedure, note 25 supra. 
91  See, e.g., Meyer-Goßner/Cierniak/Schwarz/Kleinknecht/Meyer, Strafprozessordnung, Vor § 141 
GVG, mn. 8 with further references. 
92  See for Germany, e.g., Rüping, Der Grundsatz des rechtlichen Gehörs und seine Bedeutung im 
Strafverfahren, pp. 143 et seq.; Sowada, Der gesetzliche Richter im Strafverfahren, pp. 158 et subs.; 
Schmidt-Aßmann in: Maunz/Dürig, Grundgesetz, Art. 103, mn. 36. 
25 
 
responsibility under this Statute, and, in doing so, investigate incriminating and 
exonerating circumstances equally […].93 
And also the ICTY, in a relatively early decision, yet being, once again, unclear in its 
reasoning, held: 
However it should be noted that the Prosecutor of the Tribunal is not, or not 
only, a Party to adversarial proceedings but is an organ of the Tribunal and an 
organ of international criminal justice whose object is not simply to secure a 
conviction but to present the case for the Prosecution, which includes not only 
inculpatory, but also exculpatory evidence, in order to assist the Chamber to 
discover the truth in a judicial setting […].94 
This reasoning, and rightly so, has been referred to as “lofty” and “not reflecting the 
responsibilities of the Office of the Prosecutor as delineated in the Tribunal’s Rules”.95 
In another occasion, Judge Shahabuddeen commented on the role of the ICTY 
Prosecutor as follows: 
The Prosecutor is a party, but it is recognised that she represents the public 
interest of the international community and has to act with objectivity and 
fairness appropriate to that circumstance. She is in a real sense a minister of 
justice. Her mission is not to secure a conviction at all costs; the Rules relating 
to disclosure of exculpatory evidence show that. This in substance applies within 
common law systems. It is equally visible in continental systems. It is an aspect 
which a criminal tribunal acting on the international plane has to bear in mind, 
more especially in view of the solemn declaration taken by the witness.96 
It may be noted that this argument, even though it does not appear to be representative 
for the Ad Hoc Tribunals as a whole, also has the notion of the Prosecutor as a 
representative of “the public interest of the international community” to it. 
Now, this finding must be compared with the procedural role of the accused. 
Admittedly and as already said, the accused is both object and subject of the trial; he is 
object of it in that the court judges over his guilt, and he is subject of it in that he must 
                                                 
93  Art. 54 (1) ICCSt. 
94  Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al., ICTY Case No. IT-95-16-T, Decision on Communications Between 
the Parties and their Witnesses, Trial Chamber, 21 September 1998. 
95  Fairlie, The Marriage of Common and Continental Law at the ICTY and its Progeny, Due Process 
Deficit, p. 314 et seq. See also Zappalà, Human rights in international criminal proceedings, p. 41, fn. 
39, as well as Karnavas, Gathering Evidence in International Criminal Trials - The View of the 
Defence Lawyer, p. 81, fn. 17. 
96  Prosecutor v. Milošević, ICTY Case No. IT-02-54-AR.73.02, Decision on admissibility of 
Prosecution Investigator’s Evidence, Partial Dissenting Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen, 
30 September 2002, par. 18 (footnotes omitted).  
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be put in a position as to being able to actively and effectively influence the decision of 
the court. He is, so to speak, the subject of the trial because he is the object of it. He can 
thus truly be said to be a party to the criminal proceedings. Systematically, normatively 
and functionally, all of the basic procedural rights guaranteed by the human rights 
documents apply to him. In comparison with the prosecution, we see that the latter lacks 
the position of the accused of being object of the trial. The procedural competences of 
the prosecution amount to nothing more than being able to influence the decision of the 
court, but not in relation to the prosecution’s ‘personal rights’ – the judgment of the 
court cannot and will not affect the prosecution in its ‘rights’, because they are not at 
stake.97 It therefore appears dysfunctional to grant the prosecution the same position as 
the accused. 
In our view the prosecution, even though it may, in the Anglo-American system as well 
as in the framework of the international criminal courts and tribunals, be formally called 
a party of the proceedings, cannot claim any procedural rights from this position. 
Admittedly, the Prosecutor at the Ad Hoc Tribunals has no formal obligation to 
investigate exonerating evidence. However, as we will see, the then ‘new feature’ of the 
Prosecutor’s obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence does show a responsibility of 
the Prosecutor to take a ‘neutral’ position to some extent. As we have seen, the 
Prosecutor of the ICC must actively investigate incriminating and exonerating evidence, 
and is, by law, committed to the quest for truth.98 The systematic as well as normative 
arguments against the prosecution basing procedural rights on the principle of equality 
of arms, which is in place to protect the accused, and not the state, prevail. And also 
functionally, it is difficult to say that the accused and the prosecution could be said to be 
in comparable positions, so as to imply that there could possibly be equality of arms 
between the two. Their respective roles are so different that, in fact, it appears tenable to 
say that the prosecution enjoys no procedural ‘rights’ within the trial at all; only the 
accused has rights before the court. What the prosecution does enjoy, in turn, are 
‘empowerments’, or ‘competences’ bestowed upon it by law, in the interest of, within a 
national system, the offended society, and, in the international system, the already 
repeatedly mentioned international community. These competences can, and regularly 
should, be explicitly contained in the relevant legal norms, yet can also be drawn from 
the principles underlying these norms if they are not explicitly mentioned. They cannot, 
however, and as we have just undertaken to show, be derived from the right to equality 
of arms, which must be understood to work in favour of the accused only.  
                                                 
97  See also Siegert, Grundlinien des Völkerstrafprozeßrechts, p. 44. 
98  See, once again, Art. 54 (1) ICCSt. 
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It is, to be sure, recognized in the jurisprudence of the relevant judicial bodies that 
human rights must not only be regarded as defensive rights of natural persons vis-à-vis 
the state, but also entail an ‘objective order’ which governs not only the relationship 
between the citizen and the state, but also influence the legal order as such.99 As far as 
can be seen, this principle has not yet been discussed in the context of the international 
criminal courts and tribunals. It is recognized, however, that state duties to protect the 
human rights of its citizens emanate from the basic human rights as contained in the 
relevant human rights treaties, meaning that the state must protect its citizens against 
infringements of their human rights not only by the state itself, but also by other 
persons.100 In X & Y v. The Netherlands, the ECtHR held that this may imply that the 
state must put a workable criminal law and procedure in place.101 The case evolved 
around the rape or sexual assault of a mentally handicapped girl, to whom the Dutch 
law gave no effective legal remedy, meaning in this case the initiation of criminal 
proceedings. It should thus go without saying that a state must also protect its citizens 
against infringements of their right to life.102 It appears fair to say that a state must 
install and keep up an ‘effective criminal justice system’ to maintain its stability and 
affirm its own legal order.103 One could say that a system of criminal justice is 
‘effective’ if it is normatively accepted by its society.104 As already briefly mentioned, a 
system which deprives the accused of his basic procedural rights would, in this sense, 
                                                 
99  In German speaking countries, the principle is mostly referred to by “objektiver Wertgehalt der 
Grundrechte” or “objektive Wertordnung”, as coined by the German Federal Constitutional Court in 
Lüth, BVerfGE 7, 198, 15 January 1958. 
100  See references as to the duty of the state to protect the property of its citizens: Frowein/Peukert, 
Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention, Art. 1 Add. Prot. 1, mn. 33 et subs.; the duty of the states to 
protect the human rights of their citizens has also been recognized regarding Art. 8 ECHR (right to 
respect for private and family life), see Airey v. Ireland, application no. 6289/73, Judgment, 9 October 
1979. 
101  X & Y v. The Netherlands, application no. 8978/80, Judgment, 26 March 1985, par. 27. 
102  Uerpmann-Wittzack, Höchstpersönliche Rechte und Diskriminierungsverbot, mn. 62 et subs. with 
further references. See also Oğur v. Turkey, ECtHR application no. 21594/93, Judgment, 20 May 
1999; Grams v. Germany, ECtHR application no. 33677/96, Decision, 5 October 1999; Salman v. 
Turkey, ECtHR application no. 21986/93, Judgment, 27 June 2000. 
103  Effektive Strafrechtspflege. See Landau, Die Pflicht des Staates zum Erhalt einer funktionstüchtigen 
Strafrechtspflege, as well as Hassemer, Die ''Funktionstüchtigkeit der Strafrechtspflege'' - ein neuer 
Rechtsbegriff?. The correct legal classification of this principle is, however, unclear, see Landau, ibid. 
See also Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, ICC Case No. 01/04-01/06, Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against the Decision on the Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the Court 
pursuant to article 19 (2)(a) of the Statute of 3 October 2006, Appeals Chamber, 14 December 2006, 
par. 36, speaking of the “efficacy of the judicial process”. 
104 Landau, Die Pflicht des Staates zum Erhalt einer funktionstüchtigen Strafrechtspflege, at p. 126. 
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be unacceptable, as it would be perceived as unjust. On the other hand, if the accused 
were put in a position in which he could obstruct the truth finding process on a regular 
basis, this would not be acceptable either. In the English case of R v Ward105 which we 
will look at in more detail below,106 Glidewell LJ, albeit at a point in the judgment 
alluding to a notion of ‘equality of arms for the prosecution’, summed up as follows: 
The law is of necessity concerned with practical affairs, and it cannot effectively 
guard against all the failings of those who play a part in the criminal justice 
system. But that sombre realism does not relieve us, as judges, from persevering 
in the task to ensure that the law, practice and methods of trial should be 
developed so as to reduce the risk of conviction of the innocent to an absolute 
minimum. At the same time we are very much alive to the fact that, although the 
avoidance of the conviction of the innocent must unquestionably be the primary 
consideration, the public interest would not be served by a multiplicity of rules 
which merely impede effective law enforcement.107 
It seems from the above cited ICTY Appeals Chamber decision in Aleksovski 108 and the 
dissenting opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen in Tadić, 109 that Glidewell LJ and Judge 
Shahabuddeen had something similar in mind when they referred to the Prosecutor as 
acting “on behalf of and in the interests of the community, including the interests of the 
victims of the offence charged” and representing “the public interest of the international 
community”, respectively. Apparently the respective organs of the Tribunal wanted to 
bring forward this argument in order to invoke equality of arms in favour of the 
prosecution. The ‘objective order’ which is given by the overall framework of the basic 
human rights is, however, not directly related with the equality of arms. The question 
thus remains, whether the ‘objective order’ given by the basic human rights, also in the 
sense of a ‘functional criminal justice system’ can serve as a basis for the ‘creation’ of 
procedural rights for the prosecution in international criminal trials. The fact that, 
especially at the beginning of the judicial practice of the Ad Hoc Tribunals in the 1990s, 
their procedural rules were only fragmentary and there was certainly no settled judicial 
practice comparable to national systems in place, may be an argument for this 
conclusion. However, it still remains doubtful whether ‘the state’, or ‘the prosecution 
acting as an agent for the international community’ for that matter, can really be said to 
have procedural rights vis-à-vis the accused. It appears preferable to speak of 
                                                 
105  [1993] 96 Cr. App. R. 1. 
106  See section 4.1.1.2 below. 
107  R v Ward, fn. 105, at p. 52; at p. 67, however, he also mentions the need to “ensure a trial which is fair 
both to the prosecution, representing the Crown, and the accused.” 
108  See fn. 81 above. 
109  See fn. 96 above. 
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‘competences’ which, it is held, can indeed be based on the general principle of a 
‘functional criminal justice’.  
In this sense, the quest for truth, being one of the principal goals of the criminal trial (or, 
for that matter, a sub-goal in order to reach a just result), is also one of the ‘features’ of 
an effective criminal justice system. However, the procedural rights of the accused for 
their part form an integral part of this system and must be fully respected. Yet to draw 
upon these rights in order to ‘create’ procedural rights for the prosecution, cannot stand. 
 
1.3.1.5 Right to an Expeditious Trial 
The right to a speedy or expeditious trial is also contained in all major human rights 
treaties.110 
As we will see in more detail below,111 disclosure of evidence has proved to be a very 
efficient tool in shortening trials. Therefore, disclosure by the prosecution can definitely 
be said to be supporting the right to an expeditious trial of the accused. 
A different question arises as concerns disclosure by the defence: can an accused or the 
defence, in support of the right to an expeditious trial, be forced to disclose evidence? 
From a formalistic point of view, given the fact that the accused enjoys the privilege 
against self-incrimination, one may be tempted to answer this question in the negative 
right away. On the other hand, as we will see, all international courts and tribunals, as 
well as all major national jurisdictions, know disclosure duties of the defence.  
The problem is indeed closely related to the one just discussed regarding the question of 
‘fair trial rights for the prosecution’. The right to an expeditious trial is but one of the 
procedural rights of the accused, and thus forms part of the ‘objective order’ of the 
(‘generally accepted’) criminal trial.112 The ECtHR has recognized that oftentimes the 
protection of the other procedural rights granted by the ECHR may for their part make 
the overall trial longer and thus work against the right to an expeditious trial; which 
means that the conflictive principles of the trial need to be balanced.113 On this general 
basis, disclosure duties of the defence may under certain circumstances be justified. 
                                                 
110  “Right to be tried without undue delay.” See Art 14 Par. 3 (c) ICCPR, Art. 21 Par. 4 (c) ICTYSt, 
Art. 20 Par. 4 (c) ICTRSt, Art. 17 Par. 4 (c) SCSLSt, Art. 67 Par. 1 (c) ICCSt. Art. 6 Par. 1 ECHR 
speaks of a “fair and public hearing within a reasonable time”; Art. 8 (1) ACHR provides: “Every 
person has the right to a hearing, with due guarantees and within a reasonable time […]”. 
111  See section 1.3.2 infra. 
112  See section 1.3.1.4 above. 
113  Compare, e.g., König v. Germany, application no. 6232/73, Judgment, 28 June 1978, par. 100. 
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However, it is certainly systematically incorrect to defer procedural obligations from 
procedural human rights.114  
 
1.3.1.6 Conclusion 
We see from the cited jurisprudence and legal scholarship that the disclosure of 
evidence in criminal trials is predominantly based on basic fair trial rights. As we have 
just attempted to show, however, the basic fair trial rights serve to protect the accused 
and the accused alone. The mentioned (limited) disclosure by the defence, which exists 
in all international courts and tribunals as well as in all national jurisdictions, can thus 
not be explained by fair trial aspects. There are, however, other purposes of disclosure 
which, within the system of the mentioned ‘objective order’ of a functional criminal 
justice system, may permit to oblige the defence to disclose part of their material as 
well. These are, it is argued, the ‘judicial economy’ aspect, as well as the truth-finding 
aspect, to which we will turn now. 
 
1.3.2 The Judicial Economy or ‘Procedural Management’ Aspect 
By the judicial economy or ‘procedural management’115 aspect, which is closely related 
to the aspect of ensuring an expeditious trial which we just looked at, we mean the 
tendency of disclosure to reduce surprises at trial and thus to also reduce the overall 
time required for it. As we will see below when we look at the historical development of 
disclosure, the consequence of shortening the legal proceedings was, at the beginning, 
maybe not expressly desired, but indeed warmly welcomed by legal practitioners – 
accused persons who are allowed to see the sheer mass of evidence the prosecution has 
up its sleeve are oftentimes much more likely to confess or enter a guilty plea116, which 
saves time and money for everyone involved. Lack of disclosure, in turn, often leads to 
                                                 
114  Ambiguous on this point a previous article by the author (Büngener, Die Entwicklung der Disclosure 
of Evidence in internationalen Strafverfahren - Annäherung der Traditionen?, p. 217). 
115  Called ‘trial-management’ by, e.g., the Prosecutor of the ICC, and endorsed by Trial Chamber I, see, 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC Case No. 01/04-01/06, Decision on Defence Disclosure, 
Trial Chamber I, 20 March 2008, par. 20. 
116  To be sure, a guilty plea may also obstruct the truth-finding function of criminal proceedings – for this 
reason, many jurisdictions have safeguards against false guilty pleas; see, e.g., Rule 11 (b)(3) Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, which requires that a ‘factual basis’ for the plea must exist. The risk of 
involuntarily entering false guilty pleas, however, is reduced by full disclosure, see McMunigal, 
Disclosure and Accuracy in the Guilty Plea Process, p. 969. 
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delays in the proceedings.117 Some disclosure provisions, such as the obligation of the 
defence to disclose evidence in relation with the defences of alibi or special defences 
(such as lack of mental responsibility) certainly point to the purpose of shortening the 
trial; however, as concerns defence disclosure, national courts have oftentimes also 
pointed to truth-finding considerations.118 The judicial economy aspect may thus also be 
seen as part of the general system of effective criminal justice.119 
 
1.3.3 The Truth-Finding Aspect 
We hold that the disclosure of evidence has a purpose in addition to safeguarding the 
rights of the accused and judicial economy, which is the one of facilitating the finding 
of truth. The statement that disclosure has something to do with truth-finding may, at 
first sight, be surprising. In the contemporary international literature as well as the legal 
practice, we find few explicit hints as to why there should be a connection between 
disclosure and truth-finding. After all, as long as a piece of evidence is not fabricated – 
why should the time at which it is introduced to the trial or, even more so, the question 
whether it was disclosed to the other party beforehand, have influence on its evidentiary 
value? It could even be said that disclosure is, systematically speaking, entirely foreign 
to the adversary trial of the Anglo-American tradition. As Wigmore, even until the 3rd 
edition of his treatise on evidence of 1940 concisely and poignantly put it: 
Now one of the cardinal moral assumptions in a contest of skill or chance is that 
a player need not betray beforehand his strength of resource, and that the 
opponent cannot complain of being surprised. […] It is this feature of games 
and sports that has influenced powerfully the policy of the common law in the 
present aspect. 'Nemo tenetur armare adversarium suum contra se.' To require 
the disclosure to an adversary of the evidence that is to be produced, would be 
                                                 
117 See also Matthews/Malek, Disclosure, mn. 1.02 et seq., who mark as the main rationale behind 
disclosure the ‘just and efficient disposal of litigation’, yet also point to the fact that disclosure itself 
can be an ‘expensive and burdensome process’. 
118  See, e.g., Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 90 S.Ct. 1893, U.S.Fla. 1970. This decision will be looked 
at in more detail at a later stage (section 4.2.2.1 below). 
119  See also, e.g., Sunderland in Ragland, Discovery before trial, at p. iii: “It is probable that no 
procedural process offers greater opportunities for increasing the efficiency of the administration of 
justice than that of discovery before trial.”; as well as Auld LJ, Review of the Criminal Courts of 
England and Wales (2001), hereinafter: Auld Report, ch. 10, par. 115: “Advance disclosure by the 
prosecution serves two main purposes. The first is its contribution to a fair trial looked at as a whole. 
The second is its contribution to the efficiency, including the speed, of the pre-trial and trial process 
and to considerate treatment of all involved in it.” (footnote omitted). 
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repugnant to all sportsmanlike instincts. Rather permit you to preserve the 
secret of your tactics, to lock up your documents in the vault, to send your 
witness to board in some obscure village, and then, reserving your evidential 
resources until the final moment, to marshal them at the trial before your 
surprised and dismayed antagonist, and thus overwhelm him. Such was the spirit 
of the common law; and such in part it still is.120 
However, even before the turn of the 20th century, there were voices from common law 
practitioners which point to the opposite direction – opposing the game-like character of 
the criminal trial and instead calling for a ‘neutral’ prosecutor and sounding, in fact, 
almost ‘inquisitorial’: 
In every criminal case, great or small, the public should provide witnesses for 
the defence as well as for the prosecution, at least where the accused is not able 
to bring his witnesses. The old theory was that a prosecution for crime was a 
contest between the injured person, or his relatives, and the accused. That 
theory has gradually yielded to the milder view that the contest is between the 
public and the accused. We ought now to be ready for the theory that a criminal 
prosecution is not a contest at all, but an investigation, conducted by the State, 
before a tribunal of its own appointment, with as great a desire to clear the 
defendant, if not guilty, as to convict him, if guilty. It is idle to say that “truth 
will out,” and that if a man is innocent the jury will find him innocent, even 
though witnesses in his behalf are not summoned. Any one who has tried cases 
in a criminal court, or in any court, knows how hollow this is.121 
The history and development of the disclosure of evidence in national and international 
systems clearly show that historically, the truth-finding aspect played a crucial role in 
the minds of people dealing with disclosure. Throughout the 19th and until the middle of 
the 20th century we find numerous explicit references to truth-finding in debates about 
disclosure; especially in the American discourse accompanying the liberalization of 
disclosure in the 1960ies.122 Why this aspect was later eclipsed by the fair trial 
discourse, is unclear.  
The relation of disclosure and truth-finding is in our view also proven by the fact that 
one can observe parallels as to who gets physical access to the evidence before a trial, as 
this appears to be the participant who has the main responsibility in the taking of 
evidence. This, however, is the main difference between the Continental-European and 
Anglo-American systems of criminal procedure. It has been held that the very objective 
                                                 
120  Wigmore, A Treatise on the Anglo-American System of Evidence in Trials at Common Law, Vol. 6, 
§ 1845, p. 375 et seq.  
121  Chaplin, Reform in Criminal Procedure, at pp. 199 et seq. 
122  See section 4.2 infra. 
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of a criminal trial in the Roman-Germanic system is the finding of the (objective) truth, 
while the Anglo-American system aims (only) at the settlement of a conflict, and is 
therefore ‘willing to subordinate the truth’ to other interests.123 From this viewpoint, 
scholars appear to define two different ‘terms’ of truth, namely, the ‘objective’ or 
‘material’ truth, as underlying the Continental European system, vis-à-vis a ‘procedural’ 
truth of the Anglo-American one.124 Phrases such as the one by Pollock and Maitland 
cited above125, or the following by Arnould certainly play a role in that: 
[…] English criminal procedure does not so much seek the discovery of truth, 
pure and simple, as the discovery of truth according to certain artificial rules, 
one of which is, that the prosecution must come into Court with its case 
absolutely and entirely complete on the day of trial, failing which it shall, as a 
penalty, fail to bring the charge home to the prisoner, who must be convicted 
according to the strict rules of the legal game, or not convicted at all – and that, 
too, however clear his guilt may be – however manifest it may be that his escape 
arises solely from maladroitness on the part of the prosecution in neglecting to 
have ready at the appointed place and time, the required modicum of strict 
technical proof.126 
While the said differentiation may be helpful as it illustrates differences in the 
respective methods of truth finding, it is on the other hand confusing, as it suggests that 
there are indeed different ‘truths’. As a matter of fact, it is not only the Roman-
Germanic system which believes that the finding of the objective truth is mandatory in 
order to find a just judgment. No society would, in the long run, accept criminal 
                                                 
123  See Fairlie, The Marriage of Common and Continental Law at the ICTY and its Progeny, Due 
Process Deficit p. 248; see also Hodgson, Conceptions of the Trial in Inquisitorial and Adversarial 
Procedure. 
124  See for numerous references Herrmann, Die Reform der deutschen Hauptverhandlung nach dem 
Vorbild des anglo-amerikanischen Strafverfahrens, pp. 114 et subs, 158 et seq. 
125  Fn. 22 supra: “[…] not in order that they may discover the truth […]”. 
126  Arnould, Life of Thomas, first Lord Denman, formerly Lord Chief Justice of England, Vol. 2 of 2, 
p. 92. See also Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure, at 
p. 1149: “The principal objective of criminal procedure, like that of procedure generally, is to assure a 
just disposition of the dispute before the court. But because time, resources and the ability to 
determine what is just are limited, a procedural system inevitably represents a series of compromises. 
Justice to society is sometimes taken to require that a given case be used not only to deal with the 
situation immediately before the court but also to serve a larger public interest. In criminal cases, the 
accused may get relief, not so much out of concern for him or for the “truth,” but because he is 
strategically located, and motivated, to call the attention of the courts to excesses in the administration 
of criminal justice.” 
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judgments which on a regular basis do not reflect the actual course of events.127 At the 
same time, the ‘truth-seeking’ Continental European system regularly also subjects 
truth-finding to fairness considerations and the protection of human rights.128 As 
commonly said: “we aim to find the truth – but not at any price”.129 On the other hand, 
for example, the rigidness of the prohibition of hearsay evidence in the adversarial 
criminal procedure has notably declined in the last century. This is so because it is 
admitted that hearsay evidence can, under certain circumstances, be reliable, i.e. helpful 
to prove the true course of events – take, e.g., the so-called ‘catch-all-exception’ to 
hearsay prohibition provided for in Fed.R.Evid. 807.130 And while it is correct that the 
finding of the truth in the Anglo-American procedure does not play the fundamental 
role as it does in the Continental-European one, we find numerous proofs for its 
importance. In fact, one may say that every truth which is found to certain procedural 
rules could be called ‘procedural’.131 
                                                 
127  See also Weigend, Is the Criminal Process about Truth?, at pp. 157 et seq.: “Knowing exactly what 
has happened, who the culprit is, and why he committed the offense, is a necessary prerequisite for 
any attempt to re-establish social peace through justice. The determination of truth is indispensable for 
yet another reason-- criminal sanctions are society's most severe expression of moral blame. It is 
therefore imperative that criminal sanctions be imposed (only) upon those who are in fact guilty.” 
(footnote omitted). 
128  Take, for example, the rights of refusal to testify on personal or professional grounds provided for in 
sections 52 and 53of the German Code of Criminal Procedure, not to mention the strict prohibition of 
evidence (directly) obtained by torture or other prohibited means (section 139a). 
129  See, e.g., German Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof), BGHSt 14, 358, 365. 
130  It reads:  
“A statement not specifically covered by Rule 803 or 804 but having equivalent circumstantial 
guarantees of trustworthiness, is not excluded by the hearsay rule, if the court determines that  
(A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact;  
(B) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which 
the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and 
(C) the general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of 
the statement into evidence. 
However, a statement may not be admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it makes 
known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party 
with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, the proponent's intention to offer the statement and the 
particulars of it, including the name and address of the declarant.” 
131  See Weigend, Is the Criminal Process about Truth?, at p. 170 et subs., who, though still differentiating 
between the two systems, convincingly argues that a visible and credible effort of truth finding is a 
necessary element of an acceptable procedural truth, regardless of who is responsible for finding it. 
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One gets the impression that jurists of either background tend to overestimate the actual 
differences between the systems, believing that the respective other judicial system 
operates in an ideal form of adversarial or, for that matter, inquisitorial trial.132 This, as 
we have briefly pointed out, is not the case, since both systems have been influenced 
and altered by the emergence of human rights and other (legal) philosophical ideas, as 
well as considerations of practicability and efficiency.133 In the end, one, if not the 
objective for holding a criminal trial in any enlightened society is to satisfy the offended 
social order by trying and punishing the offender as well as by reaffirming the legal 
norms of the society as a whole. This is where criminal law and procedure derive their 
acceptance from, within the society in which they operate. And this very purpose is 
comparable in all modern societies.  
It is therefore clear that it is not the truth which is different, but the methods of finding it 
which considerably differ; and which therefore, in fact, may produce considerable 
differences in the outcomes of the trial.134 
As illustrated above, the main difference in the two systems is where the responsibility 
for the finding of the truth lies. In the Anglo-American system the investigation and 
presentation of evidence, which is the basis on which the truth is found (whether by a 
jury or a judge), is up to the prosecution and the defence. In the Roman-Germanic 
system, this is done by the judge, for he will be the one to call witnesses and experts, 
and conduct the proceedings actively. 
This distribution of responsibilities, it is held, is important in that it influences the 
disclosure regime of courts within certain procedural systems. As we will see, 
disclosure in the material sense takes place among those who are responsible for the 
finding of the truth or, to be more precise, those who control the truth-finding process. 
In the ‘classical’ Anglo-American adversarial trial, this task is solely assigned to the 
parties. In the Continental European system, all participants are informed via the 
dossier, thus no disclosure in the procedural sense takes place. However, materially135, 
what happens is that the evidence is made open (i.e. materially disclosed) to the judges 
                                                 
132  In fact, many scholars and practitioners appear to disregard the exceptions and inconsistencies within 
their own systems and themselves believe to be operating in ‘pure’ legal systems. 
133  See for a concise description of the history of criminal procedure in Germany, England and the United 
States Safferling, Towards an international criminal procedure, pp. 4-16 with further references. 
134  See on this point, and generally on the widespread misconception of the Anglo-American procedural 
tradition especially by German scholars Herrmann, Die Reform der deutschen Hauptverhandlung 
nach dem Vorbild des anglo-amerikanischen Strafverfahrens, pp. 115 et subs. See also Danziger, Die 
Medialisierung des Strafprozesses, fn. 611. 
135  See section 1.1.1.2 above. 
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as the ones responsible for conducting the truth-finding process. In the course of this 
thesis, we will observe that in the ‘mixed’ systems of international criminal courts that 
the more actively the judges, by the statutory framework or by their own practice, get 
involved in managing the truth-finding process, the more they also become part of the 
disclosure process. 
 
1.4 Exceptions to Disclosure 
As we will see below, jurisdictions pertaining both to the Anglo-American tradition or 
those adhering to the Continental-European one and thus following a dossier approach, 
as well as all international criminal jurisdictions know exceptions to disclosure. They 
mainly relate to the protection of victims and witnesses,136 or confidentiality as well as 
national security interests.137 
The ECtHR has constantly recognized that under certain circumstances the rights of the 
accused to be informed of the evidence against him can be restrained in order to protect 
overriding individual or public interests: 
However, […] the entitlement to disclosure of relevant evidence is not an 
absolute right. In any criminal proceedings there may be competing interests, 
such as national security or the need to protect witnesses at risk of reprisals or 
keep secret police methods of investigation of crime, which must be weighed 
against the rights of the accused. In some cases it may be necessary to withhold 
certain evidence from the defence so as to preserve the fundamental rights of 
another individual or to safeguard an important public interest. However, only 
such measures restricting the rights of the defence which are strictly necessary 
are permissible under Article 6 § 1. Moreover, in order to ensure that the 
accused receives a fair trial, any difficulties caused to the defence by a 
limitation on its rights must be sufficiently counterbalanced by the procedures 
followed by the judicial authorities. 138 
As usual, the ECtHR does not give strict guidance on this point, but points out that as 
long as the ‘overall’ fairness of the trial is observed, Art. 6 ECHR is not violated.139  
                                                 
136  See, e.g., Rule 69 RPE-ICTY, Art. 68 (5) ICCSt. 
137  See, e.g., Rule 70 (B) RPE-ICTY, Art. 54 (3)(e) ICCSt, Art. 72 ICCSt. 
138  Rowe and Davis v. UK, note 64 supra, par. 61; Edwards v. UK, note 64, par. 52. This holding has 
since been reiterated by the ECtHR many times, see lately McKeown v. UK, Application no. 6684/05, 
Judgment, 11 January 2011, par. 43. 
139  See e.g., Edwards v. UK, note 64 supra, par. 34; see lately Ebanks v.UK, (Application no. 36822/06), 
ECtHR Judgment, 26 January 2010: “In considering whether the trial proceedings were fair within the 
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1.5 Conclusion 
In sum, we can state that, even though the term of disclosure is originally rooted in the 
adversarial trial as commonly known in the Anglo-American legal tradition, it should, 
particularly in the realm of international criminal courts and tribunals, not be understood 
narrowly, so as to just comprise the procedural feature or phase within an adversarial 
trial, but must be given a broader meaning, so as to cover all actions which aim at 
informing other participants in the trial of (not necessarily all) evidence and other 
material in one’s position. It should also not be seen as relating exclusively to the 
parties of the trial, but to other participants, such as victims, and, not least, the court. 
As to the purpose of disclosure, we hold that it is threefold. Disclosure obviously serves 
to safeguard the procedural rights of the accused. In turn, contrary to the apparent view 
of the majority in legal scholarship and practice, disclosure duties of the defence cannot 
be invoked based upon ‘procedural rights of the prosecution’. Notwithstanding, 
disclosure rights and obligations of both the prosecution and the defence may arise and 
be shaped by the duty of the courts to maintain a certain ‘efficacy of judicial 
proceedings’. This latter point is closely connected with the second function of 
disclosure, which is to enhance judicial economy within the proceedings (the procedural 
management aspect). Finally, disclosure may contribute to improved truth-finding, a 
fact which, as we will see, was commonplace in a phase of liberalization of disclosure, 
but later neglected by most courts and tribunals both on the national and international 
level, whereas it now appears to be revived, particularly in the jurisprudence of the ICC 
and the role which the ICC Chambers acquire in the ICC proceedings.  
                                                                                                                                               
meaning of Article 6, the Court must consider the proceedings as a whole including the decision of the 
appellate courts.”. 
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2 The development of disclosure in national systems 
until 1945 
In the following, we will take a look at the development of disclosure on the national 
level, taking as examples the English system and, especially, the American one. The 
English system will be looked at because England had a more developed disclosure 
regime in criminal proceedings in place before the United States, and for its part 
influenced the development of disclosure in the United States.  
The United States’ disclosure regime, in essence, proved to be a role model for the 
modern international criminal courts and tribunals. The disclosure rules of the Ad Hoc 
Tribunals were strongly influenced by proposals stemming from American sources.140 
The rules of the Ad Hoc Tribunals, in turn, partially served as a blueprint for the 
disclosure regime of the ICC.141 And also as far as Nuremberg is concerned, the 
Americans had, of all nations involved, the strongest influence as to the shaping of the 
procedural rules.142  
We start out with the development until 1945, which is when the Nuremberg IMT was 
conceived and started. The development from 1945 until the 1990ies or the present day, 
for that matter, will be dealt with in Chapter 4.  
 
2.1 England143 
As a general introductory remark, it must be noted that the English legal system as 
regards criminal procedure is, and was much more in the past, complex.144 Different 
categories of crimes now as in the past, warranted varying competences of different 
legal bodies, all applying their own procedural rules, which at times differed 
considerably.145 Concerning disclosure, the different procedural rules could, in the past, 
                                                 
140  See Chapter 5 below. 
141  See Chapter 6 below. 
142  See Chapter 3 below. 
143  Meaning the legal system of England and Wales, see Cownie/Bradney/Burton, English legal system in 
context, p. 1.  
144  See also Fisher, The Ethical Duty to Seek Exculpatory Evidence in Police Hands, at p. 109. 
145  For a relatively brief overview of the (historical) court system in England and the respective 
procedures see, e.g., Dewar, Criminal procedure in England and Scotland, pp. 4 et subs. 
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lead to the consequence that in the proceedings for a certain crime the accused would be 
entitled to disclosure of some kind, in another trial for a different crime, however, not.146 
In the following, we will thus limit ourselves to briefly sketch the development of 
disclosure within the English legal system, shedding some light on just a few of the 
different procedures available. Where appropriate, reference will be given to further 
reading.  
There had been no statutory law in England generally regulating the disclosure of 
prosecution evidence in criminal trials until the Criminal Procedures and Investigations 
Act147 which entered into force in 1996, a fact which has been referred to as 
“surprising”.148 It may at a first glance be even more surprising that the CPIA directly 
only refers to the disclosure of material which the Prosecution is not planning to use at 
the trial. As we have seen above, disclosure is nowadays generally based on fair trial 
rights for the accused; and no matter which specific fair trial right is invoked, it all boils 
down to the principle that the accused must be informed of all the evidence which is to 
be used against him in advance. Yet until this day, there is no (direct) general statutory 
provision in the English legal system which would oblige the prosecution to disclose the 
evidence on which it intends to rely or which would enable the competent court to order 
accordingly. There were and still are, however, quite a few statutory provisions which 
relate to disclosure of certain parts and types of evidence, as well as to certain 
procedural stages. The above-mentioned numerous different pre-trial institutions and 
procedures within the historical English legal system, however, force us restrict 
ourselves to mentioning only a few more impressive examples.  
To be sure, in practice, it is today generally unlikely that the prosecution would ever not 
disclose the evidence it is planning to use beforehand. Even though nothing would 
legally prevent the prosecution from presenting evidence previously undisclosed to the 
defence at trial, the court would on application of the defence adjourn the trial in any 
case; wherefore the non-disclosure of prosecution evidence would result in a mere 
waste of time.149  
                                                 
146  See, as a very striking example, Stephen/Stephen, A digest of the law of criminal procedure, Article 
233 (Copies of Depositions, see below), fn. 2: “22 Vict. c. 33 [Coroners’ Inquests Bail Act 1859], s. 3. 
This Act applies only to cases of manslaughter, the preamble stating that inconvenience has been 
caused by the coroner's inability to admit to bail in cases of manslaughter. The result is, that a prisoner 
committed by a coroner on a charge of manslaughter has a right to a copy of the depositions, but a 
prisoner committed for murder has not.” 
147  1996 c. 25, hereinafter: CPIA. 
148  Niblett, Disclosure in criminal proceedings, at p. 3. 
149  See Niblett, Disclosure in criminal proceedings, at p. 32. 
40 
 
 
2.1.1 Early Statutory and Case Law until the End of the 19th Century 
Whereas in civil litigation the disclosure of evidence developed from a relatively early 
date, probably already in ecclesiastical courts and then definitely in the courts of 
equity,150 criminal procedure did not know discovery until the late 17th century. The fact 
that discovery was granted in civil proceedings, but not in criminal proceedings is, from 
a modern point of view, surprising, since an accused in a criminal case against him is 
much more in need of protection, as his freedom or even his life is at stake. Originally, 
however, not only did disclosure not take place, but even an indictment, if any, was not 
transmitted to the accused, but only read out to him at the beginning of the trial.151 This 
was based on the assumption that the truth was most likely to be determined if the 
accused would be confronted with the evidence against him only in the courtroom;152 
apparently because it was feared that the accused might tamper with the evidence if he 
had knowledge of it in advance;153 and, as we have seen above, disclosure systematically 
does not really ‘fit’ into a ‘pure’ adversarial procedure.154 It may therefore come as a 
surprise that the first statutory provisions with regard to disclosure apparently were, of 
all laws, the Treason Acts of 1695155 and 1708156: 
[…] And be it further enacted by the authority aforesaid, that […] when any 
person is indicted for high treason or misprision of treason, a list of the 
witnesses that shall be produced on the trial, for proving the said indictment, 
and of the jury, mentioning the name, professions, and place of abode of the said 
                                                 
150  See Matthews/Malek, Disclosure, mn. 1.10 et subs. with further references. 
151  In addition to that, it has only been since 1731 that indictments “shall be in the English tongue and 
language only”, 4 Geo. 2 c. 26, cited according to Hawkins/Curwood, A Treatise of the Pleas of the 
Crown Vol. II, p. 434; before that, indictments were regularly written in Latin or French, which, 
presumably, many accused persons did not understand. 
152  Taylor, Crime, policing and punishment in England, 1750-1914, p. 112, cited according to Plater, The 
Development of the Prosecutor's Role in England and Australia with Respect to its Duty of 
Disclosure: Partisan Advocate or Minister of Justice?, p. 117. 
153  This fear is generally uttered frequently as a counter-argument to liberal disclosure; we will run across 
it regularly within this thesis. 
154  See section 1.3 above. 
155  7 & 8 Will. III c. 3. The law also brought other progresses, such as (apparently for the first time) the 
right of the accused to be represented by counsel; and that defence witnesses, which at that point only 
recently had been allowed at all, could be sworn. See also Wigmore, A Treatise on the System of 
Evidence in Trials at Common Law, Vol. 1, § 575, pp. 697 et subs. 
156  Act for Improving the Union of the Two Kingdoms [England and Scotland], 7 Ann. c. 21, available at 
http://www.jacobite.ca/documents/1708improving.htm. 
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witnesses and jurors, be also given at the same time that the copy of the 
indictment is delivered to the party indicted; and that copies of all indictments 
for the offences aforesaid, with such lists, shall be delivered to the party 
indicted, ten days before the trial, and in presence of two or more credible 
witnesses; any law or statute to the contrary notwithstanding.157 
It has been stated that this relatively liberal provision was passed with the legislators 
themselves in mind, as they were the ones who ran the highest risk of being prosecuted 
for treason. As Stephen, indeed very critically, notes in 1893: 
This was considered as an extraordinary effort of liberality. It proves, in fact, 
that even at the beginning of the eighteenth century, and after the experience of 
the state trials held under the Stuarts, it did not occur to the legislature that, if a 
man is to be tried for his life, he ought to know beforehand what the evidence 
against him is, and that it did appear to them that to let him know even what 
were the names of the witnesses was so great a favour that it ought to be 
reserved for people accused of a crime for which legislators themselves or their 
friends and connections were likely to be prosecuted. It was a matter of direct 
personal interest to many members of parliament that trials for political offences 
should not be grossly unfair, but they were comparatively indifferent as to the 
fate of people accused of sheep-stealing, or burglary, or murder.158 
This remark of Stephen is underlined by the justices at the King’s Bench Division, 
according to whom there was, at the end of the 18th century, no entitlement to disclosure 
as a matter of right nor as a matter of discretion; and that the Treason Act had to be 
considered an exception to the general rule; in fact the judges appear to have been 
shocked by the mere thought that it could be otherwise: 
Lord Somers and Sir J. Holt, in framing the Statute of Anne159, thought it a great 
indulgence to furnish a person accused of high treason with the names of the 
witnesses to be produced against them. But it never occurred to them that the 
rule, even in the case of treason, should be extended as far as this application 
seeks to go; for here the application is made for a copy of the substance of the 
evidence which is to be produced against the defendant. […]160 
In other cases, a defendant has no other intimation of the particular charge 
intended to be brought against him than what appears upon the indictment or 
information. Nor was it ever conceived to be necessary or fit that he should 
                                                 
157  Ibid., note 156 supra, s. XI. 
158  Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England Vol. 1, p. 226. See also Fletcher, Pretrial 
Discovery in State Criminal Cases, at p. 294. 
159  That is the said Act for Improving the Union of the Two Kingdoms, see fn. 156. 
160  Lord Kenyon, Ch. J., in R v Holland (1792) 100 E.R. 1248, at p. 1250. 
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receive intelligence of the particular evidence by which the charge was to be 
made out. And I should be sorry if such a rule were to be laid down in any case. 
[…]161 
It is clear that neither at common law, or under any of the statutes, is the 
defendant entitled as a matter of right, to have his application granted. And if we 
were to assume a discretionary power of granting this request, it would be 
dangerous in the extreme, and totally unfounded on precedent.162 
From a modern point of view and in the light of modern human rights, this reasoning 
certainly sounds absurd.  
Concerning disclosure in civil proceedings, we find proof that in the legal scholarship of 
the middle of the 19th century, the possible relation between disclosure and fact-finding, 
as well as the aspect of procedural management were clearly seen, even though the fear 
that disclosure might in the end be counter-productive because of the risk of perjury, 
prevailed: 
If it were now, for the first time, to be determined – whether, in the investigation 
of disputed facts, truth would best be elicited by allowing each of the contending 
parties to know, before the trial, in what manner, and by what evidence, his 
adversary proposed to establish his own case; arguments of some weight might 
a priori be adduced in support of the affirmative of this important question. 
Experience, however, has shewn – or (at least) Courts of justice in this country, 
act upon the principle – that the possible mischiefs of surprise at a trial are 
more than counterbalanced by the danger of perjury, which must inevitably be 
incurred, when either party is permitted, before a trial, to know the precise 
evidence against which he has to contend; and, accordingly, by the settled rules 
of Courts of justice in this country (approved as well as acknowledged) each 
party in a cause has thrown upon him the onus of supporting his own case, and 
meeting that of his adversary, without knowing beforehand by what evidence the 
case of his adversary is to be established, or his own opposed.163 
And concerning the judicial economy benefits of (civil) disclosure, the Second Report 
of the Common Law Practice Commissioners states unequivocally: 
                                                 
161  Ashhurst, J., ibid. 
162  Grose, J., ibid., at p. 1251; see also Plater, The Development of the Prosecutor's Role in England and 
Australia with Respect to its Duty of Disclosure: Partisan Advocate or Minister of Justice?, at 118. It 
may be noted that the explicit mentioning of the motives of the ‘historical legislator’ of statutory laws 
in a judgment is somewhat unusual for common law judgments, see Radbruch, Der Geist des 
englischen Rechts, p. 28. 
163  Wigram, Points on the Law of Discovery, § 148, footnotes omitted. 
43 
 
As to facts within the knowledge of the adverse party, the Courts of law possess 
no power of compelling discovery […]. We have no hesitation in saying that this 
is altogether wrong. We assert as an indisputable proposition, that every Court 
ought to possess within itself the means of administering complete justice within 
the scope of its jurisdiction. […] This opportunity for examination prior to the 
trial will be useful, not only for the purpose of discovering facts exclusively in 
the knowledge of the opposite party, but as the means of sparing the trouble and 
expense of producing evidence of facts which he may be prepared to admit. 
[…]164 
In criminal cases, most courts, however, expressed the view that while a generous 
approach to disclosure was desirable, they lacked the authority to oblige the prosecution 
accordingly.165 Others, however, which appear to have been mostly overlooked, were 
more audacious. In R v Harrie166, which evolved around a threatening letter, the court 
granted a motion of the defence that the letter could be inspected by defence witnesses 
to prove that, in their belief, the letter was not in the handwriting of the accused. And in 
R v Colucci167 the court held that the prosecution could be obliged to let the defence 
inspect letters seized at the premises of the accused (albeit not make copies of them). 
However, as stated, these cases were few and appear not to have had any major 
impact.168  
Around the same time, some more statutory disclosure provisions regarding certain 
kinds of preliminary proceedings were introduced. The Prisoners’ Counsel Act of 1836 
granted the accused, in addition to the right to legal representation, access to copies of 
examinations of witnesses and depositions made against him.169 By the Indictable 
Offences Act of 1848170, the accused was legally entitled to be present during the taking 
of depositions at his committal proceedings, something which appears to have been 
                                                 
164  Common Law Practice Commissioners, Second Report 1853, p. 35, quoted according to Wigmore, A 
Treatise on the System of Evidence in Trials at Common Law, Vol. 3, p. 2409 et seq. 
165  R v O'Connor(1845) I Cox CC 233, cited according to Niblett, Disclosure in criminal proceedings, 
p. 33. 
166  172 E.R. 1165 (1833). 
167  176 E.R. 46 (1861). 
168  Plater, The Development of the Prosecutor's Role in England and Australia with Respect to its Duty 
of Disclosure: Partisan Advocate or Minister of Justice?, at p. 120. 
169  See Bentley, English Criminal Justice in the Nineteenth Century, p. 36 et seq., May, The bar and the 
Old Bailey, 1750-1850, p. 197; see also Niblett, Disclosure in criminal proceedings, p. 33. 
170  11 & 12 Vict. c. 42. 
44 
 
common practice already before that time.171 Some authors, however, note that in 
practice this was often of little use for the accused, since many were illiterate.172  
Stephen’s Digest of the Law of Criminal Procedure in Indictable Offences of 1881173 
reads in Article 126 for the pre-trial proceedings before justices: 
DEFENDANT ENTITLED TO COPIES OF DEPOSITIONS. 
At any time after all the examinations of witnesses are completed and before the 
first day of the assizes or sessions or other first sitting of the Court at which any 
person committed to prison or admitted to bail as aforesaid is to be tried, such 
person may require, and is entitled to have of and from the officer or person 
having the custody of the same, copies of the depositions on which he was 
committed, or bailed, on payment of a reasonable sum for the same, not 
exceeding at the rate of three-halfpence for each folio of ninety words. 
And for inquest proceedings174, Article 233 reads: 
COPIES OF DEPOSITIONS 
At any time after all the depositions of the witnesses have been taken, every 
person against whom any coroner's jury have found a verdict of manslaughter is 
entitled to have from the person having custody thereof copies of the depositions 
on which such verdict was found, on payment of a reasonable sum for the same, 
not exceeding the rate of three halfpence for every folio of ninety words. 
Even though the explicit mentioning of a certain fee to be paid for the disclosure of 
depositions may appear a little comical nowadays, the examples clearly show that even 
though no general right to disclosure was introduced, disclosure was an issue considered 
by both the legislative as well as the judicative authorities. To be sure, however, it can 
also be assumed that many of the accused may have lacked sufficient means to pay for 
copies of the depositions.  
For some preliminary procedures, there were no disclosure provisions at all. For 
misdemeanours, where the criminal proceedings were initiated by criminal information, 
                                                 
171  See Bentley, English Criminal Justice in the Nineteenth Century, p. 35. 
172  See Bentley, English Criminal Justice in the Nineteenth Century, p. 36, referring to contemporary 
statistics. 
173  See fn. 146 above. 
174  This refers to inquest proceedings of Coroner’s Courts, which, in contrast to most other types of 
English criminal procedure have an inquisitorial nature; see Slapper/Kelly, The English legal system, 
p. 196, as well as Cownie/Bradney/Burton, English legal system in context, p. 64 et seq. 
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there was also no preliminary examination, and thus no disclosure.175 Prosecutors could 
also circumvent all magistrates’ court committal procedures by applying to the Grand 
Jury. If the latter returned a True Bill, i.e. issued an indictment, there would be no 
committal hearing at all; the accused would thus be completely uninformed about the 
evidence against him at trial. This was not altered before the passing of the Vexatious 
Indictment Act in 1859.176  
Most importantly, the statutory law made no reference to evidence which was not taken 
at the committal hearing, but either appeared afterwards or was even held back by the 
prosecution during the committal procedure on purpose. It appears that judges, while at 
first prohibiting the disclosure of such evidence to the accused, later at least submitted 
the indictment, with the names of the additional witnesses written on the back of it, to 
him.177 Overall, however, together with the increasing number of singular statutory 
provisions regarding disclosure, the English judges appear to have become increasingly 
averse towards non-disclosure, occasionally expressing their discontent with lack of 
pre-trial disclosure in “strong words”. This later extended to evidence other than 
depositions.178 Still later, the judges would regularly adjourn the hearing, if they found 
that the accused was prejudiced by the late introduction of evidence.179 As Hawkins J. 
held in 1882:  
Modern practice concedes to every accused person the right to know, before his 
trial, what evidence will be given against him. Hence, if any one who was not 
produced before the committing justice is to be called as a witness, full 
information should be furnished to the accused, both as his name and as to the 
evidence he will give. If this has not been done, his evidence should not be 
pressed at the trial if the accused objects.180  
                                                 
175  This remained unaltered until informations were abolished in England in 1967; see Bentley, English 
Criminal Justice in the Nineteenth Century, p. 38. 
176  22 & 23 Vict. c. 17, see Bentley, English Criminal Justice in the Nineteenth Century, ibid. 
177  See Bentley, English Criminal Justice in the Nineteenth Century, p. 37. 
178  R v. Pietro Stigiani (1867) 10 Cox CC552, R v Greenslade (1884) 15 Cox CC 412, cited according to 
Niblett, Disclosure in criminal proceedings, p. 34. 
179  R v Flanagan and Higgins, (1884) 15 Cox CC 403, cited according to Plater, The Development of the 
Prosecutor's Role in England and Australia with Respect to its Duty of Disclosure: Partisan Advocate 
or Minister of Justice?, at p. 121; and R v Wright (1934) 25 Cr App R 35: “At most that is a grievance 
and cannot affect the admissibility of the evidence […], and, if the appellant or his counsel thought 
that he was being prejudiced by having had no notice, […] he could have applied for an adjournment, 
but he did not do so.” See also Bentley, English Criminal Justice in the Nineteenth Century, p. 37, as 
well as Niblett, Disclosure in criminal proceedings, p. 34; both with further references. 
180  R v Harris (1882), C.C.C. Sess. Pap XCV, 525, cited according to Orfield, Criminal procedure from 
arrest to appeal, p. 333, fn. 265. 
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However, English courts never went as far as the Australian courts, which as early as 
1869 prohibited that previously undisclosed evidence be given at trial.181 
 
2.1.2 The first half of the 20th century 
In the first half of the 20th century, there was little movement with regard to disclosure 
as far as statutory law is concerned.182 Cases on the matter, in comparison to the second 
half of the century, are also relatively scarce. However, with the general practice of 
disclosing prosecution evidence established, according to the cases available, the focus 
turned to the disclosure of material which would not be given into evidence by the 
prosecution, but nevertheless have to be made available to the defence, such as 
exonerating material, or such which would cast doubt on the reliability of prosecution 
evidence. One of the cases which are usually cited in this regard is R v Bryant and 
Dickson183. Others, such as R v Nicholson184 , appear to have been “overlooked”.185 
Likewise, in R v Clarke the Court of Criminal Appeal as early as 1930 indicated that the 
non-disclosure of inconsistent prosecution witness statements would be inappropriate: 
If in the result it had appeared that there was anything in those written 
descriptions which was contradictory to the evidence which was given by the 
police officer, or the other witnesses at the Trial, or at the police court, we 
should have had seriously to consider whether any miscarriage of justice had 
been caused by this attitude which was unfortunately assumed by the learned 
counsel for the prosecution.186  
This decision remained practically uncited until the 1990ies; it was relied upon in the 
above-mentioned ECtHR decision in Edwards v. UK.187 In R v Bryant and Dickson, the 
                                                 
181  R v Brown (1869), 6 WW & A’B239, cited according to Bentley, English Criminal Justice in the 
Nineteenth Century, p. 37. 
182  See Niblett, Disclosure in criminal proceedings, p. 35. 
183  (1946) 31 Cr. App. R. 146, see also Plater, The Development of the Prosecutor's Role in England and 
Australia with Respect to its Duty of Disclosure: Partisan Advocate or Minister of Justice?, p. 123, as 
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in criminal proceedings, p. 59. 
184  Unreported, discussed in (1936) JPN 553, cited according to Niblett, Disclosure in criminal 
proceedings, ibid. 
185  Plater, The Development of the Prosecutor's Role in England and Australia with Respect to its Duty 
of Disclosure: Partisan Advocate or Minister of Justice?, ibid. The appellants in R v Bryant and 
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187  See note 64 above. 
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Court188 took a much stricter approach and held that the prosecution did not have a duty 
to disclose a statement of a witness they were not going to call: 
It is said that it was the duty of the prosecution to have supplied the defence with 
a statement which Campbell had admittedly made to the prosecution. The 
prosecution, for reasons which one can well understand, did not call Campbell. 
Is there a duty in such circumstances on the prosecution to supply a copy of the 
statement which they have taken to the defence? In the opinion of the Court 
there is no such duty, nor has there ever been. In the first place, if they had 
supplied a copy of the statement of Campbell, that would not have enabled the 
defence to put the statement in. The statement which Campbell made could have 
become evidence only if he had been called as a witness. But it is said that it was 
the duty of the prosecution to put that statement at the disposal of the defence. In 
the opinion of the Court, the duty of the prosecution in such a case is to make 
available to the defence a witness whom the prosecution know can, if he is 
called, give material evidence. That they did in this case[…].189 
The Court thus appears to be of the opinion that there is a duty of the prosecution to 
provide information on the fact that the witness exists, but not to provide his actual 
statements; a feature which we will come across again on the international level later in 
this thesis. It has been stated that, given the facts of the actual case, it was not surprising 
that the Court decided as it did, since the defence clearly had been aware of the 
existence of the witness and also of the fact that he would be able to give material 
evidence; on top of that, he had been physically present during the whole trial.190 
 
2.1.3 Conclusion 
Until the end of World War II, we can notice a development of disclosure which started 
relatively early, but went slowly overall. It took more than 100 years until a general 
practice of disclosure of the prosecution case had developed; and regarding the 
disclosure of unused material, the courts followed a rather restrictive approach. As we 
will see below, the development in the second half of the 20th century went at a much 
greater speed. As a general remark, it appears that the courts in their judgments did not 
express a particularly systematic view of the matter, in contrast to the mentioned legal 
                                                 
188  Mr Justice Humphreys sat both in R v Clarke and R v Bryant and Dickson. 
189  R v Bryant and Dickson, fn. Fehler! Textmarke nicht definiert., p. 151. 
190  See Niblett, Disclosure in criminal proceedings, p. 60; O'Connor, Prosecution Disclosure: Principle, 
Practice and Justice, p. 465. From the explanations in the appeals judgment it appears that both parties 
chose not to call Mr Campbell for tactical reasons and that all of the people involved knew this. 
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scholarship, and in contrast also to the American jurisprudence, which we will take a 
look at instantly.  
As to the scope of evidence which had to be disclosed, we can thus state that in 1945, a 
rather complete disclosure of prosecution evidence had to take place. As far as unused 
material is concerned, we can observe a duty to disclose the names of those witnesses 
which in their statements have contradicted the prosecution case, but generally not their 
statements. Concerning time frames, we find no explicit hints. 
As regards disclosure by the defence, we find no hints in the English system until 1945. 
The first time defence disclosure appeared in England seems to be in 1968.191  
 
2.2 The United States of America – From the beginning until 
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (1946) 
The law of the United States, even though it has been influenced by other legal 
traditions and indeed ‘invented’ some “uniquely American features”, is fundamentally 
based on the English Common Law.192 It is therefore not surprising that originally the 
disclosure rights and duties in criminal proceedings were very limited. In the following, 
we will take a short look at the development of disclosure in American jurisprudence. It 
does not make much sense to divide this section into chronological sub-sections, since 
until the passing of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in 1946, we cannot really 
discern particular phases. 
 
2.2.1 Prosecution Disclosure 
Just as in England, we can observe that discovery was in place in civil proceedings 
much earlier than in criminal proceedings.193  
In criminal trials, the courts at first generally followed the common law, which, as we 
have seen, said that there was no general duty of the prosecution to disclose the 
prosecution evidence. This was, however, not without exceptions. On the federal level, 
the United States had followed the English example of providing for obligatory 
                                                 
191  See Chapter 4.1.2. below. 
192  LaFave/Israel/King/Kerr, Criminal procedure Part I, 1, 1.6 (a); Pound, Criminal Justice in America, 
pp. 77 et subs.. 
193  Orfield, Criminal procedure from arrest to appeal, p. 328. 
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disclosure in procedures relating to treason, which provided, as in England, for the 
compulsory disclosure of a witness list; this was apparently extended regarding other 
capital offences.194 We also find some jurisprudence loosely related to this exception – 
arguably the famous case of United States v. Burr, which is known for Chief Justice 
Marshall’s holding that the President of the United States, like every other citizen, is 
subject to the law, can be seen as relating to disclosure, in that the inspection of 
documents in the hands of the prosecution was granted by the court.195 Other than that, 
we do occasionally find liberal decisions regarding disclosure during the 19th century, 
emphasizing the supposed role of the prosecutor as a minister of justice.196 
Generally, however, a restrictive attitude towards disclosure can be observed. As far as 
legal scholarship is concerned, it is notable that despite of this fact in the 1st edition of 
Wigmore on evidence of 1904 disclosure in both civil and criminal proceedings are 
discussed at considerable length and in remarkable depth.197 Wigmore first mentions 
truth finding combined with fair trial aspects as possible purposes or reasons for 
disclosure; stating that surprise in itself is no threat to fairness or truth-finding, but that 
it may raise the risk of falsities.198 According to Wigmore, these aspects were, however, 
generally seen as counterbalanced by two main considerations: the ‘sportsmanship’ 
tradition of the common law, which allows the parties to keep their resources 
concealed;199 and the related risk of the opponent tampering with the evidence.200 The 
second argument for disclosure, according to Wigmore, and in his mind, apparently the 
                                                 
194  St. 1790, Apr. 30, § 29, cited according to Wigmore, A Treatise on the Anglo-American System of 
Evidence in Trials at Common Law, Vol. 3, p. 939, fn. 1; “at least three entire days before the trial” in 
treason cases and “two entire days” in cases of capital offences. See, as for today, 18 U.S.C. § 3432. 
195  United States v. Burr, 25 F.Cas. 30, C.C.Va. 1807, p. 35: “[T]he court has no right to refuse its aid to 
motions for papers to which the accused may be entitled, and which may be material in his defence. 
These observations are made to show the nature of the discretion which may be exercised. If it be 
apparent that the papers are irrelative to the case, or that for state reasons they cannot be introduced 
into the defence, the subpoena duces tecum would be useless. But, if this be not apparent, if they may 
be important in the defence, if they may be safely read at the trial, would it not be a blot in the page 
which records the judicial proceedings of this country, if, in a case of such serious import as this, the 
accused should be denied the use of them?”. This case does not appear to have been covered by 
Wigmore. 
196  See, once again, People v. Davis, fn. 89 above. 
197  Wigmore, A Treatise on the System of Evidence in Trials at Common Law, Vol. 3, §§ 1845-1862, 
pp. 2398-2458. 
198  Ibid., pp. 2398 et subs. 
199  Ibid., p. 2401 et seq., see also the quotation above (note 120). 
200  Ibid., p. 2402 et seq. 
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most important one in practice, is what we have called the ‘procedural management’ 
aspect above: 
So far as concerns the interests of litigation in general, the policy of requiring 
discovery or notice of evidence before trial is equally urgent, though on larger 
grounds. Its propriety, moreover, is independent of the truth or falsity of the 
opponent's evidence; it is, in fact, strongest where the opponent's evidence is 
assumed to be true. That policy rests on the fact of experience that the parties to 
controversies are prone to proceed either with a blind faith in the strength of 
their cause and the truth of its essential propositions of fact, or with the 
misguided assumption that the facts forming its defects and weaknesses are 
unknown to the adversaries and that their concealment to the last moment will 
heighten the chances of success. If these two states of mind could be prevented, a 
large proportion of litigation would be cut short at the beginning, with 
advantage to justice; because parties entertaining either belief without 
foundation would be disabused of it at an early moment, would perceive the 
uselessness of further contest in court, and would act accordingly. Any 
requirements of preliminary discovery, designed to lead to such a saving of time 
and expense, would be well worth imposing in the interests of expeditious 
litigation and of justice at large.201 
This argument was, according to Wigmore, also countered with the fear of abuse, as 
well as the hardly flattering argument that a reduction of litigation might lessen the 
income of the legal professionals involved in it.202  
Quite a few states, however, had statutory laws concerning disclosure of witness lists 
before the turn of the century.203 Some states required the names of the witnesses who 
had testified before the grand jury to be written on the indictment and the indictment 
handed over to the accused, in some cases this was extended to a copy of their 
statements; others demanded that the names of the witnesses which the prosecutor knew 
to be disclosed; and finally some states demanded that the names of all witnesses 
intended to be called to be produced.204  
                                                 
201  Ibid., p. 2403. 
202  Ibid. Wigmore notes: “This is not a consideration which honorable men could entertain as in the least 
hindering a measure otherwise desirable. But it was in fact undoubtedly a powerful though silent 
motive, in the resistance, active and inert, with which the efforts towards reform in this respect were 
met in England in the closing days of Lord Eldon’s nomination, and indeed everywhere else, 
whenever such a reform was needed.” 
203  See references at Wigmore, A Treatise on the System of Evidence in Trials at Common Law, Vol. 3, 
pp. 2415 et seq., fn. 2. 
204  See references ibid., pp. 2415 et subs. 
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They largely differed as what the consequences of non-compliance were. Generally, 
however, non-compliance with the statutory disclosure rules would have no particular 
consequences for the prosecution. The latter could, for instance, not be forced to swear 
in all of the witnesses they intended to call at trial. The calling of a witness at trial who 
had not been sworn in before the grand jury was generally205 not considered 
inadmissible. In the poignant words of Justice Woodward of the Supreme Court of 
Iowa:  
Another error assigned is, that the court permitted a witness to testify in chief, 
whose name was not indorsed on the indictment. The bill of exceptions shows, 
that the witness had not been before the grand jury, and was not one of those 
upon whose testimony the indictment was found […]. The question presented is, 
whether the prosecution is confined to the witnesses upon whose testimony the 
charge is founded, and whose names are indorsed. We think it is not. Such a rule 
would greatly embarrass the administration of justice in the punishment of 
offences. It would make it necessary for the State to search for all possible 
evidence, before it presented an indictment, and thus favor the escape of the 
guilty; or it would deprive it of much evidence, and even of that which is the best 
and the most satisfactory. There is no principle of law, or of natural right, which 
entitles a defendant to a previous knowledge of all the witnesses to be called 
against him.206 
The solution of the English courts to generally grant a postponement of the trial was 
occasionally also applied by American courts in the case of a “real and unfair 
surprise”.207 Apparently, however, it fell short of being considered a general rule. 
Apart from the (limited) witness lists which had to be provided according to state 
statutes, especially thus as regards documentary evidence and tangible objects, the 
jurisprudence on the question whether the courts had an inherent authority to compel 
prosecution disclosure is somewhat unclear at the beginning of the 20th century. While 
some courts recognized discretion of the courts in that respect,208 others, in the tradition 
                                                 
205  Few exceptions cited by Wigmore, A Treatise on the System of Evidence in Trials at Common Law, 
Vol. 3, p. 2418. 
206  State v. Abrahams, 6 Clarke 117, Iowa 1858; see also Hill v. People, 26 Mich. 496, 1873 WL 3015, 
Mich. 1873. 
207  Wigmore, A Treatise on the System of Evidence in Trials at Common Law, Vol. 3, p.  
208  Commonwealth v. Jordan, 207 Mass. 259 (1911) at p. 811: “As to those matters it is plain, we think, 
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conditions, these various documents, it is possible that he could have obtained positive evidence as to 
the payment of the money to the proper persons. The whole theory of our law as to the trial of one 
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of the old English jurisprudence described above, held that this discretion did not 
exist.209 In any case, however, the discretion was hardly ever exercised.210 On rare 
occasions, on the other hand, we find very far-reaching judgments which allowed the 
defendant comprehensive inspection rights, like the following decision of the Supreme 
Court of Missouri of 1927: 
The prosecuting attorney is both an officer of the state and of the court, and his 
duty extends no further than an impartial, fair, and just trial of defendant. If in 
any manner [the statement] tended to show that defendant was not guilty of the 
offense charged, he was entitled to the benefit of it. […] The state in its might 
and power ought to be and is too jealous of according a defendant a fair and 
impartial trial to hinder him in intelligently preparing his defense and in 
availing himself of all competent material and relevant evidence that tends to 
throw light on the subject-matter on trial.211 
The court clearly analyses the procedural role of the prosecutor and in consequence 
indeed compels the disclosure of exculpatory evidence. It not only refers to the name of 
a witness, but even his statement. This approach was far ahead of its time, and was in 
fact overruled only three years later.212  
The general approach, however, was much more restrictive and, as it were, ‘back to the 
roots’. In an often-quoted decision of the Court of Appeals of the State of New York, 
the court, though citing several English213 and American cases in which the courts had 
                                                                                                                                               
accused of crime is to give him an opportunity to know the charges against him, so that he can make 
proper investigation and preparation for the trial. We see no reason why the motion of plaintiff in 
error on this point should not have been granted by the trial court.” 
209  State v. Jeffries, 117 Kan. 742, 232 P. 873, Kan. 1925, at p. 874: “[…]since there is no right for an 
inspection of the letters in question except by virtue of express authorization by the Legislature, and 
since none has been granted in the Criminal Code either directly or by reference to the Civil Code, 
there was no power in the court to make the order requiring the county attorney to turn over the letters 
for inspection […]”. 
210  See, e.g. U.S. v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, D.C.N.Y. 1923, at p. 649: “Finally, the defendants, recognizing 
that it is difficult to make a case for quashal by the scraps of evidence accessible, move for inspection 
of the grand jury's minutes. I am no more disposed to grant it than I was in 1909. [...] It is said to lie in 
discretion, and perhaps it does, but no judge of this court has granted it, and I hope none ever will. 
Under our criminal procedure the accused has every advantage. While the prosecution is held rigidly 
to the charge, he need not disclose the barest outline of his defense. He is immune from question or 
comment on his silence […]. Why in addition he should in advance have the whole evidence against 
him to pick over at his leisure, and make his defense, fairly or foully, I have never been able to see.” 
211  State v. Tippett, 317 Mo. 319, 296 S.W. 132, Mo. 1927, pp. 326 et seq. 
212  State ex rel. Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Hall, 325 Mo. 102, 27 S.W.2d 1027, Mo. 1930. 
213  Among them the above-mentioned case of R v Harrie (fn. 166 supra). 
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held that they did have the inherent power to compel a party to disclose part of its 
evidence to the other party before trial in one form or the other, finally followed the old 
R v Holland214 approach. The court held that the disclosure of material which in itself 
would not be admissible as evidence could definitely not be required. As to potentially 
admissible evidence, the court nominally left the question open, but was obviously 
generally not in favour of pre-trial disclosure. Comparing civil procedure to the criminal 
case before it, Justice Cardozo, who had been an appeals judge since 1914215 and should 
later serve at the United States Supreme Court, held: 
We leave the question open, for if the power exists at all, this case is not within 
it. The most that can be argued with any show of reason in behalf of the 
defendant is that the remedy of inspection in civil causes as now prescribed by 
statute is to be applied in consimili casu to criminal prosecutions. The power in 
criminal prosecutions may not improbably be less. It surely can be no greater. 
[…] 
If the statute governing inspection were extended in so many words to criminal 
prosecutions, the defendant would be unable on such a showing to make good 
her title to relief. We have no occasion at this time to consider to what extent 
inspection might be directed at the trial as an aid to cross-examination after the 
witnesses had testified. […] What concerns us at the moment is the scope of the 
remedy available in advance. At such a stage of the contest, a remedy so drastic 
is within the condemnation of the rule that inspection may not be had for the 
sole purpose of prying into the case of one's opponent.216 
In this wording something resembling the ‘equality of arms’ for the prosecution appears 
to become visible, first, in that the trial is characterized as a “contest”, second, in that 
the court alleges that the defendant would not be “able to make good” the advantage of 
pre-trial discovery, which presumably has also got to do with the constitutional 
privilege against self-incrimination217 – it may simply have been unconceivable for the 
court that anyone could ask from the accused anything like what was proposed for the 
prosecution. This is quite possibly also the reason why it appeared self-evident that 
disclosure in criminal proceedings would have to be more restricted than in civil 
                                                 
214  Fn. 160 supra. 
215  New York Times of 3 February 1914, available on the internet at 
http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9B0DEED81F3BE633A25750C0A9649C94659
6D6CF.  
216  People ex rel. Lemon v. Supreme Court of State of New York, 245 N.Y. 24, 156 N.E. 84, N.Y. 1927, 
pp. 86 et seq. 
217  The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: “No person shall […] be compelled 
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself […].” 
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proceedings. Justice Cardozo thus (knowingly) did not take heed to the fact that the 
English courts had made considerable progress since R v Holland.218 After Lemon, most 
courts did recognize discretion of the courts as concerns the ordering of disclosure of 
evidence, however, just like before, this discretion was not often exercised, including 
regarding evidence originally belonging to the accused.219  
The states requiring witness lists became more numerous around this time and in the 
following years;220 and in some states the disclosure obligations of the prosecution were 
extended to include not only the lists but also transcripts of their testimony before the 
grand jury.221 In this line, the Model Code of Criminal Procedure, drafted by the 
American Law Institute in 1930, provided in § 194: 
Names of witnesses to be endorsed on indictment or information. 
When an indictment or information is filed, the names of all the witnesses or 
deponents on whose evidence the indictment or information was based shall be 
endorsed thereon before it is presented, and the prosecuting attorney shall 
endorse on the indictment or information at such time as the Court may by rule 
or otherwise prescribe the names of such other witnesses as he purposes to call. 
A failure to endorse the said names shall not affect the validity or sufficiency of 
the indictment or information, but the Court in which the indictment or 
information was filed shall, upon application of the defendant, direct the names 
of such witnesses to be endorsed. No continuance shall be allowed because of 
the failure to endorse any of the said names, unless such application was made 
at the earliest opportunity and then only if a continuance is necessary in the 
interest of justice.222 
This model code, in contrast to its successor, the model penal code, apparently did not 
have a larger impact. Throughout the 1930ies, the courts followed the restrictive 
                                                 
218  Fletcher, Pretrial Discovery in State Criminal Cases, at p. 295, calls this fact “unfortunate”. Dession, 
The New Rules of Federal Criminal Procedure: II, at p. 219, fn.165, notes that the court “found it 
necessary to examine the problem almost as a new question”. 
219  See for references Note: Pre-Trial Disclosure in Criminal Cases, 60 Yale Law Journal (1951), 626-
646, at p. 627 (fn. 9).  
220  Compare §1851 in the second and third editions of Wigmore (1923 and 1940, respectively). 
221  Wigmore, A Treatise on the Anglo-American System of Evidence in Trials at Common Law, Vol. 6, 
§ 1855a. 
222  Quoted according to Wigmore, A Treatise on the Anglo-American System of Evidence in Trials at 
Common Law, Vol. 6, p. 400 et seq., fn. 1. 
55 
 
approach of Lemon.223 This was despite of the fact that for civil cases, the discovery had 
by then developed to such an extent that each side was given “pre-trial access to almost 
all relevant information within the knowledge of the other side.”224 
There was, however, some positive jurisdiction on the question whether, during trial, 
previous inconsistent evidence concerning a witness statement must be disclosed for 
impeaching a witness at cross-examination.225 This reminds us to some extent of the 
English jurisprudence described above, like R v Clarke;226 and it appears that the tenet 
that this would advance truth-finding played a major role in this: 
But neither of these situations is like that at bar, where the competence of the 
document appeared without inspection, and inspection was necessary only to 
fulfill a procedural condition to its admission. In that situation inspection loses 
its character as a prying into the preparation of the prosecution, and becomes 
merely a means of releasing evidence pregnant with importance in ascertaining 
the truth. […] While therefore it must be admitted that the question has not been 
settled in federal criminal procedure, there is good authority in other 
jurisdictions supporting our view. […] That there are contrary decisions is true, 
but justice so plainly points in one way that we cannot hesitate to choose as we 
have indicated.227 
This jurisprudence, however, does not cover disclosure in the formal sense, i.e. before 
the trial, and does not imply a positive disclosure duty of the prosecution. It is different 
from the situation in England, where disclosure in principle had to take place before the 
trial, but only the identity of the witness had to be disclosed. 
In 1938, the works for what would become the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
(FRCP) began.228 Based on the adapted Rules Enabling Act229, the United States 
Supreme Court was tasked with the elaboration of the FRCP. The Court for its part 
                                                 
223  See, e.g., State ex rel. Page v. Terte, 324 Mo. 925, 25 S.W.2d 459, Mo. 1930; People v. Gatti, 167 
Misc. 545, 4 N.Y.S.2d 130, N.Y.Gen.Sess. 1938; see also State v. Di Noi, 59 R.I. 348, 195 A. 497, 
R.I. 1937. 
224  LaFave/Israel/King/Kerr, Criminal procedure, at § 20.1(a). 
225  See U.S. v. Rosenfeld, 57 F.2d 74, C.A.2 1932; Asgill v. U.S., 60 F.2d 776, C.A.4 1932; People v. 
Walsh, 262 N.Y. 140, 186 N.E. 422, N.Y. 1933, at p. 149/425; U.S. v. Krulewitch, 145 F.2d 76, C.A.2 
1944; there was an according decision as early as 1914: State v. Bachman, 41 Nev. 197, 168 P. 733, 
Nev. 1917. 
226  See fn. 186 supra. 
227  U.S. v. Krulewitch, fn. 225, ibid. 
228  See on the history of the FRCP generally Dession, The New Rules of Federal Criminal Procedure: I, 
pp. 694 et subs. 
229  28 U.S.C. § 2072; adapted for the FRCP in 1940. 
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appointed an advisory committee in 1941. Two preliminary drafts were published in 
1943 and 1944, respectively. Successively the draft was transmitted to the United States 
Attorney General in December 1944 to be reported to the United States Congress in 
January 1945. After that, an additional volume of notes was published. Together, these 
norms represent the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which entered into force on 
21 May 1946.230 They comprised 60 rules.  
With regard to the drafting of the FRCP, it is interesting to note that Robert H. Jackson, 
who in 1945 became the American Chief Prosecutor at the Nuremberg IMT, was, from 
1940 until 1941, United States Attorney General, and after that became Associate 
Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, which he remained until his death in 1954. In his 
position of Attorney General he was followed by Francis Biddle, who held this position 
from 1941 until 1945, and in 1945 became the primary American judge in Nuremberg. 
Even though the FRCP thus entered into force after the beginning of the Nuremberg 
trial, it is worthwhile to briefly discuss them here, since the draft was actually finished 
in 1944; and both Robert H. Jackson as well as Francis Biddle held key positions in the 
surroundings of the FRCP and later in the Nuremberg proceedings. Jackson may be said 
to have been the driving force in the trial as a whole, not least in the preparatory 
proceedings, like the London Conference. Biddle did not play a major role in the 
preliminary works for Nuremberg, however, in his capacity as Attorney General, he co-
drafted a memorandum for President F.D. Roosevelt for the Yalta Conference, where 
the cornerstone for the later trial was laid.231 
The FRCP in their original version did not contain groundbreaking novelties. To a large 
degree, they simply constituted or consolidated already existing law, enriched with 
some novelties that had been ‘tested’ in more progressive states and in England.232 
Concerning disclosure, the FRCP contained one relatively short provision, Rule 16. By 
its wording, we may conclude that the Supreme Court wished the dispute as to whether 
the courts should have discretion to compel disclosure from the prosecution to be settled 
in favour of discretion. Rule 16 in its original form provided: 
Discovery and Inspection 
Upon motion of a defendant at any time after the filing of the indictment or 
information, the court may order the attorney for the government to inspect and 
copy or photograph designated books, papers, documents or tangible objects, 
                                                 
230  Dession, The New Rules of Federal Criminal Procedure: I, at p. 696 et seq.  
231  See Jackson, Report of Robert H. Jackson, United States Representative to the International 
Conference on Military Trials, London, 1945, p. 3. 
232  Dession, The New Rules of Federal Criminal Procedure: I, at p. 699. 
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obtained from or belonging to the defendant or obtained from others by seizure 
or by process, upon a showing that the items sought may be material to the 
preparation of his defence and that the request is reasonable. The order shall 
specify the time, place and manner of making the inspection and of taking the 
copies or photographs and may prescribe such terms and conditions that are 
just. 
This provision had apparently been included in the first draft already.233 In the first draft, 
however, the scope of the norm had been somewhat wider, in that it originally said: 
“any designated books, papers, documents, or tangible objects, not privileged”, and later 
the qualification added “obtained from or belonging to the defendant or obtained from 
others by seizure or by process” was inserted.234  
The norm only referred to “books, papers, documents or tangible objects”. Furthermore, 
it only applied to such material which had been obtained by seizure or process, thus did 
not cover those items which had been transmitted to the prosecution voluntarily.235 In 
addition to that, the defence had to make a case that, first, the items “might be material”; 
how it should have been able to do this without the help of the prosecution, is unclear. 
After all, the court was given a wide margin of discretion as to the ‘if’ and ‘how’ of 
disclosure. We can thus conclude that Rule 16 in its original wording was very limited 
as to its scope of application, and particularly vague as regards the legal consequences 
of its applicability. 
Generally, Rule 16 contained no specific reference as to the evidence which the 
prosecution intends to present at the trial. As we have indicated above, this is also the 
approach taken by the English Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act of 1996. 
Rule 16 only referred to objects “material” to the defence, while their materiality is, of 
course, generally difficult to prove without having seen them. Furthermore, Rule 16 
made no mention of the names, let alone the statements of grand jury witnesses, no 
matter whether envisaged for trial or not; and Rule 6 (e) FRCP allowed few exceptions 
of the general secrecy of the grand jury proceedings. This is particularly noteworthy 
given the fact that, as we have just seen, this was the very disclosure provision which 
was present, to one extent or another, in the procedural rules of most of the states, and 
was indeed contained in the Model Code of Criminal Procedure. To be sure, as briefly 
mentioned above, in cases for treason and capital offences, witness lists (have) had to be 
                                                 
233  Under preliminary Rule 19, see Orfield, The Preliminary Draft of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure (Part I), at p. 61. 
234  Quoted according to Shores v. U.S., 174 F.2d 838, C.A.8 1949. 
235  See also Dession, The New Rules of Federal Criminal Procedure: II, at p. 220. 
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transmitted to the defence since 1790.236 It has been noted in this regard that there was, 
however, an ‘indirect’ way to obtain a list of the prospective witnesses by “watching the 
praecipes filed with the clerk of court” by the prosecution.237 As a matter of fact, this 
indirect method appears rather unusual; it is thinkable, however, that it was used in 
practice.  
Another possibility of ‘indirect’ discovery, in any case, proved to be of considerable 
practical importance: the issuing of a subpoena duces tecum according to 
Rule 17 (c) FRCP. This provision was originally worded as follows: 
[Subpoena] [f]or Production of Documentary Evidence and of Objects. A 
subpoena may also command the person to whom it is directed to produce the 
books, papers, documents or other objects designated therein. The court on 
motion made promptly may quash or modify the subpoena if compliance would 
be unreasonable or oppressive. The court may direct that books, papers, 
documents or objects designated in the subpoena be produced before the court 
at a time prior to the trial or prior to the time when they are to be offered in 
evidence and may upon their production permit the books, papers, documents or 
objects or portions thereof to be inspected by the parties and their attorneys. 
By their sheer wording, the scopes of application of Rule 17 (c) and Rule 16 in their 
respective original forms clearly overlap, indeed it may well be said that the scope of 
application of Rule 17 (c) was wider than that of Rule 16.238 The question must thus be 
asked whether the narrow margin of Rule 16 FRCP could be circumvented by a resort to 
Rule 17 (c). Before the Nuremberg IMT, we find naturally no related jurisprudence 
concerning this point; we will, however, come back to it below, since this problem was 
imminent in the United States, and indeed a similar systematic problem has also 
appeared in the practice of the modern international tribunals.239 It may be noted 
already, in any case, that the difficulty or even impossibility of accurately separating 
production and disclosure of evidence illustrates the close relation between disclosure 
and truth-finding.  
 
                                                 
236  See fn. 194 supra. 
237  Dession, The New Rules of Federal Criminal Procedure: II, ibid. 
238  Orfield, Discovery and Inspection in Federal Criminal Procedure, at p. 312; see also Note: Pre-Trial 
Disclosure in Criminal Cases, 60 Yale Law Journal (1951), 626-646, at p. 629. 
239  See section 5.5 infra. 
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2.2.2 Defence Disclosure 
As noted above, in English criminal procedure, there were originally no obligations of 
defence disclosure whatsoever. This is in contrast to some of the American systems, 
which in fact had from a relatively early stage a, though limited, disclosure obligation of 
the defence with regard to alibi and some affirmative defences, such as insanity. Some 
statutes in federal states had according statutes in place already in the 1920ies; and they 
became more numerous in the following years;240 which is why it appears somewhat 
inaccurate to hold, as many scholars and courts did, that the accused was generally 
protected from any form of disclosure due to his privilege against self-incrimination. 
Proposals for obligatory defence notice and even the disclosure of witness lists date 
back to the early 20th century.241 It had been contemplated to incorporate an according 
rule in the FRCP, this was also proposed by the Criminal Division of the department of 
justice;242 apparently a provision to this end was included in a committee note to the 
Second Draft of the FRCP.243 In the end, however, it was not kept.  
 
2.2.3 Conclusion 
In sum, we can state for the American system that it would be exaggerated to say that 
disclosure was inexistent until the middle of the 20th century – the issue was highly 
relevant in court practice and present in legal discussions. Its scope, however, was, with 
the exception of very few states, in fact very limited. Even though by the 1940ies we 
may state that for the most part it was held that American courts both on the state and 
federal level had discretion whether to compel disclosure or not, this discretion was 
rarely exercised. 
The FRCP, which in Rule 16 in a sense sum up the common law as regards the state of 
development of disclosure in the mid-1940ies, show a scanty picture, as they comprise 
only a very limited range of material; and disclosure here is generally not a matter of 
right, but of discretion. Some states were somewhat more generous; overall, however, 
the prosecution apparently retained a significant momentum of ‘trial by surprise’. 
                                                 
240  See references at Wigmore, A Treatise on the Anglo-American System of Evidence in Trials at 
Common Law, Vol. 6, § 1855b, fn. 2, pp. 419 et seq. 
241  Wigmore, A pocket code of the rules of evidence in trials at law, § 1331, p. 301: “The prosecution 
may on motion obtain before trial a list of the accused’s witnesses. [Note: This is not law anywhere, 
but it ought to be.”] 
242  See Barron, Proposed Rules of Procedure in Criminal Cases: A Prosecutor's Viewpoint, at p. 215. 
243  See Dession, The New Rules of Federal Criminal Procedure: II, at p. 216. 
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2.3 Conclusion 
Comparing the English and the American systems so far, we see that generally, even 
though there were a few exceptions, disclosure developed later and slower in the United 
States than in England. This is, however, not the case as concerns witness lists in capital 
crimes cases, where the lists had to be disclosed before trial since 1790 – albeit in 
England this exception applied only to treason cases. The same could obviously be said 
with regard to defence disclosure, which was, at least in some states, in place before this 
was contemplated in England. From a human rights perspective, however, this fact 
could well be seen as a step backwards, and not as a progressive development. 
With regard to the material which was to be disclosed, we find a much more restrictive 
approach in America than in England. Prosecution disclosure as regards practically all 
of the prosecution evidence had, in theory at least, been common practice in England 
from the beginning of the 20th century, whereas in the United States there remained a 
significant element of surprise. The discussion in England had already turned away 
from incriminating prosecution evidence to the disclosure of unused material, which in 
America was, with few exceptions, like the duty to disclose inconsistent evidence 
during trial for cross-examination, unheard of.  
This was thus the ‘state of the art’ of disclosure in England and the U.S.A. at the time 
when the discussions leading to the establishment of the Nuremberg IMT took place. To 
these discussions and the later practice of the IMT we will now turn. 
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3 The Nuremberg IMT 
 
3.1 Overview and Legal Framework 
The Nuremberg trial against the major war criminals marks the first time in history that 
gross human rights abuses were brought before an international tribunal. From 20 
November 1945 until 1 October 1946, 21244 German and Austrian defendants stood trial 
for their involvement in war crimes and crimes against humanity committed during 
World War 2. Additionally, seven organisations were indicted.245 The indicted persons 
and organisations were defended246 by a total of 27 chief defence counsel, assisted by 54 
associate defence counsel and 67 secretaries.247  
Legally, the trial was based on the London Agreement of 8 August 1945 and the Charter 
of the International Military Tribunal, which, for its part, constituted an annex to the 
Agreement. Compared to the statutes of modern international criminal courts and 
tribunals, the IMT Charter is merely fragmentary. It consists of 30 articles.  
In its first part, the Charter contains provisions concerning jurisdiction and substantive 
law, whereas Articles 16 et seq. concern the rights of the accused as well as basic 
procedural rules. In Article 13, the drafting of more explicit procedural Rules was left to 
the Judges of the Tribunal: 
The Tribunal shall draw up rules for its procedure. These rules shall not be 
inconsistent with the provisions of this Charter. 
However, these Rules were also, in comparison to the procedural rules of modern 
bodies of international criminal law, and, for instance, the existing German Code of 
                                                 
244  Originally, 24 natural persons had been indicted. However, Robert Ley, Reichsleiter of the Nazi Party 
and head of the German Labour Front, had committed suicide in his cell, industrialist Gustav Krupp 
von Bohlen und Halbach was unfit to stand trial, and Martin Bormann, Head of the Party Chancellery, 
was missing (in fact, as it later turned out, he was already dead); Bormann was, however, tried in 
absentia.  
245  The Reich Cabinet, the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party, the SS, SD, Gestapo, SA, and the General 
Staff and High Command of The German Armed Forces. 
246  A very instructive overview over the situation of the defence counsel at the IMT and the legal as well 
as practical problems they encountered is provided by Safferling/Graebke, Strafverteidigung im 
Nürnberger Hauptkriegsverbrecherprozess: Strategien und Wirkung, p. 47-81;  
247  Heydecker/Leeb, Der Nürnberger Prozeß, p. 118.  
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Criminal Procedure of that time, rudimentary, consisting of only eleven rules covering 
little more than four pages.248 
In the following, we will take a look at the making of the Nuremberg Charter as well as 
the Rules of Procedure and will briefly analyze the legal content of the relevant 
finalized provisions. After that, we will analyze the practice of the IMT concerning 
disclosure in general and vis-à-vis the provisions. 
 
3.1.1 The Making of the Legal Provisions 
3.1.1.1 The IMT Charter 
As just mentioned, the IMT Charter was an annex to the London Agreement of 
8 August 1945. Even though the intention to punish those responsible for Nazi atrocities 
committed during the Second World War had been formulated as early as January 1942 
in the so-called St.-James-Declaration249, the legal preparatory works for the creation of 
an international tribunal started quite late, since the Allies and the United Nations 
Commission for the Investigation of War Crimes (UNWCC) had initially put emphasis 
on the gathering of materials to be used as evidence against the alleged war criminals. 
The actual work on the implementation of an international tribunal and its procedure 
was practically left until after the capitulation of Nazi Germany in early May 1945. At 
the beginning it was far from clear whether the German Nazi leaders, i.e. those 
considered to be the most responsible for the committed atrocities, should be tried at all. 
The Moscow Declaration250, which constitutes the second major public document 
concerning punishment of Axis war crimes, had envisaged that the major German war 
criminals would “be punished by joint decision of the government of the Allies” – this 
wording, however, was ambiguous enough to cover everything from an international 
trial to a summary execution. Some of the allies had, as far as Nazi leaders were 
concerned, strong reservations against the holding of a trial in the proper sense. The 
British government, for instance, was rather in favour of summary executions of those 
                                                 
248  See IMT vol. 1, p. 19 et subs.. 
249  The Declaration of St. James of 13 January 1942 (reprinted in: Punishment for War Crimes: The Inter-
Allied Declaration signed at St. James’s Palace, London, on 13th January, 1942, and Relative 
Documents) is often considered to mark the cornerstone for the IMT, mainly for the wording 
“punishment through the channel of organized justice of those guilty and responsible for these 
crimes“.  
250  The full text of the declaration can be found, e.g., on the internet at 
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1943/431000a.html.  
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persons considered most responsible for the committed atrocities. As late as April 1945, 
the British feared that the outcome of a trial with high ranking defendants represented 
by legal counsel was uncertain and that full defence rights might render the trial too 
protracted. Also, it was held that a war of aggression might not constitute a crime under 
international law.251  
The American government, on the other hand, was the strongest supporter of the idea of 
a proper trial. Since September 1944, the advocates of a proper trial in the American 
government, namely Secretary of War Stimson and Secretary of State Hull, had urged 
President Roosevelt to push for a trial of justice instead of summary executions, which 
had been contended by others on the American side as well, such as Secretary of the 
Treasury Henry Morgenthau.252 
 
3.1.1.1.1 The Memorandum for President Roosevelt253 
The first document containing specific legal information on the strategy of 
implementing an international criminal tribunal and thus forming the basis of the later 
London Agreement, is the ‘Memorandum to President Roosevelt from the Secretaries of 
State and War and the Attorney General, January 22, 1945’254. It was drafted as a guide 
to President Roosevelt in preparation for the Yalta Conference in February 1945255 and 
contains remarks on the crimes and criminals to be punished, the nature and 
composition of the prospective tribunal as well as summaries of the attitudes of the 
other main Allies (Great Britain and the USSR at that time) towards the plan. However, 
the memorandum does not entail even the most basic ideas as to how to implement the 
planned tribunal procedurally. The Yalta Conference as such was little fruitful as 
regards the treatment of the major war criminals: the only thing the ‘Big Three’ could 
agree on was that ‘the question of the major war criminals should be the subject of 
inquiry by the three Foreign Secretaries for report in due course after the close of the 
                                                 
251  Aide-Mémoire from the United Kingdom [to the United States], 23 April 1945, published in: Jackson, 
Report of Robert H. Jackson, United States Representative to the International Conference on Military 
Trials, London, 1945 (hereinafter: Jackson Report), p. 18 et subs. The Aide-Mémoire was written at a 
time when Hitler, who committed suicide on 30 April 1945, was still alive and would thus have been 
the most important prospective indictee of a future tribunal. 
252  Compare Harris, Tyranny on trial, p. 7 et subs. 
253  Sometimes referred to as “Yalta memorandum” or “Crimean proposal”, see Jackson Report, p. 4. 
254  Published in: Jackson Report, p. 18 et subs. 
255  Ibid, p. 18. 
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conference’256. It is obvious that, lacking a concrete agreement as to the ‘if’ of a proper 
international tribunal, the ‘how’, meaning the procedure to be employed, was left aside. 
 
3.1.1.1.2 The San Francisco Draft 
From 25 April to 26 June 1945 the ‘United Nations Conference on International 
Organization’ was held in San Francisco as a follow-up conference of Yalta.257 It was 
here where the UN Charter was signed on the final day of the conference.  
During the San Francisco Conference, informal discussions on the topic of the 
prosecution of the alleged war criminals took place between 2 and 10 May. Here, an 
American first draft of an ‘Executive Agreement’, prepared by the State, War, and 
Justice Departments, was handed to the representatives of Great Britain, the USSR, and, 
for the first time, the Provisional Government of France. The draft was accompanied by 
an explanatory memorandum.258  
The papers had been drafted in conference with U.S. Supreme Court Justice Robert H. 
Jackson, 259 who at the time was already unofficially appointed by the new American 
President Truman as American Chief Prosecutor for Axis war crimes committed in 
Europe, his designation becoming effective on 2 May 1945.260 Jackson was a strong 
proponent of a trial in the proper sense.261  
The two papers are quite concrete as to the crimes the Allies or, for that matter, the 
Americans were seeking to punish, and to the structure of the prospective international 
tribunal. However, they also contain proposals as to the procedure to be followed in 
order to establish the guilt of the prospective defendants.  
Some of the fundamental tenets of the later IMT Charter as regards criminal procedure 
are clearly based on the provisions of the San Francisco draft. The principle that the 
prospective tribunal would establish its own rules of procedure is contained (Art. 18 San 
                                                 
256  See Yalta Agreement VI. (‘Major War Criminals’). 
257  See Yalta Agreement I. 1. (‘World Organization’). 
258  The full texts of the proposal and the accompanying memorandum are published in: Jackson Report, 
p. 23 through 38. 
259  Jackson Report, p. 22; see also: Taylor, The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials, p. 40; Harris, 
Tyranny on trial, p 10 et. subs. 
260  See Executive Order by President Truman, May 2, 1945, published inJackson Report, p. 21. 
261  Compare, e.g., Jackson’s speech before the American Society of International Law on the topic “The 
Rule of Law Among Nations”, published in: American Society of International Law Proceedings, vol. 
39 (1945), p. 10 et subs.  
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Francisco Draft, Art. 13 IMT Charter); as is the principle of ‘non-technical’ procedure 
and a considerable laxity as far as the admissibility of evidence is concerned 
(Articles 13 and 14 San Francisco Draft, Art. 19 IMT Charter). The accompanying 
memorandum on its part contains interesting background information on this. Even 
though there is no concrete suggestion as to a set of procedural rules, it is clear that 
from the point of view of the Americans, a ‘mixed’ procedural model should be 
followed:  
It should not shock anyone that a trial before an Allied military tribunal should 
have some aspects based upon common law traditions and some drawn from the 
Continental and Slavic systems. For example, the United States and the United 
Kingdom cannot insist on the full, rigid application of Anglo-American 
procedures, the rules of evidence, the privilege against self incrimination and 
similar matters. These are not inherent parts of other systems of criminal 
practice and there is no need for leaning over backward to give the Axis leaders 
the benefit of protective principles, not afforded by German law, even prior to 
Axis distortion of German justice. The Hitlerites need only have a fair trial. 
Similarly, those raised in the Russian and Continental systems of law cannot 
properly object to having the methods of trial influenced by common law 
principles to some extent. The trial should be an Allied venture, reflecting the 
influence of the systems of justice in force in all four of the principal Allied 
nations.262 
The principal reason for this expressed point of view is clear: the Americans are 
obviously appealed by the flexible approach of the continental justice system as regards 
some procedural matters and safeguards for the defendant, such as the relatively lax law 
of evidence. This is understandable, particularly in the light of the above mentioned 
British fears as to the duration of a proper trial.263 The said motivation expressed in the 
American memorandum, however, also underlies a different theory as to the roots of the 
IMT procedural law, namely that, while effectively blending elements of Anglo-
American and Continental-European procedure, it was in fact based on the practice of 
American Military Commissions such as in ex parte Quirin.264  
                                                 
262  Jackson Report, p. 36. 
263  See in this regard also the interim Report of Justice Jackson to the President of the U.S.A. of 5 June 
1945: “These hearings, however, must not be regarded in the same light as a trial under our system, 
where defense is a matter of constitutional right. Fair hearings for the accused are, of course, required 
to make sure that we punish only the right men and for the right reasons. But the procedure of these 
hearings may properly bar obstructive and dilatory tactics resorted to by defendants in our ordinary 
criminal trials.” Jackson Report, p. 46. 
264  Wallach, The Procedural And Evidentiary Rules of the Post-World War II War Crimes Trials: Did 
They Provide An Outline For International Legal Procedure? In a slightly different context, Harris 
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The San Francisco Draft does not contain any information as to the disclosure of 
evidence stricto sensu. However, Art. 12 of the draft does contain provisions as to the 
necessary notification of the defendants of the indictment: 
DUE PROCESS FOR DEFENDANTS  
12. In order to insure fair trial for defendants charged with crime pursuant to 
this Agreement, it is declared that the following is required in order to constitute 
due process in their behalf: 
a. Reasonable notice shall be given to the defendants of the charges against 
them and of the opportunity to defend. Such notice may be actual or 
constructive. Any tribunal before which charges are tried pursuant to this 
Agreement shall have the right to determine what constitutes reasonable notice 
in any given instance.  
b. The defendants physically present before the tribunal (a) will be furnished 
with copies, translated into their own language, of any indictment, statement of 
charges or other document of arraignment upon which they are being tried, and 
(b) will be given fair opportunity to be heard in their defense personally and by 
counsel. The tribunal shall determine to what extent proceedings against 
defendants may be taken without their presence. 
c. (...)  
This is mentioned because for one, as we shall see, the ‘due process’ requirement was 
later replaced by a ‘fair trial’ principle, and, as we will also see, the views of the Four 
Powers differed fundamentally as to what documents should be lodged (and thereby 
disclosed) together with the indictment. 
In the months following the San Francisco Conference, a number of amendments of the 
draft agreement were discussed among the Allies, almost all of which, however, did not 
relate to the envisaged procedure.265 Nevertheless, it took several weeks before the San 
Francisco Draft was even officially accepted as a basis for further discussions, meaning 
that the governments of the other Allies were not immediately convinced of the 
American approach.266 On 14 June 1945, a revised version of the draft was circulated; it 
                                                                                                                                               
also makes reference to Military Commissions serving as a role model for the IMT, see Harris, 
Tyranny on trial, at p. 500 et subs. 
265  The only proposed amendment which refers to the procedure was to omit the possibility of 
constructive notice of the defendants (Art. 12 lit. a. of the San Francisco Draft), see British 
Memorandum of May 28, 1945, published in: Jackson Report, p. 39 et subs., particularly p. 40. 
266  The British Aide-Mémoire in which the acceptance of the San Francisco Draft as a basis for 
discussion is officially announced is dated June 3, 1945, see Jackson Report, p. 41. 
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incorporated several changes, none of which, however, had been suggested by the other 
Allies.267 
 
3.1.1.1.3 The Revised Draft, 14 June 1945 (‘London Draft’) 
This draft268 constituted the basis for the discussions which took place within the 
London Conference, starting on 26 June 1945. 
As far as the envisaged procedure is concerned, the new draft is clearly based on the 
former one. The competence of the tribunal to draw up its own rules of procedure (now 
contained in Art. 8) and the ‘non-technical’ rules of evidence (now contained in 
Articles 17 and 18) were sustained. The above-mentioned provisions concerning the 
notification of the defendants of the indictment were also kept. However, there is a 
slight difference in the wording of what is now Art. 16: 
FAIR TRIAL FOR DEFENDANTS  
16. In order to insure fair trial for defendants charged with crime pursuant to 
this Agreement, it is declared that the following procedure is required:  
a. Reasonable notice shall be given (...) 
As will be noted, the ‘due process’ requirement contained in the San Francisco Draft 
was replaced by a principle of ‘fair trial’. ‘Due process’, or, more completely, ‘due 
process of law’ is a legal principle which is deeply rooted in the law of the USA as well 
as England. The term was used for the first time in a statutory rendition of the Magna 
Carta as early as 1354 under King Edward III,269 and was later incorporated into the U.S. 
Constitution (5th and 14th Amendment). The concept tries to encompass basic legal 
foundations of a state of law and has developed considerably over time. Its exact scope 
is widely unclear and cannot be discussed in detail here.270 However, it must be 
understood as encompassing the concept of fair trial, meaning that fair trial is a 
necessary, but not a sufficient prerequisite for a ‘due process of law’. This goes together 
with the above quoted memorandum (‘(...) the United States and the United Kingdom 
cannot insist on the full, rigid application of Anglo-American procedures (...) The 
                                                 
267  See Jackson Report, p. 55. 
268  Published in: Jackson Report, p. 55 et subs., hereinafter referred to as „London Draft“ 
269  See 1354 Liberty of Subject Act (28 Edw 3 c. 3): ‘No man of what estate or condition that he be, shall 
be put out of land or tenement, nor taken, nor imprisoned, nor disinherited, nor put to death, without 
being brought in answer by due process of the law.’ 
270  See, e.g., Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 535, 1884: “those fundamental principles of liberty and 
justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions”. 
68 
 
Hitlerites need only have a fair trial’, see page 65). The substantial difference between 
the San Francisco and the London draft on this point is, however, little. At no time the 
Allied nations or, for that matter, the Americans were planning to grant the prospective 
defendants the full rights afforded by American constitutional law. Nevertheless, in the 
preface of his report to President Truman, Justice Jackson takes up the notion of ‘due 
process of law’ once more, stating: 
While it obviously was indispensable to provide for an expeditious hearing of the 
issues, for prevention of all attempts at unreasonable delay and for elimination 
of every kind of irrelevancy, these necessary measures were balanced by other 
provisions which assured to the defendants the fundamentals of procedural "due 
process of law." Although this famous phrase of the American Constitution 
bears an occasionally unfamiliar implication abroad, the Continental countries 
joined us in enacting its essence-guaranties securing the defendants every 
reasonable opportunity to make a full and free defense.271 
 
3.1.1.1.4 The London Conference 
The London Conference, which took place from 26 June 1945 until 8 August 1945 
turned out to be the founding conference for the IMT, for it was here that the Charter of 
the IMT was finalized. However, a quick look into the minutes of the discussions and 
the memoranda shows that, at least at the beginning, the procedure which the Four 
Powers wanted the Court to follow was far from clear. This follows foremost from the 
different legal background of the actors – the Americans and British adhering to the 
Anglo-American system, the French and Russians sticking to Continental-European 
principles. It appears that the actors, which in their respective countries doubtlessly 
enjoyed a high reputation,272 were quite clueless as regards the legal systems of their 
colleagues and sometimes maybe even their own systems.273 In the following few 
                                                 
271  Jackson Report, Preface, p. X et seq. 
272  André Gros as one of the French delegates was professor for international law and later became a 
judge at the International Court of Justice, Aron Naumovich Trainin, member of the Soviet delegation, 
was professor for criminal law in Moscow. Many of the other delegates were high-ranking legal 
practitioners – first and foremost Robert H. Jackson, who was an associate justice at the U.S. Supreme 
Court, David Maxwell-Fyve was Attorney General of the United Kingdom, Robert Falco had been a 
conseiller at the French Cour de cassation. 
273  See as an illustration the remark by General Nikitchenko on the final day (!) of the London 
Conference (Jackson Report, p. 403):  
 “GENERAL NIKITCHENKO. There is one question. What is meant in the English by "cross-
examination"? 
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paragraphs we shall take a brief look at the different positions as they appear from the 
minutes of the meetings as well as from the memoranda prepared by the participants.  
 
3.1.1.1.4.1 The American position 
The American position, as far as the procedure is concerned, follows (unsurprisingly) 
the American role model of criminal procedure. This can be derived not so much from 
the law of evidence – the Americans, as we have seen above, from the very beginning 
were not willing to grant the prospective defendants the safeguards of the rigid Anglo-
American evidentiary rules – but from the envisaged truth-finding process, which is 
clearly adversarial.  
The planned procedure was the following: 
1. Reading of the indictment.  
2. Arraignment of defendants by Tribunals, calling on each to plead “guilty” or 
“not guilty”.  
3. Opening statements by the Prosecutors.  
4. Presentation of the case by Prosecutors, defendants having the right to cross-
examine.  
5. Opening statements by defendants or their counsel.  
6. Defendants’ evidence, with cross-examination by Prosecutors.  
7. Defendants’ final arguments or summations.  
8. Prosecutors’ final arguments or summations.  
9. Judgment. 274 
This represents the most basic form of an Anglo-American trial. The particularity starts 
fundamentally with the plea-principle – a plea is something a Continental European 
criminal lawyer could hardly reconcile himself with, since the very idea of a criminal 
                                                                                                                                               
 LORD CHANCELLOR. In an English or American trial, after a witness has given testimony for the 
prosecution he can be questioned by the defense in order that the defense may test his evidence, verify 
his evidence, to see whether it is really worthy of credit. In our trials the defendant or his counsel is 
always entitled to put questions in cross-examination. And I think the same situation prevails in the 
courts of France. 
 JUDGE FALCO. Yes, the same.”; see also Safferling, International Criminal Procedure, p. 53 with 
further remarks. 
274  See notes by Sidney Alderman, American Representative to the drafting Subcommittee at the London 
Conference, of 10 July 1945, published in: Jackson Report, p. 191 et subs., particularly p. 192. 
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trial from the Roman Germanic point of view is the finding of guilt or innocence by a 
court, and not the settlement of a dispute between two dissenting parties. Also, opening 
statements by the prosecution and the defence as well as the truth-finding process based 
on cross-examination are somewhat unknown to Central European Courts.275  
Naturally, the pre-trial procedure of the envisaged court proceedings was, in the view of 
the Americans, based on the same model. First of all, and this is what matters most in 
the context of our main topic of disclosure, the Americans could not reconcile 
themselves with the idea of lodging any evidence together with the indictment. In a 
Continental-European system, the dossier containing all the evidence is handed over to 
the court together with the indictment and, upon request, to the defence.276 This, 
however, was nothing the Americans could accept – maybe not so much as far as 
disclosure to the defence was concerned, but rather disclosure to the court. From an 
American point of view, to present evidence to a court before trial and without the 
previous possibility of the other party to cross-examine the evidence is not imaginable, 
for it might leave the judges biased. Also, and perhaps more importantly, the Americans 
were afraid of losing control over the evidence vis-a-vis the court. As Mr. Justice 
Jackson noted in the discussions at the London Conference: 
Our indictment is merely a charge. It merely accuses and names the crime of 
which it accuses, tells briefly where it was committed and when, and does not 
give evidence. (…) You do not set forth the evidence in the indictment. You 
merely start the case in motion, and then the trial is for producing the 
evidence.277 
However, in a later meeting, Justice Jackson, while emphasizing that he was not willing 
to let the control of the trial out of his hands, demonstrated considerable openness to 
find a compromise: 
I notice in your article 15 that you provide that the indictment shall be 
accompanied by all of the evidence pertaining to the case. Now you see, we do 
not do that, and therefore what we have reserved is the right to act 
independently in the trial of the case if necessary, as well as in the investigation, 
while you have reserved the right to act independently only in the investigation. I 
do not see how we could act on the basis that all evidence pertaining to the case 
must accompany the indictment because that leaves nothing for the trial but to 
read the evidence (...). The indictment in our practice is intended to state an 
                                                 
275  See fn. 273 above. 
276  See already Chapter 1 above. 
277  See Minutes of Conference Session of June 26, 1945, published in: Jackson Report, p. 71 et subs., 
particularly p. 78 et subs.). 
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outline of the charges rather than all the evidence. We are quite willing in this 
case to put in a great deal of evidence for the indictment or as supplementary to 
it in some form, but do not think we could deprive the trial of all functions of 
taking the evidence.278 
 
3.1.1.1.4.2 The Soviet Position 
Next to the Americans, the Soviet delegation headed by General Nikitchenko, who later 
became the Jugde for the Soviets, and Professor Trainin proved very active in the 
discussions, putting forward their point of view concerning the envisaged procedure. As 
usual in the Continental-European system,279 the Russians favoured active judges, with 
the other participants playing a subordinate role. Most importantly in our context, the 
Russians put forward the idea of handing the evidence to the judges together with the 
indictment, this point, as seen above, being controversial with the American position. 
The issue came up several times at the London Conference. The Soviet drafts provided: 
Art. 15 
Indictment 
At the conclusion of the investigation the Commission shall draw up an 
indictment which shall be lodged with the Tribunal together with all the 
evidence pertaining to the same. In the absence of sufficient evidence to warrant 
the turning of the case over to the Tribunal the Commission280 shall decide 
whether to bring the proceedings to an end. (…)281 
At the same time, the American proposal read: 
There shall be lodged with the Court prior to commencement of the trial an 
indictment, supported by full particulars, specifying in detail the charges being 
brought to trial. No proof shall be lodged to the Court except at the trial, and 
copies of any matters to be introduced in writing shall be furnished the 
defendants prior to their introduction.282 
It is interesting to note that at this time the Soviet proposal does not contain provisions 
as to handing over the evidence to the defendant. Art. 17 of the Soviet draft merely 
                                                 
278  See Minutes of Conference Session of July 3, 1945, published in: Jackson Report, p. 143 et subs., 
particularly p. 153. 
279  See Chapter 1. 
280  Later renamed in ‘Committee’, meaning the group formed by the Prosecutors. 
281  See ‘Draft Showing Soviet and American Proposals in Parallel’, Jackson Report, p. 165 et subs., 
particularly p. 175 et subs. 
282  Ibid. 
72 
 
speaks of the indictment which is to be handed over to the defendant.283 However, from 
the context of the discussion at the conference, it is clear that the Soviets intended to 
hand the evidence to the defendants also.284 Nevertheless, the arguments which the 
Soviets brought forward in favour of this position were actually not so much focused on 
protecting the rights of the accused, but rather speeding up the trial: 
The difference apparently is on the point as to whether the material is to be 
submitted to the court or whether it is to be kept by the prosecuting officers. In 
the view of the Soviet Delegation, if the court is to be assisted, that material 
should be referred to it and reference should be made in the indictment as to the 
reasons for the charges advanced, giving the evidence that has been collected 
and leaving it with the court as completely presented.285 
As to the American critique of possible bias of the prospective judges, General 
Nikitchenko expressed his view that in a case of such magnitude complete judicial 
impartiality was merely fictitious: 
Third, with regard to the position of the judge-the Soviet Delegation considers 
that there is no necessity in trials of this sort to accept the principle that the 
judge is a completely disinterested party with no previous knowledge of the case. 
The declaration of the Crimea Conference is quite clear that the objective is to 
bring these criminals to a just and speedy trial. Therefore, the judge, before he 
takes his seat in court, already knows what has been quoted in the press of all 
countries, and it is well known about the criminal as accused and the general 
outline of the case against him. The case for the prosecution is undoubtedly 
known to the judge before the trial starts and there is, therefore, no necessity to 
create a sort of fiction that the judge is a disinterested person who has no legal 
knowledge of what has happened before. If such procedure is adopted that the 
judge is supposed to be impartial, it would only lead to unnecessary delays and 
offer opportunity for the accused to bring delays in the action of the trial.286 
This conclusion can hardly be denied, given the fact that General Nikitchenko later in 
fact became the Soviet Judge of the Tribunal – his statement was furthermore uttered in 
the very same moment as his (in-)famous quote: 
We are dealing here with the chief war criminals who have already been 
convicted and whose conviction has been already announced by both the 
Moscow and Crimea declarations by the heads of the governments, and those 
                                                 
283  Ibid., p. 176. 
284  See, e.g. Jackson Report, p. 154. 
285  General Nikitchenko, Conference session 26 June 1945, Jackson Report p. 80. Compare also p. 116. 
286  See Jackson Report, p. 105. 
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declarations both declare to carry out immediately just punishment for the 
offenses which have been committed.287 
 
3.1.1.1.4.3 The French Position 
The French delegation, lead by Professor Gros and the later Alternate Judge Falco, 
appears to have played a rather diplomatic and balancing role in the London 
Conference.288 The delegates emphasized that a flexible approach should be taken as far 
as the procedure was concerned, as the envisaged tribunal was without precedent.289 The 
French were, like the Russians, in favour of lodging the evidence together with the 
indictment, and, most probably for streamlining the proceedings, proposed to entrust 
this evidence to a designated member of the Tribunal, who should then serve as a 
rapporteur and present the case to the other judges.290 We also find proof that at a stage 
when the proceedings had already started, Judge De Vabres, the French Judge, proposed 
to introduce some kind of dossier approach.291 Judge De Vabres also published a major 
work on the proceedings in the aftermath of Nuremberg,292 and, while concentrating on 
questions of substantive law, also elaborated on the procedure and indeed dedicated part 
of his work to comparative considerations.293 As to the influence of the French 
delegation regarding the procedure, he states that some ‘continental’ features, like the 
right of the defendant to make an unsworn statement (Art. 24 (j) of the IMT Charter), 
were based on French proposals.294 However, he notes nothing in particular as far as 
disclosure is concerned. 
 
                                                 
287  Jackson Report, p. 104 et seq. 
288  Compare also Ascensio, The French Perspective, p. 40, who states that “[i]n writing the Statute of the 
Nuremberg Tribunal, French influence was probably low, as the procedure was modelled on traditions 
of common law.”. 
289  See ‘Observations of the French Delegation on American Draft, June 29, 1945’, published in: Jackson 
Report, p. 89 et subs. 
290  Ibid., p. 91. See also the interventions by Judge Falco, Minutes of Conference Session of June 26, 
1945, published in: Jackson Report, p. 81. 
291  See section 3.3.1.2 below. 
292  Donnedieu de Vabres, Le Procès de Nuremberg. 
293  Ibid., see particularly pages 120 et subs. as well as 186 et subs. 
294  Ibid. p. 154. 
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3.1.1.1.4.4 The British Position 
The British law of criminal procedure is, and was at the time of the London Conference, 
close to the American system. The British were therefore in favour of the American 
model to lodge the evidence in open court.295 However, as regards the disclosure of 
evidence, or, for that matter, the access to the dossier, they were apparently somewhat 
appealed by the Soviet and French point of view. Shortly after the beginning of the 
conference, on 29 June 1945, the British delegate Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, who was 
Attorney-General at the time and later became deputy prosecutor for the British, stated: 
I wondered whether we could consider this method, which is an adaptation of 
Professor Gros’ suggestion, as being one on which we could find a synthesis of 
our different views-that the prosecuting body, those of us around this table, 
when we have prepared the indictment and got together the evidence on which 
the indictment is based, might forward that indictment and the evidence or a full 
summary of the evidence to the court, who would then transmit it to the 
defendants. That is, the court would get it, and that would meet General 
Nikitchenko's point that the court should be fully informed of the prosecution. 
On the other hand, if it is passed to the defendants, it would mean the defendants 
had had fair notice of what they had to meet; they would then be compelled to 
say which part of it they accepted and which part they disputed, and these 
matters could come before the court. I put that forward as being a method of 
trying to find a synthesis between the different systems of prosecution.296 
And, at a later stage of the conference, the British put forward a draft provision which 
contained a surprisingly detailed regime as to which documents should be lodged with 
the indictment: 
The Chief Prosecutors shall act as a Committee for the following purposes:  
(c) to settle the draft of the Indictment and the documents to be submitted 
therewith, copies of which are to be furnished to the Defendants.  
The documents to be submitted with the Indictment shall include: 
(i) lists of treaties, agreements or assurances, to be referred to by the 
Prosecution, and copies of relevant clauses and parts thereof:  
(ii) official governmental documents and reports of the' United Nations, 
including the acts and documents of the committees set up in the various allied 
                                                 
295  See Mr. Roberts’ (alternate of Sir David Maxwell Fyfe at the London Conference) reaction to 
American delegate General Donovan’s intervention at the session of 26 June 1945, Jackson Report, 
p. 81. 
296  See Minutes of Conference Session of June 29, 1945, published in: Jackson Report, p. 97 et subs., 
particularly p. 113 et seq.). 
75 
 
countries for the investigation of war crimes and records or findings of military 
or other tribunals of any of the United Nations:  
(iii) copies of the statement, deposition or affidavit of any witness on which the 
Prosecution intends to rely save in cases where it is proposed that the witness 
shall testify before the Tribunal in person:  
(iv) copies of any statements made by any Defendant.  
No document of a class other than those mentioned shall be submitted with the 
Indictment unless the Chief Prosecutors, by a majority vote, decide otherwise: 
but nothing herein contained shall prejudice the right of the Chief Prosecutors 
to submit to the Tribunal (with the duty to serve copies thereof on the 
Defendants) at any time after the lodging of the Indictment or at the Trial, any 
other document (whether or not of the classes referred to in sub-paragraphs (i) 
to (iv) hereof) which was not available or convenient for lodging with the 
Indictment: or to call at the Trial any oral evidence.297 
This takes up the arguments of the Soviets and French, while keeping in mind Justice 
Jackson’s concern that the case might be taken out of the hands of the prosecution. In 
the conference session after the draft was circulated Sir David Maxwell Fyfe explained 
the compromise-based approach in further detail.298 The draft divides the documents to 
be lodged in four different categories: public documents, such as treaties, government 
documents, statements of witnesses which cannot be called to testify, as well as 
previous statements of the defendants themselves. The last paragraph makes clear that, 
in principle, this enumeration of documents is exhaustive, but can be handled flexibly 
by majority vote. The French reaction to this is telling. Judge Falco had obviously until 
that point not quite realized what could possibly happen, namely that documents could 
be withheld from the court and the defence, or at least presented surprisingly: 
I accept the suggested draft for article 15, but there is one point which strikes 
my mind from the point of view of a French prosecutor as a little shocking: the 
indictment and the documents lodged with the Tribunal should contain the whole 
case of the prosecution so that from the time the indictment is filed both the 
Tribunal and defendants can know the whole case against them. It seems there is 
a possibility under this draft that the defense could be faced during the trial with 
the opening of Pandora's box of unhappy surprises, in as much as during the 
trial there is liberty to the prosecution to produce something new.299 
                                                 
297  Proposed Revision of Article 15 of Draft Agreement, Submitted by British Delegation, July 19, 1945, 
published in: Jackson Report, p. 310 et subs. 
298  Minutes of Conference Session of July 20, 1945, published in: Jackson Report, p. 315 et subs., 
particularly p. 318. 
299  Ibid., p. 319. 
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Sir David Maxwell Fyfe argued against this point of view, stating from his own practice 
that this procedure would not necessarily produce unfairness, since the defence would 
be notified as soon as possible and be given time to react, if necessary.300 The promising 
discussion was unfortunately quite abruptly stopped again because other things, such as 
the decision-making of the committee of Chief Prosecutors were of greater importance 
to the participants, yet the new wording of Art. 15 (which would later become Art. 14 of 
the Charter) appeared to be generally acceptable to all participants. However, it was not 
kept. In a ‘redraft’ submitted by the British on 23 July301, the wording of Art. 15 was the 
following: 
(1) The Chief Prosecutors shall act as a committee for the following purposes :  
(…) 
(c) to approve the Indictment and the documents to be submitted therewith.  
(d) to lodge the Indictment and the accompanying documents with the Tribunal.  
This wording actually went back almost verbatim to the wording of a draft proposed by 
the drafting sub-committee on 11 July302 – and it was the wording which in the end was 
kept. The sources do not provide any specific reason as to why the British changed their 
mind and why the Russians or the French did not comment on that. Perhaps the new (or 
old, for that matter) wording provided enough of a compromise – as will be noted, the 
provision that ‘all the evidence’ should be lodged with the indictment which was 
contained in the Soviet draft (see 3.1.1.1.4.2 above) was given up, as well as the 
American proposal which provided that ‘[n]o proof shall be lodged to the Court prior to 
the trial’. The new wording leaves open the possibility of lodging documents, while not 
imposing a duty on the Committee of Chief Prosecutors to lodge any documents at all, 
let alone specifying certain types of documents. Perhaps the flexibility of the new 
wording appealed to all participants. 
On 8 August 1945, the London Charter was signed – literally at the last minute, with 
some matters disputed until the very end.303  
 
                                                 
300  Ibid. 
301  Redraft of Charter, Submitted by British Delegation, July 24, 1945, published in: Jackson Report, 
p. 348 et subs. 
302  Compare Draft of Agreement and Charter, Reported by Drafting Subcommittee, July 11, 1945. 
303  About the difficulties at the London Conference, especially as regards Justice Jackson’s distrust 
towards the Soviets, Taylor, The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials Chapter 4: Establishing the 
London Charter, passim. 
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3.1.1.2 The Rules of Procedure 
As we have seen, the idea that the procedural rules of the prospective court would be 
made by the judges themselves was already contained in the San Francisco Draft of the 
IMT Charter (see 3.1.1.1.2 above) and kept until the end. This approach, at least at the 
time, was rather usual for common law legal systems, and the other powers, though at 
first favouring a more detailed regulation of the proceedings, were persuaded by 
arguments brought forward by the Americans: flexibility and the extraordinary 
character of the prospective tribunal.304 From Art. 19 of the Charter it follows that the 
chief prosecutors had a decisive say on the wording of the procedure. It provides: 
The Chief Prosecutors shall act as a committee for the following purposes: (…) 
(e) to draw up and recommend to the Tribunal for its approval draft rules of 
procedure, contemplated by Article 13 of this Charter. The Tribunal shall have 
the power to accept, with or without amendments, or to reject, the rules so 
recommended. 
So it was done. Unfortunately the available sources do not provide any guidance on how 
and when exactly the Rules were drafted among the Prosecutors. In any event, in their 
closed session on Friday, 12 October 1945, the IMT Judges, in closed session, began 
discussing the proposal made by the Prosecution, and proposed and agreed on several 
changes.305 In the next two days, the Rules played a minor role in the discussions; it may 
be interesting to note, however, that in fact the title “Rules of the International Military 
Tribunal” was agreed on on 14 October 1945, following a proposal by General 
Nikitchenko, who presided the session on that day.306 On 15 and 16 October 1945, the 
Rules were on the agenda once more. Most of them were approved, some with 
amendments.307 It appears that the last amendments were made on the 29th of October, 
and the Rules passed by the Judges immediately afterwards.308 Unfortunately, as the 
sources do not contain any details as to how the original draft by the Prosecutors looked 
                                                 
304  See Mr. Justice Jackson’s statement at the session of 26 June 1945, Jackson Report, p. 75. 
305  Nuremberg IMT, Minutes of Closed Sessions No. 4, 5, 12 October 1945. The 100 minutes of closed 
sessions of the Nuremberg IMT are kept, together with the other original documents of the Tribunal, 
at the library of the International Court of Justice in the Peace Palace in The Hague, Netherlands. 
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306  Nuremberg IMT, Minutes of Closed Sessions No. 8, 14 October 1945. 
307  Nuremberg IMT, Minutes of Closed Sessions No. 9, 10, 15 and 16 October 1945. 
308  Nuremberg IMT, Minutes of Closed Sessions No. 16, 29 October 1945. 
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like, the amendments by the judges which are contained in the minutes of closed 
sessions are out of context and can thus hardly be evaluated.  
 
3.2 The Content of the Provisions 
In the following we will briefly name the provisions which in the final versions of the 
Charter and Rules had (potential) impact on the disclosure of evidence and analyze their 
legal content. 
Art. 16 (a) of the IMT Charter is, at least on the surface, the central disclosure provision 
of the IMT Charter. It provides: 
Article 16. 
In order to ensure fair trial for the Defendants, the following procedure shall be 
followed:  
(a) The Indictment shall include full particulars specifying in detail the charges 
against the Defendants. A copy of the Indictment and of all the documents 
lodged with the Indictment, translated into a language which he understands, 
shall be furnished to the Defendant at reasonable time before the Trial.  
However, it must be read together with Art. 14 (c) through (e), which, as we have seen 
above, contains a flexible norm as to what documents (if any) can be lodged together 
with the indictment. 
These provisions are complemented by the Rules of Evidence. Rule 2 (a) gives further 
detail as to what shall constitute ‘reasonable time before the trial’ as provided in Art. 16, 
fixing a term of 30 days: 
Rule 2. Notice to Defendants and Right to Assistance of Counsel. 
(a) Each individual defendant in custody shall receive not less than 30 days 
before trial a copy, translated into a language which he understands, (1) of the 
Indictment, (2) of the Charter, (3) of any other documents lodged with the 
Indictment, and (4) of a statement of his right to the assistance of counsel as set 
forth in sub-paragraph (d) of this Rule, together with a list of counsel. He shall 
also receive copies of such rules of procedure as may be adopted by the 
Tribunal from time to time.  
Finally, Rule 3 provides that the same procedure shall apply in the case of an amended 
indictment, and Rule 9 (b) states that evidentiary documents must be produced also in 
the language of the defendants.  
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The disclosure regime provided by the IMT Charter and Rules is thus thin. However, as 
we have seen, the topic was an issue in the run-up to the IMT and, after only a few days 
of trial, proved to be of considerable practical relevance, which we will see in the 
following. 
 
3.3 The Practice of the IMT 
3.3.1 Disclosure by the Prosecution 
In modern times, the disclosure duties of the prosecution compared to those of the 
defence are generally more ample. The reasons for this are obvious: the defendant is 
generally protected by the principle that the burden of proof lies on the prosecution, 
therefore the latter is primarily responsible for the gathering of the evidence and, 
accordingly, its disclosure. In the following, we will look at how the mentioned legal 
provisions shaped the practice of and before the IMT. In the first part, we will cover 
pre-trial disclosure, for this is what the Charter and Rules contain provisions about. 
After that, and certainly more importantly, we will take a look at how the disclosure of 
evidence went during the ongoing trial, citing only a few examples, however, in order to 
give the reader a general idea. Overall, it appears fair to say that the question of 
disclosure was a constant issue between the participants and led to numerous disputes, 
not least due to the different legal backgrounds of the actors.309 Also, it should be noted 
                                                 
309  See as a striking example the transcript of 14 December 1945: 
 “DR. FRIEDRICH BERGOLD (Counsel for the Defendant Bormann): May it please the Tribunal, I 
should like to bring up one other point, which appears to me important, because it was apparently the 
real source of this discussion. According to our legal system it is the duty of the Prosecution to 
produce not only the incriminating evidence but also evidence for the defense of the accused. […] We 
find ourselves in difficulties because, in contrast to our own procedure, the Prosecution for the most 
part simply presents incriminating evidence but omits to present the exculpating evidence which may 
form part of any document or part of the testimony of a witness. […] 
 THE PRESIDENT: Will you explain the part of the German law to which you were referring, where 
you say it is the duty of the Prosecution not only to produce evidence for the Prosecution but also to 
produce evidence for the Defense. 
 DR. BERGOLD: That is a general principle of German jurisprudence, established in Paragraph 160 of 
the Reich Code of Penal Procedure. It is one of the basic principles of law in Germany to… 
 […] 
 MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think one bit of additional information should be furnished in view of the 
statements made here that we have information that we are withholding. […] [U]nder the Charter our 
80 
 
that, whenever technical questions of disclosure actually arose, they referred only to 
material actually used by the prosecution – a general right of the defence to access to 
the documents in possession of the prosecution was not granted at any time, which was, 
in any case, criticized by the German defence counsel.310 
 
3.3.1.1 Pre Trial Disclosure  
As we have seen, the four powers at Nuremberg implemented a system which did not 
follow the Continental-European approach to lodge all evidence together with the 
indictment but rather took a flexible approach by which documents could be lodged but 
did not necessarily need to be according to Article 14 (c) and (d) in connection with 
Article 16 (a) of the Charter and Rule 2 (b) of the Rules.  
The available official documents which are contained in the official publication of the 
IMT state that the indictments were served to the defendants, together with a notice, a 
copy of the Charter of the IMT, a copy of Rule 2 (d) of the Rules of Procedure and a list 
of German lawyers. Most of the defendants obtained their documents on 19 October,311 
two on the 18th,312 and the indictment of defendant Bormann, who was believed to be 
still alive, was published in several newspapers as well as read on the radio.313 As to any 
additional “documents lodged together with the Indictment” (Rule 2 (a)(3)), the primary 
sources do not contain any details;314 the only document to which the indictment makes 
                                                                                                                                               
duty is to present the case for the Prosecution. I do not, in any instance, serve two masters.” IMT, 
p. 548 et subs. 
310  See Kranzbühler, Nuremberg Eighteen Years Afterwards, p. 336, who also makes reference to the fact 
that not only had the German documents been confiscated by the prosecution, but also access to 
foreign archives was not granted; see also Haensel, The Nuremburg Trial Revisited, p. 256, as well as 
Safferling/Graebke, Strafverteidigung im Nürnberger Hauptkriegsverbrecherprozess: Strategien und 
Wirkung, p. 75 et seq. with further references, as well as Donnedieu de Vabres, Le Procès de 
Nuremberg, p. 188. The inherent unfairness of this situation towards the defence is recognized by 
Taylor, The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials, p. 627. Taylor notes that “in normal circumstances”, 
the prosecution archives would have been open to the defence, while stating that, however, the 
“conditions were decidedly not normal”. At the same time, we have seen that an ‘open archive’ policy 
was the rule neither in the United States nor in England at the time. 
311  Certificate of Service to Individual Defendants of 24 October 1945, IMT, vol. 1, p. 117; Certificate of 
Service on Defendant Gustav Krupp von Bohlen of 23 October 1945, ibid., p. 118. 
312  Acknowledgment of Service by the Defendants Fritzsche and Raeder, IMT, vol. 1, p. 123. 
313  Order of the Tribunal Regarding Notice to Defendant Bormann, 18 October 1945, IMT, vol. 1, p. 102 
et seq. 
314  The author was given access to the original indictment kept in the premises of the ICJ, however, the 
mentioned list of evidentiary documents could not be found. Its existence, however, is proven by 
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reference is a secret order of the Naval Staff about the planned destruction of 
Leningrad/St. Petersburg, and it cites only parts of that order. However, secondary 
sources indicate that a list of documentary evidence was apparently transmitted together 
with the indictment,315 which could be accessed by the defence lawyers via the 
‘Defendants Information Center’ installed in the Nuremberg Palace of Justice. Here, the 
defence counsel could get access to copies of prosecution evidence. Copies could be 
taken, yet at that time apparently only by hand.316 Also, during the court proceedings, 
mention was made that some original documents were made accessible to defence 
counsel in exceptional circumstances.317 The defence lawyers were, however, 
overwhelmed by the mass of documents available at that time; there appears to have 
been no specific order.318  
 
3.3.1.2 Disclosure during the trial  
Before the trial started on 20 November 1945 with the reading of the indictment, three 
preliminary hearings took place, in which the indictment against Krupp, some technical 
issues as well as the indictment against Bormann were treated. On 21 November, Justice 
Jackson held his famous opening statement; the actual presentation of evidence started 
                                                                                                                                               
references contained in secondary sources, see Von der Lippe, Nürnberger Tagebuchnotizen, p. 17. 
Dr. von der Lippe was assistant to Dr. Siemers, defense counsel for the defendant Raeder. See also the 
intervention made by Alfred Seidl, defence counsel to Hans Frank, IMT, vol. 2, p. 114, as well as the 
explanation made by Mr. Alderman, member of the American prosecution team, to the President, 
IMT, vol. 2, p. 251. 
315  IMT, vol. 1, p. 58. 
316  See Von der Lippe, Nürnberger Tagebuchnotizen, ibid., see in this context also the intervention by Dr. 
Stahmer, defence counsel for Hermann Göring, complaining about the insufficient number of copies 
of certain evidentiary documents: “Yes, I have one more request. The Prosecution has just said that it 
will hardly be possible to make 23 photostatic copies. I believe, gentlemen, that if these documents are 
as important as the Prosecution said today, it is a conditio sine qua non that every defense counsel and 
every defendant should have a photostatic copy of these documents. As we all know it is easy to 
produce a photostat in a few hours. With the excellent apparatus here available to the Prosecution it 
should, in my opinion, be easy to produce 20 or 40 photostats of these 10 documents in 48 hours.”, 
IMT, vol. 2, p. 252 et seq. 
317  Affidavit by Maj. William C. Hoogan, IMT Vol. 2, p. 157 et seq. (159): ‘If the officers preparing the 
certified translation, or one of the officers working on the briefs, found it necessary to examine the 
original document, this was done within the Document Room in the section set aside for that purpose. 
The only exception to this strict rule has been where it has been occasionally necessary to present the 
original document to Defense Counsel for examination. In this case, the document was entrusted to a 
responsible officer of the Prosecution staff.’ 
318  See Von der Lippe, Nürnberger Tagebuchnotizen, passim. 
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on 22 November. However, in a brief statement, Sir Geoffrey Lawrence made reference 
to the disclosure of evidence, stating: 
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has heard with great satisfaction of the steps 
which have been taken by the Chief Prosecutors to make available to defending 
counsel the numerous documents upon which the Prosecution rely, with the aim 
of giving to the defendants every possibility for a just defense.319 
Nonetheless, as Telford Taylor later noted: ‘It soon emerged that this matter had not 
been satisfactorily resolved.’320 
The prosecution had divided its work following the different counts in the indictment. 
Accordingly, the Americans lead the prosecution committee on count one: crimes 
against peace. The fact that it was the Americans who started the trial is important in 
our context, for it were experienced common lawyers who shaped the first part of the 
proceedings.  
We will cover the first few days of the trial in a little more detail, for it took a while 
until a mode of procedure concerning the disclosure of evidence (at least in theory) was 
found.  
On 22 November, the prosecution explained its envisaged ‘mode of operation’ 
concerning the documentary evidence of the case. According to the Statement of Maj. 
Storey, the Americans selected 2500 from the ‘tons of documents’321, which they 
translated and photocopied. For the trial, trial briefs were prepared which later should be 
handed to the Judges and the defence counsel. They contained, ordered by counts of the 
indictment, citations from the relevant documents and had the complete documentary 
evidence attached to them. Also, legal propositions of the United States were contained. 
Maj. Storey pointed out that while the court would get the trial briefs in English, the 
Defence would get them in German translation. The original evidence cited in the trial 
briefs would afterwards be handed to the Tribunal. However, at that point in time, the 
documents were not actually served to the defence lawyers, but rather kept in the 
already mentioned ‘Defendants Information Center’ in a limited quantity. The president 
of the Tribunal, Sir Geoffrey Lawrence, agreed to the proposed procedure; the defence 
counsel showed no reaction, which was taken as an approval.322  
The silence of the defence counsel on the first few days concerning the transmittal of 
documents is quite telling. German criminal lawyers are used to the practice that the 
                                                 
319  IMT, vol. 2, p. 29. 
320  Taylor, The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials, p. 165. 
321  IMT, vol. 2, p. 157, 160. 
322  IMT, vol. 2, p. 161. 
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court leads the trial, and that they get all the evidence beforehand. One might have 
expected an outcry against any practice in which there might have been a chance of trial 
by surprise. However, this did not happen, at least not at the beginning. The defence 
lawyers were concerned with other things, such as a common motion against the 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal, which had been lodged on the second day of the trial.323 
Also, the communication of the counsel with the defendants was difficult.324 And, 
finally, the general conditions of living and working were, little more than six months 
after the end of the war, in Nuremberg as well as in the rest of Germany, far from 
normal.325  
The defence lawyers were also not used to the practice of trial briefs. Von der Lippe 
compared them to ‘doctoral theses en miniature’ and was dismayed by the sheer 
quantity of documents, which he also did not believe would come in German 
translation. He furthermore noted that the oral submissions of the prosecution only 
partially relied on the briefs.326  
The president, for his part, showed a quite caring attitude towards the defence lawyers 
and made clear that the documents should actually be served to the defence counsel. In 
the afternoon session of the same day, a telling discussion took place in the courtroom, 
showing quite well how the participants of the trial understood their respective roles: 
MAJOR WALLIS: I now offer the documents which establish the aims of the 
Nazi Party and their doctrinal techniques. I also have for the assistance of the 
Court and Defense Counsel, briefs which make the argument from these 
documents. (...) 
THE PRESIDENT: Major Wallis, have you got copies of these for defendants' 
counsel?  
MAJOR WALLIS: In Room 54, Sir.  
THE PRESIDENT: Well, they will be wanting to follow them now.  
MAJOR WALLIS: Mr. President, my remarks, which I am proceeding toward, 
will cover an entirely different subject than in the briefs before you. The briefs 
cover what I have already said, Sir.  
                                                 
323  See IMT, vol. 2, p. 95. 
324  See the discussion in IMT, vol. 2 p. 95 et subs. 
325  See Von der Lippe, Nürnberger Tagebuchnotizen, passim; at the same time, the defence lawyers were 
quite privileged as compared to the average German citizen, see Ferencz, Nuremberg Trial Procedure 
and the Rights of the Accused. 
326  Von der Lippe, Nürnberger Tagebuchnotizen, p. 34. 
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THE PRESIDENT: Are you depositing a copy of these briefs for each of the 
defendants’ counsel?  
MAJOR WALLIS: I am informed, if Your Honor pleases, that the same 
procedure has been followed with respect to these briefs as has been followed 
with respect to the documents, namely, a total of six has been made available to 
the defendants in Room 54. If Your Honor does not deem that number sufficient, 
I feel sure that I can give assurance, on behalf of the Chief Prosecutor of the 
United States, that before the close of the day an ample supply of copies will be 
there for use. 
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks that the Defense Counsel should each 
have a copy of these briefs.  
MAJOR WALLIS: That will be done, Sir.  
THE PRESIDENT: Members of the Defense Counsel: You will understand that I 
have directed on behalf of the Tribunal that you should each have a copy of this 
brief.  
DR. DIX: We are very grateful for this directive, but none of us has seen any of 
these documents so far. I assume and hope that these documents will be given to 
the Defense in the German translation.  
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Major Wallis. 
(...)327  
In the next few days, the defence counsel were apparently a little more settled and 
became more audacious.328 The court, in turn, asked the prosecution for the future to 
hand their trial briefs to the court and the defence before the start of their respective 
speech, as well as to give a short explanation pertaining to the same. Here, again, Sir 
Geoffrey Lawrence acts in the interest of the defence but also clearly on his own behalf: 
THE PRESIDENT: (...) And the other matter is an observation, which the 
Tribunal desires me to make to the Prosecution, and to suggest to them that it 
would be more convenient to the Tribunal and possibly also to the Defense, that 
their briefs and volumes of documents should be presented to the Tribunal 
before Counsel speaking begins that branch of the case, so that the brief and 
volume of documents should be before the Tribunal whilst Counsel is addressing 
the Tribunal upon that branch of the case; and also that it would be convenient 
to the Tribunal – if it is convenient to Counsel for the Prosecution –that he 
should give a short explanation – not a prolonged explanation – of the 
                                                 
327  IMT, vol. 2, p. 184 et seq. 
328  See, e.g., the interventions made by Dr. Nelte, and Dr. Dix, defence counsel for Keitel and Schacht, 
the next morning, IMT, vol. 2, p. 203 
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documents, which he is presenting. to the Court, drawing their attention to any 
passages in the documents, which he particularly wishes to draw attention to.329  
It becomes clear once again that disclosure to the defence and the bench are closely 
related. 
Apparently, on a common basis, the defence counsel would obtain the documents only 
in English while not getting access to the original documents (which were in 
German).330 The prosecution agreed to make the trial briefs available to the defence, in 
English, with the possibility of a German translation, to give the defence the opportunity 
to find out possible inaccuracies in the translation.331 The right of the defence to this was 
emphasised be the president.332 Obviously, however, the prosecution had not prepared 
enough copies of the documents, so they had to be given to the defence some days later. 
The prosecution promised that from the following day on, all trial briefs would be made 
available to the Tribunal and the defence in advance.333 The question of translation of 
the document had, naturally, not only an impact on the defence, but also on the bench, 
since half of the Judges were not able to read English. 
In the view of the defence, the situation concerning the disclosure of evidence by the 
prosecution was quite desperate. Von der Lippe in his diary uses expressions such as 
‘war’ or ‘battle’ of documents. Obviously, as the above quoted statements of the 
President show, the Tribunal itself was also not quite satisfied with what they got from 
the prosecution. This had to do as well with the vast amount of documents which the 
Tribunal was confronted with. The Americans were planning to only read summaries of 
the trial briefs (which in themselves were summaries already) in open court, while 
submitting to the Tribunal the briefs together with the attached documents, expecting 
this to be sufficient in order to bring the whole of the evidence on the record; a 
technique which was, at first, even approved by the Tribunal.334 This, however, would 
                                                 
329  Announcement by the President, IMT vol. 2, p. 204 et seq. 
330  See Von der Lippe, Nürnberger Tagebuchnotizen, p. 35 et seq. The primary sources contain little 
evidence on this point, however, there are indications that occasionally documents introduced in the 
proceedings were re-translated, see, e.g., IMT, vol. 2, p. 250, as well as vol. 9, p. 610. 
Notwithstanding, the defence lawyers made clear that they were willing to co-operate with the 
Tribunal and indicated that in the view of the defence it was unnecessary to translate all of the 
documents which were to be used during the trial, see IMT, vol. 2, p. 191. 
331  IMT, vol. 2, p. 215 et seq. 
332  IMT, vol. 2, p. 241. 
333  IMT, vol. 2, p. 209. 
334  See IMT, vol. 2, p. 204. See also Taylor, The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials, pages 172 and 174, 
who cites Justice Jackson as boasting to have put in 331 documents in the first few hours of the trial, 
and that his lawyers had ‘glutted’ the court with a mass of documents. 
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have meant that neither the Tribunal itself, nor the defence would have been able to 
keep track of the evidence.  
On the same day, the 23rd of November, Dr. Seidl, counsel for the defendant Frank, 
noted that of the twelve documents the prosecution had produced on that day, not a 
single one had been contained in the list supplied to the defence.335 Later Dr. Siemers, 
defence counsel for the defendant Raeder, complained that a new document list was 
handed to the defence counsel, yet almost all of the documents contained in the list were 
not accessible.336 
Therefore, the Tribunal convened for a closed session on Saturday, 24 November, and 
ordered the prosecution to find an arrangement with the defence before that.337 There are 
no minutes of the discussions between the prosecution and the defence; however, the 
diary of Von der Lippe as well as the minutes of closed sessions of the IMT contain 
some information on their content. Von der Lippe states that the main issues of the two 
meetings with the prosecution that took place on that day were the prior disclosure of 
the trial briefs with the pertaining documents, the question whether each of the defence 
lawyers should have his own copy of the brief (something the prosecution had actually 
already agreed to), and particularly the already mentioned question whether the cited 
documents would entirely have to be read in open court, in order to enter the record and 
be considered as evidence. He describes the discussions as very controversial.338  
The contentious issues were reported to the participants of the IMT closed session of 
that day by Judge Francis Biddle, who apparently served as some kind of intermediary 
between the parties and the Judges. He suggested that those portions of the documents 
the prosecution wished to present should be ‘read into the record’.339 This suggestion 
was taken up by Lord Justice Lawrence, who proposed the following procedure: 
1. Only that part of documents read in court would be regarded as submitted in 
evidence. 
2. Copies of trial briefs and documents translated into English will be furnished 
to defense counsel. It was eventually agreed that ten copies of each trial brief 
and five copies of each book of documents should be provided. 
                                                 
335  See IMT, vol. 2, p. 214 et seq. 
336  See IMT, vol. 2, p. 252. 
337  Ibid., p. 253. 
338  Von der Lippe, Nürnberger Tagebuchnotizen, p. 37. 
339  Nuremberg IMT, Minutes of Closed Sessions, No. 42, 24 November 1945. 
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3. Counsel for defense shall have an opportunity to see the text of every 
document, part of which is offered in evidence, in the Defendants’ Information 
Center. 
4. In order to make this possible, the original or a photostatic copy and one copy 
in German of each document, part of which is offered in evidence, will be 
available in the Defendants’ Information Center twenty-four hours before any 
portion of it is to be presented in evidence. 
5. A copy of the transcript of each day’s proceedings in German will be provided 
to each defense counsel on the day after the proceedings take place.340 
Colonel Storey for the prosecution and Dr. Dix for the defence then joined the meeting 
and presented their views on the issues personally to the Judges, whereupon Lord 
Justice Lawrence repeated his proposal. General Nikitchenko then proposed that a 
photocopy of the document should be handed to the defence at the time it was offered in 
evidence; Judge Biddle, for his part, proposed that the document should be handed to 
the German interpreter for a better preparation of the latter. Apparently, Colonel Storey 
and Dr. Dix agreed to the solution – which is interesting insofar as the amendment 
proposed by General Nikitchenko was actually to the disadvantage of the defence: while 
the President had envisaged previous notice of twenty-four hours, General 
Nikitchenko’s proposal might have lead to the effect that the disclosure of the respective 
documents would coincide with their presentation in the courtroom. It might be that Dr. 
Dix was more concerned with the question as to whether only those parts of the 
documents which were actually read in open court would become part of the record – 
and was obviously happy with the results.341  
Interestingly, apparently Judge De Vabres on that occasion suggested introducing a kind 
of dossier system, proposing that the prosecution should collect all evidence pertaining 
to the respective defendants in separate ‘files’. However, the other members, while not 
being opposed to the idea, held that at this point in time the American prosecutors could 
not be asked to reorganize their documents entirely.342 
The reached conclusions were summarized by the President in the morning session of 
the 26th of November:343 
                                                 
340  Ibid. 
341  The minutes state that Dr. Dix agreed to “ask the other defense counsel not to raise the document 
problem in open court but rather to deal with future difficulties in the matter by conference. He 
recognized the physical limitations upon the capacity of the prosecution in this matter.”, ibid. 
342  Ibid. 
343  IMT, vol. 2, p. 255 et seq.  
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THE PRESIDENT: As was announced at the sitting on Friday, Counsel for the 
Prosecution were to try to arrange with defendants’ counsel some satisfactory 
arrangement with reference to the production of documents in the German 
language. In accordance with that announcement, Counsel for the Prosecution 
saw Counsel for the Defense, and representatives of the Prosecution and the 
Defense appeared before the Tribunal and the Tribunal has provisionally made 
the following arrangement:  
1. That in the future, only such parts of documents as are read in court by the 
Prosecution shall in the first instance be part of the record. In that way those 
parts of the documents will be conveyed to defendants’ counsel through the 
earphones in German. 
2. In order that defendants and their counsel may have an opportunity of 
inspecting such documents in their entirety in German, a photostatic copy of the 
original and one copy thereof shall be deposited in the defendants’ counsel room 
at the same time that they are produced in court.  
3. The defendants’ counsel may at any time refer to any other part of such 
documents.  
4. Prosecuting counsel will furnish defendants’ counsel with 10 copies of their 
trial briefs in English and five copies of their books of documents in English, at 
the time such briefs and books are furnished to the Tribunal.  
5. Defendants’ counsel will be furnished with one copy of each of the transcripts 
of the proceedings.  
That is all. (...) 
The fact that only those parts of the documents actually read in open court become part 
of the record is a positive development for the defence. However, it is questionable 
whether the rest of the arrangement can be called a success. According to paragraph 1, 
the documents are read to the defence in German, notwithstanding, a simultaneous 
translation by an interpreter is not the same as a proper translation, even with the 
mentioned previous information of the interpreter, which, however, does not appear in 
the above cited summarization of the President. Paragraph 2 in connection with 
paragraph 4 might take the edge off this, however, the provisions do not say when 
exactly the documents are to be submitted to the Tribunal and the defence, they only say 
that it has to happen at the same time; from Paragraph 2, it may be concluded that the 
production of the evidence and its disclosure coincide – if  a document is read in open 
court, and the copy of it is provided in the defendant’s counsel room at the very same 
time, it is of very little help to the defence. Also, given the circumstances, one must 
conclude that ‘a photostatic copy of the original and one copy thereof’ literally mean 
that a maximum of two such copies were meant to be provided to 27 defence counsel 
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and 54 associate defence counsel. The same is true for the number of English 
documents envisaged by paragraph 4. The small number of copies provided by the 
prosecution was explained by technical capacities. 
However, on that very same day various situations arose which put these arrangements, 
especially the last point, in doubt again.  
Dr. Siemers, counsel of the defendant Raeder, tried to prevent the reading of a previous 
statement by his client which had not previously been furnished to him – albeit only 
after a friendly notification by the President.344 However, when the document was to be 
read after a recess, it showed that the prosecution had not complied with the procedure 
agreed to a few days before. As Dr. Siemers noted345: 
DR. SIEMERS: In the meanwhile during the lunch hour I have seen the minutes. 
I should like to observe that I don’t think it is very agreeable that the 
Prosecution should not depart from their point that the Defense should only 
receive the documents during the proceedings, or just before the proceedings, or 
at times, even after the proceedings. I should be grateful if the Prosecution could 
see to it in the future that we are informed in good time.  
Yesterday a list of the documents which were to be presented today was made in 
our room, number 54. I find that the documents presented today are not included 
in yesterday’s list. You will understand that the task of the Defense is thereby 
rendered comparatively difficult. On principle, I cannot in my statement of 
today, give my agreement to the reading of minutes of interrogations. In order to 
facilitate matters, I should like to follow the Court's suggestion, and declare that 
I am agreeable to the minutes presented here being read. (...) 
In the afternoon session, Dr. Stahmer, defence counsel for the defendant Goering, 
protested against a document which had not yet been produced by the prosecution, but 
had nevertheless already been published in the press. The discussion which ensued 
between the President, who once more proved to be caring for the defence, and the 
prosecution counsel, has a comical note to it: 
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, the Tribunal would like to know how many of 
these documents are given to the press.  
MR. ALDERMAN: I can’t answer that.  
COL. STOREY: May it please the Tribunal, it is my understanding that as and 
when documents are introduced in evidence, then they are made available to the 
press.  
                                                 
344  IMT, vol. 2, p. 321 et seq. 
345  Ibid., p. 323. 
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THE PRESIDENT: In what numbers?  
COL. STOREY: I think about 250 copies of each one, about 200 or 250 
mimeographed copies.  
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal think that the defendants’ counsel should have 
copies of these documents before any of them are handed to the press. I mean to 
say that in preference to gentlemen of the press the defendants' counsel should 
have the documents.  
COL. STOREY: Your Honor, if it please the Court, I understand that these 
gentlemen had the 10 documents on Saturday morning or Sunday morning. They 
had them for 24 hours, copies of the originals of these documents that have been 
read today, down in the Information Center.  
THE PRESIDENT: I stated, in accordance with the provisional arrangement 
which was made, and which was made upon your representations, that 10 copies 
of the trial briefs and five copies of the volumes of documents should be given to 
the defendants’ counsel.  
COL. STOREY: Sir, I had the receipts that they were deposited in the room.  
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but what I am pointing out to you, Colonel Storey, is 
that if 250 copies of the documents can be given to the press, then the 
defendants’ counsel should not be limited to five copies.  
COL. STOREY: If Your Honor pleases, the 250 copies are the mimeographed 
copies in English when they are introduced in evidence. I hold in my hands, or in 
my briefcase here, a receipt that the document books and the briefs were 
delivered 24 hours in advance.  
THE PRESIDENT: You don’t seem to understand what I am putting to you, 
which is this: That if you can afford to give 250 copies of the documents in 
English to the press, you can afford to give more than five copies to the 
defendants’ counsel – one each. Well, we do not need to discuss it further. In the 
future that will be done.346 
A few days later, a situation of similar embarrassment for the prosecution arose. The 
prosecution on 30 November called its first witness – without giving prior notice to the 
defence, with the argument that the agreement between the prosecution and the defence 
only covered documentary evidence. Justice Jackson also gave security policy reasons 
for not disclosing the identity of the witness before the trial. Nevertheless, again, the 
name of the witness had been given to the press beforehand, though apparently without 
Jackson’s knowledge.347 The question of witnesses did, however, not arise very 
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frequently, for the prosecution relied mainly on documentary evidence and affidavits, in 
order to keep trial proceedings short.348 The practice to make use of affidavits, i.e. 
transcripts of witness interrogations in which the defence counsel had not been present, 
was however, criticized by the defence as a ‘mix’ of documentary evidence and 
witnesses.349 
The disclosure practice of the prosecution, regrettably, did often not comply with the 
principles laid down in the agreement pronounced by the Tribunal on the 24th of 
November. In many more instances in the court proceedings, documents were furnished 
late or in an inadequate manner, such as in an untranslated form.350 It is also important to 
note that the prosecution did not disclose documents which it intended to use during 
cross-examination of the defence witnesses, thus retaining an element of surprise.351 
Some authors noticed an ‘ever increasing sharpness’ of the Tribunal towards the 
prosecution.352 However, it is difficult to ascertain that, for mere ‘criticism’353 of the 
prosecution’s practice by the Tribunal without strict rulings on inadmissibility of 
undisclosed pieces of evidence is hardly enough. 
 
3.3.2 Disclosure by the Defence 
At the time of Nuremberg, defence disclosure obligations in national systems were few, 
if one does not take into account the limited disclosure obligations of the defence 
regarding special defences. As we have seen, one of the arguments brought forward by 
the opponents of disclosure in criminal proceedings was the idea that disclosure 
                                                 
348  See also Schäfers, Freispruch in Nürnberg - der Weg zum freisprechenden Urteil des Internationalen 
Militärtribunals von Nürnberg im Fall Hans Fritzsche, p. 37 et subs. 
349  See, once again, the intervention by Dr. Siemers, IMT, vol. 2, p. 321, referring to previous statements 
of his client, defendant Raeder. In his reply to the intervention, the President stated that “[t]he 
Tribunal thinks that if interrogations of defendants are to be used, copies of such interrogations should 
be furnished to defendant's counsel beforehand.” See also Safferling/Graebke, Strafverteidigung im 
Nürnberger Hauptkriegsverbrecherprozess: Strategien und Wirkung, p. 70 et subs., with further 
references. 
350  See complaints by Dr. Sauter and Dr. Seidl, IMT, vol. 5, p. 22 et seq. 
351  See May/Wierda, International Criminal Evidence, p. 72, with further references, as well as Schäfers, 
Freispruch in Nürnberg - der Weg zum freisprechenden Urteil des Internationalen Militärtribunals von 
Nürnberg im Fall Hans Fritzsche, p. 42 et seq. 
352  Appleman, Military Tribunals and International Crimes, p. 104 et seq., see also May/Wierda, 
International Criminal Evidence, p. 71. 
353  Appleman, Military Tribunals and International Crimes, p. 105. 
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obligations could, because the burden of proof lies on the prosecution, never be imposed 
upon the defence, and, for the principle of the equality of arms, therefore not on the 
prosecution either. Also, neither the Charter nor the Rules provide anything about 
disclosure obligations by the defence. 
It is therefore surprising that in the practice of the IMT the defence was obliged by the 
court to disclose considerable part of its evidence and strategy. The first hint as to this 
was given by the Tribunal as early as 10 December 1945, when Sir Geoffrey Lawrence 
stated: 
THE PRESIDENT: (...) At the conclusion of the case for the Prosecution, the 
defendants’ counsel will be invited to submit to the Tribunal the evidence they 
propose to call; but they will be strictly confined to the names of the witnesses 
and the matters to which their evidence will be relevant, and this submission 
must not be in the nature of a speech. Is that clear? In case there should be any 
misunderstanding, what I have just said will be posted up on the board in the 
defendants’ Counsel Room so that you can study it there.354 
Even though this statement is phrased as an ‘invitation’, it is quite clear that anything 
differing from it would not have been accepted – and it provides an unequal treatment 
of the defence, for the counsel would not be allowed to make an opening statement.355  
The conflict became virulent as the beginning of the defence case drew nearer. On 4 
February 1946, the defence counsel, acting as a committee, provided to the Tribunal a 
proposal how the defence case should be conducted. The exact wording of this proposal 
is not available as a primary source; however, Von der Lippe in his diary provides a 
concise summary:  
1. After the conclusion of the prosecution case, each defence counsel would 
name the witnesses he wished to be called. 
2. The counsel read their documentary evidence, examine their witnesses and 
make remarks. Each counsel prepares a document book. 
3. Opportunity of conversation between counsel and defendant. 
4. 14 days before presentation in trial, each counsel furnishes the General 
Secretary with the document books in order for the General Secretary to prepare 
translations into the other three languages. 
5. The counsel formulate a common opinion on basic legal matters 
                                                 
354  IMT, vol. 3, p. 335. 
355  Even though the latter circumstance may already be concluded e contrario from Art. 24 (c) of the 
IMT Statute, see Safferling/Graebke, Strafverteidigung im Nürnberger Hauptkriegsverbrecherprozess: 
Strategien und Wirkung, p. 68. 
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6. Motion for recess of three weeks after the conclusion of the prosecution case, 
submitting that after several months of prosecution case the defence cannot be 
expected to answer immediately.356 
The proposal, though signed by Dr. Stahmer, was mainly the work of Dönitz’ defence 
counsel, Otto Kranzbühler.357 On 11 February 1946, the prosecution reacted to this 
proposal with an own motion as to the evidence of the defendants. The exact wording of 
this motion is also unknown, for it is not contained in the records of the IMT 
proceedings or in any other primary source. However, it appears from other sources that 
the prosecution planned to introduce an obligation for the defence as to state which 
points of the accusations it challenged and which it acknowledged; the defence should 
make detailed statements as to their witnesses and documents and record affidavits with 
their witnesses, leaving the decision whether it was necessary to call those witnesses to 
the Tribunal.358 The Tribunal dealt with the motions for the first time in its closed 
session on the 16th of February, with numerous members of the prosecutors and defence 
counsel present.359 Once again, only the decisions, but not the discussions, which lasted 
more than three hours, were recorded. After a recess of about an hour, a preliminary 
decision was taken, the ‘official’ version of which was announced by the President on 
18 February: 
Paragraph 1: The Tribunal cannot accept Paragraph 1 of the Prosecution’s 
motion,360 as to the evidence of the defendants, dated 11 February 1946, but 
directs that, in complying with Article 24(d) of the Charter, counsel for the 
defendants shall confine their evidence to what is required for meeting the 
charges in the Indictment.  
The Tribunal will announce later their decision with regard to Paragraphs 2 to 
5 of the Prosecution’s motion.  
Paragraph 2: With regard to the naming of witnesses, et cetera, by the Defense 
under Article 24(d) of the Charter, which is referred to in Paragraph 1 of Dr. 
Stahmer’s memorandum to the Tribunal, dated 4 February 1946, the Tribunal 
makes the following order:  
                                                 
356  Von der Lippe, Nürnberger Tagebuchnotizen, p. 115. 
357  Ibid., p. 116. 
358  See Von der Lippe, Nürnberger Tagebuchnotizen, p. 131 et seq. 
359  Nuremberg IMT, Minutes of Closed Sessions, No. 56, 16 February 1946. Participants included Justice 
Jackson, David Maxwell-Fyfe, General Rudenko and Charles Dubost for the prosecution, as well as 
Dr. Stahmer, Dr. Kranzbühler, Dr. Exner and Dr. Siemers for the defence. 
360  This probably relates to the matter of forcing the defence to state which accusations were 
acknowledged and which were challenged, see Von der Lippe, Nürnberger Tagebuchnotizen, p. 139. 
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In order to avoid delay in securing the attendance of witnesses and procuring of 
documents, without prejudice to the defendant's right to make further 
application at the conclusion of the case for the Prosecution, counsel for the 
Defendants Goring, Hess, Ribbentrop, and Keitel shall, before 5 p.m. on 
Thursday, the 21st of February, file with the General Secretary written 
statements giving the names of the witnesses and particulars of the documents 
they respectively desire to call or put in evidence, with a summary of the facts to 
be proved thereby and an exposition of the relevance thereof.  
The Tribunal hereby appoints Saturday, the 23rd of February, at 1000 hours − 
that is to say, 10 o’clock − for the hearing of argument upon such statements in 
open session.  
Paragraph 3: The Tribunal will, in due course, issue directions as to the filing of 
similar statements on behalf of the other defendants.  
Paragraph 4: The Tribunal will announce later their decision on the other 
matters raised in Dr. Stahmer’s memorandum.361 
Obviously, in paragraph 2 the Tribunal orders the defence to disclose specifically and in 
writing which witness and documentary evidence they intend to rely upon, also 
imposing a deadline. This was not exactly what the defence counsel had proposed, and 
also constituted a significantly unequal treatment of the defence vis-à-vis the 
prosecution. After their first lodging of the written statements, the four defence counsel 
named in the Tribunal’s decision (see paragraph 2) were apparently ordered by the 
Tribunal to rewrite their statements and specify their evidence further.362 In the court 
session of 23 February, this, together with the Tribunal’s decision on the other 
paragraphs of the defence’s proposal (which contained ample obligations as to the 
statements of the defence, the calling and sequence of witnesses, the treatment of 
documentary evidence, preparation of document books and their lodgement with the 
Tribunal two weeks before presentation etc.363), lead to a dispute in the courtroom. The 
main concern of the defence counsel was that according to the new procedure the 
prosecution could claim the alleged irrelevance of every piece of evidence offered by 
the defence long before its presentation, something which the defence during the 
prosecution case had not been entitled to. The decision was based on Art. 24 (d) of the 
Charter, which stated: 
                                                 
361  IMT, vol. 7, p. 516. 
362  See Von der Lippe, Nürnberger Tagebuchnotizen, p. 145. 
363  See IMT, vol. 8, p. 159 et seq. The decision had been prepared in the closed session of 21 February 
1946, see Nuremberg IMT, Minutes of Closed Sessions No. 59, 21 February 1946. The motion of the 
prosecution was finally denied entirely. 
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The Tribunal shall ask the prosecution and the defense what evidence (if any) 
they wish to submit to the Tribunal, and the Tribunal shall rule upon the 
admissibility of any such evidence. 
However, the defence claimed that the Tribunal had never made use of this provision 
vis-à-vis the Prosecution.364 The counsel had the impression that the President in his 
answers to the submissions did not quite address the point.365 This conclusion is not 
entirely wrong, as the transcript of the session shows: 
DR. OTTO STAHMER (Counsel for Defendant Göring): Mr. President, I do not 
wish to repeat, but I believe that the objection of Dr. Horn has not been 
understood quite rightly. Dr. Horn wanted only to complain about the fact that 
the Defense in no case has been asked previously whether an item of evidence 
that the Prosecution has presented was relevant or not, but we have always been 
surprised when a witness was brought in and we had no possible opportunity to 
make any material objections relative to him.  
Insofar as objections against documents were concerned, that is, as to their 
relevance, the Defense has always been told that for such an objection the time 
had not yet come for the Defense. 
THE PRESIDENT: I beg your pardon, Dr. Stahmer, but you have 
misunderstood. The Defense have never been told that objections to the 
admissibility of documents could be left over until later. Every objection to the 
admissibility of a document has been dealt with at the time. Observations upon 
the weight of the document are to be dealt with now, during the course of the 
Defense. I don’t mean today, but during the course of the Defense.  
There is a fundamental distinction between the admissibility of a document and 
the weight of a document, and all questions of admissibility have been dealt with 
at the time.  
DR. STAHMER: Mr. President, I fully understood that distinction. Nor did I 
want to say that objections against admissibility were turned down, but rather 
objections against relevancy.  
THE PRESIDENT: Objections to the relevancy of documents − that is to say, 
their admissibility – that is the governing consideration under this Charter as to 
the admissibility of documents. If they are relevant, they are admissible. That is 
what the Charter says. And any objection which has been made to documents or 
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to evidence by defendants’ counsel has been heard by the Tribunal and has been 
decided at the time.366 
The decision of the Tribunal was mainly based on the (plausible) argument that the 
defence was not in a position to guarantee for the appearance of the witnesses and the 
availability of the documents. There was, however, no possibility for the defence to 
keep this evidence secret from the prosecution until its presentation. The prosecution at 
least in one case appears to have tried to abuse its prior knowledge of the defence 
evidence. The Soviet prosecution obtained an affidavit of a witness long after this 
witness had been proposed by the defence, and without notifying the witness of an 
interrogatory the defence had filed with the Tribunal several weeks earlier. However, 
the Tribunal did not accept the Soviet affidavit in evidence.367 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter we have taken a look at the provisions of the IMT relevant to disclosure 
and their genesis. Also, we have briefly analyzed some examples of the relevant 
practice of and before the IMT. 
There is no doubt that, by today’s human rights standards, the disclosure regime of the 
IMT, as well as its procedure in general, could not stand.368 However, we must judge the 
IMT by the standards of its time. The factual and political situation was extraordinarily 
difficult. Large parts of the world were in ruins, a cold war was developing at high 
speed. But the legal situation was also desperate. A legal framework of international 
criminal justice was non-existent. Neither were there binding international treaties 
concerning human or judicial rights. It is therefore difficult to find a legal standard to 
evaluate the proceedings in order to be able to tell what was a fair trial in the mid 40ies 
of the 20th century. 
What we can state is that a compromise concerning the procedure had to be found, and 
it had to be found quickly. The people working on it came from different legal 
                                                 
366  IMT, vol. 8, p. 164 et seq. 
367  IMT, vol. 14, p. 528 et subs., 533.  
368  See also May/Wierda, International Criminal Evidence, p. 69, as well as Eser, Das Internationale 
Militärtribunal von Nürnberg aus deutscher Perspektive, p. 54. See recently, however, Schäfers, 
Freispruch in Nürnberg - der Weg zum freisprechenden Urteil des Internationalen Militärtribunals von 
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backgrounds, and these differences had their strongest effect in the criminal procedure. 
As especially Justice Jackson stated several times, public interest for the Tribunal, at 
least in the Allied countries, was very high, and expectations of whole nations had to be 
met. There was no role model; all of the participants did not really know where the 
journey would end.369  
As far as disclosure in particular is concerned, it may be true that, as Justice Jackson 
said in the proceedings, the defence got ‘more than much more than any citizen of the 
United States gets on trial in the courts of the United States’370. This is a plausible 
argument in the light of the history of the disclosure of evidence in criminal proceedings 
in the United States, which we have sketched above. However, if we look not at what 
evidence the defence received, but rather at what evidence it had to disclose vis-à-vis 
the prosecution, we must admit that a principle such as the one of equality of arms or 
‘equal treatment’ was not fully recognized at Nuremberg. As also Justice Jackson, 
probably not too happily, given the fact that the Soviets were commonly portrayed as 
the ones having no real interest in the fairness of the proceedings, had to concede in the 
aftermath of the IMT: 
[T]he Soviet delegation envisioned a trial with the following features: First: The 
prosecutors would prepare an indictment or “accusation” which would include 
a dossier of evidence – every statement of a witness and every document – and 
hand it over to the court and a copy to each defendant. They considered that this 
reduced the scope and probability of contest and also that it is more fair to a 
defendant than to withhold knowledge of the evidence from him until he is in 
court. There is much to be said in favor of this view. […]371 
This is an interesting notion concerning fairness, in that Jackson says (or, for that 
matter, agrees with the Soviets, that ‘fair’, as an adjective, can be compared, i.e. that 
one can differentiate between ‘fair’, ‘fairer’, and, possibly, ‘fairest’. Generally, one 
would rather expect a distinction between ‘fair’ and ‘unfair’ only. However, this 
expression must be endorsed; because it shows that the scope of ‘fairness’, while it has 
a bordering line of unfairness, also entails normative judgments which make some 
issues more desirable than others. If we understand fairness to comprise all basic rights 
of a person within a judicial proceeding, it may well be desirable, for the ‘fairest’ way 
of conducting the proceedings, to enable the person to exercise these rights completely. 
Fairness rights, however, can be balanced by other legitimate interests within a judicial 
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proceeding, which is acceptable, and the trial thus ‘still fair’, as long as the line of 
unfairness is not crossed.372 
As we will see below,373 this statement of Robert H. Jackson appears to have a certain 
impact on the discussions on a liberalization of disclosure in the United States of 
America. 
                                                 
372  See also Haensel, The Nuremburg Trial Revisited, p. 258, who states that the IMT “proceedings, the 
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other hand, Laternser, Looking Back at the Nuremberg Trials with Special Consideration of the 
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373  See Chapter 4.2.1 below. 
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4 The Development of Disclosure in National 
Systems after 1945 
Having examined the national systems before Nuremberg above, it appears justified, in 
preparation of our analysis of the modern international tribunals, to turn our view to 
national systems again. Both in England and the U.S.A., the second half of the 20th 
century saw groundbreaking changes and developments regarding criminal procedure, 
not least concerning the disclosure of evidence. 
 
4.1 England 
4.1.1 Prosecution Disclosure 
4.1.1.1 From 1945 to the Attorney General’s Guidelines 1981 
As mentioned above, the movement of the law regarding disclosure in England in the 
first half of the 20th century was slow. The above-cited case of R v Bryant and Dickson, 
however, proved influential; the same holds true for Dallison.  
However, we should turn to the political level first, for there was an interesting debate at 
the House of Commons on 6 December 1951, showing that the problem of disclosure of 
unused material “occasionally came to the surface”375 at the parliamentary level as well. 
It is remarkable in the sense that it shows that politically, a liberal, or ‘open books’ 
approach to disclosure was expressed as desirable, or even (though falsely) as actually 
existing, at the highest level at a relatively early stage. It is, however, all the more 
remarkable in the context of this thesis, since it involves, among others, two persons 
who had been directly involved in the Nuremberg IMT just a few years before as 
prosecutors for the British side: Sir David Maxwell Fyfe, member of the Conservative 
Party and Home Secretary in 1951, who had been Attorney General in Winston 
Churchill’s caretaker government in 1945, and in this position also, at first, been head of 
the British delegation at the London Conference in 1945, and Sir Hartley Shawcross, 
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Labour politician and Fyfe’s successor in the position of Attorney General and later 
head of the British prosecution team at Nuremberg. The debate evolved around a Home 
Office inquiry of Mr Jolly, K.C., a few years earlier, about one Walter Rowlands, who 
had most probably been wrongfully convicted of murder and executed. 
[…] 
Mr David Maxwell Fyfe (Liverpool, West Derby): 
[…] The confession376 was the subject at the time of an exhaustive inquiry by the 
late Mr. Jolly, K.C., appointed by the then Home Secretary, and Mr. Jolly's 
report was presented to Parliament in February, 1947, by command of His 
Majesty. In his report, Mr. Jolly rejected the confession which he regarded as 
false, and said that he was satisfied that there were no grounds for thinking that 
there had been any miscarriage of justice in the conviction of Rowland for 
murder. During the course of the inquiry Ware retracted his confession and in a 
signed statement published in the report said that his confession was absolutely 
untrue. There is nothing in the recent charge brought against Ware to require 
any further inquiry or action on my part. 
Mr Samuel Silverman (Nelson and Colne): 
Would the right hon. and learned Gentleman bear in mind that this case at the 
time occasioned the most acute public anxiety, that the recent development 
showing that this man had an insane obsession to do the very thing which he 
confessed to doing has served to increase that anxiety infinitely, that the police 
have in their possession a great deal of evidence in Rowland's favour which was 
never made available to the defence, and that in view of the enormous public 
importance of satisfying the public that an execution has not been carried out on 
an innocent man, will the right hon. and learned Gentleman cause a new inquiry 
to be made? 
Mr David Maxwell Fyfe (Liverpool, West Derby): 
The late Mr. Jolly who conducted the inquiry was known to me for nearly 30 
years as one of the most careful and conscientious men whom I have ever known 
at the Bar. The results of the inquiry showed that he had taken immense pains 
with the subject, and I do not myself see that there is any reason to throw doubt 
on the conclusion to which he came. 
[…] 
Mr Hartley Shawcross (St Helens): 
                                                 
376  Of one David Ware, probably the real perpetrator. 
101 
 
Does the right hon. and learned Gentleman accept the suggestion made by the 
hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) that the police had a 
great deal of evidence favourable to Rowland which they failed to disclose to the 
defence, and does he agree that it is the paramount duty of the prosecution and 
the police in all criminal cases to disclose all information, whether favourable 
or unfavourable to the defence? 
Mr David Maxwell Fyfe (Liverpool, West Derby): 
I certainly agree with the last part of the right hon. and learned Gentleman's 
question, that it is the practice at the Bar of England, as I understand it, that 
prosecuting counsel must make known to the defence any evidence which is 
relevant to the matter. […]377 
To be sure, as we have seen, neither the “duty” as described by Sir Hartley Shawcross, 
nor the according “practice” as put by Home Secretary Maxwell-Fyfe, existed at the 
time.378 The two learned King’s Counsel could certainly not have inferred their opinions 
from the holding of the Court of Criminal Appeal in R v Bryant and Dickson, and there 
is, of course, no proof that their common Nuremberg experience had any influence on 
them regarding this point. The fact that this debate took place between these two 
persons nevertheless is worth mentioning. 
In the middle of the 20th century some cases show a tendency to oblige the prosecution 
to disclose evidence which would cast doubt on the credibility of the prosecution 
evidence or the witnesses themselves. In 1958, in Baksh v R, the Privy Council quashed 
an appeal judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeal of British Guiana, which had 
dismissed an appeal concerning the non-disclosure of non-consistent witness statements 
on the grounds that they were in any case unfavourable to one of the accused. The court, 
however, had allowed the appeal of the other accused, for the previous statements were 
favourable to him. The Privy Council held that the credibility of witnesses cannot be 
divided and therefore quashed the judgment.379 The Privy Council, however, did not 
mention explicitly whether a duty of disclosure concerning inconsistent witness 
statements existed.380 In 1968, the then Court of Appeal quashed a conviction also on the 
                                                 
377  Available on the internet at http://www.theyworkforyou.com/debates/?id=1951-12-06a.2552.3; 
footnote added. 
378  See also the criticism expressed by O'Connor, Prosecution Disclosure: Principle, Practice and Justice, 
at p. 466. 
379  Baksh  
380  Dissenting apparently Niblett, Disclosure in criminal proceedings, p. 25. 
102 
 
grounds that material which was likely to cast doubt on the reliability of the prosecution 
evidence was not disclosed.381  
Concerning a possible duty to call credible witnesses contradicting the prosecution case 
or disclosing their statements, however, the jurisprudence stayed in line with R v Bryant 
and Dickson. In R v Collier, the Court of Criminal Appeal also stated that the 
prosecution did have a duty to disclose the identity of the witness, but not his statement, 
let alone to call him themselves.382 
The next influential383 decision after R v Bryant and Dickson regarding disclosure was, 
as mentioned, Dallison v Caffery, a civil case decided by the Court of Appeal 20 years 
later, in 1964.384 The plaintiff had charged the defendant with malicious prosecution; the 
underlying case of the civil action was thus a criminal one. The latter evolved around 
the question whether the prosecution should have disclosed witness statements which 
supported the accused’s alibi defence before, or at least at the committal hearing. In line 
with R v Bryant and Dickson and R v Collier, the Court answered this question in the 
negative: 
This contention seems to me to be based on the erroneous proposition that it is 
the duty of a prosecutor to place before the court all the evidence known to him, 
whether or not it is probative of the guilt of the accused person. A prosecutor is 
under no such duty. His duty is to prosecute, not to defend. If he happens to have 
information from a credible witness which is inconsistent with the guilt of the 
accused, or, with his guilt, is helpful to the accused, the prosecutor should make 
such witness available to the defence (see Rex v. Bryant and Dixon). But it is not 
the prosecutor's duty to resolve a conflict of evidence from apparently credible 
sources: that is the function of the jury at the trial.385 
However, obiter, Lord Denning went beyond this holding – or arguably rather 
contradicted it. In his opinion, he stated:  
[…] at the committal proceedings, the evidence of Mr. and Mrs. Stamp and Mrs. 
Lansman was not made available to the magistrates. I do not see that this should 
be taken against Caffery. He did not conceal these statements. He put them 
before his superior officers and also before the solicitor for the prosecution. It 
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was not his fault that the solicitor did not think it necessary to put them before 
the magistrates. Nor do I think the solicitor need have done. The duty of a 
prosecuting counsel or solicitor, as I have always understood it, is this: if he 
knows of a credible witness who can speak to material facts which tend to show 
the prisoner to be innocent, he must either call that witness himself or make his 
statement available to the defence. It would be highly reprehensible to conceal 
from the court the evidence which such a witness can give. If the prosecuting 
counsel or solicitor knows, not of a credible witness, but a witness whom he does 
not accept as credible, he should tell the defence about him so that they can call 
him if they wish. Here the solicitor, immediately after the court proceedings, 
gave the solicitor for the defence the statement of Mr. and Mrs. Stamp; and 
thereby he did his duty.386 
These two holdings, contained in the same judgment, are difficult to reconcile.387  
Another quite far reaching holding of Lawton LJ in 1978 had apparently no impact on 
this problematic matter: 
[The Courts] must also keep in mind that those who prepare and conduct 
prosecutions owe a duty to the Courts to ensure that all relevant evidence of 
help to an accused is either led by them or made available to the defence. We 
have no reason to think that this duty is neglected; and if ever it should be, the 
appropriate disciplinary bodies can be expected to take action. The judges for 
their part will ensure that the Crown gets no advantage from neglect of duty on 
the part of the prosecution.388 
There was no clear line in the law and practice of criminal disclosure. It can be 
generally remarked that throughout the 20th century prosecutors in England enjoyed a 
wide discretion concerning disclosure; and the question whether evidence would be 
                                                 
386  Ibid, p. 368 et seq. 
387  See also O'Connor, Prosecution Disclosure: Principle, Practice and Justice, at p. 465: “confusion of 
policy”; Niblett, Disclosure in criminal proceedings, p. 61; Plater, The Development of the 
Prosecutor's Role in England and Australia with Respect to its Duty of Disclosure: Partisan Advocate 
or Minister of Justice?, p. 123. 
388  R v Hennessey, (1979) 68 Cr. App. R. 419, at p. 426. Plater, The Development of the Prosecutor's 
Role in England and Australia with Respect to its Duty of Disclosure: Partisan Advocate or Minister 
of Justice? on p. 122 rightly points out that in the light of the miscarriages of justice of the 1970ies 
Lord Lawton’s confidence in the prosecution was “misplaced”. To be sure, Lord Lawton’s judgment 
on the point of disclosure was finally cited in Ward, which we will look at immediately. 
104 
 
disclosed or not oftentimes depended of the individual prosecuting counsel and their 
relation with the defence counsel.389  
In this regard, there was an interesting development in England at the Magistrates’ 
Courts in the early 1980ies. In about a dozen of them, a practice of so-called “pre-trial 
reviews” was established, whereby the prosecution and the defence well before the trial 
convened under the auspices of the court, in order to identify disputed issues and, if 
possible reach agreement on them beforehand. This was done with the intention to 
reduce delay and costs, which, as we have seen, has generally been one of the main 
purposes of disclosure. The pre-trial reviews apparently worked as a kind of “open 
books” discovery, where the prosecution would provide full disclosure on the condition 
that the defence would do the same, or at least provide an outline of its case.390 In the 
light of the privilege against self-incrimination, this arguably appeared unheard of, and 
indeed provoked much dogmatic criticism. However, the experiences made by the 
practitioners were apparently quite positive; and especially the defence lawyers seemed 
to have “no problem” with giving at least a general outline of their case, or even more, 
in return for full prosecution disclosure; an attitude which, however, was also seen as 
critical.391 This kind of ‘reciprocal’ disclosure is something we will come across again at 
the discussion of the international courts and tribunals below – and generally we will 
notice that apart from or parallel to the ‘law in the books’, the ‘law in action’392 
concerning disclosure, the protagonists often found pragmatic solutions.  
However, this pragmatic approach to disclosure apparently remained limited to the 
Magistrates’ Courts, and, as mentioned, only to about a dozen of them. Generally 
speaking, criminal disclosure remained more or less chaotic.393 Not least due to this 
confusion, several more or less widely known miscarriages of justice occurred, with 
infamous IRA terrorism cases, such as the one against Judith Ward as well as the 
‘Guildford Four’, the ‘Maguire Seven’ or the ‘Birmingham Six’ cases, the judgments of 
                                                 
389  Compare Plater, The Development of the Prosecutor's Role in England and Australia with Respect to 
its Duty of Disclosure: Partisan Advocate or Minister of Justice?, at p. 125 et subs.; see also Epp, 
Building on the decade of disclosure in criminal procedure, p. 49. 
390  Feeney/Baldwin, Defense Disclosure in the Magistrates' Courts, p. 59 et subs. 
391  Ibid., p. 604 et subs. 
392  The graphic differentiation between ‘law in books’ and ‘law in action’ apparently goes back to an 
article with the same name written by Roscoe Pound, 44 American Law Journal (1910), p. 12 et subs., 
see Maxeiner, U.S. ''methods awareness'' (Methodenbewußtsein) for German jurists, p. 130. 
393  See, once again, O’Connor, Niblett, Plater, fn. 387 above.  
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all of which were quashed in the late 1980ies and early 1990ies.394 All of them, it has 
been argued, were at least partially caused by lack of disclosure.395  
 
4.1.1.2 From the Attorney General’s Guidelines to the CPIA 
The felt need for some harmonization and standardization of disclosure led to the 
“Attorney General's Guidelines for the Disclosure of Information to the Defence in 
Cases to be Tried on Indictment”396. The legal status of these guidelines remained 
unclear most of the time. While they were intended to have an advisory status in the 
form of legal instructions of prosecutors only, their legal character remained disputed.397 
The principal duty of prosecution disclosure was quite far-reaching: 
In all cases which are due to be committed for trial, all unused material should 
normally ( i.e. subject to the discretionary exceptions mentioned in paragraph 
(6) be made available to the defence solicitor if it has some bearing on the 
offence(s) charged and the surrounding circumstances of the case.398 
However, this disclosure duty was limited again by a wide discretion as to non-
disclosure. Paragraph 6 of the guidelines allowed non-disclosure in cases where 
intimidation of witnesses had to be feared; many single exceptions related to the 
holding-back of witness statements which could be of use in cross-examination, another 
range of exceptions pertained to “sensitive information”.399 For the latter category of 
exceptions, Paragraph 13 foresaw possibilities to have a “limited form of disclosure”, 
such as providing redacted documents only. To be sure, even though in cases of doubt 
the Guidelines provided that “disclosure should be resolved always in favour of the 
accused”400, the discretion as to the exercise of discretion also lay with the prosecution, 
and there was little room for judicial control over it.401 The main problem, however, 
remained the unclear legal status of the guidelines and their impact on the above-
                                                 
394  See generally Walker/Starmer, Miscarriages of justice: A Review of Justice in Error 
395  Niblett, Disclosure in criminal proceedings, p. 16 et subs. 
396   (1982) 74 Cr.App.R. 302. 
397  See Niblett, Disclosure in criminal proceedings, p. 67 for references. 
398  Par. 2 Attorney General’s Guidelines. 
399  See for critical remarks on the exceptions O'Connor, Prosecution Disclosure: Principle, Practice and 
Justice, at p. 471. 
400  Par. 9 Attorney General’s Guidelines. 
401  See for a detailed description of the Guidelines Niblett, Disclosure in criminal proceedings, p. 67 et 
subs. 
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mentioned conflict(s) between Bryant and Dickson, Lord Diplock in Dallison v Caffery 
and Lord Denning in Dallison v Caffery.402 In R v Saunders et al.403, Justice Henry held: 
Now, it was initially suggested to me – though I think that finally there was some 
retreat from this position – that the Attorney-General's Guidelines do not have 
the force of law. I found a certain unreality in that submission because it seems 
to me that any defendant must be entitled to approach his trial on the basis that 
the prosecution will have complied with the guidelines and those accordingly 
are the ground rules which govern his trial.404 
He thus treated the Guidelines as legally binding; above that, he held that the guidelines 
not only applied to witness statements but to all in any way disclosable materials; and 
thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, he found that the materiality (i.e. the ‘relevance‘ 
of the evidence) was not for the prosecution, but for the defence to decide; the 
discretion of the prosecution as to non-disclosure should be limited to cases of sensitive 
evidence. This judgment became known as the “Guinness ruling”.405 It had quite an 
impact on the disclosure practice in England, in that the prosecution reacted by 
formalising its internal procedures and, most importantly, formalising and co-ordinating 
those of the police, so that the latter would start preserving disclosable material from the 
beginning of the investigation and generally work more closely with the prosecution.406 
In the early 1990ies, however, it appears that the development of jurisprudence in a way 
overtook the Attorney General’s Guidelines and in the end led to the passing of the 
CPIA.  
In R v Maguire and others407, the infamous Maguire Seven case, O’Connor LJ stated: 
The Court has now consistently taken the view that a failure to disclose what is 
known or possessed and which ought to have been disclosed, is an “irregularity 
in the course of the trial.” Why there was no disclosure is an irrelevant question, 
                                                 
402  See O'Connor, Prosecution Disclosure: Principle, Practice and Justice, at p. 469: “Confusion reigns”. 
403  1989, unreported, transcripts available at C.C.C. August 29, 1989, cited according to O'Connor, 
Prosecution Disclosure: Principle, Practice and Justice, note 17. 
404  Cited according to Niblett, Disclosure in criminal proceedings, p. 72. A summary can also be found in 
the appeals judgment, [1996] 1 Cr. App. R. 463, see below. 
405  See Niblett, Disclosure in criminal proceedings, p. 70 et subs.; Fisher, The Ethical Duty to Seek 
Exculpatory Evidence in Police Hands, at p. 114 et seq. 
406  “Guinness Advice”, see Niblett, Disclosure in criminal proceedings, p. 72 et subs.; Fisher, The Ethical 
Duty to Seek Exculpatory Evidence in Police Hands, at p. 115 et seq. The case later went to the 
ECtHR (Saunders v. UK, Application no. 19187/91, Judgment of 17 December 1996), which did not 
dwell on questions of disclosure but found a violation of the accused’s right to silence (paras. 67 et 
subs.). 
407  [1992] 94 Cr. App. R. 133. 
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and if it be asked how the irregularity was “in the course of the trial” it can be 
answered that the duty of disclosure is a continuing one. If categorisation is 
necessary we are content to categorise a failure to disclose as a “procedural” 
irregularity, and because that which was not disclosed ought to have been 
disclosed, we would expect the irregularity to be one which usually satisfied the 
adjective “material.”408 
In our context, this judgment is particularly interesting as it states that the disclosure 
obligation is “continuing”. This is an indication in favour of our hypothesis that 
disclosure must not just be seen as a procedural ‘feature’ or phase, but in its plain 
material meaning. Little later, in the Ward appeals judgment of 1992409, Glidewell LJ 
took up this notion of the Maguire judgment and added 
The obligation to disclose only arises in relation to evidence which is or may be 
material in relation to the issues which are expected to arise, or which 
unexpectedly do arise, in the course of the trial. If the evidence is or may be 
material in this sense, then its non-disclosure is likely to constitute a material 
irregularity.410 
Later in the judgment, taking up the above-mentioned holding of Lawton LJ in 
Hennessey411, he stated: 
We would emphasise that “all relevant evidence of help to the accused” is not 
limited to evidence which will obviously advance the accused's case. It is of help 
to the accused to have the opportunity of considering all the material evidence 
which the prosecution have gathered, and from which the prosecution have 
made their own selection of evidence to be led.412 
A kind of short summary, even though nominally only referring to scientific evidence, 
can be seen in the following lines: 
It is necessary to consider the impact of the legal rules governing the disclosure 
by the prosecution of material scientific evidence. An incident of a defendant's 
right to a fair trial is a right to timely disclosure by the prosecution of all 
material matters which affect the scientific case relied on by the prosecution, 
that is, whether such matters strengthen or weaken the prosecution case or 
assist the defence case. This duty exists whether or not a specific request for 
disclosure of details of scientific evidence is made by the defence. Moreover, this 
                                                 
408  Ibid., p. 146. 
409  [1993] 96 Cr. App. R. 1. 
410  Ibid., at p. 22. 
411  See fn. 388 above. 
412  R v Ward, fn. 409 above, at p.  
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duty is continuous: it applies not only in the pre-trial period but also throughout 
the trial.413 
In these words of Lord Glidewell’s judgment, we find several interesting thoughts. First 
of all, he makes clear that he ties the disclosure of evidence to the notion of the 
defendant’s right to a fair trial. In addition to that, and arguably for the first time in this 
clarity, he states that “material” means everything which strengthens or weakens the 
prosecution case or assists the defence case. Third, he reiterates the mentioned notion 
from the Maguire judgment that the duty of disclosure is continuous. Finally, he states 
that, at least as far as scientific evidence is concerned, the prosecution has a duty of 
disclosure regardless of a specific request by the defence. This can hardly be reconciled 
with the concept of a purely partisan prosecutor. It is arguably in line with the latter 
statement that the Court also, going beyond (or contradicting) the above-mentioned 
Guinness Ruling, which had held that the assessment of materiality of the evidence was 
for the defence to decide, but had left the discretion as to what evidence was “sensitive” 
to the prosecution, opined that this should rather be the task of the court. The practically 
very important issue of “sensitive” material or, as the court, utilising a then relatively 
new term, said: material underlying “public interest immunity” should, according to 
Ward, lie in the responsibility of the judges.414 Notice of an according motion to the 
court must be given to the defence. If the prosecution should refuse to let the court rule 
upon the issue, the charges would have to be dropped.415 
Finally, Glidewell LJ stated quite clearly how he characterized the importance and legal 
force of the Attorney General’s Guidelines: 
For the avoidance of doubt we make it clear that we have not overlooked the 
Attorney-General's Guidelines for the disclosure of “unused” material to the 
defence in cases to be heard on indictment […]. It is sufficient to say that 
nothing in those guidelines can derogate in any way from the legal rules which 
we have stated. It is therefore unnecessary for us to consider to what extent the 
Attorney-General's Guidelines relating to “sensitive material” (the phrase used 
in those guidelines) are in conformity with the law as we have expounded it in 
the judgment.416 
                                                 
413  Ibid, at p. 50. 
414  Ibid., at p. 53 (“[I]f difficulties arise in a particular case, the court must be the final judge.”) and 56. 
Public interest immunity, according to the decision, is in essence what used to be called “crown 
privilege”, ibid., p. 26. 
415  Ibid., at p. 57. 
416  Ibid., at p. 57. 
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It should be mentioned, however, that the actual scope of disclosure, i.e. what 
information would be ‘material’ for the defence, was not entirely clarified. Whereas 
Lawton LJ in Hennessey417 had stated that “all relevant evidence of help to an accused” 
should be made available, Glidewell LJ in Ward418 had held that all matters have to be 
disclosed if they “strengthen or weaken the prosecution case or assist the defence case”. 
The most far-reaching duty was, theoretically, probably the one contained in the 
Guidelines themselves: “if it has some bearing on the offence(s) charged and the 
surrounding circumstances of the case”.419 
The mentioned central role of the judges as concerns “sensitive” material, or public 
interest immunity, was soon rendered more precise in that a three-tier approach should 
apply: If the prosecution was of the opinion that material should be protected by public 
interest immunity, an inter partes hearing should take place about the issue, wherefore 
the defence should be provided with general information about the category of material. 
The second stage would just imply a notice to the defence of the motion without 
specifying the material; the motion of the prosecution would be ex parte. In the third 
(“highly exceptional”) category of cases, the defence would not be notified of the 
prosecution’s ex parte application at all.420  
Soon afterwards, Lord Chief Justice Taylor in R v Keane421 again saw himself forced to 
‘refine’ the disclosure obligations of the prosecution, giving them back some of their 
discretion as to materiality which they had lost as a consequence of the Guinness Ruling 
and R v Ward. Citing the unreported case of R v Melvin and Dingle, he held: 
As to what documents are “material” we would adopt the test suggested by 
Jowitt J. in Melvin and Dingle (judgment December 20, 1993). At p. 5 of the 
transcript, the learned judge said: 
“I would judge to be material in the realm of disclosure that which can be seen 
on a sensible appraisal by the prosecution: 
(1)to be relevant or possibly relevant to an issue in the case; 
                                                 
417  See fn. 388 supra. 
418  See fn. 409 supra. 
419  See also Niblett, Disclosure in criminal proceedings, p. 75. 
420  R v Davis, Rowe and Johnson, (1993) 97 Cr. App. R. 110, at p. 114. The case later went to the 
ECtHR, see note 64 above; in the ECtHR judgment, see paras. 39 et seq. As to the critique of defence 
counsel especially as regards the third category of cases, see also Niblett, Disclosure in criminal 
proceedings, p. 79. 
421  (1994) 99 Cr. App. R. 1. 
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(2)to raise or possibly raise a new issue whose existence is not apparent from 
the evidence the prosecution proposes to use; 
(3)to hold out a real (as opposed to fanciful) prospect of providing a lead on 
evidence which goes to (1) or (2).” […]422 
It was thus (again) the prosecution which was, in principle, to decide whether a piece of 
evidence was material or not.  
The final death blow for the Guidelines came with the Court of Appeal’s decision in R v 
Winston Brown423, where Justice Steyn held, similarly to Glidewell LJ in Ward424: 
Judged simply as a set of instructions to prosecutors, the Guidelines would be 
unobjectionable if they exactly matched the contours of the common law duty of 
non-disclosure. If they set higher standards of disclosure than the common law, 
that would equally be unobjectionable. But if the Guidelines, judged by the 
standards of today, reduce the common law duties of the Crown and thus 
abridge the common law rights of a defendant, they must be pro tanto 
unlawful.425 
The case evolved around the question whether material affecting the credibility of 
defence witnesses had to be disclosed in the same way as for prosecution witnesses. The 
Court of Appeal answered this in the negative; this was upheld by the House of Lords in 
1997,426 already after the entry into force of the CPIA.  
 
4.1.1.3 The Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 
The law of disclosure was thus developing quite rapidly in the late 1980ies and early 
1990ies.427 However, the courts were perceived as being too favourable to the defence; 
and it was feared that the workload of the prosecution as well as the courts would 
become unbearable. The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice428, established in 1991, 
in its 1993 report had come to the conclusion that 
                                                 
422  Ibid., at p. 6. 
423  [1995] 1 Cr. App. R. 191. 
424  See fn. 416 supra. 
425  R v Winston Brown, fn. 423 supra, at p. 197. 
426  R v Winston Brown, [1998] 1 Cr. App. R. 66. 
427  This was not only true for England; see, once again, the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in 
R v Stinchcombe, fn. 89 supra. 
428  Often named after its chairman, Viscount Runciman; hereinafter: Runciman Report. 
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[…] the decisions have created burdens for the prosecution that go beyond what 
is reasonable. At present the prosecution can be required to disclose the 
existence of matters whose potential relevance is speculative in the extreme. 
Moreover, the sheer bulk of the material involved in many cases makes it wholly 
impracticable for every one of what may be hundreds of thousands of individual 
documents to be disclosed.429 
Referring to the conclusions of the Runciman Commission, then Lord Chief Justice 
Taylor in a lecture in 1994 stated: 
No one now can doubt that there must be adequate rules to ensure that material 
which may be helpful to the defence is made available to them. However, the 
one-way traffic of disclosure by the prosecution with no corresponding duty on 
the defence, has given rise to grave difficulties both for the CPS and for the 
courts. There are problems both in regard to the bulk of the material to be 
considered for disclosure and in some cases to the sensitivity of some material. 
[…] Indeed, there are often more and more searching requests by the defence 
for material on a purely speculative basis. […] Courts are being required to 
peruse large quantities of documents and judges, instead of being in court, are 
sitting in their rooms to decide what disclosure is to be made. This is an 
unacceptable state of affairs. It shows the balance in this area has become 
distorted.430 
The Runciman Report also formed part of the discussions in the House of Lords in 
November 1995, where the bill for the CPIA was debated. Part of the opening remarks 
of the then Minister of State for the Home Office, Baroness Blatch, shall be quoted 
here, because they sum up the concerns in the light of the development of the 
jurisprudence very well: 
One of the most important responsibilities of any government is to ensure that 
their criminal justice system is fair, efficient and effective. It should be fair 
towards all those affected by it, whether as defendants or as victims and 
witnesses. It should be efficient in focusing on the issues that really matter at 
trial, and it should be effective in ensuring that the innocent are acquitted and 
the guilty are convicted. […] 
                                                 
429  Royal Commission on Criminal Justice, Report (London, HMSO, 1993) Ch 6, par. 48, quoted 
according to Plater, The Development of the Prosecutor's Role in England and Australia with Respect 
to its Duty of Disclosure: Partisan Advocate or Minister of Justice?, p. 134. 
430  Taylor, Consideration of Reforms in Progress - Tom Sargant Memorial Lecture, 19 January 1994. The 
fact that Taylor LCJ had himself been a prosecutor in the trial against Judith Ward, as well as in R v 
Kisko, both of which are counted among the most infamous miscarriages of justice in the 1970ies, and 
that, however, Lord Taylor volunteered to give evidence at the appeal (see Morton, Obituary: Lord 
Taylor of Gosforth), may be of interest in this regard. 
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The current disclosure requirements, which derive from the common law, reflect 
the decisions of the courts in a series of cases over the past five years or so. […] 
[T]he context of the current arrangements is a series of high-profile miscarriage 
of justice cases in which convictions were overturned because of the non-
disclosure of prosecution material which pointed away from the defendants. This 
reduced public confidence in the criminal justice system in general, and in the 
police and prosecuting authorities in particular, and it is understandable that 
the courts saw a need to extend the duties of disclosure owed by these 
authorities.  
What has happened, however, is that these duties have been extended much 
further than anyone may have intended. The result is a system which not only 
protects the innocent but also makes it more difficult to convict the guilty. The 
current law requires the prosecutor to disclose to the accused anything which 
might possibly be relevant to an issue at the trial, whether or not it has any 
bearing on the defence which the accused relies on at trial. It is open to the 
accused, if he so wishes, to seek the disclosure of large volumes of material in an 
attempt at least to delay the onset of the trial, and if possible to uncover some 
sensitive material which the prosecutor cannot disclose and thereby cause the 
abandonment of the proceedings. And this is what has happened in practice. In 
short, the current disclosure regime is neither fair, nor efficient, nor effective. 431 
The first part of the quote strengthens our argument made above that fair trial rights 
indeed apply to the accused only,432 but have certainly nothing to do with protection of 
the prosecution. Apart from that, Baroness Blatch reiterates the arguments for a 
reformation of the disclosure law and hints at another important aspect: disclosure by 
the defence, which up to that point was underdeveloped in England; and to which we 
will come instantly. 
The CPIA was enacted on 4 July 1996 and has been amended several times since then. 
Section 21 (1)433 makes clear that all existing common law rules as to disclosure should 
                                                 
431  Lords Hansard 27 November 1995 (151127-04), columns 462 et seq., available on the internet at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld199596/ldhansrd/vo951127/text/51127-04.htm. 
432  The question whether and to what extent they apply to victims also is a different matter which we 
cannot further inquire here; see for the legal status of the victims in proceedings before the 
International Criminal Court Safferling, Das Opfer völkerrechtlicher Verbrechen: Die Stellung der 
Verbrechensopfer vor dem Internationalen Strafgerichtshof. 
433  “Common law rules as to disclosure 
 (1)Where this Part applies as regards things falling to be done after the relevant time in relation to an 
alleged offence, the rules of common law which— 
 (a)were effective immediately before the appointed day, and 
 (b)relate to the disclosure of material by the prosecutor, 
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be superseded by the CPIA. In accordance with s. 23, a Code of Practice was issued by 
the Secretary of State.434 To put it in simple terms, until 2003, the CPIA at first 
implemented a three stage approach, consisting of ‘primary disclosure’ by the 
prosecution, followed by a ‘defence case statement’ by the defence, and a subsequent 
‘secondary disclosure’ by the prosecution.435 Primary disclosure obligations of the 
prosecution basically extend to “material which […] might reasonably be considered 
capable of undermining the case for the prosecution against the accused or of assisting 
the case for the accused”436, which is a clear limitation compared with the wording of 
the Guidelines (“if it has some bearing on the offence(s) charged and the surrounding 
circumstances of the case”). After that, it is up to the defence to provide the prosecution 
as well as the court with a defence case statement, where a general outline of the 
defence must be stated, including factual and legal issues which are disputed as well as 
limited information on evidence the accused intends to rely on.437 This is also where, 
apparently for the first time, the disclosure of the evidence for the prosecution case 
comes into play, in that s. 5 (1)(b) and s. 6 (1)(b) provide that the defence case 
statement need not be made before the prosecution evidence has been disclosed. One 
may notice that this disclosure to the court is rather untypical for the traditional 
adversarial trial and just once more shows that modern day disclosure cannot be seen as 
detached from the court anymore. According to CPIA s. 6E (4), the judge may, on 
application by one of the parties or on his own motion, direct that the defence case 
statement is given to the jury, which is also highly unusual for the typically oral 
proceedings before juries. Notably, however, the material which is disclosed by the 
prosecution is not disclosed to the court. As to the scope of the investigations, it is 
noteworthy that an apparently ‘neutral’, as opposed to partisan, duty is imposed on the 
investigation authorities by the CPIA Code of Practice: “In conducting an investigation, 
the investigator should pursue all reasonable lines of inquiry, whether these point 
towards or away from the suspect.”438 If the accused does not submit a defence 
statement or submits one which is defective, or if the time limit for its submission has 
expired, the court may infer negative conclusions from this fact.439 The handing over of 
                                                                                                                                               
 do not apply as regards things falling to be done after that time in relation to the alleged offence.” 
434  Available at http://www.xact.org.uk/information/downloads/CPIA/Disclosure_code_of_practice.pdf. 
435  See also Taylor, Advance Disclosure: Reflections on the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act, 
at p. 115 et seq. 
436  CPIA s. 3 (1) (a). 
437  CPIA s. 5 through 6A. 
438  S. 3.5 CPIA Code of Practice. 
439  CPIA s. 11 (5): “Where this section applies— 
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the defence case statement until 2003 triggered a secondary disclosure duty of the 
prosecution. By the Criminal Justice Act of 2003440 the mentioned secondary disclosure 
by the prosecution was replaced by a continuing duty of the prosecutor to “review at 
any given time” whether more unused material needs to be disclosed,441 meaning a 
replacement of the ‘three stage approach’ by a ‘two stage’ one. At the same time, an 
objective standard was introduced as to what material needs to be disclosed, in that the 
wording “in the prosecutor’s opinion might undermine” was replaced by “might 
reasonably be considered capable of undermining”.442 
 
4.1.2 Defence Disclosure 
As was just mentioned, since the introduction of the CPIA in 1996, the defence must 
provide the prosecution with a defence statement, in order to support the prosecution 
with its disclosure obligations. Originally, the CPIA in s. 5 foresaw that the accused 
would have to give a general outline of his defence and the matters on which he took 
issue with the prosecution; if he was to invoke a defence of alibi, he would have to 
name the names and particulars of his witnesses.443 These regulations were, by the 
                                                                                                                                               
 (a)the court or any other party may make such comment as appears appropriate; 
 (b)the court or jury may draw such inferences as appear proper in deciding whether the accused is 
guilty of the offence concerned.” 
440  2003 c. 44. 
441  S. 37 Criminal Justice Act 2003 (s. 7A CPIA). 
442  S. 32 (1) Criminal Justice Act 2003 (s. 1(3) CPIA). 
443  S. 5(5): Compulsory disclosure by accused. 
 […] 
 Where this section applies, the accused must give a defence statement to the court and the prosecutor. 
 (6)For the purposes of this section a defence statement is a written statement— 
 (a)setting out in general terms the nature of the accused’s defence, 
 (b)indicating the matters on which he takes issue with the prosecution, and 
 (c)setting out, in the case of each such matter, the reason why he takes issue with the prosecution. 
 (7)If the defence statement discloses an alibi the accused must give particulars of the alibi in the 
statement, including— 
 (a)the name and address of any witness the accused believes is able to give evidence in support of the 
alibi, if the name and address are known to the accused when the statement is given; 
 (b)any information in the accused’s possession which might be of material assistance in finding any 
such witness, if his name or address is not known to the accused when the statement is given. 
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Criminal Justice Act of 2003, ‘moved’ into s. 6A, with little substantial amendments. A 
specific disclosure duty of the accused as regards alibi defence is also contained in s. 11 
of the Criminal Justice Act 1967444, which was the first time that defence disclosure 
officially appeared within the English system, thus much later than in the United 
States.445 In the future, it is apparently planned to generally oblige the accused to 
disclose the details of witnesses as well as experts he intends to call in his defence.446 
Obviously, a general duty of the accused to disclose the particulars of his witnesses 
would render the specific duty to disclose the particulars of alibi witnesses obsolete. 
Other than that, the accused is planned to be obliged to ‘update’ his defence statement, 
meaning a continuing duty of disclosure similar to that of the prosecution.447  
 
4.1.3 Conclusion 
Summing up, for England we can state that a development which started several 
hundred years ago took up considerable speed towards the end of the 20th century. 
Together with that, we notice a change of paradigm as regards the procedural roles of 
the participants at trial, especially the role of the prosecution. It has developed from a 
mostly partisan party of the proceedings to a more neutral ‘minister of justice’. 
Investigation authorities are obliged to investigate more neutrally; the prosecution is 
made more responsible for the conduct of the investigation; the clear separation 
between investigation and prosecution thus becomes more permeable. Together with 
that, the prosecution forced to disclose more and more of its material, and, since about 
the middle of the 20th century, also particularly of that which it is not going to use. But 
also the defence is, in the interests of a more efficient justice, obliged to disclose much 
more material than it used to; with the prospective new sections 6B, 6C and 6D of the 
                                                                                                                                               
 (8)For the purposes of this section evidence in support of an alibi is evidence tending to show that by 
reason of the presence of the accused at a particular place or in a particular area at a particular time he 
was not, or was unlikely to have been, at the place where the offence is alleged to have been 
committed at the time of its alleged commission. 
 (9)The accused must give a defence statement under this section during the period which, by virtue of 
section 12, is the relevant period for this section.” 
444  1967 c. 80. 
445  In this regard, it may be noted that in Scotland defence disclosure regarding all affirmative defences 
had been in place since the end of the 19th century, see Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act, 50 & 51 
Vict. c. 35, § 36 (1887). 
446  See prospective sections 6C and 6D CPIA, as shown on http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1996/25, 
retrieved on 09 October 2012. 
447  See prospective section 6B CPIA, ibid. 
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CPIA448, the defence will actually underly similar disclosure duties as the prosecution. 
Together with that, the courts are called upon to work as controllers of the justice 
process, especially regarding the prosecution; not only during the trial, but also in the 
pre-trial process. Over time, the courts themselves took a more and more self-confident 
approach towards controlling the prosecution.  
Regardless of the criticism of part of the outcome, it appears justified to say that the 
judiciary and the legislator found that more disclosure (from both sides) leads to more 
fairness and more efficient proceedings. 
 
4.2 The United States of America 
As we have seen above, most federal states had disclosure provisions in place by the 
middle of the century, albeit disclosure was still considered a matter of discretion (of the 
court), and not of right (of the accused).449 On the federal level, with the limited scope of 
disclosure allowed by the FRCP, regulations were lagging behind.  
From the beginning of the 1950ies through the 1960ies, criminal disclosure apparently 
was one of the most dominant issues in the legal discussion; the debate has been 
described as “classic”.450 This is understandable, since, as we have noted, disclosure 
goes to the heart of criminal procedure itself, and indeed touches upon fundamental 
questions regarding fairness and the purpose of criminal procedure. We can 
discriminate two major sources of disclosure and its development in the second half of 
the 20th century: the FRCP in its different versions, as well as, and at least as 
importantly, the jurisprudence, particularly of the U.S. Supreme Court, which based 
certain disclosure obligations of the prosecution directly on the due process clause of 
the 5th or 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution. Since this jurisprudence in 
part influenced the development of the FRCP, it appears reasonable to start with the 
jurisprudence. Also, the jurisprudence is particularly instructive as it demonstrates the 
underlying arguments in favour of and against disclosure much better than the statutory 
law, which is why the emphasis will be laid on the jurisprudence. We will first take a 
look, for historical reasons, on three decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court regarding 
disclosure in which Robert H. Jackson, back at the Court as Associate Justice after 
Nuremberg, took part. Furthermore, we will concentrate on the description and analysis 
                                                 
448  Notes 446 and 447, respectively. 
449  See Chapter 2, 1.2.3 supra. 
450  LaFave/Israel/King/Kerr, Criminal procedure, § 20.1(a). See also the references at Traynor, Ground 
Lost and Found in Criminal Discovery, fn. 2. 
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of some landmark decisions of American courts regarding disclosure, in order to 
illustrate the debate and find out which were the issues that concerned the judicial 
practice. At the same time, reference will be made to some of the legal scholarship. In 
contrast to the description of the English system, it does not appear reasonable to 
identify specific chronological phases. 
 
4.2.1 Prosecution Disclosure 
The early judicial practice after World War II remained sceptical and widely 
inconsistent regarding disclosure. The vast majority of the decisions evolved around the 
question whether the defendant must be allowed to inspect his own statements and 
confessions, a matter which obviously relates both to the prosecution case and the 
defence case.451 On several occasions, federal courts found that Rule 16 FRCP did not 
apply to confessions or other statements of the defendant, which was based on the 
drafting history of Rule 16,452 the scope of which had been narrowed instead of 
widened; at the same time, it was regularly reiterated that ‘fishing expeditions’ by the 
defence could not be allowed.453 There was, however, some sporadic jurisprudence 
which allowed the inspection of confessions on the grounds that a defendant’s statement 
by right must be considered a property interest belonging to him.454 As to the above-
mentioned question whether Rule 16 FRCP could be circumvented by resort to a motion 
for subpoena duces tecum according to Rule 17 (c) FRCP, the U.S. Supreme Court in its 
1951 decision in Bowman Dairy Co. v. U.S.455, a decision in which Justice Jackson took 
                                                 
451  Compare on the pivotal role of the confession the notion of Chief Justice Weintraub in State v. 
Johnson, 28 N.J. 133, 145 A.2d 313, N.J. 1958, at p. 137: “We must be mindful of the role of a 
confession. It frequently becomes the core of the State's case. It is not uncommon for the judicial 
proceeding to become more of a review of what transpired at headquarters than a trial of the basic 
criminal event itself.” See for a more thorough analysis of this issue 4.2.1.1 (State v. Tune) below. 
452  See, once again, section 2.2.1 above 
453  See as to the drafting history of Rule 16 FRCP section 2.2.1. above; Shores v. United States, 174 F.2d 
838, C.A.8 1949; endorsed by United States v. Pete, 111 F.Supp. 292, D.C.D.C. 1953; see also 
Schaffer v. U.S., 221 F.2d 17, C.A.5 1955, as well as e.g. United States v. Peltz, 18 F.R.D. 394, 
S.D.N.Y., 1955; United States v. Gogel, 19 F.R.D. 107, S.D.N.Y., 1956; United States v. Chandler, 7 
F.R.D. 365, D.C.Mass., 1947. To the latter case, the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari and a 
rehearing; see Chandler v. U.S., 336 U.S. 918, 69 S.Ct. 640 (Mem), U.S., 1949; as well as 336 U.S. 
947, 69 S.Ct. 809 (Mem), U.S., 1949, respectively. 
454  See references at Kaufman, Criminal Discovery and Inspection of Defendant's Own Statements in the 
Federal Courts, at p. 114, notes 9 and 10. 
455  Bowman Dairy Co. v. U.S., 341 U.S. 214, 71 S.Ct. 675, U.S. 1951. 
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part, held that in principle both provisions are applicable at the same time. In this case, 
the defendants had made discovery motions according to Rule 16 FRCP in respect to all 
material covered by the provision,456 as well as subpoenas duces tecum according to 
Rule 17 (c) FRCP457, concerning “certain other books, papers, documents and objects 
obtained by the Government by means other than seizure or process”. These motions 
were granted by the District Court; and the government attorney who refused to produce 
the documents in order to protect confidential informants was held in contempt of court. 
The government appealed the decision, and the Court of Appeals reversed on the 
mentioned grounds of the drafting history of Rule 16; holding that a circumvention by 
Rule 17 (c) was impossible, since it appeared from the wording that it is only directed at 
witnesses and not at parties.458 Chief Judge Major pointed out for the majority: 
Defendants' construction of Rule 17 not only brings it in irreconcilable conflict 
with Rule 16 but strips the latter of all meaning. If such construction be 
accepted, I perceive no reason why a defendant would ever proceed under Rule 
16. Why bother to go into court and obtain an order directing the government to 
make the limited production required under Rule 16 when much more could be 
obtained merely by filling in the blank space of a subpoena as provided for in 
Rule 17?[…] Thus, as I read Rules 16 and 17, there is no conflict. Each is 
designed to serve a separate and distinct purpose. Rule 16 confers a limited 
privilege upon a defendant and to a like extent imposes an obligation upon ‘the 
attorney for the government’. Rule 17 enables either party to obtain the 
attendance of a witness for the purpose of giving testimony, which witness may 
‘also’ be required to produce documents. In the latter event, the court may order 
                                                 
456  See once again Rule 16 FRCP 1946: “Upon motion of a defendant at any time after the filing of the 
indictment or information, the court may order the attorney for the government to permit the 
defendant to inspect and copy or photograph designated books, papers, documents or tangible objects, 
obtained from or belonging to the defendant or obtained from others by seizure or by process, upon a 
showing that the items sought may be material to the preparation of his defense and that the request is 
reasonable. The order shall specify the time, place and manner of making the inspection and of taking 
the copies or photographs and may prescribe such terms and conditions as are just.” 
457  See once again Rule 17 (c) FRCP 1946: “[Subpoena] [f]or Production of Documentary Evidence and 
of Objects. A subpoena may also command the person to whom it is directed to produce the books, 
papers, documents or other objects designated therein. The court on motion made promptly may quash 
or modify the subpoena if compliance would be unreasonable or oppressive. The court may direct that 
books, papers, documents or objects designated in the subpoena be produced before the court at a time 
prior to the trial or prior to the time when they are to be offered in evidence and may upon their 
production permit the books, papers, documents or objects or portions thereof to be inspected by the 
parties and their attorneys.” 
458  U.S. v. Bowman Dairy Co., 185 F.2d 159, C.A.7 (Ill.), 1950, at p 165. 
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such documents produced prior to trial and may permit their inspection by ‘the 
parties and their attorneys.459 
Circuit Judge Lindley dissented, holding: 
Rule 17(c) authorizes a subpoena duces tecum, - an age-old expedient for 
securing the production of documents at the trial. However, it adds an 
innovation, in that the documents subpoenaed may be ordered produced prior to 
trial, for inspection. If we ignore this plain provision, then defendants may have 
only the documents mentioned in Rule 16; they may not have access to the 
additional documents authorized by 17(c); they are thereby completely 
prevented from employing the means provided by 17(c). Such a conclusion, it 
seems to me, does violence to the plain language of the rule. […] Why should the 
fact that the person who has the documents happens to be an attorney destroy 
the rule? […] Could the defendants successfully object to a similar subpoena 
served upon one of their counsel, commanding him to produce documents in his 
possession for inspection, as the rule provides, simply because it is addressed to 
one who is counsel in the case? I think not. 
I agree with Judge Major that there is no conflict between the two rules and that 
each is ‘designed to serve a separate and distinct purpose.’ But I must part 
company with him when he concludes that we must absolve the government from 
compliance with a rule general in terms and applicable to any person merely 
because the person named in the subpoena happens to be a lawyer for the 
government.460 
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and basically agreed with Judge Lintley’s 
dissent.  
It was not intended by Rule 16 to give a limited right of discovery, and then by 
Rule 17 to give a right of discovery in the broadest terms. […] Rule 17(c) was 
not intended to provide an additional means of discovery. Its chief innovation 
was to expedite the trial by providing a time and place before trial for the 
inspection of the subpoenaed materials. However, the plain words of the Rule 
are not to be ignored. They must be given their ordinary meaning to carry out 
the purpose of establishing a more liberal policy for the production, inspection 
and use of materials at the trial.  There was no intention to exclude from the 
reach of process of the defendant any material that had been used before the 
grand jury or could be used at the trial. In short, any document or other 
materials, admissible as evidence, obtained by the Government by solicitation or 
voluntarily from third persons is subject to subpoena. […] Where the court 
                                                 
459  Ibid., at p. 166. 
460  Ibid., at p. 167. 
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concludes that such materials ought to be produced, it should, of course, be 
solicitous to protect against disclosures of the identity of informants, and the 
method, manner and circumstances of the Government's acquisition of the 
materials.461 
The Court, however, quashed the subpoena issued by the District Court in part, holding 
it was too broad, thereby retaining its established jurisprudence that disclosure must 
never amount to a ‘fishing expedition’: 
Clause (c), which is the last clause in the subpoena, reads as follows: 
‘are relevant to the allegations or charges contained in said indictment, whether 
or not they might constitute evidence with respect to the guilt or innocence of 
any of the defendants * * *.’ 
This is a catch-all provision, not intended to produce evidentiary materials but 
is merely a fishing expedition to see what may turn up. The clause is therefore 
invalid.462 
It is also to be noted that this ruling has as a consequence that the material which is to 
be produced must in itself be admissible as evidence.463 This can pose difficulties with 
regard to confessions.464  
As to this question, and in the respective application of Rule 16, the federal courts 
retained a restrictive approach. In the U.S. Supreme Court case of Leland v. State of 
Oregon465 the Court, though tacitly, endorsed this practice, even though, as we have 
seen, Justice Jackson, who participated in the case, had recognized with regard to 
Nuremberg that full disclosure might generally be “more fair”.466 The Court stated that 
                                                 
461  Bowman Dairy Co. v. U.S., fn. 455 supra, at p. 679, reference omitted. 
462  Ibid. 
463  “In short, any document or other materials, admissible as evidence, obtained by the Government by 
solicitation or voluntarily from third persons is subject to subpoena.”, fn. 461 
464  See Kaufman, Criminal Discovery and Inspection of Defendant's Own Statements in the Federal 
Courts, at p. 1115 et seq.: “[W]here the material sought to be subpoenaed is a recorded statement, the 
question is more complicated since it is probable that the only evidential value the material may have 
for defendant is for purposes of impeachment, and then only if the Government introduces testimonial 
evidence relating to its contents. The problem is similar where the statement is signed by defendant 
and admissible against him, since, if the Government should present at trial only those portions of the 
statement which constitute admissions, the defendant may desire to introduce other portions of the 
statement which are exculpatory. Consequently, in both these situations any utilization of the 
statement for evidentiary purposes is dependent on the prosecution first placing all or part of the 
statement before the court.”, references omitted. 
465  Leland v. State of Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 72 S.Ct. 1002, U.S. 1952. 
466  See section 3.4 above. 
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while the disclosure of the defendant’s confession might be recommendable, its non-
disclosure was in itself certainly no infringement of due process:  
Appellant also contends that the trial court's refusal to require the district 
attorney to make one of appellant's confessions available to his counsel before 
trial was contrary to due process. We think there is no substance in this 
argument. […] While it may be the better practice for the prosecution thus to 
exhibit a confession, failure to do so in this case in no way denied appellant a 
fair trial. The record shows that the confession was produced in court five days 
before appellant rested his case. There was ample time both for counsel and 
expert witnesses to study the confession. In addition the trial judge offered 
further time for that purpose but it was refused. There is no indication in the 
record that appellant was prejudiced by the inability of his counsel to acquire 
earlier access to the confession.467 
This holding is not entirely clear, since it leaves open the question whether, had the 
confession not been produced five days before the accused rested his case, the Court 
would have found that due process was in fact violated. 
Apart from that, however, there is one decision on disclosure in which Justice Jackson 
himself delivered the opinion of the Court regarding, in the English nomenclature, 
‘unused’ material. As already mentioned above, there had been some jurisprudence, 
particularly in the 1930ies and 1940ies, regarding material which contradicted witness 
statements given in court, the production of which could be required for impeaching the 
witness in cross-examination.468 Also in this case, the witness, an accomplice of the 
accused on the stand had admitted that he had given statements to the prosecution 
before his final one, which differed in that the previous ones had not involved the 
accused. The defence had demanded from the court production of these documents for 
their inspection, but the motion had been denied, for it was held that the statements in 
themselves might not be admissible as evidence, and it would not have amounted to 
reversible error, had the trial judge excluded the documents. Justice Jackson 
distinguished between the question of production for inspection on the grounds to 
impeach a witness in cross-examination and the question of production of evidence in 
the technical sense. He held: 
Demands for production and offers in evidence raise related issues but 
independent ones, and production may sometimes be required though inspection 
may show that the document could properly be excluded. […] The demand was 
for production of these specific documents and did not propose any broad or 
                                                 
467  Leland v. State of Or., fn. 465 supra, at p. 801 et seq. 
468  See section 2.2.1 above. 
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blind fishing expedition among documents possessed by the Government on the 
chance that something impeaching might turn up. Nor was this a demand for 
statements taken from persons or informants not offered as witnesses. The 
Government did not assert any privilege for the documents on grounds of 
national security, confidential character, public interest, or otherwise. […] 
Despite some contrary holdings on which the courts below may have relied, we 
think their reasoning is outweighed by that of highly respectable authority in 
state and lower federal courts in support of the view that an accused is entitled 
to the production of such documents. Indeed, we would find it hard to withstand 
the force of Judge Cooley’s observation in a similar situation that ‘the state has 
no interest in interposing any obstacle to the disclosure of the facts, unless it is 
interested in convicting accused parties on the testimony of untrustworthy 
persons.’469 […] It is unnecessary to decide whether it would have been 
reversible error for the trial judge to exclude these statements once they had 
been produced and inspected. For production purposes, it need only appear that 
the evidence is relevant, competent, and outside of any exclusionary rule; for 
rarely can the trial judge understandingly exercise his discretion to exclude a 
document which he has not seen, and no appellate court could rationally say 
whether the excluding of evidence unknown to the record was error, or, if so, 
was harmless. The question to be answered on an application for an order to 
produce is one of admissibility under traditional canons of evidence, and not 
whether exclusion might be overlooked as harmless error.470 
Justice Jackson went on to say that it was not enough that the contradiction between the 
witness’ statements was already apparent from the cross-examination, but that the 
documents themselves were the more accurate and reliable evidence and would have 
corroborated the contradiction of the statements; this surely reminds us of Jackson’s 
practice in Nuremberg to predominantly rely on documentary evidence instead of 
witnesses, even though the scope of the trials is obviously not comparable.471 This 
judgment is in line with the jurisprudence mentioned above; it once again shows the 
relation between disclosure and truth-finding. However, Jackson stays cautious in that 
he still demands, or arguably leaves open the question, that the disclosed material 
should generally in itself be admissible in evidence, yet that it should be enough to 
make a prima facie case, or, as it was later called, a ‘preliminary foundation’ that it is. 
                                                 
469  People v. Davis, see for the full citation note 89 above. 
470  Gordon v. U.S., 344 U.S. 414, 73 S.Ct. 369, U.S. 1953, at p. 418 et subs., references omitted. 
471  “The elementary wisdom of the best evidence rule rests on the fact that the document is a more 
reliable, complete and accurate source of information as to its contents and meaning than anyone's 
description and this is no less true as to the extent and circumstances of a contradiction.”, ibid., at 
p. 421. 
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Generally during that time the voices demanding a more liberal approach to disclosure 
became louder. As early as 1951, only five years after the entry into force of the FRCP, 
a note in Yale Law Journal had made a relatively detailed proposal which would have 
introduced basically the same rules which were applied in civil cases for criminal cases 
as well.472 In addition to that, in a note contained in Harvard Law Journal of 1954 which 
mainly deals with the question of the relation between Rules 16 and 17 (c) FRCP, we 
find a reference to Justice Jackson’s 1948 notion that according to the Continental-
European tradition the accused gets all the evidence in a dossier;473 this is, as a matter of 
fact, the same passage in which Jackson admits that this practice may be considered 
“more fair”.474 
 
4.2.1.1 State v. Tune 
Also on the state level, the question of disclosure was virulent. An often cited judgment 
of the Supreme Court of New Jersey, like many others during that period, evolved 
around the problem whether defendants should generally be granted to inspect their own 
confessions. In the case of State v. Tune475, Chief Justice Vanderbilt, for the 4:3 
majority, sums up the arguments against disclosure very instructively. The same holds 
true for the truth-finding and fairness arguments in favour of a more liberal disclosure 
approach brought forward by Justice Brennan for the minority opinion. For the 
judgment’s instructiveness, it appears justified to quote part of the opinions here.  
In a murder case, the accused had made a confession upon his apprehension. Two 
months later, he had been assigned counsel, who had made a motion to the court to 
compel the disclosure of the confession and some other documents. The County Court 
had allowed the disclosure of the defendant’s confession, together with denying 
disclosure of the additional documents.476 Notably, the motion of the defence had been 
made not according to disclosure provisions in the technical sense, but rather by asking 
for a subpoena duces tecum. The New Jersey Supreme Court, however, makes no 
mention of this, and only speaks of “disclosure”. As mentioned earlier, the distinction 
between subpoenas and disclosure is difficult to draw. 
                                                 
472  Note: Pre-Trial Disclosure in Criminal Cases, 60 Yale Law Journal (1951), 626-646, at p. 640 et subs. 
473  Note: The Scope of Criminal Discovery Against the Government, 67 Harvard Law Review (1954), 
492-500, at p. 492, fn. 1. 
474  See section 3.4 supra. 
475  State v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 98 A.2d 881, 25 June 1953. 
476  State v. Tune, 24 N.J.Super. 428, 94 A.2d 695, 3 February 1953.  
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The prosecution had moved against the decision of the County Court; the Supreme 
Court by majority reversed the granting part of the County Court decision and thus 
denied disclosure altogether. Chief Justice Vanderbilt remarked, making reference to 
the argument that liberal disclosure may “promote the fullest possible presentation of 
the facts, minimize opportunities for falsification of evidence, and eliminate the vestiges 
of trial by combat”477: 
Defendant argues that in keeping with the modern trend toward liberal 
discovery in civil proceedings we should grant him the unqualified right to an 
inspection of all […] documents in the possession of the State […]. Such an 
argument completely ignores the fundamental difference between civil and 
criminal proceedings. […] [S]uch liberal fact-finding procedures are not to be 
used blindly where the result would be to defeat the ends of justice. In criminal 
proceedings long experience has taught the courts that often discovery will lead 
not to honest fact-finding, but on the contrary to perjury and the suppression of 
evidence. Thus the criminal who is aware of the whole case against him will 
often procure perjured testimony in order to set up a false defense […]. Another 
result of full discovery would be that the criminal defendant who is informed of 
the names of all of the State's witnesses may take steps to bribe or frighten them 
into giving perjured testimony or into absenting themselves so that they are 
unavailable to testify. Moreover, many witnesses, if they know that the defendant 
will have knowledge of their names prior to trial, will be reluctant to come 
forward with information during the investigation of the crime […]. All these 
dangers are more inherent in criminal proceedings where the defendant has 
much more at stake, often his own life, than in civil proceedings. […]. To permit 
unqualified disclosure of all statements and information in the hands of the State 
would go far beyond what is required in civil cases; it would defeat the very 
ends of justice.478 
Chief Justice Vanderbilt thus takes up the known argument of the dangers of the 
accused tampering with the evidence, e.g. by threatening witnesses, or that witnesses 
themselves might feel intimidated anyway if they know that the defendant is informed 
that they will testify against him; this has been called the ‘intimidation argument’.479 In 
addition to that, Justice Vanderbilt brings another well known argument into play, 
which has been referred to as the “perjury argument”.480 This means that the accused 
who knows too much of the evidence against him has the chance to ‘tailor-make’ his 
                                                 
477  Note: Pre-Trial Disclosure in Criminal Cases, 60 Yale Law Journal (1951), 626-646. 
478  State v. Tune, fn. 475, at p. 209 et seq. 
479  LaFave/Israel/King/Kerr, Criminal procedure, § 20.1.(b). 
480  LaFave/Israel/King/Kerr, Criminal procedure, ibid; we find this argument in 19th century literature 
already, see note 163 above; Justice Brennan also mentions this in the minority opinion. 
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own defence and thus, by making a false statement or in any other way producing 
perjured testimony.481Chief Justice Vanderbilt thus basically turns the truth-finding 
argument for liberal disclosure around, in saying that, to the contrary, liberal disclosure 
means a threat to the determination of the truth. Finally, he sums up the third main 
argument against disclosure, which has been called the “reciprocity argument”. Citing 
the relevant jurisprudence some of which we have pointed to above as well referring to 
the limitations of the FRCP, he continues: 
In considering the problem it must be remembered that in view of the defendant's 
constitutional and statutory protections against self-incrimination, the State has 
no right whatsoever to demand an inspection of any of his documents or to take 
his deposition, or to submit interrogatories to him. […]  
See also State v. Bunk, 63 A.2d 842, at page 844 (N.J.Cty.Ct.1949): 
'The element of reciprocity is present in the conduct of civil causes. Each party 
may examine the other, force disclosure of material evidence and thus reduce to 
a minimum the element of surprise or chance in the trial. In criminal causes no 
such reciprocity is possible. The State could not examine the defendant before 
trial without his consent, nor could any rule of court force such examination.' 
Except for its right to demand particulars from the defendant as to any alibi on 
which he intends to rely, Rule 2:5-7, the State is completely at the mercy of the 
defendant who can produce surprise evidence at the trial, can take the stand or 
not as he wishes, and generally can introduce any sort of unforeseeable evidence 
he desires in his own defense. To allow him to discover the prosecutor's whole 
case against him would be to make the prosecutor's task almost 
insurmountable.482 
This is once again taking up the argument that the defence is not in a position to ‘make 
good’ the disclosure by the prosecution, for he is protected by his procedural rights. 
This is, of course, reminiscent of the argument for ‘equality of arms for the 
prosecution’, the only difference being that the ‘reciprocity’ argument is used to deny 
                                                 
481  In this regard, it appears worth mentioning that under the Anglo-American adversatorial procedure, 
the accused has a right to testify as a witness for the defence, which means that he is sworn in just as 
any other witness and is also subject to cross-examination; furthermore, he can be liable of perjury. 
This is unknown in the Continental-European tradition, where the functional role of the witness in the 
trial is considered to be incompatible with the position of the accused. The accused may not be 
brought into the dilemma of having to tell the truth under oath on the one hand and having the right to 
silence on the other, see, for Germany, Court of the German Empire (Reichsgericht), RGSt 57, 53 
(54), endorsed by Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof), BGHSt 10, 8-15, par. 3. This is not to 
say, of course, that the accused is not allowed to speak out, however, he may not be interrogated under 
oath. 
482  State v. Tune, fn. 475, at p.  211 et seq. 
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disclosure to the defence, while the ‘fair trial for the prosecution’ argument is used for 
grounding disclosure obligations of the defence. The argument is obviously the same; 
just the degree of the consequence drawn is different. In the introduction, we have 
already stated that in our view, this line of argument cannot stand. We thus find the 
three main arguments against disclosure collected in one judgment: risk of intimidation 
of witnesses, risk of perjury, and the reciprocity argument.483 
Chief Justice Vanderbilt appears to make a fourth argument against disclosure, which 
one could almost call ‘ethnical’. It reminds us of the “spirit of the common law” 
mentioned in the introduction.484 To be sure, it has a very comical note to it, but appears 
to have been meant seriously: 
The defendant also relies on the English practice of full discovery in criminal 
matters. The criminal law of England differs materially from that of the United 
States. […] Moreover, its system of crime detection and investigation is far more 
advanced than anything known in this country except in the federal field, and the 
law-abiding instincts of the population are in marked contrast to the disrespect 
for law which has long characterized the American frontier and which has not 
yet disappeared as the criminal statistics indicate in certain segments of the 
American population.485 
While it is certainly true that the culture and specific history of peoples has a lot to do 
with their legal traditions, one would nowadays probably not find such a holding from 
high ranking judges anymore. It is also interesting to note that Chief Justice Vanderbilt 
appears to derive the social necessity to implement a non-liberal criminal procedure 
from a perceived moral ‘underdevelopment’ of the American society. 
For the minority, Justice Brennan started right out with his belief that disclosure leads to 
truth-finding, and that the experience of disclosure in civil proceedings shows that the 
perjury argument in practice proved to be invalid: 
That old hobgoblin perjury, invariably raised with every suggested change in 
procedure to make easier the discovery of the truth, is again disinterred from the 
grave where I had thought it was forever buried under the overwhelming weight 
of the complete rebuttal supplied by our experience in civil causes where liberal 
discovery has been allowed.486 
                                                 
483  Compare, once again LaFave/Israel/King/Kerr, Criminal procedure, §§ 20.1(a) and 20.1(b). 
484  See section 1.3.3. above. 
485  State v. Tune, fn. 475, at p.  219. 
486  State v. Tune, fn. 475, at p. 227. 
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Other than that, he mainly alludes to the general fairness of the proceedings, particularly 
the opportunity for defence-preparation, and is obviously embittered by the majority 
decision which he finds utterly unjust. However, the determination of the truth is clearly 
his main concern: 
It shocks my sense of justice that in these circumstances counsel for an accused 
facing a possible death sentence should be denied inspection of his confession 
which, were this a civil case, could not be denied. If we should not overlook the 
fact that constitutional and statutory guaranties for the protection of the 
criminal accused deny the State a corresponding breadth of discovery, so that it 
is reasonable not ordinarily to allow the accused access to the prosecutor's 
‘work product’ in the form of the statements of others, that reason cannot be 
applied to the accused's own confession. […] [H]ow possibly can we say that 
counsel for the accused should be denied a copy in face of the affirmative 
findings by Judge Speakman, certainly supported by what was before him, that 
neither the public interest nor the prosecution of the State's case will suffer? […] 
[Counsel’s] primary concern was not with the voluntary or involuntary 
character of the confession but with the more vital issue of its credibility if it is 
admitted in evidence. Their investigation so far as it has gone raises doubt in 
their minds as to the truth of some of the things which apparently are stated in 
the confession. […] 
The holding of this case gives the majority's protestation that ‘In this State our 
courts are always mindful of the rights of the accused’ a hollow ring. The 
assurance seems doubly hollow in light of the emphasis upon formalism in this 
case while it has been our boast in all other causes that we have subordinated 
the procedural niceties to decisions on the merits.487 
In the following years, we find, despite some exceptions, a strong and rapid tendency of 
liberalization in the relevant state jurisprudence, regarding the disclosure of confessions, 
tangible objects, or expert reports.488 In fact also the New Jersey Supreme Court, with 
partially new personnel, five years after Tune now made clear with a 5:2 majority that in 
principle the disclosure of previous statements and confessions was desirable and 
should regularly be granted, again for fairness, yet predominantly fact-finding 
reasons.489 
                                                 
487  Ibid., at p. 231 et subs., references omitted. 
488  Fletcher, Pretrial Discovery in State Criminal Cases, at p. 297 with numerous references. 
489  State v. Johnson, fn. 451, at p. 136, 139 et seq.: “We start with the premise that truth is best revealed 
by a decent opportunity to prepare in advance of trial. We have embraced that tenet with respect to 
civil litigation, and absent overriding considerations, it should be as valid in criminal matters. […] 
Surely it cannot be proposed that rules of practice be geared to foster convictions without regard to 
fairness to the individual. Justice requires that the innocent be acquitted. And even with respect to the 
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Justice Brennan, who drafted the minority dissent, should in the following years 
significantly advance the development of disclosure. Three years after Tune, in 1956, 
Justice Brennan was appointed to the U.S. Supreme Court and stayed an Associate 
Justice until 1990. As we will see, particularly in the years of the Warren Court490 we 
can notice a liberal and progressive, at times almost radical development concerning 
disclosure at (see the decisions until Napue v. Illinois below), which appears to decline 
in the later years of the Burger Court, as exemplified in Agurs and Bagley.  
As concerns Justice Brennan, the disclosure of evidence was apparently one of the 
topics he was particularly passionate about. In one often-cited lecture of 1963 entitled 
“The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for Truth?”, he also makes 
reference to Tune and analyses the contemporary disclosure law in the United States, 
which he takes this as an opportunity to fundamentally criticise the, in his opinion, 
misunderstood concept of the criminal trial as a whole. Once more, he places the truth-
finding function of the criminal process in the middle of his analysis.491 Notably, 
especially in the context of this thesis, he makes reference to foreign jurisdictions, and 
indeed to the Nuremberg IMT proceedings; noting with some sarcasm that, of all, the 
Soviet criticism of the procedure regarding disclosure had, in his mind, some merit: 
I think it is particularly ironic that, according to Mr. Justice Jackson, Soviet 
prosecutors at the War Crimes Trials at Nuremberg protested against adoption 
of the prevailing American procedures on the ground that they're "not fair to 
defendants." The upshot was a compromise procedure which permitted the 
accused at those trials more liberal discovery than allowed under American law, 
although apparently narrower than Soviet or French practice sanctions.492 
Of course we cannot necessarily say that Justice Brennan and thereby the later 
jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court were actually influenced by Nuremberg and 
the reactions to its shortcomings, however, together with the mentioned reference in the 
1954 note in Harvard Law Journal493, it appears fair to say that Nuremberg did not go 
entirely unnoticed in the disclosure debate.  
                                                                                                                                               
guilty, it is no less imperative that convictions be fairly obtained; otherwise the judicial trial may as 
well be discarded and the issue of guilt left to executive determination.” 
490  See on the Supreme Court during the time of Chief Justice Warren (1953-1969) generally 
Belknap/Warren, The Supreme Court under Earl Warren, 1953 - 1969. 
491  Brennan, The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or the Quest for Truth?. 
492  Ibid., at p. 283 and seq. This was a reference to Jackson, Some Problems in Developing an 
International Legal System, at p. 150: “[The Soviets] considered that this reduced the scope and 
probability of contest and also that it is more fair to a defendant than to withhold knowledge of the 
evidence from him until he is in court. There is much to be said in favor of this view.” 
493  See fn. 473 supra. 
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In the same year (1964), Justice Brennan also gave the introductory remarks to a 
Symposium at the Judicial Conference of the District of Columbia Circuit on the topic 
of disclosure in criminal cases.494 Here, Justice Brennan puts more emphasis on the fair 
trial aspect of disclosure, as well as on the procedural management one.495 Later in his 
speech, he mostly recurs to what he had said in his lecture a few months before.496 His 
passion concerning disclosure is, of course, not least proved by the ‘progress report’ on 
disclosure, which he gave 27 years after the mentioned lecture, in 1990, which was the 
year of his retirement.497 
 
4.2.1.2 Roviaro v. United States 
In 1957, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down a decision in Roviaro v. U.S.498 The case 
evolved around the identity protection of government informants. The defendant had 
been indicted, inter alia, for selling drugs to one ‘John Doe’, the usual name given to an 
unidentified person, who was an informant. He had requested a bill of particulars 
containing, among other things, the name and address of ‘John Doe’. The government 
had objected on grounds of identity protection and the court denied the motion. During 
trial, a government officer testified on the conversation between the defendant and 
‘John Doe’ which he had overheard in the trunk of a car; the only other persons present 
in the car being the defendant and ‘John Doe’. It was thus highly probable that the 
defendant knew who ‘John Doe’ was, even though the U.S. Supreme Court in the end 
held otherwise.499 Nevertheless, cross-examination concerning the identity of ‘John 
Doe’ had not been permitted by the trial court. The Court of Appeals sustained the 
conviction, finding that the identity of ‘John Doe’ was “wholly immaterial” on the 
                                                 
494  Junior Bar Section of the Bar Association of the District of Columbia, Discovery in Federal Criminal 
Cases: A Symposium at the Judicial Conference of the District of Columbia Circuit. 
495  Ibid., at p. 58. 
496  Fn. 491 supra. 
497  Brennan, The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or the Quest for Truth? A Progress Report. 
498  Roviaro v. U.S., 353 U.S. 53, 77 S.Ct. 623, U.S. 1957. 
499  Ibid., fn. 8: “The record contains several intimations that the identity of John Doe was known to 
petitioner and that John Doe died prior to the trial. […] However, any indications that petitioner, at the 
time of the trial, was aware of John Doe's identity are contradicted by the testimony of Officer Bryson 
that John Doe at police headquarters denied knowing, or ever having seen, petitioner. The trial court 
made no factual finding that petitioner knew Doe's identity. On this record we cannot assume that 
John Doe was known to petitioner, and, if alive, available to him as a witness. Nor can we conclude 
that John Doe died before the trial.” 
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charge.500 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari. The majority generally held that 
first of all, if the identity is already known to the defendant, there is no need to keep it 
secret at trial. However, as just mentioned, the Court did not want to conclude this fact 
from the case record before it. It then went on to say that for reasons of fairness it may 
be obligatory to disclose the identity of the informant; otherwise the case would have to 
be dismissed:  
A further limitation on the applicability of the privilege arises from the 
fundamental requirements of fairness. Where the disclosure of an informer's 
identity, or of the contents of his communication, is relevant and helpful to the 
defense of an accused, or is essential to a fair determination of a cause, the 
privilege must give way. In these situations the trial court may require 
disclosure and, if the Government withholds the information, dismiss the action. 
[…] 
We believe that no fixed rule with respect to disclosure is justifiable. The 
problem is one that calls for balancing the public interest in protecting the flow 
of information against the individual's right to prepare his defense. Whether a 
proper balance renders nondisclosure erroneous must depend on the particular 
circumstances of each case, taking into consideration the crime charged, the 
possible defenses, the possible significance of the informer's testimony, and 
other relevant factors.501 
For the particular case, the Court held that since ‘John Doe’ was the only other person 
involved in the actual drug transaction, and the defendant had had to assume that during 
the transaction he was alone with the informant, his identity and testimony would have 
been highly material. In a footnote, the Court also stated that regarding another count 
for which the accused had been tried, the materiality of ‘John Doe’s’ identity had been 
obviously material from the outset, which is why it should have been disclosed before 
and not only during the trial.502  
Justice Clark dissented in strong words, on the grounds that the identity protection of 
informants in drug trafficking prosecutions is indispensable, and particularly on the 
grounds that in this particular case the defendant most probably did know the true 
identity of ‘John Doe’. He held: 
In truth, it appears that petitioner hoped that the Government would not furnish 
the name for, if the informant was dead as he believed, petitioner's ground was 
cut from under him. If the informant was living he knew that even though his 
                                                 
500  U.S. v. Roviaro, 229 F.2d 812, C.A.7 1956, at p. 814. 
501  Roviaro v. U.S., fn. 498 supra, at p. 60 et subs. 
502  Ibid., at p. 65, fn. 15. 
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testimony was favorable it would not be sufficient to overcome the presumption 
of the statute. In fact, a casual reading of the record paints a picture of one 
vainly engaging in trial tactics rather than searching for real defenses-
shadowboxing with the prosecution in a baseless attempt to get a name that he 
already had but in reality hoping to get a reversible error that was nowhere else 
in sight. We should not encourage such tactics.503 
 
4.2.1.3 Jencks v. United States 
Only a few months later, and related to Rovario, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down 
a landmark decision regarding disclosure, which is also closely related to Justice 
Jackson’s holding in Gordon504, and considerably advanced it. It was once more Justice 
Brennan, now being Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, who pushed for a 
liberalization of criminal disclosure. The case, which took place during McCarthyism, 
evolved around the conviction of one Clinton E. Jencks, who had falsely sworn that he 
was not a member of the American Communist Party. His conviction was mainly based 
on the testimonies of two F.B.I. informants. The defendant had been denied to inspect 
the reports which had previously been written by these informants, before the trial and 
also later, during trial for cross-examination; this had been upheld by the trial court and 
on appeal. Citing Gordon, the denial had been based on the fact that the defendant had 
not laid a preliminary foundation of inconsistency between the reports and the 
testimonies of the witnesses. This, however, must have been impossible without 
knowing the contents of the reports. The U.S. Supreme Court, having granted certiorari, 
held that the denial was in error, in that the reports were obviously the only reasonable 
way in which the two witnesses could be impeached. Justice Brennan pointed out that 
the informants had admitted that part of their testimony had also been part of the 
reports; and since they did not remember the contents of their reports anymore, this had 
to suffice to constitute a foundation for the production of the documents. In relation to 
Gordon, Justice Brennan said that Gordon must be interpreted more widely.  
[T]o say that Gordon held a preliminary showing of inconsistency a prerequisite 
to an accused's right to the production for inspection of documents in the 
Government's possession, is to misinterpret the Court's opinion. The necessary 
essentials of a foundation, emphasized in that opinion, and present here, are that 
‘(t)he demand was for production of  specific documents and did not propose 
any broad or blind fishing expedition among documents possessed by the 
Government on the chance that something impeaching might turn up. Nor was 
                                                 
503  Ibid., at p. 70. 
504  Fn. 470 supra. 
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this a demand for statements taken from persons or informants not offered as 
witnesses.’ We reaffirm and re-emphasize these essentials. ‘For production 
purposes, it need only appear that the evidence is relevant, competent, and 
outside of any exclusionary rule * * *.’[…] Requiring the accused first to show 
conflict between the reports and the testimony is actually to deny the accused 
evidence relevant and material to his defense. The occasion for determining a 
conflict cannot arise until after the witness has testified, and unless he admits 
conflict, as in Gordon, the accused is helpless to know or discover conflict 
without inspecting the reports. A requirement of a showing of conflict would be 
clearly incompatible with our standards for the administration of criminal 
justice in the federal courts and must therefore be rejected. […]505 
However, Justice Brennan went much further than that, holding that only the defence 
could reasonable decide whether the evidence could be of use or not; and the court was 
not entitled to decide over the matter: 
We now hold that the petitioner was entitled to an order directing the 
Government to produce for inspection all reports of [the witnesses] in its 
possession, written and, when orally made, as recorded by the F.B.I., touching 
the events and activities as to which they testified at the trial. We hold, further, 
that the petitioner is entitled to inspect the reports to decide whether to use them 
in his defense. Because only the defense is adequately equipped to determine the 
effective use for purpose of discrediting the Government's witness and thereby 
furthering the accused's defense, the defense must initially be entitled to see 
them to determine what use may be made of them. Justice requires no less. […] 
The practice of producing government documents to the trial judge for his 
determination of relevancy and materiality, without hearing the accused, is 
disapproved. Relevancy and materiality for the purposes of production and 
inspection, with a view to use on cross-examination, are established when the 
reports are shown to relate to the testimony of the witness. Only after inspection 
of the reports by the accused, must the trial judge determine admissibility–e.g., 
evidentiary questions of inconsistency, materiality and relevancy–of the contents 
and the method to be employed for the elimination of parts immaterial or 
irrelevant. […]506 
Yet Justice Brennan did not stop here. He goes as far as saying that if the government 
elected to keep its reports secret and not disclose them to the defence, then this would 
have a cessation of the criminal prosecution, i.e. a dismissal of the charges as a 
necessary consequence; 
                                                 
505  Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957), at p. 666 et subs., references omitted. 
506  Ibid., at p. 668 et seq. 
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It is unquestionably true that the protection of vital national interests may 
militate against public disclosure of documents in the Government's possession. 
[…] But this Court has noticed, in United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 73 
S.Ct. 528, 97 L.Ed. 727, the holdings of the Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit507 that, in criminal causes ‘* * * the Government can invoke its 
evidentiary privileges only at the price of letting the defendant go free. The 
rationale of the criminal cases is that, since the Government which prosecutes 
an accused also has the duty to see that justice is done, it is unconscionable to 
allow it to undertake prosecution and then invoke its governmental privileges to 
deprive the accused of anything which might be material to his defense * * *.’ 
[…] We hold that the criminal action must be dismissed when the Government, 
on the ground of privilege, elects not to comply with an order to produce, for the 
accused's inspection and for admission in evidence, relevant statements or 
reports in its possession of government witnesses touching the subject matter of 
their testimony at the trial. The burden is the Government's, not to be shifted to 
the trial judge, to decide whether the public prejudice of allowing the crime to 
go unpunished is greater than that attendant upon the possible disclosure of 
state secrets and other confidential information in the Government's 
possession.508 
This holding, especially given its time, is revolutionary and, in fact, radical; apparently 
it provoked harsh criticism.509 We see that while Justice Brennan in his previous 
decisions gave high importance to the finding of the truth, fair trial aspects appear to 
prevail. This is particularly relevant, of course, regarding the question whether non-
disclosure can be based on reasons of security or public interest immunity; and Justice 
Brennan opts for the radical solution. The decision was not anonymous. Justice Burton 
and with him Justice Harlan, concurring, held that the decision took too much discretion 
away from the trial judge whether to grant disclosure or not, and that there was no need 
to this radicalism: 
The trial judge exercises his discretion with knowledge of the issues involved in 
the case, the nature and importance of the Government's interest in maintaining 
secrecy, and the defendant's need for disclosure. By vesting this discretion in the 
trial judge, the conflicting interests are balanced, and a just decision is reached 
in the individual case without needless sacrifice of important public interests.510 
                                                 
507  United States v. Beekman, 155 F.2d 580; United States v. Andolschek, 142 F.2d 503. 
508  Jencks v. United States, fn. 505, at p. 670 et subs. 
509  See Note: The Jencks Legislation: Problems in Prospect, 67 Yale Law Journal (1958), 674-699, at 
p. 680 et subs. 
510  Ibid., at p. 677. 
134 
 
Justice Clark, as in Rovario, dissented poignantly, and probably not without merit, 
holding: 
The Court holds ‘that the criminal action must be dismissed when the 
Government, on the grounds of privilege, elects not to comply with an order to 
produce, for the accused's inspection and for admission in evidence, relevant 
statements or reports in its possession of government witnesses touching the 
subject matter of their testimony at the trial.’ This fashions a new rule of 
evidence which is foreign to our federal jurisprudence. […] Unless the Congress 
changes the rule announced by the Court today, those intelligence agencies of 
our Government engaged in law enforcement may as well close up shop, for the 
Court has opened their files to the criminal and thus afforded him a Roman 
holiday for rummaging through confidential information as well as vital 
national secrets.511 
In fact, the Congress did react immediately on this decision, by passing the ‘Jencks 
Act’512, which provides that disclosure of the relevant documents must take place after 
the witness has testified in direct examination. If the government determines that parts 
of the documents relate to other matters than the subject matter of the witness’ 
testimony, the court must, in camera, excise those parts and deliver the rest of the 
material to the defendant. The government, however, need not comply with the order of 
the court, which has as a consequence that the witness’ testimony must be stricken from 
the record; the judge may also, in the interests of justice, declare a mistrial. This 
legislation obviously tries to strike a balance between the rights of the accused and 
national security interests of the state.513 Some of the substance of this rule has also 
made its way into the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and has since 1979 been 
included, with some amendments, in Rule 26.2 FRCP. This topic is indeed relevant for 
matters of disclosure, not least, as we will see below, on the international level. 
However, the Supreme Court upheld its jurisprudence that the fair trial guarantees of the 
Constitution of the United States, i.e. the due process clause of the 5th or 
14th Amendment, do not per se require pre-trial disclosure. While reiterating that 
disclosure of the defendant’s confession might the “better practice”, it was maintained 
that it is generally in the discretion of the trial court whether to grant it or not.514  
                                                 
511  Ibid., at p. 681 et seq. 
512  71 Stat. 595 (1957); 18 U.S.C. § 3500. 
513  See as to the Supreme Court judgment and the Jencks Act in general Note: The Jencks Legislation: 
Problems in Prospect, 67 Yale Law Journal (1958), 674-699. 
514  Cicenia v. La Gay, 357 U.S. 504, 78 S.Ct. 1297, U.S. 1958, at p. 511: “[A]lthough it may be the 
‘better practice’ for the prosecution to comply with a request for inspection, we cannot say that the 
discretionary refusal of the trial judge to permit inspection in this case offended the Fourteenth 
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4.2.1.4 Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States 
In some relation to Jencks we find another decision which evolves around the question 
of inconsistent statements of witnesses before the grand jury and later in trial. As we 
have seen in Chapter 2, the secrecy of grand jury proceedings according to Rule 6 (e) of 
the original version of the FRCP was difficult to penetrate, and in any case was at the 
discretion of the judge.515 In Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States516, the 
defendants had been convicted on a conspiracy charge. Their motion for a discovery of 
grand jury testimony in order to find inconsistencies had been denied by the trial court; 
this was upheld by the Court of Appeals.517 The U.S. Supreme Court by majority also 
upheld the decision: 
It appears to us clear that Jencks v. United States, supra, is in nowise 
controlling here. It had nothing to do with grand jury proceedings and its 
language was not intended to encompass grand jury minutes. Likewise, it is 
equally clear that Congress intended to exclude those minutes from the 
operation of the so-called Jencks Act, 71 Stat. 595, 18 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1958) s 
3500, 18 U.S.C.A. s 3500. […] Petitioners argue, however, that the trial judge's 
discretion under Rule 6(e) must be exercised in accordance with the rationale of 
Jencks; namely, upon a showing on cross-examination that a trial witness 
testified before the grand jury-and nothing more-the defense has a ‘right’ to the 
delivery to it of the witness' grand jury testimony. This conclusion, however, 
runs counter to ‘a long-established policy’ of secrecy older than our Nation 
itself. […] It does not follow, however, that grand jury minutes should never be 
made available to the defense. This Court has long held that there are occasions 
when the trial judge may in the exercise of his discretion order the minutes of a 
grand jury witness produced for use on his cross-examination at trial. Certainly 
‘disclosure is wholly proper where the ends of justice require it.’ The burden, 
however, is on the defense to show that ‘a particularized need’ exists for the 
minutes which outweighs the policy of secrecy. We have no such showing here. 
[…] Petitioners also claim error because the trial judge failed to examine the 
transcript himself for any inconsistencies. But we need not consider that 
problem because petitioners made no such request of the trial judge.518 
                                                                                                                                               
Amendment..” Justice Brennan took no part in the consideration or decision of that case; three Justices 
dissented, albeit apparently not for reasons of disclosure but infringement of the right to counsel. 
515  See section 2.2.1 supra. 
516  Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. U.S., 360 U.S. 395, 79 S.Ct. 1237, U.S. 1959 
517  Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. U.S., 260 F.2d 397, C.A.4 1958 
518  Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. U.S., fn. 516, at p. 398 et subs., references omitted. 
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The majority thus sticks to the centuries-old tradition of secrecy of grand jury 
proceedings. They do, however, leave loopholes of discretion “where the ends of justice 
require it”, as well as leaving open the question whether the court itself can be asked to 
inspect the material before the defence. 
Justice Brennan, and joining him justices Black and Douglas, dissented. Referring to his 
own holding in Jencks, he stated: 
The considerations which moved us to lay down this principle as to prior 
statements of government witnesses made to government agents obviously apply 
with equal force to the grand jury testimony of a government witness. For the 
defense will rarely be able to lay a foundation for obtaining grand jury 
testimony by showing it is inconsistent with trial testimony unless it can inspect 
the grand jury testimony, and, apparently in recognition of this fact, the Court 
holds today that a preliminary showing of inconsistency by the defense would 
not be necessary in order for it to obtain access to relevant grand jury 
minutes.519 
Justice Brennan, goes on to reiterate his opinion in Jencks that the trial court should not 
be involved in the disclosure process, for only the defence can assess properly whether 
the evidence is material or not. This arguably runs counter to the Jencks act, which 
specifically provided that the court should inspect the relevant material first. 
 
4.2.1.5 Napue v. Illinois 
Another decision worth mentioning in this regard is the 1959 certiorari decision in 
Napue v. Illinois520. Even though it does not technically involve disclosure, it 
demonstrates once more the importance of truth finding and the prosecution’s 
commitment to it in its role as a minister of justice. The key witness and co-perpetrator 
in a murder trial (one Hamer) had been promised that the prosecuting attorney would 
recommend a reduction of his sentence. On cross-examination the witness had denied 
any promises, as well as in his redirect-examination; in a subsequent testimony the 
witness, however, had stated that somebody had made him a promise, but that that 
person had not been a state representative, but probably some public defence lawyer. 
The jury thus knew that the witness had lied. It was for this reason that the Illinois 
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520  Napue v. People of State of Ill., 360 U.S. 264, 79 S.Ct. 1173, U.S. 1959, opinion by Chief Justice 
Warren. 
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Supreme Court denied a retrial.521 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari. Citing 
previous jurisprudence, it held that not only is the prosecution not allowed to use 
perjured testimony relating to the guilt of the defendant,522 but it is also banned from 
using evidence which relates to the credibility of the evidence. This is a ‘feature’ which 
we will run across again when examining the disclosure of exculpatory evidence at the 
modern international tribunals. In this regard, one can also mention the U.S. Supreme 
Court Decision of Alcorta v. Texas523, in which the Court held that the disclosure 
obligation also exists regarding material which is only relevant for the sentencing, not 
the determination of guilt. Furthermore, and at least as importantly, the decision points 
out that the prosecutor must intervene if the perjured testimony appears during the trial. 
This duty of intervention is indeed closely related to disclosure obligations, and reminds 
us once again of the duty to disclose inconsistent witness statements.524  
First, it is established that a conviction obtained through use of false evidence, 
known to be such by representatives of the State, must fall under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The same result obtains when the State, although not soliciting 
false evidence, allows it to go uncorrected when it appears. […] The principle 
that a State may not knowingly use false evidence, including false testimony, to 
obtain a tainted conviction, implicit in any concept of ordered liberty, does not 
cease to apply merely because the false testimony goes only to the credibility of 
the witness. The jury's estimate of the truthfulness and reliability of a given 
witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence, and it is upon such 
subtle factors as the possible interest of the witness in testifying falsely that a 
defendant's life or liberty may depend.525 
Another point worth mentioning, however, especially in the context of this thesis, is the 
special circumstance that the jury had in fact already known that the witness had lied. 
Therefore, as the Supreme Court of Illinois had argued, there was technically no need to 
                                                 
521  Napue v. People, 13 Ill.2d 566, 150 N.E.2d 613, Ill. 1958, at p. 570: “Hamer's testimony to the effect 
that no promise had been given to him was clearly untrue, and had there been no disclosure of its 
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522  See, e.g., Mooney v. Holohan, fn. 89 above. 
523  355 U.S. 28 (1957). 
524  See section 2.1.2. above. 
525  Napue v. Illinois, fn. 523 supra, at p. 269. 
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reverse the judgment of the trial court, since the defendant had not been deprived of his 
due process rights. The U.S. Supreme Court, however, held that it did make a difference 
whether the jury might believe that it was actually not the prosecution who made the 
promise to reach a reduction of the sentence but someone who is not attributable to the 
State: 
Second, we do not believe that the fact that the jury was apprised of other 
grounds for believing that the witness Hamer may have had an interest in 
testifying against petitioner turned what was otherwise a tainted trial into a fair 
one. As Mr. Justice Schaefer, joined by Chief Justice Davis, rightly put it in his 
dissenting opinion below: 
‘What is overlooked here is that Hamer clearly testified that no one had offered 
to help him except an unidentified lawyer from the public defender's office.’ 
Had the jury been apprised of the true facts, however, it might well have 
concluded that Hamer had fabricated testimony in order to curry the favor of the 
very representative of the State who was prosecuting the case in which Hamer 
was testifying, for Hamer might have believed that such a representative was in 
a position to implement (as he ultimately attempted to do) any promise of 
consideration.526 
The U.S. Supreme Court thus arguably makes the case that there is indeed a difference 
regarding the ‘kind’, or ‘level’ of falsity, or, for that matter, of the scope of a trial with 
regard to the determination of the (whole) truth. This can only be explained with the 
special role that the prosecution has as a minister of justice, which makes it more than 
just a party of adversary judicial proceedings.527 
At the state level, the cases of the 1950ies apparently did not have a major impact. The 
jurisprudence in the states, while overall moving towards more liberal disclosure, is 
heterogeneous during this time.528 
 
                                                 
526  Ibid., at p. 270. 
527  See Note: The Prosecutor's Constitutional Duty to Reveal Evidence to the Defendant, 74 Yale Law 
Journal (1964), 136-150, at p. 138 et seq. See also People v. Savvides, 1 N.Y.2d 554, 136 N.E.2d 853, 
N.Y. 1956, at p. 556 et seq.: “The administration of justice must not only be above reproach, it must 
also be beyond the suspicion of reproach. […] A lie is a lie, no matter what its subject, and, if it is in 
any way relevant to the case, the district attorney has the responsibility and duty to correct what he 
knows to be false and elicit the truth. Nor does it avail respondent to contend that defendant's guilt 
was clearly established or that disclosure would not have changed the verdict.” 
528  See Fletcher, Pretrial Discovery in State Criminal Cases; see also Note: Developments in the Law - 
Discovery, 74 Harvard Law Review (1961), 940-1072. 
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4.2.1.6 Brady v. Maryland 
In close relation to Napue v. Illinois is another landmark decision regarding disclosure: 
Brady v. Maryland529. In this case, the petitioner had been indicted for murder and 
pleaded guilty, albeit stated that he had not committed the actual killing; he was 
sentenced to death. A co-perpetrator, who was tried separately, had previously 
confessed to the prosecution that he had done the actual killing, the petitioner being 
only a bystander. This confession had been suppressed by the prosecution, and only 
later used in the trial of the co-perpetrator. The appeals court had held that this non-
disclosure was unconstitutional as an infringement of due process (5th and 14th 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution), and remanded the case for a re-trial, albeit only 
on the question of punishment.530 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and upheld 
the decision of the appeals court: 
We now hold that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an 
accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either 
to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the 
prosecution. The principle of Mooney v. Holohan531 is not punishment of society 
for misdeeds of a prosecutor but avoidance of an unfair trial to the accused. 
Society wins not only when the guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are 
fair; our system of the administration of justice suffers when any accused is 
treated unfairly. An inscription on the walls of the Department of Justice states 
the proposition candidly for the federal domain: ‘The United States wins its 
point whenever justice is done its citizens in the courts.' A prosecution that 
withholds evidence on demand of an accused which, if made available, would 
tend to exculpate him or reduce the penalty helps shape a trial that bears heavily 
on the defendant. That casts the prosecutor in the role of an architect of a 
proceeding that does not comport with standards of justice, even though, as in 
the present case, his action is not ‘the result of guile,’ to use the words of the 
Court of Appeals.532 
As was shown in previous decisions, the U.S. Supreme Court is not inclined to tamper 
with perjured evidence. However, this decision goes further in that it treats perjured 
evidence and evidence which is not perjured, but suppressed by the prosecution, 
equally. The decision is explicitly based on the due process rights of the accused. This is 
accurate in the sense the defendant is in a much weaker position than the prosecution, 
                                                 
529  373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, U.S.Md. 1963. The decision, though announced by Justice Brennan, had 
been drafted by Justice Douglas. 
530  Brady v. State, 226 Md. 422, 174 A.2d 167, Md. 1961. 
531  See note 89 above. 
532  Brady v. Maryland, fn. 529 above, at p. 87 et seq. 
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and this is aggravated if the prosecution suppresses material. The adequate preparation 
of a defence is thereby made virtually impossible. Nevertheless, it appears justified to 
also mention the importance for truth-finding in this regard: without the confession it 
was impossible to get the ‘whole picture’, namely in this case, that the accused was not 
the one who physically perpetrated the killing. However, the defence did not have 
access to the evidence, and could not obtain it without the assistance of the prosecution. 
The mandatory disclosure of exculpatory evidence indeed serves the interest of justice 
both as regards fairness and truth. 
Brady v. Maryland has retained an enormous significance until today.533 As we could 
already observe above in the English system, the importance of ‘unused’ evidence has 
been successively recognized during the 20th century. Nevertheless, as of 2010, the 
disclosure of exculpatory evidence still rests on Brady and subsequent jurisprudence, 
such as Giglio534; and exculpatory evidence which needs to be disclosed is generally 
referred to as “Brady material”. In contrast to Jencks,535 the disclosure rules related to 
Brady have not yet536 found their way into the FRCP; the disclosure of exculpatory 
material is still not regulated by statute. 
 
4.2.1.7 Dennis v. United States 
The 1966 case of Dennis v. United States537, like Pittsburgh Plate Glass some years 
earlier, evolved around the question of inconsistent statements of witnesses before the 
grand jury and later in trial. The defendants had been convicted on communism-related 
offences; the first judgment was reversed on the ground of admittance of prejudicial 
hearsay evidence.538 In the retrial they were convicted again. A motion (at trial) for the 
production of grand jury testimony of prosecution witnesses in order to find 
                                                 
533  See generally, also with some critical tones Cerruti, Through the Looking-Glass at the Brady 
Doctrine: Some New Reflections on White Queens, Hobgoblins and Due Process, as well as Sundby, 
Fallen Superheroes and Constitutional Mirages: The Tale of Brady v. Maryland. 
534  See section 4.2.1.8 below. 
535  See as to the consequences of Jencks for the FRCP section 4.2.2.3 below. 
536  See as to proposals to amend Rule 16 FRCP accordingly American College of Trial Lawyers, 
Proposed Codification of Disclosure of Favorable Information under Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure 11 and 16. 
537  Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 86 S.Ct. 1840, U.S.Colo. 1966. It may be noted that the 
attorney for the petitioners before the U.S. Supreme Court was Telford Taylor, who had been assistant 
to Robert H. Jackson in Nuremberg and later became Chief Counsel himself for the twelve 
Nuremberg ‘Follow-Up’ trials. 
538  Dennis v. U.S., 302 F.2d 5, C.A.Colo. 1962. 
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inconsistencies had been denied. In contrast to Pittsburgh Plate Glass, however, the 
defendants had made the motion to disclose the testimony either to the defence or 
alternatively the court; which, as we have seen above, the U.S. Supreme Court had left 
open in Pittsburgh Plate Glass. The motion had been denied by the trial court. This was 
upheld by the Court of Appeals, albeit expressing serious doubts and stating that an 
inspection by the court would have been “safer”.539 The U.S. Supreme Court granted 
certiorari and reversed, holding that the decision of non-disclosure by the trial court 
was reversible error, and stating that the general development of disclosure demanded a 
more liberal approach 
This Court has recognized the ‘long-established policy that maintains the 
secrecy of the grand jury proceedings in the federal courts.’ […] In general, 
however, the Court has confirmed the trial court's power under Rule 6(e) of the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to direct disclosure of grand jury 
testimony ‘preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceeding.’ In 
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co, the Court acknowledged that ‘after the 
grand jury's functions are ended, disclosure is wholly proper where the ends of 
justice require it.’ And in Pittsburgh Plate Glass, where four members of the 
Court concluded that even on the special facts of that case the witness' grand 
jury testimony should have been supplied to the defense, the entire Court was 
agreed that upon a showing of ‘particularized need’ defense counsel might have 
access to relevant portions of the grand jury testimony of a trial witness. […] 
These developments are entirely consonant with the growing realization that 
disclosure, rather than suppression, of relevant materials ordinarily promotes 
the proper administration of criminal justice. This realization is […] also 
reflected in the expanding body of materials, judicial and otherwise, favoring 
disclosure in criminal cases analogous to the civil practice 
                                                 
539  Dennis v. U.S., 346 F.2d 10, C.A.Colo., 1965, at p. 17 et seq.: “[W]e have left no doubt of the inherent 
power and the inescapable duty of the trial court to lift the lid of secrecy on grand jury proceedings in 
aid of the search for truth. The court should not hesitate to inspect and to disclose any inconsistencies 
if it is likely to aid the fair administration of criminal justice through proper cross-examination and 
impeachment. In determining variances or inconsistencies we should remember that flat 
contradictions are not the only test of inconsistency. Omissions of fact or even contrast in emphasis or 
different order of treatment may be relevant to the process of testing credibility of a witness' trial 
testimony. Our affirmance is based primarily on the proposition that inasmuch as the witnesses were 
thoroughly and competently cross-examined on numerous other relevant judicial and extra-judicial 
statements without manifest inconsistency, it is safe to assume that the grand jury proceedings would 
not have disclosed anything of impeaching significance. While it would have been safer to have 
inspected the grand jury testimony, in these peculiar circumstances we remain unwilling to say the 
trial court committed reversible error by refusing the ‘in camera’ inspection.” 
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In Pittsburgh Plate Glass, supra, the Court reserved decision on the question 
whether in camera inspection by the trial judge is an appropriate or satisfactory 
measure when there is a showing of a ‘particularized need’ for disclosure. […] 
While this practice may be useful in enabling the trial court to rule on a defense 
motion for production to it of grand jury testimony – and we do not disapprove it 
for that purpose – it by no means disposes of the matter. Trial judges ought not 
to be burdened with the task or the responsibility of examining sometimes 
voluminous grand jury testimony in order to ascertain inconsistencies with trial 
testimony. […] Nor is it realistic to assume that the trial court's judgment as to 
the utility of material for impeachment or other legitimate purposes, however 
conscientiously made, would exhaust the possibilities. In our adversary system, 
it is enough for judges to judge. The determination of what may be useful to the 
defense can properly and effectively be made only by an advocate. The trial 
judge's function in this respect is limited to deciding whether a case has been 
made for production, and to supervise the process: for example, to cause the 
elimination of extraneous matter and to rule upon applications by the 
Government for protective orders in unusual situations, such as those involving 
the Nation's security or clearcut dangers to individuals who are identified by the 
testimony produced.540 
The dissent of Justices Douglas and Black did not refer to this point in the judgment. 
We see that this is a significant digression from Pittsburgh Plate Glass, and indeed 
Justice Brennan’s dissent in Pittsburgh Plate Glass is cited more often than the majority 
opinion in that case. It also arguably incorporates some of the holdings in Jencks, in that 
it downplays, though not excludes, the role of the judge in the disclosure process. As we 
have stated in the introduction and as we will see especially regarding the international 
courts and tribunals, the judges play indeed an ever more important role in the 
disclosure process by inspecting the material which the prosecution is not willing to 
disclose to the defence. 
 
4.2.1.8 Giglio v. United States 
In close relation to Brady and Napue is the certiorari decision of Giglio v. United 
States541. Once more, the case evolved around an alleged co-perpetrator, who during the 
investigation had been given a promise by the prosecution that he would not be 
prosecuted if he testified against the accused; this fact had been discovered by the 
defence only after the conviction of the defendant. The prosecuting attorney in the trial, 
                                                 
540  Dennis v. United States, fn. 537 supra, at p. 869 et subs., 874 et subs., references partially obmitted. 
541  405 U.S. 150, 92 S.Ct. 763, U.S. 1972. 
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however, had no knowledge of this promise, and in his summation stated that the 
witness had not received any promise of non-prosecution. The U.S. Supreme Court 
held, combining its holdings in Brady and Napue that the prosecution, irrespective of 
good or bad faith, is required to disclose matters which may cast doubt on the credibility 
of a witness. Therefore, it held that it is irrelevant whether the prosecuting attorney 
knew of the promise made by his predecessor and also whether either of the two was 
legally in a position to make any promises to the witness. Quite importantly, the Court 
stated that the actions of the prosecutors are in any case attributable to the Government: 
[W]hether the nondisclosure was a result of negligence or design, it is the 
responsibility of the prosecutor. The prosecutor's office is an entity and as such 
it is the spokesman for the Government. A promise made by one attorney must be 
attributed, for these purposes, to the Government. […] To the extent this places 
a burden on the large prosecution offices, procedures and regulations can be 
established to carry that burden and to insure communication of all relevant 
information on each case to every lawyer who deals with it. Here the 
Government's case depended almost entirely on [the witness’] testimony; 
without it there could have been no indictment and no evidence to carry the case 
to the jury. [The witness’] credibility as a witness was therefore an important 
issue in the case, and evidence of any understanding or agreement as to a future 
prosecution would be relevant to his credibility and the jury was entitled to know 
of it.542 
This, in our opinion, makes clear that it is all the more difficult to speak of the 
prosecution as a party in criminal proceedings which is on the same level as the accused 
as an individual. 
 
4.2.1.9 United States v. Agurs 
In 1976, the U.S. Supreme Court apparently found that the liberalization of discovery 
had gone a too far. In United States v. Agurs543, the Court once again decided by way of 
certiorari on a matter relating to potentially exculpatory evidence. The petitioner had 
been convicted for second degree murder. In the trial, she had pleaded self-defence. The 
victim had had a record of violent crimes, a fact which had not been disclosed by the 
prosecution; the defence, however, had not made any disclosure request before the trial, 
because the defence attorney was of the opinion that the prior record of the victim 
would be inadmissible if the accused had no knowledge of it, a legal opinion which, as 
                                                 
542  Ibid., at p. 154 et seq. 
543  427 U.S. 97, 96 S.Ct. 2392, U.S.Dist.Col. 1976. 
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clarified by the U.S. Supreme Court little after the incident, was wrong.544 After the trial, 
the defence applied for a new trial, stating that the prosecution had violated its 
obligations under Brady by not disclosing the victim’s record. The District Court denied 
the motion on the grounds of a lack of materiality since the victim’s violent character 
had become sufficiently apparent during the trial. The Appeals Court, however, 
reversed, stating that the jury might have found a different verdict, had the record been 
disclosed and eventually presented at the trial.545  
The U.S. Supreme Court first reiterated the function of the criminal trial as a means to 
the determination of the truth; however, it prepares a restriction as to the case before it. 
Justice Steven, delivering the majority opinion, stated:  
[T]he Court has consistently held that a conviction obtained by the knowing use 
of perjured testimony is fundamentally unfair, and must be set aside if there is 
any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the 
judgment of the jury. It is this line of cases on which the Court of Appeals placed 
primary reliance. In those cases the Court has applied a strict standard of 
materiality, not just because they involve prosecutorial misconduct, but more 
importantly because they involve a corruption of the truth-seeking function of 
the trial process. Since this case involves no misconduct, and since there is no 
reason to question the veracity of any of the prosecution witnesses, the test of 
materiality followed in the Mooney line of cases is not necessarily applicable to 
this case.546 
The Court then joined the District and Appeals Courts in that it can make no difference 
whether a general request for disclosure is made or not, when the defence cannot know 
that a specific piece of evidence exists. To oblige the defence to make a general request 
for “all Brady material” would, in the opinion of the majority of the Court, amount to 
unwarranted formalism: 
In many cases, however, exculpatory information in the possession of the 
prosecutor may be unknown to defense counsel. In such a situation he may make 
no request at all, or possibly ask for “all Brady material” or for “anything 
exculpatory.” Such a request really gives the prosecutor no better notice than if 
no request is made. If there is a duty to respond to a general request of that kind, 
it must derive from the obviously exculpatory character of certain evidence in 
the hands of the prosecutor.547 
                                                 
544  U.S. v. Burks, 470 F.2d 432, C.A.D.C., 1972. 
545  U.S. v. Agurs, 510 F.2d 1249, C.A.D.C. 1975. 
546  Ibid., at p. 103 et seq., references omitted. 
547  Ibid., at p. 106 et seq. 
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Preparing to define what evidence had to be considered ‘material’ in the sense that it 
needed to be disclosed, the Court made clear once again that while a liberal disclosure 
practice might be desirable, due process does not require an entirely open file: 
Because we are dealing with an inevitably imprecise standard, and because the 
significance of an item of evidence can seldom be predicted accurately until the 
entire record is complete, the prudent prosecutor will resolve doubtful questions 
in favor of disclosure. But to reiterate a critical point, the prosecutor will not 
have violated his constitutional duty of disclosure unless his omission is of 
sufficient significance to result in the denial of the defendant's right to a fair 
trial. […] For a jury's appraisal of a case “might” be affected by an improper 
or trivial consideration as well as by evidence giving rise to a legitimate doubt 
on the issue of guilt. If everything that might influence a jury must be disclosed, 
the only way a prosecutor could discharge his constitutional duty would be to 
allow complete discovery of his files as a matter of routine practice. Whether or 
not procedural rules authorizing such broad discovery might be desirable, the 
Constitution surely does not demand that much. 548 […] 
The Court then goes on to state that materiality needs to be evaluated from an ex post 
perspective, meaning that the entire record of the trial must be taken into account. The 
Court holds that the standard in such a case, where the ‘newly discovered’ evidence had 
actually been in the hands of the prosecution, must lie in between the ‘normal’ standard 
for ordering a new trial, meaning that the accused needs to show that he would probably 
have been acquitted, had the new evidence been introduced in the trial, and the standard 
of ‘harmless error,’ meaning that it the evidence would not, or only slightly have had an 
effect on the finding of the jury.549 However, the Court goes on to say that only if the 
undisclosed material casts a reasonable doubt on the finding of guilt, the judgment must 
be reversed: 
The proper standard of materiality must reflect our overriding concern with the 
justice of the finding of guilt. Such a finding is permissible only if supported by 
evidence establishing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. It necessarily follows 
that if the omitted evidence creates a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise 
exist, constitutional error has been committed. This means that the omission 
must be evaluated in the context of the entire record. If there is no reasonable 
doubt about guilt whether or not the additional evince is considered, there is no 
justification for a new trial. On the other hand, if the verdict is already of 
                                                 
548  Ibid., at p. 108 et subs., references omitted. 
549  Ibid., at p. 111 et seq. 
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questionable validity, additional evidence of relatively minor importance might 
be sufficient to create a reasonable doubt.550  
In the end, the Court apparently proposes a three-fold approach: (1) when the 
prosecution knowingly uses perjured evidence or leaves it uncontested, the trial must 
inevitably be reversed.551 (2) When evidence which is not perjured is not disclosed, but 
had been specifically requested by the defence, the trial must also be reversed, if there is 
“any reasonable likelihood” that the result of the trial would have been different.552 (3) 
In a case like the present one, where no request has been made, the undisclosed 
evidence must cast a “reasonable doubt” on the outcome of the trial, which has the 
effect that without a request only material which is “obviously exculpatory”553 needs to 
be disclosed. This standard, the Court held, was the one applied by the District Judge; 
and therefore it reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The U.S. Supreme Court 
thus in essence applied the usual standard of ‘newly discovered evidence’ to this case, 
in that it must be shown that the outcome of the trial would probably have been 
different. This arguably results in a reversal of the burden of proof. It is therefore not 
surprising that Justice Brennan, whom we have gotten to know as a strong supporter of 
liberal defence discovery, dissented, concurring with Justice Marshall, who drafted the 
dissenting opinion: 
The Court today holds that the prosecutor's constitutional duty to provide 
exculpatory evidence to the defense is not limited to cases in which the defense 
makes a request for such evidence. But once having recognized the existence of 
a duty to volunteer exculpatory evidence, the Court so narrowly defines the 
category of “material” evidence embraced by the duty as to deprive it of all 
meaningful content. […]554 
Our overriding concern in cases such as the one before us is the defendant's 
right to a fair trial. One of the most basic elements of fairness in a criminal trial 
is that available evidence tending to show innocence, as well as that tending to 
show guilt, be fully aired before the jury; more particularly, it is that the State in 
its zeal to convict a defendant not suppress evidence that might exonerate him. 
[…] No interest of the State is served, and no duty of the prosecutor advanced, 
by the suppression of evidence favorable to the defendant. On the contrary, the 
                                                 
550  Ibid., at p. 112 et seq., references omitted. 
551  The prime example being Mooney v. Holohan, see fn. 89 above. 
552  The prime example being Brady v. Maryland, see above fn. 529. 
553  See once again United States v. Agurs at p. 103 et seq., fn. 546 
554  Ibid., at p. 114. 
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prosecutor fulfills his most basic responsibility when he fully airs all the relevant 
evidence at his command.555 
Under today's ruling, if the prosecution has not made knowing use of perjury, 
and if the defense has not made a specific request for an item of information, the 
defendant is entitled to a new trial only if the withheld evidence actually creates 
a reasonable doubt as to guilt in the judge's mind. With all respect, this rule is 
completely at odds with the overriding interest in assuring that evidence tending 
to show innocence is brought to the jury's attention. The rule creates little, if 
any, incentive for the prosecutor conscientiously to determine whether his files 
contain evidence helpful to the defense. Indeed, the rule reinforces the natural 
tendency of the prosecutor to overlook evidence favorable to the defense, and 
creates an incentive for the prosecutor to resolve close questions of disclosure in 
favor of concealment.556 
[The Court holds that i]n cases in which “the undisclosed evidence 
demonstrates that the prosecution's case includes perjured testimony and that 
the prosecution knew, or should have known, of the perjury,” the judgment of 
conviction must be set aside “if there is any reasonable likelihood that the false 
testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury.” This lesser burden on 
the defendant is appropriate, the Court states, primarily because the withholding 
of evidence contradicting testimony offered by witnesses called by the 
prosecution “involve(s) a corruption of the truth-seeking function of the trial 
process.” But surely the truth-seeking process is corrupted by the withholding of 
evidence favorable to the defense, regardless of whether the evidence is directly 
contradictory to evidence offered by the prosecution.557 
This critique is certainly justified. It must be admitted that, if anything that might have 
influenced the jury must be disclosed, it is difficult to argue that anything short of full 
access to the prosecution file should be constitutional. However, the prior record of the 
victim in a case where the accused pleads self-defence is almost necessarily material for 
the defence. In case of doubt, the decision should always be made in favour of 
disclosure. One gets the impression that although the majority claimed that a request to 
“all Brady material” would amount to formalism and thus need not be made, they had 
the particular case in mind, finding a sort of compensation for the non-disclosure in the 
fact that the ‘violent character’ of the victim had become apparent during the trial and 
quite possibly also in the accused’s defence counsel’s negligence. 
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4.2.1.10 United States v. Bagley 
A further refinement (or complication) of the question of materiality came about with 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1985 decision in U.S. v. Bagley558. In this somewhat 
controversial559 decision promises of financial reward which had been made to two 
prosecution witnesses had not been disclosed, even though specifically the discovery of 
any promises made to the witnesses had been requested. Instead, it appeared from the 
answer of the prosecution that no promises had been made. The defence, however, 
obtained the relevant information by other means, and requested a retrial, which was 
denied by the District Court (in fact, by the same judge who had sat in the summary 
trial) on the grounds of non-materiality; the Court found beyond reasonable doubt that, 
had the material been disclosed, the result would not have been different. This was 
reversed by the Appeals Court; the main ground for reversal being that a failure to 
disclose material for cross-examination amounts to an impairment of the right to 
confront witnesses;560 however, the Appeals Court also criticized the reasoning of the 
District Court with regard to the failure to produce Brady material upon the specific 
request.561 By majority, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed this decision and remanded the 
case back to the Court of Appeals. Citing Agurs562, Justice Blackmun stated,: 
The Brady rule is based on the requirement of due process. Its purpose is not to 
displace the adversary system as the primary means by which truth is uncovered, 
but to ensure that a miscarriage of justice does not occur.[Note 6: By requiring 
the prosecutor to assist the defense in making its case, the Brady rule represents 
a limited departure from a pure adversary model. The Court has recognized, 
however, that the prosecutor's role transcends that of an adversary: he “is the 
representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty ... 
whose interest ... in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that 
justice shall be done.” Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88, 55 S.Ct. 629, 
633, 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1935).] Thus, the prosecutor is not required to deliver his 
                                                 
558  U.S. v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 105 S.Ct. 3375, U.S.Wash.,1985. 
559  “Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I and II; Justice Blackmun, 
joined by Justice O'Connor, delivered an opinion with respect to Part III; Justice White filed an 
opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Chief Justice Burger and Justice 
Rehnquist joined; Justice Marshall filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Brennan joined; Justice 
Stevens filed a dissenting opinion.” 
560  Ibid., at p. 1464. 
561  Bagley v. Lumpkin, 719 F.2d 1462 (1983). 
562  See fn. 545 above. 
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entire file to defense counsel, but only to disclose evidence favorable to the 
accused that, if suppressed, would deprive the defendant of a fair trial […].563 
The Court held that the ruling of the Appeals Court that the non-disclosure of 
impeachment evidence amounted to an infringement of the right to witness 
confrontation was in error, and that impeachment evidence had to be treated like 
exculpatory evidence as falling under the Brady rule.564 Referring to the reasoning in 
Agurs once again, the Court stated: 
“If the standard applied to the usual motion for a new trial based on newly 
discovered evidence were the same when the evidence was in the State's 
possession as when it was found in a neutral source, there would be no special 
significance to the prosecutor's obligation to serve the cause of justice.”[565] The 
standard of materiality applicable in the absence of a specific Brady request is 
therefore stricter than the harmless-error standard but more lenient to the 
defense than the newly-discovered-evidence standard.566 
As we have seen, Agurs basically resulted in the ‘newly-discovered-evidence’ standard 
(meaning that the accused has to prove that the trial would ‘probably’ have resulted in 
an acquittal), though claiming that it wasn’t; the Court in Bagley appears to confuse the 
question of request, which Agurs had said was irrelevant if the request could only be 
general anyway, with the question of materiality. Relying on the decision in Strickland 
v. Washington567, the Court held that ‘reasonable probability’ as in Agurs should mean a 
“probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome”, since this standard was 
“sufficiently flexible”.568 Since the Court of Appeals had based its reversal mainly on 
the question of witness confrontation but expressed some doubts as to the “beyond 
reasonable doubt” reasoning of the District Court, the U.S. Supreme Court remanded 
the case back to the Court of Appeals to reconsider it applying the newly found 
standard. The fact that this standard for its part is not particularly clear is obviously 
intended by the majority for its “flexibility”. 
Justice White formulated a concurring opinion holding that while the ‘reasonable 
probability’ approach was justified, the specific analysis of the kind of discovery 
                                                 
563  U.S. v. Bagley, fn. 558 supra, at p. 675. 
564  Ibid., at p. 676 et subs. 
565  U.S. v. Agurs, fn. 545 supra, at p. 111 et seq 
566  Ibid., at p 678. 
567  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, U.S.,1984 
568  U.S. v. Bagley, fn. 558 supra, at p. 682. 
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request and its specificity were superfluous. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist 
joined. 569  
As in Agurs, Justice Marshall and, joining him, Justice Brennan, dissented, their 
dissenting opinion is quite a bit longer than the majority opinion. They started out with 
the determination that when the undisclosed evidence is impeaching material for the 
state’s only witnesses, it can logically not be harmless error not to disclose it.570 What 
follows is, for the most part, based on the premise that disclosure, and especially 
disclosure of exculpatory material, advances the discovery, or emergence, of the truth, 
as well as general fairness for the defendant.571  
Our system of criminal justice is animated by two seemingly incompatible 
notions: the adversary model, and the state's primary concern with justice, not 
convictions. Brady, of course, reflects the latter goal of justice, and is in some 
ways at odds with the competing model of a sporting event. Our goal, then, must 
be to integrate the Brady right into the harsh, daily reality of this apparently 
discordant criminal process.  
At the trial level, the duty of the state to effectuate Brady devolves into the duty 
of the prosecutor; the dual role that the prosecutor must play poses a serious 
obstacle to implementing Brady. The prosecutor is by trade, if not necessity, a 
zealous advocate. He is a trained attorney who must aggressively seek 
convictions in court on behalf of a victimized public. At the same time, as a 
representative of the state, he must place foremost in his hierarchy of interests 
the determination of truth. Thus, for purposes of Brady, the prosecutor must 
abandon his role as an advocate and pore through his files, as objectively as 
possible, to identify the material that could undermine his case.572 
Justice Marshall goes on to state that disclosure of favourable evidence enhances truth-
finding and fairness, from which he draws the conclusion that, lacking a countervailing 
interest, due process requires accordingly. The bases for counter-arguments, such as 
possible witness intimidation or administrative difficulties, he holds, either do not exist 
or can be circumvented by other means. Interestingly, and in fact surprisingly, given the 
fact that the decision dates from 1985, he obviously does want to retain some element of 
surprise for the prosecution, since he is obviously not in favour of an open file 
discovery, which would include inculpatory evidence, too; the disclosure of prosecution 
evidence was, as we have seen above, in the English and also partially in the American 
                                                 
569  Ibid., at p. 685. 
570  Ibid. 
571  Ibid., at p. 692 et subs. 
572  Ibid. 
151 
 
procedure was actually something that came before anyone even thought about 
disclosing unused material: 
Neither of these concerns, however, counsels in favor of a rule of nondisclosure 
in close or ambiguous cases. To the contrary, a rule simplifying the disclosure 
decision by definition does not make that decision more complex. Nor does 
disclosure of favorable evidence inevitably lead to disclosure of inculpatory 
evidence, as might an open file policy, or to the anticipated wrongdoings of 
defendants and their lawyers, if indeed such fears are warranted. We have other 
mechanisms for disciplining unscrupulous defense counsel; hamstringing their 
clients need not be one of them. I simply do not find any state interest that 
warrants withholding from a presumptively innocent defendant, whose liberty is 
at stake in the proceeding, information that bears on his case and that might 
enable him to defend himself. 573 
In the third part of his dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall analyzes the materiality 
standard as defined by the majority, and quite rightly points out that it has the 
consequence of asking from the prosecutor to apply what is basically an ex post analysis 
prior to trial, which he sees as both impossible to properly apply and as an invitation to 
unscrupulous prosecutors.574 While reiterating that Brady requires to disclose all 
exculpatory material, Justice Marshall makes clear that this does not mean that any non-
disclosure requires a new trial, however, he argues for an application of the ‘harmless 
error’ test, meaning that, for the review of decisions, i.e., from an ex post perspective it 
must be clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the undisclosed evidence would not have 
had any effect on the outcome of the trial; for the ex ante perspective of the prosecutor 
before trial, he that a presumption for disclosure should be maintained: 
In so saying, I recognize that a failure to divulge favorable information should 
not result in reversal in all cases. It may be that a conviction should be affirmed 
on appeal despite the prosecutor's failure to disclose evidence that reasonably 
might have been deemed potentially favorable prior to trial. The state's interest 
in nondisclosure at trial is minimal, and should therefore yield to the readily 
apparent benefit that full disclosure would convey to the search for truth. After 
trial, however, the benefits of disclosure may at times be tempered by the state's 
legitimate desire to avoid retrial when error has been harmless. However, in 
making the determination of harmlessness, I would apply our normal 
constitutional error test and reverse unless it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the withheld evidence would not have affected the outcome of the trial.575  
                                                 
573  Ibid., at p. 699. 
574  Ibid., at p. 699 et subs., references omitted. 
575  Ibid., at p. 696 et seq., 704. 
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Finally Justice Stevens also delivered a dissenting opinion, stating that he, like Justice 
Marshall, sees Bagley as clearly comparable with Brady since there was a specific 
request by the prosecution; however, he also gets to the conclusion that the case should 
be remanded to the Court of Appeals, albeit not on the new standard as formulated by 
the majority, but under the usual Brady standard – he holds that the Supreme Court 
should not itself decide on the basis of the trial record. He does, however, generally 
support the majority in Agurs, in that he holds that without a specific request Brady is 
not applicable. 
 
4.2.1.11  Kyles v. Whitley 
In 1995, another important and disputed decision was handed down with respect to 
favourable evidence. In Kyles v. Whitley576 the defendant had been found guilty of 
murder and sentenced to death. He had been incriminated by one ‘Beanie’,577 who had 
given several different and inconsistent statements, which in fact cast a suspicion on 
himself, too. Furthermore, not all of the eyewitnesses had identified the defendant in a 
photo line-up. These facts, however, were withheld from the defence, even though there 
had been a specific request. In the first trial, the jury was hung; in the second trial, with 
the same conditions as regards disclosure, the defendant was convicted. His appeals 
were not successful, though it later turned out that at least one of the eye witnesses had 
testified wrongly in court. The U.S. Supreme Court invoked, among other cases, 
Mooney, Brady, Agurs, and Bagley. It interprets Bagley quite widely, stating: 
Bagley 's touchstone of materiality is a “reasonable probability” of a different 
result, and the adjective is important. The question is not whether the defendant 
would more likely than not have received a different verdict with the evidence, 
but whether in its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting 
in a verdict worthy of confidence. A “reasonable probability” of a different 
result is accordingly shown when the government's evidentiary suppression 
“undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.” The second aspect of 
Bagley materiality bearing emphasis here is that it is not a sufficiency of 
evidence test. A defendant need not demonstrate that after discounting the 
inculpatory evidence in light of the undisclosed evidence, there would not have 
been enough left to convict. The possibility of an acquittal on a criminal charge 
does not imply an insufficient evidentiary basis to convict. One does not show a 
Brady violation by demonstrating that some of the inculpatory evidence should 
                                                 
576  Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 115 S.Ct. 1555, U.S.La.,1995. 
577  This was apparently not his real name, but since he used several different aliases, the Court also 
referred to him as ‘Beanie’. 
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have been excluded, but by showing that the favorable evidence could 
reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to 
undermine confidence in the verdict.578 
The Court emphasizes again that the U.S. Constitution does not demand an open-file 
policy; and that the prosecution retains a level of discretion regarding exculpatory 
material. However, it is the task of the prosecution to make sure that the “point of 
materiality” is not reached.579 Of course, this does not really clarify the Bagley standard 
of materiality. The Court reiterates the Brady holding that whatever the police collects 
as evidence and consequently transmits to the prosecution, is in the sole responsibility 
of the prosecution, which is therefore held responsible even when it is not aware of the 
exculpatory evidence itself. As to the argument that the responsibility of the prosecutor 
to judge whether the evidence is exculpatory or not places too much of a burden on him, 
the Court remarks, with regard to the role of the prosecutor in the adversary trial as a 
truth-finding device: 
[I]t is hard to find merit in the State's complaint over the responsibility for 
judgment under the existing system, which does not tax the prosecutor with error 
for any failure to disclose, absent a further showing of materiality. Unless, 
indeed, the adversary system of prosecution is to descend to a gladiatorial level 
unmitigated by any prosecutorial obligation for the sake of truth, the 
government simply cannot avoid responsibility for knowing when the 
suppression of evidence has come to portend such an effect on a trial's outcome 
as to destroy confidence in its result. This means, naturally, that a prosecutor 
anxious about tacking too close to the wind will disclose a favorable piece of 
evidence. This is as it should be. Such disclosure will serve to justify trust in the 
prosecutor as “the representative ... of a sovereignty ... whose interest ... in a 
criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be 
done.” Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88, 55 S.Ct. 629, 633, 79 L.Ed. 
1314 (1935). And it will tend to preserve the criminal trial, as distinct from the 
prosecutor's private deliberations, as the chosen forum for ascertaining the truth 
about criminal accusations. The prudence of the careful prosecutor should not 
therefore be discouraged.580 
The Court then went on to evaluate the undisclosed material, and found that in fact 
taken as a whole it easily reached the threshold of materiality meaning that it did 
undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial. 
                                                 
578  Kyles v. Whitley, fn. 576 supra, at p. 434 et seq., reference omitted. 
579  Ibid., at p. 437. 
580  Ibid., at p. 439 et seq., references partially omitted. 
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Justice Scalia, and, joining him, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy and 
Thomas dissented. First of all, he states that certiorari should not have been granted, 
indicating that the habeas corpus petition of the defendant was based merely on the 
wrong application of the law on the facts. Other than that, Justice Scalia restricts 
himself to pointing out in considerable length why the prosecution case was still strong.  
 
4.2.1.12 The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
As pointed out in Chapter 2, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure entered into force 
in 1946. Since then, they have been amended many times. These changes not least had 
considerable impact on the rules of discovery; Rule 16 was amended nine times 
between 1946 and 1994;581 and has also since been amended several times.582 In the 
framework of this thesis, it is impossible to give a detailed overview as to the 
development of the Rules. What concerns us is predominantly the development between 
1946 and the mid-1990ies, which is when the international Ad Hoc Tribunals took up 
their work. We will therefore limit our description to a brief comparison of the original 
FRCP and the 1994 version – an ‘optical’ comparison, as a matter of fact, speaks for 
itself. Due to the sheer length of Rule 16 and the difference in wording, it appears 
superfluous to make a synopsis as is usually done later in this thesis when analyzing the 
rules of the Ad Hoc tribunals and those of the ICC. 
Rule 16 as of 1946: 
Discovery and Inspection 
Upon motion of a defendant at any time after the filing of the indictment or information, 
the court may order the attorney for the government to inspect and copy or photograph 
designated books, papers, documents or tangible objects, obtained from or belonging to 
the defendant or obtained from others by seizure or by process, upon a showing that the 
items sought may be material to the preparation of his defence and that the request is 
reasonable. The order shall specify the time, place and manner of making the inspection 
and of taking the copies or photographs and may prescribe such terms and conditions 
that are just. 
 
Rule 16 as of 1994: 
Discovery and Inspection 
(a) Governmental Disclosure of Evidence 
(1) Information Subject to Disclosure 
(A) Statement of Defendant. Upon request of a defendant the government must disclose 
to the defendant and make available for inspection, copying, or photographing: any 
                                                 
581  See notes in FRCP issue U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 1994. 
582  The current version can be accessed on the internet at http://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frcrmp/. 
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relevant written or recorded statements made by the defendant, or copies thereof, within 
the possession, custody, or control of the government, the existence of which is known, 
or by exercise of due diligence may become known, to the attorney for the government; 
that portion of any written record containing the substance of any relevant oral 
statement made by the defendant whether before or after arrest in response to 
interrogation by any person then known to the defendant to be a government agent; and 
recorded testimony of the defendant before a grand jury which relates to the offense 
charged. The government must also disclose to the defendant the substance of any other 
relevant oral statement made by the defendant whether before or after arrest in response 
to interrogation by any person then known to the defendant to be a government agent if 
the government intends to use that statement at trial. Upon request of a defendant which 
is an organization such as a corporation, partnership, association or labor union, the 
government must disclose to the defendant any of the foregoing statements made by a 
person who the government contends (1) was, at the time of making the statement, so 
situated as a director, officer, employee, or agent as to have been able legally to bind the 
defendant in respect to the subject of the statement, or (2) was, at the time of the offense, 
personally involved in the alleged conduct in which the person was involved. 
(B) Defendant’s Prior Record. Upon request of the defendant, the government shall 
furnish the defendant such copy of the defendant’s prior criminal record, if any, as is 
within the possession, custody, or control of the government, the existence of which is 
known, or by the exercise of due diligence may become known, to the attorney for the 
government. 
(C) Documents And Tangible Objects. Upon request of the defendant to inspect and copy 
or photograph books, papers, documents, photographs, tangible objects, buildings or 
places, or copies or portions thereof, which are within the possession, custody or control 
of the government, and which are material to the preparation of the defendant’s defense 
or are intended for use by the government as evidence in chief at the trial, or were 
obtained from or belonged to the defendant. 
(D) Reports Of Examinations And Tests. Upon request of a defendant the government 
shall permit the defendant to inspect and copy or photograph any results or reports of 
physical or mental examinations, and of scientific tests or experiments, or copies thereof, 
which are within the possession, custody, or control of the government, the existence of 
which is known, or by the exercise of due diligence may become known, to the attorney 
for the government, and which are material to the preparation of the defense or are 
intended for use by the government as evidence in chief at the trial. 
(E) Expert Witnesses. At the defendant’s request, the government shall disclose to the 
defendant a written summary of testimony the government intends to use under Rules 
702, 703, or 705 of the Federal Rules of Evidence during its case in chief at trial. This 
summary must describe the witnesses’ opinions, the bases and the reasons therefore, and 
the witnesses’ qualifications. 
(2) Information Not Subject To Disclosure. Except as provided in paragraphs (A), (B), 
(D) and (E) of subdivision (a)(1), this rule does not authorize the discovery or inspection 
of reports, memoranda, or other internal government documents made by the attorney 
for the government or other government agents in connection with the investigation or 
prosecution of the case. Nor does the rule authorize the discovery or inspection of 
statements made by government witnesses except as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3500. 
(3) Grand Jury Transcripts. Except as provided in Rules 6, 12(i) and 26.2, and 
subdivision (a)(1)(A) of this rule, these rules do not relate to discovery or inspection of 
recorded proceedings of a grand jury. 
(b) The Defendant’s Disclosure of Evidence 
(1) Information Subject To Disclosure 
(A) Documents And Tangible Objects. 
If the defendant requests disclosure under subdivision (a)(1)(C) or (D) of this rule, upon 
compliance with such request by the government, shall permit the government to inspect 
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and copy or photograph books, papers, documents, photographs, tangible objects, or 
copies or portions thereof, which are within the possession, custody, or control of the 
defendant and which the defendant intends to introduce as evidence in chief at the trial. 
(B) Reports Of Examinations And Tests. If the defendant requests disclosure under 
subdivision (a)(1)(C) or (D) of this rule, upon compliance with such request by the 
government, shall permit the government to inspect and copy or photograph any results 
or reports of physical or mental examinations and of scientific tests or experiments made 
in connection with the particular case, or copies thereof, within the possession or 
control of the defendant, which the defendant intends to introduce as evidence in chief at 
the trial or which were prepared by a witness whom the defendant intends to call at the 
trial when the results or reports relate to that witness’ testimony. 
(C) Expert Witnesses. If the defendant requests disclosure under subdivision (a)(1)(E) of 
this rule and the government complies, the defendant, at the government’s request, must 
disclose to the government a written summary of testimony the defendant intends to use 
under Rules 702, 703 and 705 of the Federal Rules of evidence as evidence at trial. This 
summary must describe the opinions of the witnesses, the bases and reasons therefore, 
and the witnesses’ qualifications. 
(2) Information not Subject to Disclosure. Except as to scientific or medical reports, this 
subdivision does not authorize the discovery or inspection of reports, memoranda, or 
other internal defense documents made by the defendant, or the defendant’s attorneys or 
agents in connection with the investigation or defense of the case, or of statements made 
by the defendant, or by government or defense witnesses, or by prospective government 
or defense witnesses, to the defendant, the defendant’s agents or attorneys. 
(c) Continuing Duty To Disclose. If, prior to or during trial, a party discovers additional 
evidence or material previously requested or ordered, which is subject to discovery or 
inspection under this rule, such party shall promptly notify the other party or that 
other’s party attorney or the court of the existence of the additional evidence or 
material. 
(d) Regulation Of Discovery. 
(1) Protective and Modifying Orders. Upon sufficient showing the court may at any time 
order that the discovery or inspection be denied, restricted, or deferred, or make such 
other order as is appropriate. Upon motion by a party, the court may permit the party to 
make such showing, in whole or in part, in the form of a written statement to be 
inspected by the judge alone. If the court enters an order granting relief following such 
an ex parte showing, the entire text of the party’s statement shall be sealed and 
preserved in the records of the court to be made available to the appellate court in the 
event of appeal. 
(2) Failure To Comply With A Request. If at any time during the course of the 
proceedings it is brought to the attention of the court that a party has failed to comply 
with this rule, the court may order such party to permit the discovery or inspection, 
grant a continuance, or prohibit the party from introducing evidence not disclosed, or it 
may enter such other order as it deems just under the circumstances. The court may 
specify the time, place and manner of making the discovery and inspection and may 
prescribe such terms and conditions as are just. 
(e) Alibi Witnesses. Discovery of alibi witnesses is governed by Rule 12.1. 
It is obvious that the original Rule 16 was transformed into something entirely different. 
In Chapter 2, we had taken a look at the limited scope of the original wording; already 
with the first revision of the FRCP in 1966 it was considerably widened.583 We find 
some reminiscence of the original rule in subdivision (a)(1)(C). 
                                                 
583  Printed in: United States Code Annotated, Title 18, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Cumulative 
Annual Pocket Part For Use In 1969, St. Paul, Minn., 1968. 
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Generally it can be noted that the disclosure of evidence has become more of a matter of 
right than a matter of discretion, albeit the court still has the last word, as shown by 
subdivision (d)(1).  
In subdivision (a)(1)(A) reference is made to the defendant’s own statements, a matter 
which, as we have seen above, was highly disputed in the 1950ies and 1960ies. A 
similar provision had already been included in the first amended version of 1966, albeit 
giving the court much more discretion. Upon request, the prosecution must thus now 
disclose to the defence the defendant’s prior statements, or those of the representatives 
of the defendant, if the latter is an organization. Other than that, the defendant’s prior 
record, documents and tangible objects, and reports of examinations and tests must be 
disclosed, if they are material to the preparation of the defence or are intended to be 
used by the prosecution at trial (subdivisions (a)(1)(B, C). We note that this latter 
feature is actually new – originally Rule 16 did not contain any reference to evidence 
which the prosecution was actually planning to use; just like in England, the disclosure 
rules rather dealt with material which the prosecution was not necessarily going to use 
at trial. In contrast to England, of course, in the U.S.A. there was no common law rule 
which provided for the obligatory disclosure of prosecution evidence. It should also be 
noted that the material which is intended for use only comprises that which is to be used 
in the examination in chief – this means that the prosecution retains a momentum of 
surprise regarding material which is to be used for impeachment purposed in cross-
examination. 
As regards the testimony of expert witnesses, it is to be noted that the testimony itself 
need not be disclosed, but that a written summary suffices, this has, in principle, not 
changed until today. 
In subdivision (a)(2) exceptions to disclosure are enumerated, such as internal 
memoranda and reports. Other than that, we find reference to the Jencks act (18 U.S.C. 
§ 3500), which, as noted above, has also influenced Rule 26.2. 
Finally, in subdivision (a)(3) we find reference to grand jury records; the rule makes 
clear that it generally does not apply to evidence taken before the grand jury; the parties 
must thus take resort to the other rules enumerated (6, 12(i) and 26.2), meaning that 
under certain circumstances this evidence may be disclosed for impeachment purposes, 
albeit generally after the witness has testified in chief. 
Subdivision (c) states that the parties generally underlie a continuing duty to disclose; 
once again showing that disclosure may and must be understood to encompass more 
than just the procedural phase. 
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What is striking, as briefly mentioned before, is the absence of disclosure of Brady 
material in the FRCP. While Jencks material is explicitly mentioned, the FRCP contain 
no provisions related to exculpatory evidence. 
An interesting feature, with which obviously the ‘reciprocity argument’ against 
disclosure was to be encountered, is the reciprocal duty of the defence regarding the 
disclosure of some of its evidence as foreseen in subdivision (b): if the defence demands 
disclosure according to subdivision (a)(1)(C) or (D) (tangible objects, reports etc.), it 
must itself let the prosecution inspect this kind of material which it has in its possession. 
As with the prosecution, this covers only material which is intended for use as evidence 
in chief – impeachment evidence need thus not be disclosed. More disclosure duties are 
enumerated in Rule 12, to which we will turn below. 
 
4.2.2 Defence Disclosure 
As we have seen, the original lack of defence disclosure was one of the main arguments 
against prosecution disclosure; and we just saw one reaction to it: the turning of the 
originally feared ‘one way street’ into a ‘two way street’ by imposing disclosure duties 
on the defence as well. As was explained in the introduction, it appears erroneous to 
base disclosure duties of the defence on fair trial rights, or, for that matter, the equality 
of arms for the prosecution. It must however be presumed that this idea was part of the 
motivation for the introduction of defence disclosure, or prosecution discovery. 
In England, we have seen that disclosure duties of the defence did not appear until 1968, 
which was when the obligatory notice of alibi defence was introduced. In the United 
States, in turn, we find earlier examples. As noted in Chapter 2, there were some states 
which had notice obligations, especially regarding alibi defences, in place as early as in 
the 1920ies.584 As a matter of fact, the privilege against self-incrimination as enshrined 
in the 5th Amendment585 may, at least at first sight, conflict with a disclosure obligation 
of the defence. 
 
4.2.2.1  Williams v. Florida 
The most important decision on defence disclosure is certainly Williams v. Florida586. 
                                                 
584  See once again references at Wigmore, A Treatise on the Anglo-American System of Evidence in 
Trials at Common Law, Vol. 6, § 1855b, fn. 2, p. 419 et seq. 
585  “No person […] shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself […]. 
586  Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 90 S.Ct. 1893, U.S.Fla. 1970. 
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The defendant had been indicted for robbery and had been planning to rely on a defence 
of alibi. Florida state law required defendants to give notice of alibi before the trial, to 
disclose the specifics of the alibi and to provide the prosecution with a list of witnesses 
in relation to the alibi defence.587 The defendant filed a motion for a protective order in 
order to be relieved from complying with the rule on the grounds of an alleged 
infringement of his privilege against self-incrimination, since he was compelled to 
deliver to the state evidence useful to convicting him. The motion was denied. He 
therefore complied, was convicted as charged and sentenced to life imprisonment. The 
U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari, albeit by majority affirmed the conviction. The 
Court bases its holding both on equality arguments as well as truth-finding 
considerations: 
We need not linger over the suggestion that the discovery permitted the State 
against petitioner in this case deprived him of ‘due process' or a ‘fair trial.’ 
Florida law provides for liberal discovery by the defendant against the State, 
and the notice-of-alibi rule is itself carefully hedged with reciprocal duties 
                                                 
587  Fla.Rule Crim.Proc. 1.200, printed in the appendix to the judgment (ibid., at p. 104 et seq.): ”Upon the 
written demand of the prosecuting attorney, specifying as particularly as is known to such prosecuting 
attorney, the place, date and time of the commission of the crime charged, a defendant in a criminal 
case who intends to offer evidence of an alibi in his defense shall, not less than ten days before trial or 
such other time as the court may direct, file and serve upon such prosecuting attorney a notice in 
writing of his intention to claim such alibi, which notice shall contain specific information as to the 
place at which the defendant claims to have been at the time of the alleged offense and, as particularly 
as is known to defendant or his attorney, the names and addresses of the witnesses by whom he 
proposes to establish such alibi. Not less than five days after receipt of defendant's witness list, or such 
other times as the court may direct, the prosecuting attorney shall file and serve upon the defendant 
the names and addresses (as particularly as are known to the prosecuting attorney) of the witnesses the 
State proposes to offer in rebuttal to discredit the defendant's alibi at the trial of the cause. Both the 
defendant and the prosecuting attorney shall be under a continuing duty to promptly disclose the 
names and addresses of additional witnesses which come to the attention of either party subsequent to 
filing their respective witness lists as provided in this rule. If a defendant fails to file and serve a copy 
of such notice as herein required, the court may exclude evidence offered by such defendant for the 
purpose of proving an alibi, except the testimony of the defendant himself. If such notice is given by a 
defendant, the court may exclude the testimony of any witness offered by the defendant for the 
purpose of proving an alibi if the name and address of such witness as particularly as is known to 
defendant or his attorney is not stated in such notice. If the prosecuting attorney fails to file and serve 
a copy on the defendant of a list of witnesses as herein provided, the court may exclude evidence 
offered by the state in rebuttal to the defendant's alibi evidence. If such notice is given by the 
prosecuting attorney, the court may exclude the testimony of any witness offered by the prosecuting 
attorney for the purpose of rebutting the defense of alibi if the name and address of such witness as 
particularly as is known to the prosecuting attorney is not stated in such notice. For good cause shown 
the court may waive the requirements of this rule.” 
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requiring state disclosure to the defendant. Given the ease with which an alibi 
can be fabricated, the State's interest in protecting itself against an eleventh-
hour defense is both obvious and legitimate. Reflecting this interest, notice-of-
alibi provisions, dating at least from 1927, are now in existence in a substantial 
number of States. The adversary system of trial is hardly an end in itself; it is not 
yet a poker game in which players enjoy an absolute right always to conceal 
their cards until played. We find ample room in that system, at least as far as 
‘due process' is concerned, for the instant Florida rule, which is designed to 
enhance the search for truth in the criminal trial by insuring both the defendant 
and the State ample opportunity to investigate certain facts crucial to the 
determination of guilt or innocence.588 
The Court then goes on to say that the fact that the defendant’s witnesses can be cross-
examined can in itself not be an infringement of the privilege against self-incrimination. 
The only difference made by the Florida provision is that the defendant is forced to lay 
open this defence before the trial; however, if the evidence were presented only at trial, 
the prosecutor could definitely ask for an adjournment of the trial on the ground of 
surprise. The difference between the two possibilities, the Court holds, has no bearing 
on the accused’s due process rights: 
In the case before us, the notice-of-alibi rule by itself in no way affected 
petitioner's crucial decision to call alibi witnesses or added to the legitimate 
pressures leading to that course of action. At most, the rule only compelled 
petitioner to accelerate the timing of his disclosure, forcing him to divulge at an 
earlier date information that the petitioner from the beginning planned to 
divulge at trial. Nothing in the Fifth Amendment privilege entitles a defendant as 
a matter of constitutional right to await the end of the State's case before 
announcing the nature of his defense, any more than it entitles him to await the 
jury's verdict on the State's case-in-chief before deciding whether or not to take 
the stand himself. Petitioner concedes that absent the notice-of-alibi rule the 
Constitution would raise no bar to the court's granting the State a continuance 
at trial on the ground of surprise as soon as the alibi witness is called. Nor 
would there be self-incrimination problems if, during that continuance, the State 
was permitted to do precisely what it did here prior to trial: take the deposition 
of the witness and find rebuttal evidence. But if so utilizing a continuance is 
permissible under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, then surely the same 
result may be accomplished through pretrial discovery, as it was here, avoiding 
the necessity of a disrupted trial. We decline to hold that the privilege against 
                                                 
588  Ibid., at p. 81 et seq. 
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compulsory self-incrimination guarantees the defendant the right to surprise the 
State with an alibi defense.589 
This ‘acceleration doctrine’590 was contested by Justice Black, and, joining him, Justice 
Douglas. The two Justices are of the opinion that any obligation of notice and disclosure 
of the defendant violate his due process rights and that there are decisive differences 
between the alternatives of disclosure before or only during the trial: 
When a defendant is required to indicate whether he might plead alibi in 
advance of trial, he faces a vastly different decision from that faced by one who 
can wait until the State has presented the case against him before making up his 
mind. Before trial the defendant knows only what the State's case might be. 
Before trial there is no such thing as the ‘strength of the State's case’; there is 
only a range of possible cases. At that time there is no certainty as to what kind 
of case the State will ultimately be able to prove at trial. Therefore any appraisal 
of the desirability of pleading alibi will be beset with guesswork and gambling 
far greater than that accompanying the decision at the trial itself. Any lawyer 
who has actually tried a case knows that, regardless of the amount of pretrial 
preparation, a case looks far different when it is actually being tried than when 
it is only being thought about. 
It is no answer to this argument to suggest that the Fifth Amendment as so 
interpreted would give the defendant an unfair element of surprise, turning a 
trial into a ‘poker game’ or ‘sporting contest,’ for that tactical advantage to the 
defendant is inherent in the type of trial required by our Bill of Rights. The 
Framers were well aware of the awesome investigative and prosecutorial 
powers of government and it was in order to limit those powers that they spelled 
out in detail in the Constitution the procedure to be followed in criminal trials. A 
defendant, they said, is entitled to notice of the charges against him, trial by 
jury, the right to counsel for his defense, the right to confront and cross-examine 
witnesses, the right to call witnesses in his own behalf, and the right not to be a 
witness against himself. All of these rights are designed to shield the defendant 
against state power. None are designed to make convictions easier and taken 
together they clearly indicate that in our system the entire burden of proving 
criminal activity rests on the State. The defendant, under our Constitution, need 
not do anything at all to defend himself, and certainly he cannot be required to 
help convict himself. Rather he has an absolute, unqualified right to compel the 
State to investigate its own case, find its own witnesses, prove its own facts, and 
convince the jury through its own resources. Throughout the process the 
                                                 
589  Ibid., at p. 85 et seq. 
590  See LaFave/Israel/King/Kerr, Criminal procedure, Part IV, § 20.4(d). 
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defendant has a fundamental right to remain silent, in effect challenging the 
State at every point to: ‘Prove it!’ 
A criminal trial is in part a search for truth. But it is also a system designed to 
protect ‘freedom’ by insuring that no one is criminally punished unless the State 
has first succeeded in the admittedly difficult task of convincing a jury that the 
defendant is guilty. That task is made more difficult by the Bill of Rights, and the 
Fifth Amendment may be one of the most difficult of the barriers to surmount. 
The Framers decided that the benefits to be derived from the kind of trial 
required by the Bill of Rights were well worth any loss in ‘efficiency’ that 
resulted. Their decision constitutes the final word on the subject, absent some 
constitutional amendment. That decision should not be set aside as the Court 
does today.591 
It must be admitted that there is certainly some merit in this dissent. Indeed the 
‘acceleration doctrine’ caused considerable debate.592 The discussion also partially 
concentrated not on the 5th Amendment, but on the 6th, in that the possible discovery of 
certain material may hamper the defence counsel’s incentive to investigate this material, 
thereby undermining the defendant’s right to effective assistance of counsel.593 
However, the majority opinion in practice prevailed; the FRCP now contain according 
rules, as do most states. 
The ruling of the Court in Williams was later refined by Wardius v. Oregon594, which 
held that there must be a reciprocal disclosure duty of the prosecution when there is a 
duty of the defence to provide alibi evidence, for otherwise the disequilibrium between 
the parties would be “fundamentally unfair”.595 
                                                 
591  Williams v. Florida, fn. 586, at p. 109, 111 et seq., 113 et seq. 
592  See, e.g., Mosteller, Discovery Against the Defense: Tilting the Adversarial Balance with references. 
593  LaFave/Israel/King/Kerr, Criminal procedure, Part IV, § 20.4(f), with further references. 
594  Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 93 S.Ct. 2208, U.S.Or. 1973. 
595  Ibid., at p. 474 et subs., references omitted:“ Although the Due Process Clause has little to say 
regarding the amount of discovery which the parties must be afforded,  it does speak to the balance of 
forces between the accused and his accuser. The Williams Court was therefore careful to note that 
‘Florida law provides for liberal discovery by the defendant against the State, and the notice-of-alibi 
rule is itself carefully hedged with reciprocal duties requiring state disclosure to the defendant.’ The 
same cannot be said of Oregon law. As the State conceded at oral argument, see Oregon grants no 
discovery rights to criminal defendants, and, indeed, does not even provide defendants with bills of 
particulars. More significantly, Oregon, unlike Florida, has no provision which requires the State to 
reveal the names and addresses of witnesses it plans to use to refute an alibi defense. We do not 
suggest that the Due Process Clause of its own force requires Oregon to adopt such provisions. But we 
do hold that in the absence of a strong showing of state interests to the contrary, discovery must be a 
two-way street. The State may not insist that trials be run as a ‘search for truth’ so far as defense 
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4.2.2.2 United States v. Nobles 
Another important decision regarding defence disclosure was U.S. v. Nobles.596 Even 
though the decision did not specifically deal with pre-trial disclosure, it contained 
significant rulings concerning the ambit of the privilege against self-incrimination.  
A private investigator had interviewed prosecution witnesses and prepared a report 
about his interviews; this report was used by the defence counsel in the cross-
examination of the witnesses. When he defence counsel was going to call the 
investigator as a witness, the court demanded that the report be produced. When this 
was refused by the defence counsel, the investigator was not allowed to testify. The 
Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case.597 The U.S. 
Supreme Court, in turn, reversed, holding that: 
The Court of Appeals concluded that the Fifth Amendment renders criminal 
discovery ‘basically a one-way street.’ Like many generalizations in 
constitutional law, this one is too broad. The relationship between the accused's 
Fifth Amendment rights and the prosecution's ability to discover materials at 
trial must be identified in a more discriminating manner. […] 
In this instance disclosure of the relevant portions of the defense investigator's 
report would not impinge on the fundamental values protected by the Fifth 
Amendment. The court's order was limited to statements allegedly made by third 
parties who were available as witnesses to both the prosecution and the defense. 
Respondent did not prepare the report, and there is no suggestion that the 
portions subject to the disclosure order reflected any information that he 
conveyed to the investigator. The fact that these statements of third parties were 
elicited by a defense investigator on respondent's behalf does not convert them 
into respondent's personal communications. Requiring their production from the 
investigator therefore would not in any sense compel respondent to be a witness 
against himself or extort communications from him. 
We thus conclude that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-
incrimination, being personal to the defendant, does not extend to the testimony 
or statements of third parties called as witnesses at trial. The Court of Appeals' 
                                                                                                                                               
witnesses are concerned, while maintaining ‘poker game’ secrecy for its own witnesses. It is 
fundamentally unfair to require a defendant to divulge the details of his own case while at the same 
time subjecting him to the hazard of surprise concerning refutation of the very pieces of evidence 
which he disclosed to the State.” 
596  422 U.S. 225, 95 S.Ct. 2160, U.S.Cal. 1975. 
597  U.S. v. Brown, 501 F.2d 146, C.A.Cal. 1974. 
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reliance on this constitutional guarantee as a bar to the disclosure here ordered 
was misplaced.598 
Even though there were separate opinions, the Court’s decision was anonymous. The 
Court thus held that the privilege against self-incrimination does not extend to third 
persons testifying for the accused. While the case at hand dealt with disclosure during 
the trial, the moment of disclosure has no impact on the Court’s ruling as regards the 5th 
amendment (the privilege against self-incrimination). It thus applies to pre-trial 
disclosure as well.599 
 
4.2.2.3 The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the original version of the FRCP did not contain any 
regulations as to defence disclosure. In fact, the inclusion of defence disclosure in both 
Rules 12 and 16 FRCP apparently came about in 1974, entering into force in 1975.600 It 
is thus quite probably a consequence of Williams and Wardius. The obligation of 
notices and disclosure regarding alibi and other special defenses is now contained on the 
federal level in Rule 12.1 through 12.3 FRCP. In 1994, they provided: 
Rule 12.1 Notice of Alibi. 
(a) Notice By Defendant. Upon written demand of the attorney for the government 
stating the time, date, and place at which the alleged offense was committed, the 
defendant shall serve within ten days, or at such different time as the court may direct, 
upon the attorney for the government a written notice of the defendant’s intention to 
offer a defense of alibi. Such notice by the defendant shall state the specific place or 
places at which the defendant claims to have been at the time of the alleged offense and 
the names and addresses of the witnesses upon whom the defendant intends to rely to 
establish such alibi. 
(b) Disclosure of Information and Witness. Within ten days thereafter, but in no event 
less than ten days before trial, unless the court otherwise directs, the attorney for the 
government shall serve upon the defendant or defendant’s attorney a written notice 
stating the names and addresses of the witnesses upon whom the government intends to 
rely to establish the defendant’s presence at the scene of the alleged offense and any 
other witnesses to be relied on to rebut testimony of any of the defendant’s alibi 
witnesses. 
(c) Continuing Duty To Disclose. If prior or during trial, a party learns of an additional 
witness whose identity, if known, should have been included in the information furnished 
under subdivision (a) or (b), the party shall promptly notify the other party’s attorney of 
the existence and identity of such additional witness. 
(d) Failure To Comply. Upon the failure of either party to comply with the requirements 
of this rule, the court may exclude the testimony of any undisclosed witness offered by 
                                                 
598  U.S. v. Nobles, note 596 supra, p. 233 et seq.. 
599  LaFave/Israel/King/Kerr, Criminal procedure, Part IV, § 20 (4)(b). 
600  See notes in FRCP issue U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 1994. 
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such party as to the defendant’s absence from or presence at, the scene of the alleged 
offense. This rule shall not limit the right of the defendant to testify. 
(e) Exceptions. For good cause shown, the court may grant an exception to any of the 
requirements of subdivisions (a) through (d) of this rule. 
(f) Inadmissibility Of Withdrawn Alibi. Evidence of an intention to rely upon an alibi 
defence, later withdrawn, or of statements made in connection with such intention, is 
not, in any civil or criminal proceeding, admissible against the person who gave notice 
of the intention. 
 
Rule 12.2. Notice of Insanity Defense or Expert Testimony of Defendant’s Mental 
Condition 
(a) Defense of Insanity. If a defendant intends to rely upon the defense of insanity at the 
time of the alleged offense, the defendant shall, within the time provided for the filing of 
pretrial motions or at such later time as the court may direct, notify the attorney for the 
government in writing of such intention and file a copy of such notice with the clerk. If 
there is a failure to comply with the requirements of this subdivision, insanity may not be 
raised as a defense. The court may for cause shown allow late filing of the notice or 
grant additional time to the parties to prepare for trial or make such other order as may 
be appropriate. 
(b) Expert Testimony Of Defendant’s Mental Condition. If a defendant intends to 
introduce expert testimony relating to a mental disease or defect or any other mental 
condition of defendant bearing upon the issue of guilt, the defendant shall, within the 
time provided for the for the filing of pretrial motions or at such later time as the court 
may direct, notify the attorney for the government in writing of such intention and file a 
copy of such notice with the clerk. The court may for cause shown allow late filing of the 
notice or grant additional time to the parties to prepare for trial or make such other 
order as may be appropriate. 
(c) Mental Examination Of Defendant. In an appropriate case the court may, upon 
motion of the attorney for the government, order the defendant to submit to an 
examination pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 4241 or 4242. No statement made by the defendant in 
the course of any examination provided for by this rule, whether the examination be with 
or without the consent of the defendant, no testimony by the expert based upon such 
statement, and no other fruits of the statement shall be admitted in evidence against the 
defendant in any criminal proceeding except on an issue respecting mental condition on 
which the defendant has introduced testimony. 
(d) Failure To Comply. If there is a failure to give notice when required by subdivision 
(b) of this rule or to submit to an examination when ordered under subdivision (c) of this 
rule, the court may exclude the testimony of any expert witness offered by the defendant 
on the issue of the defendant’s guilt. 
(e) Inadmissibility Of Withdrawn Intention. Evidence of an intention as to which notice 
was given under subdivision (a) or (b), later withdrawn, is not, in any civil or criminal 
proceeding, admissible against the person who gave notice of the intention. 
 
Rule 12.3. Notice of Defense Based Upon Public Authority 
(a) Notice By Defendant; Government Response; Disclosure Of Witnesses. 
(1) Defendant’s Notice and Government’s Response. A defendant intending to claim a 
defense of actual or believed exercise of public authority on behalf of a law enforcement 
or Federal intelligence agency at the time of the alleged offense shall, within the time 
provided for the filing of pretrial motions or at such later time as the court may direct, 
serve upon the attorney for the Government a written notice of such intention and file a 
copy of such notice with the clerk. Such notice shall identify the law enforcement or 
Federal intelligence agency and any member of such agency on behalf of which and the 
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period of time the defendant claims the actual or believed exercise of public authority 
occured. If the notice identifies a Federal intelligence agency, the copy filed with the 
clerk shall be under seal. Within ten days after receiving the defendant’s notice, but in 
no event less than twenty days before the trial, the attorney for the Government shall 
serve upon the defendant or the defendant’s attorney a written response which shall 
admit or deny that the defendant exercised the public authority identified in the 
defendant’s notice. 
(2) Disclosure of Witnesses. At the time that the Government serves its response to the 
notice or thereafter, but in no event less than twenty days before trial, the attorney for 
the Government may serve upon the defendant or the defendant’s attorney a written 
demand for the names and addresses of the witnesses, if any, upon whom the defendant 
intends to rely in establishing the defense identified in the notice. Within seven days after 
receiving the Government’s demand, the defendant shall serve upon the attorney for the 
Government a written statement of the names and addresses of any such witnesses. 
Within seven days after receiving the defendant’s written statement, the attorney for the 
Government shall serve upon the defendant or the defendant’s attorney a written 
statement of the names and addresses of the witnesses, if any, upon whom the 
Government intends to rely in opposing the defense identified in the notice. 
(3) Additional Time. If good cause is shown, the court may allow a party additional time 
to comply with any obligation imposed by this rule. 
(b) Continuing Duty To Disclose. If, prior to or during trial, a party learns of any 
additional witness whose identity, if known, should have been included in the written 
statement furnished under subdivision (a)(2) of this rule, that party shall promptly notify 
in writing the other party or the other party’s attorney of the name and address of any 
such witness. 
(c) Failure To Comply. If a party fails to comply with the requirements of this rule, the 
court may exclude the testimony of any undisclosed witness offered in support of or in 
opposition to the defense, or enter such other order as it deems just under the 
circumstances. This rule shall not limit the right of the defendant to testify. 
(d) Protective Procedures Unaffected. This rule shall be in addition to and shall not 
supersede the authority of the court to issue appropriate protective orders, or the 
authority of the court to issue appropriate protective orders, or the authority of the court 
to order that any pleadings be filed under seal. 
(e) Inadmissibility of Withdrawn Defense Based Upon Public Authority. Evidence of an 
intention as to which notice was given under subdivision (a), later withdrawn, is not, in 
any civil or criminal proceeding, admissible against the person who gave notice of the 
intention. 
 
We thus find similar notice and disclosure provisions regarding the affirmative defences 
of alibi, insanity and public authority, with slight differences as to the disclosable 
material, which changes according to the type of defence. However, all three 
subdivisions enable the prosecution to require notice and disclosure, backed, in the 
sense of Wardius, with reciprocal disclosure duties of the prosecution regarding their 
rebuttal evidence. A problematic feature, as apparently also contained in most state 
rules, is a possible preclusion of evidence relating to these defences. While the 
testimony of the defendant himself on the affirmative defences can generally not be 
precluded, a possible preclusion of other evidence not previously disclosed may run 
counter the quest for truth. 
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4.2.3 Conclusion 
For the United States we can state a downright amazing development of the law of 
disclosure both regarding statutory law and jurisprudence in the second half of the 20th 
century. However, it is not entirely clear where this development is going. Both sources 
of law have not yet merged; still a lot of disclosure obligations need to be directly 
derived from constitutional due process – the FRCP until now do not contain any 
provisions relating to exculpatory evidence. The differences between federal law and 
state law further complicate the matter.  
We can state once again that the law concerning disclosure in America developed more 
slowly than in England. Given the fact that England, in contrast to the U.S.A., to this 
day does not have a written constitution with a bill of rights, one might have expected a 
different result. But apparently the development in the United States is also due to a 
certain rivalry between the liberal and conservative justices. Indeed, we have seen that 
during the days of the Warren Court the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court regarding 
prosecution disclosure was significantly liberalized; afterwards, however, it became 
more conservative again. Notwithstanding this conclusion, on the whole, comparing the 
law of disclosure of 1945 with the law of today, we can state a significant move towards 
liberalization of prosecution disclosure, together with an expansion of defence 
disclosure. At the same time, the involvement of the courts in the disclosure process has 
gotten stronger, which in part is a logical consequence of the fact that wider disclosure 
obligations have been imposed on both parties, which demands more guidance and 
control of the court. 
 
4.3 Conclusion 
In both England and the U.S.A., the 20th century brought about revolutionary changes in 
the law of disclosure. For both countries, we note a parallel development in a 
liberalization of prosecution disclosure, even though it happens earlier in England. 
Particularly in the U.S.A. in the 1950s and 1960s, the liberalization is based on the 
truth-finding function of disclosure in the trial as a whole. In England, we also find 
numerous truth-finding notions in the 1990s in the context of the quashing of many 
miscarriages of justice of the 1970s. In both countries, notions of judicial economy 
appear to have played a role also. We can, however, also observe certain rollback of the 
liberalization, the beginning of which can be dated, in the U.S.A., in the early 1970s 
(after the Warren Court), and in England in the 1990s, when the legislator reacted to, in 
the eyes of the government, all-too strict disclosure obligations imposed upon the 
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prosecution by the courts. In both countries, furthermore, disclosure obligations of the 
defence were significantly widened. Whereas English law originally did not know any 
disclosure obligations of the defence, they had been in place in the U.S.A. for a long 
time, and were significantly widened over the years. The disclosure duties of the 
defence in England are about to widen further significantly in the near future. 
All of this, we hold, shows that the original strict adversarial role allocation, particularly 
of the prosecution, has shifted. The latter has constantly (been) developed into a more 
neutral instance, whereas the accused is, for the sake of truth finding and judicial 
economy, increasingly forced to ‘play ball’, once he wants to present evidence. The 
courts, in turn, have obtained a stronger role in controlling the disclosure process, 
especially as regards controlling the prosecution concerning the materiality of evidence 
as well as issues of public interest immunity. 
This is thus the overall situation in which the first international criminal tribunal after 
Nuremberg, the ICTY, is established.601 As we will see, particularly the American 
disclosure law had a strong influence on it. 
                                                 
601  To be sure, the English CPIA was issued only after the establishment of the ICTY. 
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5 Disclosure of Evidence at the Ad Hoc Tribunals 
 
5.1 Overview and Legal Framework 
The system of disclosure at the ICTY and ICTR as well as the SCSL is governed by 
their respective Rules of Procedure and Evidence602. While the Statutes do not contain 
specific rules as to disclosure, the provisions of the respective Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence of the Tribunals about the disclosure of evidence are quite elaborate. The 
section headed “Production of Evidence” (ICTY: Section 4, ICTR/SCSL: Section 3), 
which comprises Rules 66 through 70, sets a detailed framework of disclosure. 
However, provisions on disclosure can also be found in other Rules, such as 
Rule 94 bis, requiring the disclosure of expert witness statements.  
In the course of Tribunals’ existence, these Rules have been subject to several changes. 
This is, among the substantial reasons, some of which we hope to identify in the course 
of this analysis, undoubtedly due to the practical fact that the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence of the Ad-Hoc-Tribunals can be easily changed. Unlike the procedural rules of 
most national legal systems, namely the ones of Roman-Germanic origin, and the Rules 
of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court (ICC), the RPE of the 
Ad-Hoc-Tribunals are not crafted by a legislative authority, but by the judges of the 
Tribunals themselves (Art. 15 ICTYSt, Art. 14 ICTRSt/SCSLSt).603 
It is, to be sure, somewhat speculative to state reasons for the respective amendments of 
the Rules, since the motives of the Judges for the amendments of the Rules are, for no 
apparent reason and criticisable in the context of a body expressly dedicated to the 
protection of human rights, confidential. For the early years of the Tribunals, some of 
the Annual Reports contain some general remarks on the motives; however, this 
practice very soon disappeared.604 
                                                 
602  In the following: RPE-ICTY, RPE-ICTR or RPE-SCSL. 
603  See, e.g., the procedural codes of Germany (Strafprozessordnung) and France (code de procédure 
pénale). In turn, England and the U.S.A., for centuries, did not have any codifications of criminal 
procedure in place. The CPIA, as we have seen, was only passed in 1996. The American FRCP of 
1946 were, as we have seen, originally elaborated by the U.S. Supreme Court. 
604  As an illustration, see the remarkable statement in the Fifth Annual Report of the ICTY, A/53/219, 
S/1998/737, 10 August 1998, par. 105: “Due to the sheer quantity of the amendments, it suffices here 
merely to list the amended Rules […].” 
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The first version of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICTY was formally 
adopted by the Judges of the ICTY on 11 February 1994. The approach to let the Judges 
adopt their own Rules of Procedure and evidence was not undisputed. Especially the 
fact that, by leaving wide parts of the Tribunal’s procedural law almost completely to 
the judges, the UN Security Council resigned to all means of controlling it, lead to 
controversy.605 In the end, before the adoption of the Rules, several states and non-
governmental organizations had made submissions to the Secretary General, according, 
as far as states were concerned, to paragraph 3 of UNSC Resolution 827 (1993), 
submitting comments and draft procedures for consideration by the Judges. Most states 
and NGOs limited their submissions to general comments and remarks, whereas the 
United States submitted a very detailed set of draft rules, including a commentary.606 In 
the course of our analysis, and as far as disclosure is concerned, we will see that the 
ICTY adopted the American proposal to a large extent, which is not surprising, given 
the lack of alternatives and the short time frame for rendering the tribunal operational.607 
The ICTR, installed by Security Council Resolution 955608, took over the Rules of the 
ICTY, as foreseen by Art. 14 of the Statute of the ICTR. The Rules of the ICTR entered 
into force on 29 June 1995. The changes adopted by the Judges of the ICTR vis-à-vis 
the RPE-ICTY were minor.609 In fact, in our context, meaning Rules 66 through 70, only 
one single word was changed.610 The Rules of the ICTR were first amended on 12 
January 1996; the first revision that brought changes to the disclosure regime of the 
ICTR came into force in June 1997. 
                                                 
605  See, e.g., the submission to the UN Secretariat made by Helsinki Watch, printed in: Morris/Scharf, An 
insider's guide to the international criminal tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, vol. 2, p. 493. 
606  ‘Suggestions Made by the Government of the United States of America: Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence for the International Tribunal for the prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Former Yugoslavia’, IT/14, 17 
November 1993, printed in Morris/Scharf, An insider's guide to the international criminal tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia vol. 2, pp. 509 et subs. 
607  Compare Morris/Scharf, An insider's guide to the international criminal tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia vol. 1, p. 177, see also Tochilovsky, Rules of Procedure for the International Criminal 
Court: Problems to Address in Light of the Experience of the Ad Hoc Tribunals, p. 345. 
608  S/RES/955, 8 November 1994. 
609  As compared to the 5th Revision of the RPE-ICTY which had entered into force on 15 June 1995, thus 
only two weeks before the original Rules of the ICTR. 
610  In Rule 69 (B) “testify” was replaced by “rely on”. Other than that, the word “Sub-rule” in Rule 69 
(C) was changed to “Rule”, albeit without changing the meaning. 
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As to the SCSL, it was established by an agreement611 between the government of Sierra 
Leone and the United Nations. Its Statute was contained in an annex to the said 
agreement; it entered into force one day after a mutual notification of the Sierra 
Leonean government and the U.N., on 12 April 2002.612 The SCSL took over the RPE of 
the ICTR; as prescribed by Art. 14 SCSLSt. At the conclusion of a plenary meeting held 
in London from 3 to 7 March 2003, the SCSL adopted its own Rules, implying quite 
significant changes vis-à-vis the Rules of the ICTR, which, as we will see in at least one 
instance, were partially inspired by the English criminal procedure. All in all they 
appear to be a little more adversarial than those of the SCSL’s two U.N. sibling 
Tribunals. In the course of 2003, the Rules were amended two more times.613 Given the 
fact that March 2003 was also when the first suspects were put into custody, it must be 
estimated that disclosure at the SCSL was never conducted under original ICTR Rules, 
but only the SCSL Rules as of 7 March 2003. 
Thus, the respective Rules of the Tribunals started from a common ground, namely the 
Rules of the ICTY as of its 5th Revision (15 June 1995), which formed the base for the 
Rules of the ICTR, which, in turn, passed its Rules, as of the revision which entered into 
force on 6 July 2002, on to the SCSL. However, from these respective moments on, the 
Rules of the respective courts developed a life of their own. Nevertheless, the basic 
structure of the Rules concerning disclosure was, and still is, identical at all three courts, 
which is why it appears proper to analyze them at the same time.  
 
Structurally, one can divide the disclosure regime of the Tribunals into four parts. 
The most important part is the disclosure by the Prosecutor, which is mainly governed 
by Rules 66 and 68. Secondly, there are also disclosure obligations of the defence, 
addressed by Rule 67. Just as in the national jurisdictions we have looked at, the duties 
of the prosecution as regards disclosure are more extensive than the corresponding 
duties of the defence. However, even though the disclosure obligations of the defence 
were originally very limited, they were considerably widened over time.  
                                                 
611  Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of 
the Special Court for Sierra Leone, signed on 16 January 2002. 
612  Art. 21 of the agreement, see Prosecutor v. Fofana and Kondewa (CDF case), Decision on 
constitutionality and lack of jurisdiction, Doc. No. SCSL-04-14-PT-035, SCSL Appeals Chamber, 13 
March 2004, par. 62, as well as Schabas, The UN International criminal tribunals, p. 39. 
613  See First Annual Report of the President of the SCSL for the Period 2 December 2002 – 1 December 
2003, p. 7. 
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Thirdly, there are the exceptions to disclosure. Rules 53, 66 (C), 69, 70 and 97 contain 
exceptions as to the duty of disclosure and as to non-disclosable materials, applying for 
the most part, at least formally, to both prosecution and defence disclosure. 
Fourthly, there is an additional category of disclosure which is not directly obvious 
from the Rules and which, in principle, we know from the American system already: 
disclosure to, by or via the Chamber. For one, the institution of the Pre-Trial Judge 
(Rule 65 ter) and the information obligations of the parties to file certain briefs 
according to Rule 65 ter (E, G) and the putting together of these filings in “files” 
(Rule 65 ter (L)) for their transmission, in fact has some characteristics of Roman-
Germanic procedural traditions. Additionally, especially at the ICTR, a disclosure via 
the Chamber has developed under Rules 54 and 98, which systematically have nothing 
to do with disclosure in the procedural sense. However, as we hope to have partially 
identified already, disclosure and truth finding are closely related; and the “Rule 98 
disclosure” is in fact a good practical example for this, showing that disclosure in the 
material sense and the procedural sense are converging. To be sure, formally, neither 
the Rules, nor the protagonists will, despite a few exceptions, speak of ‘disclosure’ to 
the Chamber, but rather of ‘filing’ or ‘communication’. However, materially, the 
Chamber gets to see what the other party gets to see, substantially resulting in 
‘disclosure to the Chamber’. 
In the following, we will take a closer look at the provisions of the Rules for all three 
courts one by one and their respective history, in a ‘vertical’ manner. This will, not least 
due to the mentioned flexible amendment procedure provided by Articles 14/15 of the 
respective Statutes, also imply reference to related relevant jurisprudence of each of the 
Tribunals. In some conclusive remarks, we will provide a short overall analysis in order 
to detect a ‘horizontal’ pattern of the development of the Rules as regards disclosure. 
 
5.2 Disclosure by the Prosecutor 
Following the Anglo-American tradition, the history of which we have looked at quite 
extensively above, at the Ad-Hoc Tribunals, disclosure by the Prosecutor represents the 
most significant category of disclosure. 
The types of material which the Prosecutor has to disclose to the defence can be divided 
into four categories: supporting material and prior statements of the accused 
(Rule 66 (A)), witness statements (Rule 66 (B)), exculpatory material (Rule 68), and 
other material evidence, such as books and tangible objects (Rule 67 (C)). 
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5.2.1 Rule 66 (A) RPE 
Rule 66, whose Sub-Rule (A) deals with the first two of the named categories of 
evidence (supporting material/prior statements of the accused and witness statements), 
can be regarded as the pivotal provision of the disclosure regime for the criminal 
procedure of all three Tribunals.  
The current614 wording of the provision, in a synoptic overview, is as follows: 
 
ICTY ICTR SCSL 
Disclosure by the Prosecutor  
 
(A) Subject to the provisions of 
Rules 53 and 69, the Prosecutor 
shall make available to the 
defence in a language which the 
accused understands  
 
(i) within thirty days of the initial 
appearance of the accused,  
copies of the supporting material 
which accompanied the 
indictment when confirmation 
was sought as well as all prior 
statements obtained by the 
Prosecutor from the accused; and  
(ii) within the time-limit 
prescribed by the Trial Chamber 
or by the pre-trial Judge 
appointed pursuant to Rule 65 
ter,  
copies of the statements of all 
witnesses whom the Prosecutor 
intends to call to testify at trial,  
 
and copies of all transcripts and 
written statements taken in 
accordance with Rule 92 bis, 
Rule 92 ter, and Rule 92 quater; 
copies of the statements of  
additional prosecution witnesses 
shall be made available to the 
defence when a decision is made 
to call those witnesses.  
 
Disclosure of Material by the 
Prosecutor 
Subject to the provisions of 
Rules 53 and 69; 
(A) The Prosecutor shall disclose 
to the defence: 
 
 
i) Within 30 days of the initial 
appearance of the accused  
copies of the supporting material 
which accompanied the 
indictment when confirmation 
was sought as well as all prior 
statements obtained by the 
Prosecutor from the accused, and 
ii) No later than 60 days before 
the date set for trial,  
 
 
 
copies of the statements of all 
witnesses whom the Prosecutor 
intends to call to testify at trial; 
 
 
 
upon good cause shown a Trial 
Chamber may order that  
copies of the statements of  
additional prosecution witnesses 
be made available to the defence 
within a prescribed time. 
Disclosure of materials by the 
Prosecutor  
(A) Subject to the provisions of 
Rules 50, 53, 69 and 75, the 
Prosecutor shall:  
 
 
 
(i) Within 30 days of the initial 
appearance of an accused,  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
disclose to the defence  
copies of the statements of all 
witnesses whom the Prosecutor 
intends to call to testify  
 
and all evidence to be presented 
pursuant to Rule 92 bis at trial.  
(ii) Continuously disclose to the 
defence copies of the statements 
of all  
additional prosecution witnesses 
whom the Prosecutor intends to 
call to testify, but not later than 
60 days before the date for trial, 
or as otherwise ordered by a 
Judge of the Trial Chamber either 
before or after the 
commencement of the trial, upon 
good clause [sic!] being shown 
by the prosecution.  
Upon good cause being shown by 
the defence, a Judge of the Trial 
Chamber may order that copies 
                                                 
614  ICTY: Rev. 46, 20 October 2011; ICTR: 1 Oct. 2009; SCSL: 27 May 2008.  
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of the statements of additional 
prosecution witnesses that the 
Prosecutor does not intend to call 
be made available to the defence 
within a prescribed time. [...] 
 
The provisions in their current basic forms were in substance introduced by the 12th 
amendment of the RPE-ICTY in October/November 1997, and the revision of 6 June 
1997 of the RPE-ICTR, although both have been subject to minor changes since then. In 
its original form, the structure of Rule 66 was considerably different, in fact, it was 
much simpler (three paragraphs, or “Sub-rules”, without sub-paragraphs). As to the 
SCSL, only minor changes were implemented as compared to the original wording of 
2003. 
We will now analyse Rule 66 in detail, starting from its current wording. In the course 
of this analysis, we will examine when and how it was modified during its existence. 
 
5.2.1.1 Supporting Material 
First of all, according to Rule 66 (A)(i) ICTY/R-RPE, the Prosecutor must disclose the 
so called “supporting material” which was transmitted to the competent judge together 
with the indictment. This basic fact has not changed during the existence of the 
Tribunals. The original wording of Rule 66 (A) RPE-ICTY provided: 
(A) The Prosecutor shall make available to the defence, as soon as practicable 
after the initial appearance of the accused, copies of the supporting material 
which accompanied the indictment when confirmation was sought. 
This wording overtook almost verbatim the proposal of the American Government, which said: 
17.1 Disclosure by the Prosecutor. Except as otherwise provided in these Rules, 
the Prosecutor shall provide the following information or matters to the defense: 
(A) Evidence which accompanied the indictment. As soon as practicable after 
the initial appearance of the accused, the Prosecutor shall provide the defense 
with copies of evidence which accompanied the indictment at the time 
confirmation was sought.615 
According to Rule 47 RPE, the indictment is to be transmitted to the competent judge 
(see Rule 28 RPE) via the Registrar, together with the supporting material. According to 
Rule 47 (E) ICTY/R-RPE read in conjunction with Art. 19 (1) ICTYSt and Art. 18 (1) 
                                                 
615  Printed in Morris/Scharf, An insider's guide to the international criminal tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia, vol. 2, p. 533. 
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ICTR-St, respectively, the competent Judge must then, based upon the indictment and 
the supporting material, determine whether a prima facie case616 exists against the 
accused. It is this material which Rule 66 (A) (i) refers to. The supporting material, 
according to the Trial Chamber in Kordić and Čerkez, comprises only such material 
which actually “supports” the indictment, i. e. “the material upon which the charges are 
based and does not include other material that may be submitted to the confirming 
Judge, such as a brief of argument or statement of facts“.617 This ruling of the Chamber 
must be criticized in the light of the above mentioned jurisprudence of the ECtHR 
concerning the right to an adversarial trial.618 Even though the disclosure of evidence 
can be limited by vital interests of witness protection and national security, there is no 
reason why legal arguments of one party should not be disclosed to the other. The right 
to an adversarial trial should give every party (meaning, in a criminal trial, the accused) 
the opportunity to react to the actions of the other and for its part try to influence the 
court. If the legal arguments are not disclosed, this right thus may be hampered; this is 
particularly true in the case of the ICTY, which has, on at least one occasion,619 though 
referring to the legal characterization of the charges, stated that it would not apply the 
principle of ‘iura novit curia’.620 Despite of the fact that the defence is not involved in 
the confirmation procedure and disclosure in the procedural sense takes place after the 
confirmation and in fact forms a procedural phase of its own, it must be noted that the 
disclosure obligation as regards the supporting material is necessary insofar as it relates 
to the very material which convinced a judge to confirm an indictment. Any legal 
arguments which accompanied this material should therefore be considered to be 
materials “supporting the charges” and be disclosed as well. In fact, under normal 
                                                 
616  The term prima facie case is usually defined as a “situation where the material facts pleaded in the 
indictment constitute a credible case which would (if not contradicted by the accused) be a sufficient 
basis to convict him of that charge”, Report of the International Law Commission, UN Document 
A/49/10 (1994), at 95, adopted by Judge Kirk McDonald in Prosecutor v. Kordić and Čerkez, 
Decision on the Review of the Indictment, ICTY Case No. IT-95-14-4, 10 November 1995. 
617  Prosecutor v. Kordić and Čerkez, Order on Motion to Compel Compliance by the Prosecutor with 
Rules 66 (A) and 68, ICTY Case No. IT-95-14/2-PT, Trial Chamber, 26 February 1999, p. 3. 
618  See, once again, Jasper v UK (2000) 30 EHRR 441, par. 51, footnote 65 above. 
619  Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al., ICTY Case No. IT-95-16-T, Trial Judgment, Trial Chamber, 
14 January 2000, paras. 720 et subs., 740. 
620  “The court knows the law”, meaning that the court, while usually being bound to the facts presented 
by the parties, is not bound by the legal characterisation of these facts as expressed by the parties, and 
may in fact base its decision on entirely different legal considerations. The principle is also known as 
‘da mihi facta, dabo tibi ius.’ (“give me the facts, and I shall give you the law.”). 
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circumstances all material not falling under the usual exceptions (as in Rules 53, 66 (C), 
70 etc.) should be disclosed, though not to the public, but to the accused.621 
In a trial against more than one accused, the prosecution should determine upon which 
material the charges against each accused are based.622 As a consequence, only the 
material for the respective accused needs to be disclosed to the defence; however, when 
the co-accused are charged with the same events, the supporting material will, as a 
matter of fact, usually be widely identical for all of them.623 
The provisions of the SCSL, however, differ considerably from the Rules of its two 
larger U.N. siblings in that they make no reference whatsoever to “supporting material”. 
This is due to the fact that, in the procedure of the SCSL, there is no “confirmation” of 
the indictment, but merely an “approval” (see Rule 47 (E) RPE-SCSL), which appears 
to set a lower standard than “confirmation”. It has been stated that both terms have the 
same meaning in practice, i.e. that the criteria which the indictments in the ICTY/ICTR 
and the SCSL have to meet, are “relatively identical”.624 This, however, must be doubted 
in the light of the wording of the provisions, and particularly as regards the “supporting 
material”. Whereas, according to Art. 19 ICTYSt and Art. 18 ICTRSt a prima facie 
case625 needs to be established, Rule 47 (E) RPE-SCSL merely provides that the 
competent judge 
shall approve the indictment if he is satisfied that: 
i. the indictment charges the suspect with a crime or crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Special Court; and 
ii. that the allegations in the prosecution's case summary would, if proven, 
amount to the crime or crimes as particularised in the indictment. 
                                                 
621  See, pointing in this direction, also Prosecutor v. Milutinović et al., Decision on application by 
Dragoljub Ojdanić for disclosure of ex parte submissions, ICTY Case No. IT-99-37-I, Confirming 
Judge, 8 November 2002. The Confirming Judge did not consider these additional materials to be 
“supporting materials”; however, he made clear that the Confirming Judge has a discretion as to order 
the disclosure of other material accompanying the indictment in the interest of justice. 
622  Prosecutor v. Furundžija, ICTY Case No. IT-95-17/1-PT, Order, Trial Chamber, 13 March 1998, 
p. 2: “CONSIDERING FURTHER that the Trial Chamber recommends that in future cases involving 
multiple accused, when seeking confinnation of the indictment, the prosecution should indicate which 
part ofthe supporting material relates to each particular accused; […]” 
623  See also Prosecutor v. Ojdanić et al., ICTY Case No. IT-99-37-PT, Decision on defence Motion to 
Require Full Compliance with Rule 66(a)(i) and for Unsealing of ex parte Materials, Trial Chamber, 
18 October 2002. 
624  Schabas, The UN International criminal tribunals, p. 363. 
625  See, as to the definition, note 616. 
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This indeed looks similar to the above mentioned definition of a prima facie case; 
however, we see that the test which the SCSL judge has to apply is only whether the 
case falls into the jurisdiction of the Court and whether the description of the alleged 
crime(s) by the prosecution would fulfil the respective prerequisites. The criteria for this 
test are therefore completely and strictly formal; for its application, the judge needs no 
“supporting material” whatsoever. In contrast, the Prosecutor at the ICTY and ICTR 
needs, according to Rule 47 (B) RPE-ICTY/R to be “satisfied that there is sufficient 
evidence to provide reasonable grounds for believing that a suspect has committed a 
crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal” and must then forward the indictment “for 
confirmation by a judge, together with supporting material”.626 In fact, in an early 
decision of the ICTY, Judge Sidhwa stated that the standards for the Prosecutor set out 
in Rule 47 (A) RPE ICTY and the one for the judge according to Rule 47 (D) in 
conjunction with Art. 18/19 of the respective Statutes are identical.627 He held that there 
must be “sufficient evidence to provide reasonable grounds for believing that a suspect 
has committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal“, stating at the same time 
that “[t]he evidence, therefore, need not be overly convincing or conclusive; it should be 
adequate or satisfactory to warrant the belief that the suspect has committed the 
crime”.628 Judge Sidhwa himself thus points to the evidence which is brought before him 
at the stage of the confirmation of the indictment and it is on this evidence that the 
confirming judge at the ICTY and ICTR must make his decision as to whether to 
confirm the indictment or not. It is therefore a substantial decision which the judge has 
to make and not, as in the SCSL procedure, a purely formal one. However, at this stage 
of the proceedings, evidence can only be brought before the (ICTY/R) judge in terms of 
“supporting material”. It is therefore only logical that this supporting material be 
disclosed to the defence, for it contains the evidence which persuaded the competent 
judge to confirm the indictment. 
 
                                                 
626  Indeed, the SCSL’s Annual Report refers to the amendment of Rule 47 as “one of the more notable” 
ones, see First Annual Report of the President of the SCSL for the Period 2 December 2002 – 1 
December 2003, p. 12. 
627  Prosecutor v. Rajić, ICTY Case No. IT-95-12-1, Review of Indictment, Trial Chamber, 29 August 
1995, p. 7 et seq. The ruling refers to Rule 47 as of the 5th revision of the Rules (15 June 1995), since, 
former sub-rules (A) and (D) have become sub-rules (B) and (E), respectively; the explicit reference 
to Art. 19 ICTYSt was not yet contained in Rule 47. 
628  This reasoning was endorsed by the Trial Chamber in Kovacević, see Prosecutor v. Kovacević, ICTY 
Case No. IT-97-24-PT, Decision on defence Motion for Provisional Release, Trial Chamber, 
20 January 1998, par. 20. 
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5.2.1.2 Prior Statements of the Accused 
Furthermore, according to the Rules of the ICTY and ICTR, the prosecution has to 
disclose to the defence “all prior statements obtained by the Prosecutor from the 
accused”.  
The original wording adopted in 1994629 did not contain any reference to statements of 
the accused, just as its role model, the proposal by the U.S. Government. Also the 
comments of the ABA Task Force Report630 make no reference to statements of the 
accused; neither does any other contribution by a state. This is remarkable, given the 
fact that statements of the accused are contained in the disclosable material under 
Rule 16 (a)(1) (A-C) of the U.S. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and have, as we 
have seen, also played a key role in the development of disclosure in the United States. 
Mandatory disclosure of statements of the accused was introduced by the 3rd 
amendment of the Rules, entering into force on 30 January 1995. Henceforth, the 
wording was: 
(A) The Prosecutor shall make available to the defence, as soon as practicable 
after the initial appearance of the accused, copies of the supporting material 
which accompanied the indictment when confirmation was sought as well as all 
prior statements obtained by the Prosecutor from the accused or from 
prosecution witnesses. 
The ICTY Annual Report of 1995 states that the amendments to Rule 66 (A) were to 
“broaden the rights of suspects and accused persons”.631 It must be noted, however, that 
the 3rd amendment also brought considerable cutbacks on disclosure, mainly because of 
a need to protect national security interests. This development, which had already 
started with the 2nd revision of the Rules and went on afterwards, will be looked at in 
more detail below.632  
The exact meaning of this wording “statements obtained by the prosecutor from the 
accused” is doubtful. It could be understood in such a way that only those statements of 
the accused that he or she has made directly to the prosecution. However, the Trial 
Chamber in the proceedings against Delalić , even though not explicitly, ruled in 1996 
that Rule 66 (A) establishes a duty to disclose all statements of the accused that are in 
                                                 
629  See p. 177 above. 
630  Report of the American Bar Association Task Force on War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia, 
Commenting on the United States’ Draft Rules of Procedure and Evidence for the International 
Tribunal, IT/INF.6/Rev.2, 18 January 1994, printed in Morris/Scharf, An insider's guide to the 
international criminal tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, vol. 2, pp. 585 et subs. 
631  Second Annual Report of the ICTY, A/50/365, S/1995/728, 23 August 1995, par. 25. 
632  See section 5.4 below. 
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the possession of the Prosecutor, regardless of how they were obtained.633 Furthermore, 
the chamber stated that this duty of disclosure is a permanent one: even statements of 
the accused which the prosecution obtains after the confirmation of the indictment must 
be disclosed.634 This finding, both as regards the substantial and temporal scope of the 
disclosure obligation concerning prior statements of the accused, was expressly 
endorsed in the proceedings against Blaškić, where the Chamber added that, contrary to 
the suggestion of the prosecution, also the form of the statement does not matter.635 
However, one and a half years later, the same Chamber, arguably contradicting itself to 
a certain extent, held that Rule 66 (A) only refers to statements of the accused in a 
formal sense, i.e. statements which the accused uttered in the context of legal 
proceedings.636 This ‘change of mind’ came about when the accused, General Blaškić, 
asked for the disclosure of intelligence interceptions of orders given by him to 
subordinates; arguing that these orders were, in fact, “prior statements” in the meaning 
of Rule 66 (A). The reasons for the change of mind of the Chamber quite obviously lie 
in the protection of national security interests. At the time of the Chamber’s ruling, 
Rule 66 (C) provided: 
Where information is in the possession of the Prosecutor, the disclosure of 
which may prejudice further or ongoing investigations, or for any other reasons 
may be contrary to the public interest or affect the security interests of any State, 
the Prosecutor may apply to the Trial Chamber sitting in camera to be relieved 
from the obligation to disclose pursuant to Sub-rule (B). When making such 
application the Prosecutor shall provide the Trial Chamber (but only the Trial 
Chamber) with the information that is sought to be kept confidential.637 
Thus, there was, at the time, no legal possibility for the Chamber to withhold 
disclosable material for reasons of national security if this material fell under 
Rule 66 (A), since restrictions on disclosure for reasons of national security were only 
allowed for material falling under Rule 66 (B).638 The intercepts, however, constituted 
                                                 
633  Prosecutor v. Delalić et al., ICTY Case No. IT-96-21-T, Decision on the Motion by the Accused 
Zejnil Delalić for the Disclosure of Evidence, Trial Chamber, 26 September 1996, par. 4. 
634  Ibid. 
635  Prosecutor v. Blaškić, ICTY Case No. IT-95-14-PT, Decision on the Production of Discovery 
Materials, Trial Chamber, 27 January 1997, paras. 32, 37. 
636  Prosecutor v. Blaskić, ICTY Case No. IT-95-14-T, Decision on the defence Motion for Sanctions for 
the Prosecutor’s Failure to comply with Sub-rule 66 (A) of the Rules and the Decision of 27 January 
1997 compelling the Production of all Statements of the Accused, Trial Chamber, 15 July 1998, p. 3. 
637  Rule 66 (C), Rev. 13, 10 July 1998. 
638  See also Moranchek, Protecting National Security Evidence While Prosecuting War Crimes: Problems 
and Lessons for International Justice from the ICTY, pp. 477 et subs. 
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intelligence material and were considered to be security interest sensitive. The 
Chamber, by taking Mr. Blaškić’s orders out of the scope of Rule 66 (A) and instead 
treating it as material in the sense of Rule 66 (B), thus subjected them to the restriction 
of Rule 66 (C). At the same time, under the disclosure regime which was in force at the 
time of the decision, the defence would have had to reciprocally let the prosecution 
inspect its own material which it intended to use at the trial (Rule 67 (C)); in the present 
case, the defence was not inclined to do that.639  
The decision of the Trial Chamber must be viewed in a differentiated way. On one 
hand, it is certainly not recommendable that a chamber digresses from its own previous 
decision, particularly when this restricts the rights of the accused. On the other hand it 
might not be a coincidence that the Presiding Judge of the Chamber, who came from a 
Roman-Germanic tradition, was willing to adopt an “open cards” approach towards 
disclosure, and arguably, especially in the relatively early days of the ICTY, not 
particularly experienced in the security demands of national states in an international 
trial. After all, “prior statements of the accused” can certainly be understood in the 
formal sense as interpreted by the Chamber in its second decision. The Trial Chamber in 
Krstić endorsed this line of argument.640 
In this light it is obvious that other statements, such as press interviews, also do not fall 
into the category of Rule 66 (A).641 Notwithstanding, this latter assertion does not apply 
to cases in which the charges are based on the statements, e.g. if the accused is charged 
with ordering the commitment of crimes or incitement to genocide;642in these cases, the 
statements must be considered to be “supporting material” and accordingly treated 
pursuant to Rule 66 (A) (i) 1st alternative RPE  
Additionally, Rule 43 (iv) determines that the statement of the accused which was 
audio- or video-recorded must be transcribed, at the latest in the moment of 
                                                 
639  See Prosecutor v. Blaskić, note 636 supra, p. 4. 
640  Prosecutor v. Krstić, ICTY Case No. IT-98-33-T, oral decision, Trial Chamber, 19 March 2001, 
mentioned in Krstić, Judgement, Trial Chamber, 2 August 2001 (Annex I, Procedural History), 
par. 36. 
641  See Tochilovsky, Indictment, disclosure, admissibility of evidence: jurisprudence of the ICTY and 
ICTR, p. 36. 
642  Historical and contemporary examples would be Julius Streicher, who published anti-semitic hate 
magazines such as Der Stürmer, and was found guilty of crimes against humanity by the Nuremberg 
IMT, as well as the accused in the RTML case of the ICTR, Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, Nahimana 
and Ngeze, ICTR Case No. 99-52-T, Judgment, Trial Chamber, 3 December 2003. 
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arraignment.643 The transcripts fall under the mentioned provisions regarding prior 
statements of the accused and must therefore be disclosed.644 
Rule 66 RPE-SCSL, in contrast, makes no reference to statements of the accused 
whatsoever. It is questionable why this was not mentioned, since the accused’s own 
statements are typically of special importance for the preparation of the defence, and the 
Judges obviously wanted to divert from the ICTR Rules which, as we have seen, were 
the SCSL’s first rules. The Annual Report645 is of no help in this respect. 
 
5.2.1.3 Prior Statements of prosecution Witnesses 
The Prosecutor must also disclose the statements of all witnesses whom he intends to 
call to testify at trial (Rule 66 (A) (ii) RPE). As seen above646, the original RPE-ICTY 
did not contain any reference as to witness statements. Just as the disclosure obligation 
concerning statements of the accused, the obligatory disclosure of (certain) witness 
statements was introduced with the 3rd Revision of the Rules in January 1995,647 
supposedly also in an effort to strengthen the rights of the accused.648 
The wording originally spoke of “prosecution witnesses”. The current wording 
“witnesses whom the Prosecutor intends to call to testify at trial” was first introduced at 
the ICTR, in June 1997. Rule 66 (A) was divided into two sub-paragraphs and 
henceforth provided as follows: 
(A) Subject to the provisions of Rules 53 and 69, the Prosecutor shall make 
available to the defence: 
i) within 30 days of the initial appearance of the accused copies of the 
supporting material which accompanied the indictment when confirmation was 
sought as well as all prior statements obtained by the Prosecutor from the 
accused, and 
                                                 
643  Rule 43 (vi) RPE-ICTY; Rule 43 (iv) RPE-ICTR provides that the content of the recording must be 
transcribed in any case. 
644  Prosecutor v. Čermak & Markać, ICTY Case No. IT-03-73-PT, Decision Relating to Disclosure 
Obligations,  Pre-Trial Judge, 26 May 2004, p. 2. 
645  See note 626 supra. 
646  Original version of the RPE-ICTY, page 177 supra. 
647  See the wording of RPE-ICTY Rev. 3, p. 181 supra. 
648  See Second Annual Report of the ICTY, note 631 supra, ibid. 
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ii) no later than 60 days before the date set for trial, copies of the statements of 
all witnesses whom the Prosecutor intends to call to testify at trial.649 
It is not quite clear whether there is a difference between a “prosecution witness” and a 
“witness whom the Prosecutor intends to call”. It could well be that the amendment was 
meant to be clarifying; after all, similar to the Continental European tradition, the 
international criminal courts and tribunals have regularly referred to witnesses not being 
‘prosecution witnesses’ or ‘defence witnesses’, but rather ‘witnesses of the court’.650 On 
the other hand a “prosecution witness” might also be perceived as not necessarily one 
which the prosecution indeed intends to call to testify; but including witnesses who only 
potentially might be called by the prosecution or which have played a role during the 
investigation, a conclusion which could be drawn especially from the wording of the 
Rules of the ICTR and the SCSL (see page 186 et seq. below), since the statements of 
witnesses which the Prosecutor does not intend to call do not need to be disclosed – 
even if they are referred to in the supporting material.651. Then again, it must be noted 
that the mandatory disclosure of the statements of witnesses which will quite possibly 
never testify can mean that the defence waste valuable resources in investigating and 
finding rebuttal evidence which they will never need.652 In practice, even with the 
modified Rules, it is still common that the defence will receive large amounts of 
evidence which eventually turns out to be useless, given the Tribunal’s (in principle 
accused-friendly) practice of encouraging early disclosure in trials in which literally 
                                                 
649  RPE-ICTR as of 6 June 1997. 
650  See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Orić, ICTY Case No. IT-03-68, Trial Transcript of 13 January 2005, p. 3484: 
Judge Agius to the witness Nedeljko Radić: “Although you have been produced as a witness, brought 
forward as a witness by the Prosecutor, in reality, you are no longer now a witness of one side or of 
the other. You are a witness of the Court. You are a witness of this Tribunal. […] In other words, you 
have no right to discriminate, say: I will answer fully and truthfully the questions that Ms. Sellers will 
ask me, but I will not be truthful and fully in my answers when Mr. Jones is putting questions. You 
have no right to do that. Your responsibility is to be truthful and honest in all your answers to all the 
questions that are put to you.”, and Prosecutor v. Prlić et al., ICTY Case No. IT-04-74, Trial 
Transcript of 2 February 2009, p. 36152, as well as Prosecutor v. Rukundo, ICTR Case No. IT-04-74, 
Decision on defence Request to Meet the Accused During his Examination-In-Chief, Trial 
Chamber II, 3 October 2007, par. 3. 
651  Prosecutor vs. Nahimana et al., Decision on an oral application by defence counsel concerning 
witness X, ICTR Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, Trial Chamber I, 19 January 2002, Par. 8. 
652  See Gibson/Lusiaá-Berdou, Disclosure, p. 318, stating as an example the ICTR case of Théoneste 
Bagasora, in which the defence received more than 800 statements of potential prosecution witnesses 
of which eventually only 83 testified. 
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years can pass between the initial appearance of the accused and the start of his trial 
hearing.653 
The term “witness statement” itself is not defined in the Statute or the Rules, yet the 
ICTY Appeals Chamber held in the Blaskić-Case that  
a witness statement in trial proceedings is an account of a person’s knowledge 
of a crime, which is recorded through due procedure in the course of an 
investigation into the crime. The Appeals Chamber is of the view that when a 
witness testifies during the course of a trial before the Tribunal, the witness’s 
verbal assertions recorded by the Registry’s technical staff through 
contemporaneous transcription, are capable of constituting a witness statement 
within the meaning of sub-Rule 66 (A) (ii).654  
The same Trial Chamber also stated that he prosecution’s disclosure obligations do not 
extend to documents such as diaries, radio logs and maps with the personal annotations 
of the witness,655 which is consistent with the holding of the same Chamber regarding 
statements of the accused.656 Transcripts of witness statements, however, do fall into this 
category.657 
In the above-mentioned Trial Chamber decision in Blaskić, the Trial Chamber had also 
emphasized that, just as for statements of the accused, the origin of the statement was 
irrelevant. Thus, not only the statements collected by the Prosecutor, but also the ones 
originating from any other source must be disclosed.658 This was endorsed by another 
ICTY Trial Chamber.659 However, as we have seen above, the Blaskić Trial Chamber 
later narrowed down its holding as regards statements of the accused. As far as witness 
statements are concerned, an ICTR Trial Chamber held in the year 2000 that statements 
made to Rwandan authorities did not qualify as witness statements in the meaning of 
                                                 
653  Compare Gibson and Lussiaà-Berdou, ibid. 
654  Prosecutor v. Blaskić, ICTY Case No. IT-95-14-A, Decision on the Appellant’s Motion for the 
Production of Material, Suspension or Extension of the Briefing Schedule and additional Filings, 
Appeals Chamber, 26 September 2000, par. 15. 
655  Prosecutor v. Blaskić, ICTY Case No. IT-95-14-PT, Decision on the defence Motion to Preclude 
Testimony of Certain prosecution Witnesses Based Upon the prosecution's Violation of the Tribunal's 
Order Compelling the Production of Discovery Materials, Trial Chamber, 25 August 1997. 
656  See Prosecutor v. Blaskić, note 636 supra. 
657  Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al., ICTY Case No. IT-25-16-T, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Request to 
Release Testimony Pursuant to Rule 66 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence Given in Closed 
Session Under Rule 79 of the Rules, Trial Chamber, 29 July 1998 
658  Prosecutor v. Blaskić, note 635 supra, par. 38. 
659  Prosecutor v. Delalić et. al., ICTY Case No. IT-96-21-T8, Decision on Motion by the Defendants on 
the Production of Evidence by the prosecution, Trial Chamber, 8 September 1997, par. 10. 
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Rule 66.660 In another decision about nine months later, however, discussing the 
aforementioned ICTR decision as well as the said jurisprudence in Blaskić and Delalić, 
a different ICTR Trial Chamber in Nyiramasuhuko stated that as long as the statements 
were uttered in legal proceedings and in the possession of the prosecution, they had to 
be disclosed regardless of their origin.661 This development with a decision regarding the 
differentiation between a witness statement and internal notes in the meaning of 
Rule 70, which are exempt from disclosure. While the prosecution argued that 
handwritten notes of witness interrogations were merely “internal documents”, the 
Appeals Chamber of the ICTR held that they, indeed, as long as questions and answers 
were put down, constituted witness statements,662 a ruling which can only be welcomed. 
At the same time, however, in a remarkable twist of argument, the Chamber noted that a 
definition for the term “statement” had yet to be found; needless to say, the Chamber 
did not bother trying to find one.663 The preliminary “final act” of the discussion appears 
to be a decision of Trial Chamber III of the ICTR, which held in 2009 that “[i]t 
considers that a reasonable interpretation of “statement”, within the meaning of Rule 66 
(A) (ii), is a statement pertaining to the allegations in the Indictment, and not to any 
statement made by a witness to the prosecution.”664  
A few months after the respective amendment of the RPE-ICTR, in the 12th revision of 
the RPE-ICTY (October/November 1997), the RPE-ICTY were amended in the same 
way (the only difference here being that the numbers were stated by words, not digits, 
thus saying “thirty” instead of “30”), albeit adding a provision regarding additional 
prosecution witnesses: 
                                                 
660  Prosecutor v. Bagambiki & Imanishimwe/Prosecutor v. Ntagerura, ICTR Case No. 99-46-T, Decision 
on Bagambiki’s Motion for Disclosure of the Guilty Pleas of Detained Witnesses and of Statements 
by Jean Kambanda, Trial Chamber III, 1 December 2000. It must be noted, however, that the 
Chamber also remarked that the witnesses did not qualify as “additional prosecution witnesses”. 
661  Prosecutor v. Nyiramasuhuko, ICTR Case No. 97-21-7, Decision on the defence Motion for 
Disclosure of the Declarations of the Prosecutor's Witnesses Detained in Rwanda, and all Other 
Documents or Information Pertaining to the Judicial Proceedings in Their Respect, Trial Chamber II, 
18 September 2001. 
662  Niyitigeka v. Prosecutor, ICTR Case No. 96-14-A, Judgment, Appeals Chamber, 9 July 2004, par. 34. 
See on the development of the interpretation of “witness statements” at the ICTR in further detail de 
los Reyes, Revisiting Disclosure Obligations at the ICTR and its Implications for the Rights of the 
Accused, pp. 585 et subs. 
663  Niyitigeka v. Prosecutor, Judgment, note 662, par. 30. 
664  Prosecutor v. Nzabonimana, ICTR Case No. 98-44D-T, Decision on defence Motion to Recall 
Witness Cnal, Trial Chamber III, 17 December 2009, par. 21. 
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(A) Subject to the provisions of Rules 53 and 69, the Prosecutor shall make 
available to the defence:  
(i) (…) 
(ii) no later than sixty days before the date set for trial, copies of the statements 
of all witnesses whom the Prosecutor intends to call to testify at trial; copies of 
the statements of additional prosecution witnesses shall be made available to the 
defence when a decision is made to call those witnesses. 
Additional prosecution witnesses were not mentioned in the original version of 
Rule 66 (A). In the above-mentioned decision in Delalić665, the Trial Chamber had, 
however, stated as early as September 1996 that the Prosecutor’s disclosure obligation 
of statements of the accused is ongoing – it is not apparent why the disclosure of 
witness-statements should be treated differently, which would render this specific 
amendment of the Rules superfluous. As previously mentioned, it is entirely common in 
Continental European jurisdictions to treat the statements of witnesses and the accused 
differently, since the latter can never be a witness in the technical sense, due to his 
dilemma in between his right to silence and privilege against self-incrimination on the 
one side, and his oath to tell the truth on the other. However, in the present situation 
there is no comparable issue at hand. If thus statements of witnesses which the 
Prosecutor intends to call need to be disclosed, this duty must of course also apply to 
witnesses for which the decision to call them is made at a later stage of the trial. This 
amendment of the Rules must thus be just clarifying and this understanding would 
definitely be in the interest of the accused. 
Half a year after the 12th revision of the RPE-ICTY, in June 1998, Rule 66 (A) RPE-
ICTR was amended again, taking over the ICTY’s provision regarding additional 
prosecution witnesses, yet in turn also implementing an extra provision:  
Subject to the provisions of Rules 53 and 69;  
(A) The Prosecutor shall disclose to the defence: 
i) (…) 
ii) no later than 60 days before the date set for trial, copies of the statements of 
all witnesses whom the Prosecutor intends to call to testify at trial; upon good 
cause shown a trial chamber may order that copies of the statements of 
additional prosecution witnesses be made available to the defence within a 
prescribed time.666 
                                                 
665  See note 633 above. 
666  Rule 66 (A) RPE-ICTR as of 8 June 1998. 
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As the new ICTY-wording, Rule 66 (A) (ii) RPE-ICTR makes clear that those 
statements of witnesses the prosecution intends to call must be disclosed (in fact now 
‘officially’ using the term “disclose” instead of “make available”). At the same time, the 
new wording of the RPE-ICTR provides for the possibility of disclosure of additional 
prosecution witnesses without the prerequisite of the decision of the prosecution to in 
fact call the respective witness, putting the decision of disclosure within the discretion 
of the trial chamber “upon good cause shown”. However, this fact, as considered above, 
also implies that a “prosecution witness” is not necessarily a witness which the 
prosecution intends to call at all; for otherwise the latter provision would not have any 
specific scope of application – the duty to disclose continuously is upon the prosecution 
at all times, and to demand the disclosure of the statement of a witness which actually 
testifies would surely not require that (additionally) good cause be shown. This 
assertion is corroborated by the wording of Rule 66 (A) (ii) of the Rules for the SCSL667. 
This Rule was obviously inspired by both the ICTY and ICTR Rules, as well as the 
related and mentioned jurisprudence, expressly providing that the prosecution is obliged 
to continuously disclose witness statements of additional prosecution witnesses which it 
intends to call to testify. Rule 66 (A) (ii) RPE-SCSL is even more elaborate than 
Rule 66 (A) (ii) RPE-ICTR on the disclosure of statements of “additional prosecution 
witnesses”, providing that “[u]pon good cause being shown by the defence, a Judge of 
the Trial Chamber may order that copies of the statements of additional prosecution 
witnesses that the Prosecutor does not intend to call be made available to the defence 
within a prescribed time.” The Rule thus clearly recognizes that a prosecution witness is 
not necessarily someone who the prosecution intends to call to testify. The question 
remains, however, in which way “good cause” in the meaning of Rule 66 (A) (ii) 
ICTR/RPE-SCSL could be shown, if the witness statement is neither additionally 
covered by Rule 66 (B) (material for the defence) or Rule 68 (exculpatory). As far as we 
can see, there is no jurisprudence on this point. 
According to Rule 66 (A) (ii) RPE-ICTY, another category of witness statements to be 
disclosed by the prosecution, yet one which does not appear in the Rules of the ICTR, 
are those statements taken in accordance with Rule 92 bis through quater, that is to say 
statements and transcripts in lieu of oral testimony, other written statements and 
transcripts as well as written statements of unavailable persons. The reference to 
Rule 92 bis in Rule 66 (A)(ii) RPE-ICTY was introduced with the 19th revision of the 
RPE-ICTY in December 2000, and was quite recently (September 2006) amended once 
more, as to include written statements taken according to Rules 92 ter and quater. 
However, the first time written statements in lieu of oral testimony as such were made 
                                                 
667  See the synopsis in section 5.2.1 above. 
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subject of disclosure was in November 1999 with the 17th revision of the Rules. For one 
year, until the above mentioned 19th revision, the wording of Rule 66 (A)(ii) RPE-ICTY 
was as follows: 
(A) Subject to the provisions of Rules 53 and 69, the Prosecutor shall make 
available to the defence in a language which the accused understands 
(i) (…) 
(ii) within the time-limit prescribed by the Trial Chamber or by the pre-trial 
Judge appointed pursuant to Rule 65 ter, copies of the statements of all 
witnesses whom the Prosecutor intends to call to testify at trial, and copies of all 
affidavits and formal statements referred to in Rule 94 ter; copies of the 
statements of additional prosecution witnesses shall be made available to the 
defence when a decision is made to call those witnesses.668 
During this time, affidavits and formal statements in the meaning of Rule 94 ter 
(“Affidavit Evidence”) had to be disclosed, which provided: 
To prove a fact in dispute, a party may propose to call a witness and to submit in 
corroboration of his or her testimony on that fact affidavits or formal statements 
signed by other witnesses in accordance with the law and procedure of the State 
in which such affidavits or statements are signed. These affidavits or statements 
are admissible provided they are filed prior to the giving of testimony by the 
witness to be called and the other party does not object within seven days after 
completion of the testimony of the witness through whom the affidavits are 
tendered. If the party objects and the Trial Chamber so rules, or if the Trial 
Chamber so orders, the witnesses shall be called for cross-examination.669 
Rule 94 bishad been adopted on 4 December 1998 (Rev. 14), amended by the 17th 
Revision in November 1999 and then deleted by the 19th Revision in December 2000. 
The term “affidavit” has since almost entirely disappeared from the Rules.670 In national 
jurisdictions, especially Anglo-American ones, affidavits are generally not admissible as 
direct evidence, as this would run counter to the adversarial system of criminal justice – 
it is, for example and as a matter of course, impossible to cross-examine an affiant, 
since he is not present in court. This is attenuated in the case of a deposition, where the 
opposing party has the opportunity to cross-examine the witness when the deposition is 
                                                 
668  Rule 66 (A) (ii) RPE-ICTY as of 17 November 1999. 
669  Rule 94 ter as of 7 December 1999 (Rev. 17) until 1 December 2000 (Rev. 19). 
670  An exception being Rule 54 bis RPE-ICTY, which refers to affidavits of state officials in proceedings 
where orders directed to states for the production of documents are in dispute; this has, however, 
nothing to do with evidence before the Tribunal. 
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taken.671 But also in Roman-Germanic jurisdictions, ’immediate’ evidence is generally 
considered to be preferable to ‘indirect' evidence.672  
Given the fact that affidavits, as mentioned above, were very commonly relied on as 
evidence in the Nuremberg IMT and other post-World-War-II-trials, it comes as a 
surprise that, with the exception of depositions, written testimony in lieu of oral 
testimony was not included in the legal framework of the ICTY from the very 
beginning. The reasons for this appear to lie in the fact that international human rights 
standards regarding fair trial guarantees had significantly changed since Nuremberg. 
Generally, the first President of the ICTY Antonio Cassese stated: “One can discern in 
the statute and the rules a conscious effort to avoid some of the often-mentioned flaws 
of Nürnberg and Tokyo.”673 In the drafting process of the RPE-ICTY, the issue of 
affidavits was addressed by at least two entities. Helsinki Watch dedicated some 
thoughts to the matter, proposing a very strict position: 
The Statute fails to indicate when, if ever, ex parte affidavits may be used. The 
ICCPR [...] simply reiterates the basic principle that in general trials should be 
open and that the accused shall have the right to examine witnesses against him. 
(See ICCPR, Article 14(3)(e).) This approach makes sense under the ICCPR, as 
it is a general statute, drafted to encompass all scenarios. The Statute, however, 
was created only to address a single and unique war crimes tribunal, a court 
burdened with the difficulty of investigating war crimes during an ongoing 
conflict and while the aggressors remain, at least in part, victorious. Given that 
the issue of admissibility of ex parte affidavits is of paramount concern under 
such circumstances (and especially because some commentators have suggested 
that ex parte affidavits be used when witnesses are too afraid to testify), the 
Statute should provide more explicit instructions. Helsinki Watch suggests that, 
in order to comply with the highest international standards of due process, 
courts never admit ex parte affidavits as substitutes for live testimony, because 
the admission of ex parte affidavits violates the rights of the accused to 
confrontation and cross-examination.674 
                                                 
671  See, for the Ad-Hoc Tribunals, Rule 71 (C), or, for the United States, Rule 15 (e) Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. 
672  See, e.g., Section 250 of the German Criminal Procedure Code: “[Principle of Examination in Person] 
If the proof of a fact is based on the observation of a person, such person shall be examined at the 
main hearing. The examination shall not be replaced by reading out the record of a previous 
examination or reading out a written statement.” See also Peters, Strafprozeß, p. 295. 
673  ICTY Annual Report 1994, A/49/342, S/1994/1007, 29 August 1994, par. 71. 
674  Procedural And Evidentiary Issues For The Yugoslav War Crimes Tribunal: Resource Allocation, 
Evidentiary Questions and Protection of Witnesses, Helsinki Watch, August 1993, printed in 
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The issue also appeared in the proposal by the American Government, which was a little 
laxer regarding the admission of written testimony, yet making clear that “primary 
evidence” should be preferable:  
The Trial Chamber shall prefer the presentation of primary evidence of a fact. 
"Primary evidence" means original or first hand evidence.675 
According to the Rules adopted at the time of the creation of the ICTY, direct 
examination of witnesses was considered the rule, depositions the exception. Rule 90 
provided: 
Witnesses shall, in principle, be heard directly by the Chambers. In cases, 
however, where it is not possible to secure the presence of a witness, a Chamber 
may order that the witness be heard by means of a deposition as provided for in 
Rule 71.676 
This rule was soon slightly watered down, stating: 
Witnesses shall, in principle, be heard directly by the Chambers unless a 
Chamber has ordered that the witness be heard by means of a deposition as 
provided for in Rule 71.677 
The next change came about in 1997, when, in exceptional circumstances, examination 
via video-link was allowed.678 The “principle” of direct examination was maintained for 
a few more years, however, it was, doubtfully from a normative and functional 
perspective, “subjected” to Rules 71 and 71 bis with the 17th Revision of the Rules.679 
The decline of the primacy of oral testimony was, once more, orchestrated with a 
reference to Nuremberg: 
13. […] The Tribunal's cases involve complex legal and factual issues, as well 
as the application of legal principles that have not previously been interpreted 
or applied. Moreover, unlike the Nürnberg and Tokyo trials, a great deal of 
                                                                                                                                               
Morris/Scharf, An insider's guide to the international criminal tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, 487, 
492 et seq. 
675  Rule 25.8 (A). 
676  Rule 90 (A) as of 11 February 1994. 
677  Rule 90 (A) as of 30 January 1995 (Rev. 3). 
678  See Rule 90 (A) as of 17 November 1999: “Witnesses shall, in principle, be heard directly by the 
Chambers unless a Chamber has ordered that the witness be heard by means of a deposition as 
provided for in Rule 71 or where, in exceptional circumstances and in the interests of justice, a 
Chamber has authorized the receipt of testimony via video-conference link.” 
679  See Rule 90 (A) as of 17 November 1999: “Subject to Rules 71 and 71 bis, witnesses shall, in 
principle, be heard directly by the Chambers.” It is indeed questionable whether one can “subject” a 
principle to other provisions without giving it up. 
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reliance is placed on the testimony of witnesses rather than on affidavits, and the 
Tribunal is committed to ensuring that the rights of the accused are fully 
respected in accordance with contemporary human rights norms. [...] 
116. A new rule, 94ter was added to the Rules, providing for the taking of 
affidavit evidence to prove a fact in dispute. This amendment is part of the 
ongoing commitment of the Tribunal to speeding up the trial process while 
providing for the proper protection of the rights of the accused and the 
obligation of the Tribunal to the international community to conduct trials fairly 
and expeditiously.680 
15 months later, with the 19th Revision of the Rules, the “principle” of direct 
examination of witnesses disappeared from the Rules for good, giving the Chamber a 
wide discretion whether to admit it or not.681 Additionally, Rule 89 (F) was adopted, 
providing: “A Chamber may receive the evidence of a witness orally or, where the 
interests of justice allow, in written form.” As one will note, the changes of the 
provisions about affidavits as once contained in Rules 94 ter partially coincide with the 
amendments of Rule 90 (A) – both disappear with the 19th Revision of the Rules in 
December 2000; and Rule 92 bis emerges, being, combined with Rule 89 (F), the most 
detailed and powerful provision for the admission of indirect evidence.  
Thus, the mentioned changes in the wording of Rule 66 (A) (ii) RPE-ICTY as regards 
affidavits must be seen in the broader context of a number of amendments aimed at 
speeding up the trials.682  
Clearly crafted reflecting the named disclosure rule of the ICTY, Rule 66 (A) (i) RPE-
SCSL, also contains a duty of the Prosecutor to disclose evidence to be presented 
pursuant to Rule 92 bis RPE-SCSL, the latter referring to provisions which also 
resemble the respective Rules of the RPE-ICTY. 
It would thus seem logical that the disclosure provisions had to move along with the 
general development. However, this appears not to have happened in the Rules of the 
ICTR – Rule 66 (A) (ii) RPE-ICTY does not contain any reference to Rule 92 bis, even 
though the RPE-ICTR does have a comparable provision in the same place, which was, 
                                                 
680  See ICTY Annual Report 1999, A/54/187, S/1999/846, 25 August 1999, paras. 13 and 116. 
681  See Rule 90 (A) since December 2000: “Every witness shall, before giving evidence, make the 
following solemn declaration: "I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the whole truth and 
nothing but the truth".” 
682  See on the increasing laxity towards written as opposed to oral evidence in the history of the ICTY in 
general Wald, Establish Incredible Events By Credible Evidence; Kay, The Move from Oral Evidence 
to Written Evidence; as well as Fairlie, Due Process Erosion. 
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however, only adopted in 2002.683 It must also be noted that the RPE-ICTR never 
contained any provision as to affidavits. At the same time, the RPE-ICTR have, until 
this day, maintained the above mentioned principle that witnesses shall provide 
evidence in person. 
 
5.2.1.4 Audio Recording, December 1996 – November 1997 
In the 10th revision of the RPE-ICTY (December 1996), an additional clause was 
attached to Rule 66 (A), changing its wording as follows: 
(A) The Prosecutor shall make available to the defence, as soon as practicable 
after the initial appearance of the accused, copies of the supporting material 
which accompanied the indictment when confirmation was sought as well as all 
prior statements obtained by the Prosecutor from the accused or from 
prosecution witnesses. The final version of the statement of the accused or a 
witness, as audio-recorded at the time of the interview, as well as a translation 
into one of the working languages of the Tribunal, shall be provided to the 
defence. 
The purpose of this additional clause is not quite clear. The “final” version of a 
statement is most probably the last one to be recorded. Since the first clause of Rule 66 
stipulates that all statements must be disclosed, it does not seem to make very much 
sense to introduce a new provision merely for stressing the fact that the final version of 
the statement must (also) be provided to the defence. The second clause can therefore 
not be understood as limiting the scope of the first. 
A possible interpretation seems to be that only the final version of the respective 
statement has to be disclosed together with a translation into one of the working 
languages of the Tribunal, and possibly a copy of the audio-recording. However, the 
already mentioned provision of Rule 43 (iv) states that a copy of the statement of the 
suspect has to be supplied to him or her anyway. Therefore, the only possible scope of 
application for the second clause seems to be translations of the final statements of the 
accused or a witness. The Fourth Annual Report of the ICTY is silent as to the reasons 
of this amendment.684 The additional clause does not seem to have had any relevance as 
regards the jurisprudence of the ICTY. It disappeared with the 12th revision, about a 
year later, and apparently had no impact on the Rules of the ICTR or the SCSL. 
 
                                                 
683  See Rule 92 bis RPE-ICTR as of 6 July 2002. 
684  Annual Report of the ICTY, A/52/375, S/1997/729, 18 September 1997, Par. 5. 
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5.2.1.5 Language Requirements 
In the Rules of the ICTY, the materials which must be disclosed under Rule 66 must be 
“in a language which the accused understands”. This phrase was introduced by the 13th 
Revision of the Rules (10 July 1998). A parallel provision is missing for the ICTR and 
SCSL. This may be due to the fact that, in contrast to the ICTY, it is assumed that all 
accused of the other courts speak English or, in the case of the ICTR, English or French, 
which are working languages of the respective courts.685 As usual, the Annual Report is 
silent on this point. 
 
5.2.1.6 Time Limits 
The time limits provided for in Rule 66 (A) vary between the different tribunals.  
In its current wording, Rule 66 (A)(i) RPE-ICTY, in principle, sets a strict time limit, 
providing that the supporting material and the statements of the accused and the 
witnesses have to be disclosed within thirty days of the initial appearance of the 
accused. The “first appearance” of the accused is governed by Rule 62, and marks the 
point when the accused is formally charged. 
The named time limit was not included in the original version of Rule 66. From the 
third until the 12th Revision of the RPE-ICTY (November 1997), its wording was as 
follows: 
(A) The Prosecutor shall make available to the defence, as soon as practicable 
after the initial appearance of the accused, copies of the supporting material 
which accompanied the indictment when confirmation was sought as well as all 
prior statements obtained by the Prosecutor from the accused or from 
prosecution witnesses. 
The new wording after the 12th revision was the following: 
(A) Subject to the provisions of Rules 53 and 69, the Prosecutor shall make 
available to the defence:  
(i) within thirty days of the initial appearance of the accused, copies of the 
supporting material which accompanied the indictment when confirmation was 
sought as well as all prior statements obtained by the Prosecutor from the 
accused, and  
(ii) no later than sixty days before the date set for trial, copies of the statements 
of all witnesses whom the Prosecutor intends to call to testify at trial; copies of 
                                                 
685  See Art. 24 SCSLSt, Rule 3 (A) RPE-SCSL; Art. 31 ICTRSt, Rule 3 (A) RPE-ICTR. 
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the statements of additional prosecution witnesses shall be made available to the 
defence when a decision is made to call those witnesses. 
Here again, the Annual Report is of no help as to the motives of the modification.686 The 
imposition of a strict time limit after the initial appearance of the accused would 
probably be the interest of the latter. The wording “as soon as practicable” might of 
course, taken seriously, result in an even quicker disclosure process, but practically the 
Prosecutor might be tempted to declare that disclosure is impracticable at any given 
time; which is difficult to challenge before the Chamber. It must, however, be noted 
that, although the now introduced time limit appears to be strict, the ICTY Judges 
introduced, by adopting Rule 127, a general provision making flexible almost all time 
limits contained in the Rules, also including those pertaining to disclosure; according to 
Rule 127, time limits cannot only be extended, but also reduced. Nevertheless, “good 
cause” needs to be shown for an application of Rule 127; in principle, therefore, the 
time limits regarding disclosure must be adhered to. 
The 12th revision, dividing Rule 66 (A) into Sub-Rules (i) and (ii), also brought a 
differentiation of time frames as regards the supporting material and the statements of 
the accused on the one hand and witness-statements on the other. As can be inferred 
from the above cited original wording, until the 12th revision of the Rules, all three 
different groups of disclosure material contained in Rule 66 (A) had to be treated 
equally as regards the time frames. Now there was a substantial change: supporting 
material and statements of the accused are to be disclosed no later than 30 days after the 
initial appearance of the accused, whereas the ‘disclosure deadline’ for witness 
statements, according to Rule 66 (A)(ii), was now no later than sixty days before the 
trial. Since usually the time between the initial appearance of the accused and the 
beginning of the trial is considerably longer than sixty days, this revision of the Rules 
meant a significant disadvantage for the accused. 
However, this rigid time frame of sixty days was revised already little more than six 
months later, and replaced by a flexible one. In the 13th revision of the Rules in July 
1998, the wording of Rule 66 (A) (i) was amended to what follows: 
(A) Subject to the provisions of Rules 53 and 69, the Prosecutor shall make 
available to the defence in a language which the accused understands 
(i) […] 
(ii) within the time-limit prescribed by the Trial Chamber or by the pre-trial 
Judge appointed pursuant to Rule 65 ter, copies of the statements of all 
witnesses whom the Prosecutor intends to call to testify at trial; copies of the 
                                                 
686  See, once again, the Fifth Annual Report of the ICTY, note 604 supra. 
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statements of additional prosecution witnesses shall be made available to the 
defence when a decision is made to call those witnesses. 
The time limit is no longer to be derived from the Rules, but left to the discretion of the 
Trial Chamber or the Pre-Trial-Judge. The latter “institution” was also introduced by the 
13th revision of the Rules (Rule 65 ter); Rule 66 was modified accordingly. 
The legal practice of the ICTY appears to have adapted to a regular period of thirty days 
prior to the trial.687 
In contrast, Rule 66 (A) RPE-ICTR, starting from an identical wording as the one of the 
ICTY, developed a little differently. At first, the RPE-ICTR also introduced strict time 
limits instead of flexible ones, and equally adopted the differentiation between 
supporting material/prior statements of the accused on one side and witness statements 
on the other. The wording of Rule 66 (A) RPE-ICTR as adopted on 08 June 1998 (thus 
seven months after the 12th revision of the RPE-ICTY) was the following: 
Subject to the provisions of Rules 53 and 69;  
(A) The Prosecutor shall disclose to the defence: 
i) within 30 days of the initial appearance of the accused copies of the 
supporting material which accompanied the indictment when confirmation was 
sought as well as all prior statements obtained by the Prosecutor from the 
accused, and 
ii) no later than 60 days before the date set for trial, copies of the statements of 
all witnesses whom the Prosecutor intends to call to testify at trial; upon good 
cause shown a trial chamber may order that copies of the statements of 
additional prosecution witnesses be made available to the defence within a 
prescribed time. 
The wording is almost identical to the one of the RPE-ICTY after the 12th revision; 
differences being that the limitation phrase subjecting Rule 66 (A) to Rules 53 and 69 in 
the RPE-ICTR not only applies to Sub-Rule (A), but to all Sub-Rules contained in 
Rule 66688 and the difference concerning the statements of “additional prosecution 
witnesses” which we have already described above. However, unlike Rule 66 (A) (ii) 
RPE-ICTY, which was amended again, introducing the “time-limit prescribed by the 
Trial Chamber or the pre-trial Judge”, Rule 66 (A) (ii) RPE-ICTR retained the strict 
time-limit of 60 days regarding statements of witnesses whom the prosecution intends 
to call to testify at trial until today. Notably, the ICTR never introduced a provision 
                                                 
687  Prosecutor v. Milutinović et al., ICTY Case No. IT-99-37-PT, Decision on prosecution's Motions for 
Protective Measures, Trial Chamber, 17 July 2003, p. 4. 
688  This will be dealt with in more detail below. 
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comparable to Rule 127 RPE-ICTY; according to Rule 107 RPE-ICTR time limits can 
only be extended, not reduced. As concerns additional prosecution witnesses, the setting 
of a time limit is left to the Trial Chamber. 
Rule 66 (A) RPE-SCSL, in contrast to the ICTY and ICTR, adopted a time limit of 30 
days after the initial appearance of the accused as regards the disclosure of the 
statements of witnesses the prosecution intends to call to testify at trial (as seen above, 
the RPE-SCSL contain no disclosure duty as regards prior statements of the accused). 
Thus, the disclosure regime of the SCSL in this respect is the friendliest towards the 
interests of the accused. Also, it installs a continuous duty of the prosecution to disclose 
the statements of additional witnesses who are intended to be called by the prosecution, 
setting a general time limit of sixty days before the trial; reminiscent of the 
corresponding provision of the ICTY. This latter limit, however, is subject to exceptions 
by decision of the Court upon good cause shown by the Prosecutor. As already briefly 
mentioned above, the Rule also states that statements of prosecution witnesses which 
are not intended to be called at trial may be ordered to be disclosed upon good cause 
shown by the defence, which is a parallel provision to Rule 66 (A) (ii) RPE-ICTR. 
An evaluation of the development of Rule 66 (A) RPE-ICTY as regards the time frames 
must come to a critical conclusion. The original wording “as soon as practicable” 
certainly left a certain margin of discretion for the Prosecutor, yet it was certainly 
possible to at least file a motion to the competent Judge or Chamber. In this context, it 
must be noted again that usually a considerable amount of time passes between the first 
appearance of the accused and the beginning of the trial.689 While the prosecution can 
and will make practical use of this time, the accused and his defence are banned to 
remain practically inactive, at least they cannot prepare a defence which is tailored to 
the prosecution case. After all, the decline from “as soon as practicable” over “not less 
than sixty days” to “within the time-limit prescribed by the Trial Chamber or by the Pre-
Trial Judge”, practically meaning a thirty days period, is strikingly contrary to the 
interests of the accused.  
In contrast, the time limits prescribed by the Rules of the SCSL appear more balanced; 
which is remarkable in the context of the late creation of the SCSL. The time limits of 
the RPE-ICTR lie in between the other two, retaining a stricter approach than the ICTY. 
 
                                                 
689  See also Gibson/Lusiaá-Berdou, Disclosure, note 652 supra, p. 318. 
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5.2.1.7 Limiting Provisions 
The 12th revision of the RPE-ICTY in November 1997 not only brought the division 
into two sub-paragraphs in Rule 66 (A), but also explicitly subjected it to two other 
provisions, namely Rules 53 and 69. Rule 66 of the RPE-ICTR as adopted on 08 June 
1998 underwent a similar change; though going further in that the subjection to 
Rules 53 and 69 was included before Sub-Rule (A), thus subjecting the whole of 
Rule 66 RPE-ICTR to Rules 53 and 69. The drafters of the RPE-SCSL structurally, at a 
first glance, followed the example of the ICTY, yet included two more limiting 
provisions, Rules 50 and 53. Factually, however, the SCSL provision is “in between” 
the ones of the other two courts, for Rule 66 (A) (iii) RPE-SCSL is in substance close to 
their Sub-Rule (B). The following synopsis should illustrate the differences: 
ICTY after 12th Rev., 
November 1997 
ICTR June 1998 SCSL 2002 
Rule 66 
Disclosure by the Prosecutor 
 
(A) Subject to the provisions of 
Rules 53 and 69,  
 
the Prosecutor shall make 
available to the defence:  
(i) within thirty days (…) and 
(ii) no later than sixty days (…)  
(B) The Prosecutor shall, upon 
request, permit the defence to 
inspect any books (…) 
Rule 66 
Disclosure by the Prosecutor 
 
Subject to the provisions of 
Rules 53 and 69;  
 
(A) The Prosecutor shall disclose 
to the defence: 
i) within 30 days (…) and 
ii) no later than 60 days (…) 
(B) At the request of the defence 
(…) 
 
Rule 66 
Disclosure of materials by the 
Prosecutor 
(A) Subject to the provisions of 
Rules 50, 53, 69 and 75,  
 
the Prosecutor shall: 
 
(i) Within 30 days (…) 
(ii) Continuously disclose (…) 
(iii) At the request of the defence, 
(…) 
 
 
5.2.1.7.1 Rule 69 
Rule 69 is concerned with the protection of victims and witnesses and its impact on 
disclosure. As seen in the introduction, the protection of victims and witnesses is 
generally one crucial aspect of disclosure limitation, and was, in fact, one of the main 
arguments against disclosure from the very beginning.690 
The wording of Rule 69 itself is quite similar in all three tribunals. Shown in a synoptic 
overview, it currently provides as follows: 
ICTY, 20 October 2011 ICTR, 1 October 2009 SCSL, 28 May 2010 
Rule 69 
Protection of Victims and 
Witnesses 
 
(A) In exceptional 
circumstances, the Prosecutor 
Rule 69 
Protection of Victims and 
Witnesses 
 
(A) In exceptional 
circumstances, either of the 
Rule 69 
Protection of Victims and 
Witnesses 
 
(A) In exceptional 
circumstances, either of the 
                                                 
690  See Chapter 1 supra. 
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may apply to a  
Judge or Trial Chamber  
 
to order the non-disclosure of the 
identity of a victim or witness 
who may be in danger or at risk  
until such person is brought 
under the protection of the 
Tribunal.  
 
(B) In the determination of 
protective measures for victims 
and witnesses, the Judge or Trial 
Chamber may consult the 
Victims and Witnesses Section.  
(C) Subject to Rule 75, the 
identity of the victim or witness 
shall be disclosed in sufficient 
time  
prior to the trial  
to allow adequate time for 
preparation of the defence.  
 
parties may apply to a  
Trial Chamber  
 
to order the non-disclosure of the 
identity of a victim or witness 
who may be in danger or at risk,  
until the Chamber decides 
otherwise. 
 
 
(B) In the determination of 
protective measures for victims 
and witnesses, the Trial Chamber 
may consult the Victims and 
Witness Support Unit. 
(C) Subject to Rule 75, the 
identity of the victim or witness 
shall be disclosed within such 
time  
as determined by Trial Chamber 
to allow adequate time for 
preparation of the prosecution 
and the defence. 
parties may apply to a  
Judge of the Trial Chamber or 
the Trial Chamber  
to order the non-disclosure of the 
identity of a victim or witness 
who may be in danger or at risk, 
until the Judge or Chamber 
decides otherwise. 
 
 
(B) In the determination of 
protective measures for victims 
and witnesses, the Judge or Trial 
Chamber may consult the 
Witnesses and Victims Section. 
(C) Subject to Rule 75, the 
identity of the victim or witness 
shall be disclosed in sufficient 
time  
before a witness is to be called  
to allow adequate time for 
preparation of the prosecution 
and the defence. 
 
The provision determines that in exceptional circumstances the competent Chamber (or 
Judge) may order the non-disclosure of the identity of a victim or witness who may be 
in danger or at risk. This implies the non-disclosure of the witness-statements from that 
person, at least as long as the witness statement allows drawing conclusions as to the 
identity of the witness.  
Rule 69 must be read in conjunction with Rule 75, which is the central Rule for the 
protection of victims and witnesses; Rule 69, according to Rule 69 (C), has to be 
understood as being supplementary to Rule 75. The latter, on its part, limits the range of 
application for Rule 69 (A). Since Rule 69 has been in existence as long as the 
Tribunals themselves, it must be concluded that it has always meant a restriction to the 
Prosecutor’s duty of disclosure, rendering the later explicit reference in Rule 66 (A) 
clarifying, but probably superfluous. 
At the ICTY, throughout the history of the Rules, the provision has remained practically 
unchanged. Originally consisting of sub-rule (A) and what is now sub-rule (C), with the 
5th Revision in June 1995, the now sub-rule (B) was added, and the former sub-rule (B) 
became sub-rule (C). The only other modifications were the renaming of the term 
“Victims and Witnesses Unit” into “Victims and Witnesses Section” (15th revision, July 
1999) and the introduction of the Judge as the judicial authority competent to order the 
disclosure or non-disclosure of documents aside of the Trial Chamber (22nd revision, 
January 2001). 
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At the ICTR, the Rule was substantially altered with the already mentioned amendment 
in mid-1998.691 First of all, it is now not only the prosecution who may make an 
according application to the Trial Chamber, but also the defence. This must be seen as a 
positive development – obviously not only prosecution witnesses may be endangering 
themselves and their relatives by testifying, but defence witnesses also.692 On the other 
hand, after the amendment, there appears to be no strict time limit anymore as to when 
at the latest the identity of the victim or witness must be disclosed. While before, just 
like in the corresponding provision at the ICTY, the identity protection had in principle 
(although still subject to Rule 75, which, however, does not provide for the anonymity 
of the witness vis-à-vis the accused) to be disclosed once the person was under the 
protection of the Tribunal, the competent Chamber now appears completely free to 
decide when or even whether the identity of victims or witnesses need to be disclosed at 
all. Even though this assumption cannot be upheld in the light of Sub-Rule (C), which 
obviously does not envisage the complete anonymity of a witness towards the accused 
either; nevertheless the introduction of such a wide margin of discretion can hardly be 
seen positively for the protection of the due process rights of the accused, and appears 
unnecessary, given the fact that Rule 75 actually provides detailed regulations as to how 
and by what measures the vital interests of victims and witnesses can be protected. The 
said amendment of Rule 69 (A) may have had to do with early jurisprudence of the 
ICTY, whereby the complete anonymity of witnesses had been, contra legem, as it is 
obvious from the Rules, allowed within certain limits.693 This jurisprudence was heavily 
disputed and discussed at the time,694 and fortunately, even though nominally endorsed, 
given up soon.695 
                                                 
691  RPE as adopted on 08 June 1998. 
692  See only Prosecutor v. Ruggiu, ICTR Case No. 97-32-I, Decision on the defence’s Motion for 
Witness Protection, Trial Chamber, 9 May 2000. 
693  Prosecutor v. Tadić, ICTY Case No. IT-94-1-T, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Motion Requesting 
Protective Measures for Victims and Witnesses, Trial Chamber, 10 August 1995. 
694  See, e.g., the minority opinion of Judge Stephen: Prosecutor v. Tadić, ICTY Case No. IT-94-1-T, 
Separate Opinion of Judge Stephen on the Prosecutor’s Motion Requesting Protective Measures for 
Victims and Witnesses, Trial Chamber, 10 August 1995; as well as Leigh, The Yugoslav Tribunal: 
Use of Unnamed Witnesses Against Accused; for a more flexible approach Chinkin, Due Process and 
Witness Anonymity; against her Leigh, Witness Anonymity is Inconsistent with Due Process. 
695  Prosecutor v. Blaškić, ICTY Case No. IT-95-14-T, Decision on the Application of the Prosecutor 
Dated 17 October 1996 Requesting Protective Measures for Victims and Witnesses, Trial Chamber, 
5 November 1996, paras. 24: “The philosophy which imbues the Statute and the Rules of the Tribunal 
appears clear: the victims and witnesses merit protection, even from the accused, during the 
preliminary proceedings and continuing until a reasonable time before the start of the trial itself; from 
that time forth, however, the right of the accused to an equitable trial must take precedence and 
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5.2.1.7.2 Rule 53 
The second provision Rule 66 (A) is expressly subjected to in the Rules of all three 
tribunals is Rule 53. It currently provides as follows: 
 
ICTY, 20 October 2011 ICTR, 1 October 2009 SCSL, 28 May 2010 
Non-disclosure 
 
(A) In exceptional 
circumstances, a Judge or a Trial 
Chamber  
may, in the interests of justice, 
order the non-disclosure to the 
public of any documents or 
information until further order. 
(B) When confirming an 
indictment the Judge may,  
 
in consultation with the 
Prosecutor,  
order that there be no public 
disclosure of the indictment 
until it is served on the accused, 
or, in the case of joint accused, 
on all the accused. 
(C) A Judge or Trial Chamber  
 
may, in consultation with the 
Prosecutor,  
also order that there be no 
disclosure of an indictment, or 
part thereof, or of all or any part 
of any particular document or 
information, if satisfied that the 
making of such an order is 
required to give effect to a 
provision of the Rules, to protect 
confidential information 
obtained by the Prosecutor, or is 
otherwise in the interests of 
justice. 
 
(D) Notwithstanding paragraphs 
(A), (B) and (C), the Prosecutor 
may disclose an indictment or 
part thereof to the authorities of 
a State or an appropriate 
authority or international body 
where the Prosecutor deems it 
necessary to prevent an 
Non-Disclosure 
 
(A) In exceptional 
circumstances, a Judge or a Trial 
Chamber  
may, in the interests of justice, 
order the non-disclosure to the 
public of any documents or 
information until further order. 
(B) When confirming an 
indictment the Judge may,  
 
in consultation with the 
Prosecutor,  
order that there be no public 
disclosure of the indictment 
until it is served on the accused, 
or, in the case of joint accused, 
on all the accused. 
(C) A Judge or Trial Chamber  
 
may, in consultation with the 
Prosecutor,  
also order that there be no 
disclosure of an indictment, or 
part thereof, or of all or any part 
of any particular document or 
information, if satisfied that the 
making of such an order is 
required to give effect to a 
provision of the Rules, to protect 
confidential information 
obtained by the Prosecutor, or is 
otherwise in the interests of 
justice. 
 
(D) Notwithstanding sub-rules 
(A), (B) and (C), the Prosecutor 
may disclose an indictment or 
part thereof to the authorities of 
a State or an appropriate 
authority or international body 
where the Prosecutor deems it 
necessary to secure the possible 
Non-disclosure  
 
(A) In exceptional 
circumstances, the Designated 
Judge  
may, in the interests of justice, 
order the non-disclosure to the 
public of any documents or 
information until further order. 
(B) When approving an 
indictment the Designated Judge 
may, 
on the application of the 
Prosecutor,  
order that there be no public 
disclosure of the indictment 
until it is served on the accused, 
or, in the case of joint accused, 
on all the accused. 
(C) The Designated Judge or the 
Trial Chamber  
may, on the application of the 
Prosecutor,  
also order that there be no 
disclosure of an indictment, or 
part thereof, or of all or any part 
of any particular document or 
information, if satisfied that the 
making of such an order is 
required to give effect to a 
provision of the Rules, to protect 
confidential information 
obtained by the Prosecutor, or is 
otherwise in the interests of 
justice. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
require that the veil of anonymity be lifted in his favour, even if the veil must continue to obstruct the 
view of the public and the media.”. 
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opportunity for securing the 
possible arrest of an accused 
from being lost. 
 
arrest of an accused. 
 
Whereas Rule 66 (A) refers to the Prosecutor’s duty to disclose documents to the 
defence, Rule 53 appears to deal with disclosure to the public, which, “in exceptional 
circumstances”, can be cut off by a Judge or a Trial Chamber, even without prior 
request of the prosecution. To understand the content of Rule 53, it may be of help to 
take a look at the wording history of the provision. Until 5 July 1996, the wording of the 
RPE-ICTR was the following: 
Non-disclosure of Indictment 
(A) When confirming an indictment the Judge may, in consultation with the 
Prosecutor, order that there be no public disclosure of the indictment until it is 
served on the accused, or, in the case of joint accused, on all the accused. 
(B) A Judge or Trial Chamber may, in consultation with the Prosecutor, also 
order that there be no disclosure of an indictment, or part thereof, or of all or 
any part of any particular document or information, if satisfied that the making 
of such an order is required to give effect to a provision of the Rules, to protect 
confidential information obtained by the Prosecutor, or is otherwise in the 
interests of justice.  
A year later, with the 9th revision of the RPE-ICTY, the ICTY followed in amending the 
provision to its current form. 
As could be inferred from the heading of this version, Rule 53 originally referred to the 
indictment only; however, Sub-Rule (B) also included the non-disclosure of other 
documents – and it may be noted that Sub-Rule (B) does not explicitly refer to 
disclosure to the public, although systematically it must be understood in this way. In 
the 9th revision of the Rules (June/July 1996), Rule 53 RPE-ICTY underwent the first 
major change: 
Non-disclosure 
(A) In exceptional circumstances, a Judge or a Trial Chamber may, in the 
interests of justice, order the non-disclosure to the public of any documents or 
information until further order.  
(B) When confirming (…)  
The specific link to the indictment in the heading was given up, and a new Sub-Rule (A) 
was inserted, giving the Judge or Trial Chamber the authority to cut off the public 
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disclosure of any document without request as a fundamental rule. However, this ’catch 
all’ authority of the Chamber to prohibit the disclosure of “any documents or 
information until further order” “in the interests of justice” was restricted to 
“exceptional circumstances”. Former Sub-Rules (A) and (B) obtained a new numbering, 
yet their wording remains unchanged until today. 
It is doubtful why the scope of application for Rule 66 (A) was expressly subjected to 
Rules 53 and 69. The relevant Annual Reports of 1997 and 1998 do not contain any 
information as to the motives of this amendment.696 Systematically, Rules 66 and 69 
belong together; both are contained in Part 5, Section 4 of the Rules (“Production of 
evidence”). As we have indicated above, it would therefore probably not have been 
necessary to mention Rule 69 in Rule 66 (A).  
The case of Rule 53 is slightly different. Systematically, Rule 53 is still closely 
connected with the indictment – it is contained in Part 5, Section 1 of the Rules 
(“Indictments”), after Rule 52, which states that indictments, in principle, are public 
documents. As shown above, this fact can be explained by the historical development of 
the provision. Now, referring to any document, it is from a systematic viewpoint a little 
’out of place’. The same holds true for the specific link between Rule 66 (A) and 
Rule 53: basically the two provisions do not have much to do with each other, since 
Rule 53 deals with disclosure to the public, whereas Rule 66 deals with disclosure to the 
defence. The identification of a witness, for instance, is a fundamental necessity for the 
preparation of the defence. On the other hand, the public disclosure of documents which 
allow the identification of a witness might put that witness into danger and does not 
advance the defence of the accused.697 Thus, measures according to Rule 53 may well go 
hand in hand with Rule 66; however, why Rule 66 should be “subject” to Rule 53, is 
unclear. 
The stated arguments cannot explain why Rules 69 and 53 are explicitly mentioned in 
Rule 66 (A), instead, they corroborate the view that the according amendment of 
Rule 66 was superfluous, since both provisions have to be applied anyway. It may well 
be that their insertion in Rule 66 was merely declaratory. 
As regards sub-rule (D), which deals with an exception to non-disclosure with regard to 
national states, it exists only at the ICTY and ICTR. This may be due to the specific 
                                                 
696  A/52/375, S/1997/729, 18 September 1997; and A/53/219, S/1998/737, 10 August 1998. 
697  Prosecutor v. Milošević, ICTY Case No. IT-02-54, Decision on prosecution motion for Provisional 
Protective Measures, Trial Chamber, 19 February 2002, par. 32; endorsed in Prosecutor v. Ojdanić, 
ICTY Case No. IT-99-37-PT, Decision on prosecution's motion for order of non-disclosure to public 
of supporting materials disclosed pursuant to Rule 66 (A) (i), Trial Chamber, 7 June 2002, par. 3. 
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legal character of the different courts – whereas the ICTY and ICTR are sub-organs of 
the UN Security Council, the SCSL is, technically, a ‘hybrid’, established by an 
agreement between Sierra Leone and the U.N. 
 
5.2.1.7.3 Rules 50 and 75 (SCSL) 
As seen in the synopsis above, Rule 66 of the RPE-SCSL, in contrast to the former two 
courts, contains two other explicit subjections: Rule 50 and Rule 75.  
Rule 50 deals with the amendment of indictments and, in its Sub-Rule B, contains 
specific disclosure provisions as to the amended indictment: 
Amendment of indictment 
(A) The Prosecutor may amend an indictment (…) 
(B) If the amended indictment includes new charges and the accused has already 
made his initial appearance in accordance with Rule 61: 
(i) A further appearance shall be held as soon as practicable to enable the 
accused to enter a plea on the new charges; 
(ii) Within seven days from such appearance, the Prosecutor shall disclose all 
materials envisaged in Rule 66(A)(i) pertaining to the new charges; 
(iii) The accused shall have a further period of ten days from the date of such 
disclosure by the Prosecutor in which to file preliminary motions pursuant to 
Rule 72 and relating to the new charges. 
Rule 50 thus contains no substantial “exceptions” as to the general provision of Rule 66, 
but rather a lex specialis as to what happens if the indictment is amended after the initial 
appearance of the accused. It obliges the Prosecutor to basically repeat the procedure 
according to Rule 66 (A)(i) with respect to the new charges, yet setting a shorter 
timeline (10 days from the “further” appearance instead of thirty days from the first). 
Rule 50 only refers to Sub-Rule (i), because Sub-Rule (ii), in the specific case of the 
SCSL, in any event imposes a continuous disclosure obligation on the Prosecutor as to 
additional prosecution witnesses, so a reference to Sub-Rule (ii) would make no sense. 
Rule 50 ICTY/RPE-ICTR does not contain specific regulations with regard the issue of 
disclosure in the event of an amendment of the indictment.   
Rule 75, dealing with measures for the protection of victims and witnesses, also 
contains specific regulations concerning disclosure to the defence in Sub-Rule (F) (ii), 
which states: 
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(F) Once protective measures have been ordered in respect of a witness or 
victim in any proceedings before the Special Court (the "first proceedings"), 
such protective measures: 
(i) shall continue to have effect mutatis mutandis in any other proceedings 
before the Special Court (the "second proceedings") unless and until they are 
rescinded, varied or augmented in accordance with the procedure set out in this 
Rule; but; 
(ii) shall not prevent the Prosecutor from discharging any disclosure obligation 
under the Rules in the second proceedings, provided that the Prosecutor notifies 
the defence to whom the disclosure is being made of the nature of the protective 
measures ordered in the first proceedings. 
The Rules of the other two Tribunals contain according provisions.698 It is not clear why 
Rule 66 RPE-SCSL makes specific reference to Rule 75, since it is already included in 
the disclosure regime by the link contained in Rule 69 (C) of the Rules of all three 
tribunals. 
 
5.2.1.7.4 Rule 66 (C) 
Under the current wording of Rule 66 (C), the prosecution’s disclosure obligations 
according to Rule 66 (A) are subject to secrecy and security reservations pursuant to 
Rule 66 (C). This is true for all three of the courts. Rule 66 (C) currently says:  
 
ICTY, 20 October 2011 ICTR, 1 October 2009 SCSL, 28 May 2010 
Where information is  
 
in the possession of the 
Prosecutor, the disclosure of 
which may prejudice further or 
ongoing investigations, or for 
any other reasons may be 
contrary to the public interest or 
affect the security interests of 
any State, the Prosecutor may 
apply to  
the Trial Chamber sitting in 
camera  
 
 
to be relieved from an obligation 
under the Rules to disclose that 
information.  
Where information or materials 
are  
in the possession of the 
Prosecutor, the disclosure of 
which may prejudice further or 
ongoing investigations, or for 
any other reasons may be 
contrary to the public interest or 
affect the security interests of 
any State, the Prosecutor may 
apply to  
the Trial Chamber sitting in 
camera  
 
 
to be relieved from the obligation 
to disclose pursuant to Sub-Rules 
(A) and (B).  
Where information or materials 
are  
in the possession of the 
Prosecutor, the disclosure of 
which may prejudice further or 
ongoing investigations, or for 
any other reasons may be 
contrary to the public interest or 
affect the security interests of 
any State, the Prosecutor may 
apply to  
a Judge designated by the 
President sitting ex parte and in 
camera, but with notice to the 
Defence,  
to be relieved from the obligation 
to disclose pursuant to Sub-
Rule (A).  
                                                 
698  Rule 75 (F) RPE-ICTY/R, respectively, which differ from Rule 75 (F) RPE-SCSL merely in that they 
say “the Tribunal” instead of “the Special Court”. 
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When making such application 
the Prosecutor shall provide the 
Trial Chamber (but only the Trial 
Chamber) with  
the information  
that is sought to be kept 
confidential. 
When making such an 
application the Prosecutor shall 
provide the Trial Chamber, and 
only the Trial Chamber, with  
the information or materials  
that are sought to be kept 
confidential. 
When making such an 
application the Prosecutor shall 
provide,  
only to such Judge,  
the information or materials  
that are sought to be kept 
confidential. 
 
This wording, however, has also fundamentally changed in the history of the Rules. 
Originally, Rule 66 contained no exceptions for reasons of security interests. In fact, the 
original wording of the entire Rules, with one very general and vague exception,699 did 
not make any reference to state security matters whatsoever. This is interesting to note, 
because the proposal of the American government which, as we have seen several times 
already, served as a role model for the RPE-ICTY, did take up the matter of security 
concerns of states, addressing restrictions to disclosure on national security reasons 
mainly as regards the public, but also as regards the accused.700  
Rule 66 (C) was first introduced in the 3rd Revision of the Rules (30 January 1995), thus 
at a very early stage. In its original wording, it provided: 
Where information is in the possession of the Prosecutor, the disclosure of 
which may prejudice further or ongoing investigations, or for any other reasons 
may be contrary to the public interest or affect the security interests of any State, 
the Prosecutor may apply to the Trial Chamber sitting in camera to be relieved 
from the obligation to disclose pursuant to Sub-rule (B). When making such 
application the Prosecutor shall provide the Trial Chamber (but only the Trial 
Chamber) with the information that is sought to be kept confidential.  
In contrast to the wording which is in force today, sub-rule (C) originally obviously 
foresaw exceptions to disclosure on grounds of ongoing investigation, public interest or 
state security interests only with regard to material under sub-rule (B), and not material 
pertaining to sub-rule (A). However, the Trial Chamber in the already mentioned 
decision in Blaškić, while interpreting the term “prior statements of the accused” 
widely,701 stated at the same time that the Prosecutor could “apply to the Trial Chamber 
for relief from the obligation to disclose evidence which may prejudice further or 
                                                 
699  Rule 41 of the original version provided: “Retention of Information: The Prosecutor shall be 
responsible for the retention, storage and security of information and physical evidence obtained in the 
course of his investigations.”  
700  See Rule 8 of the American proposal and the respective commentary (printed in Morris/Scharf, An 
insider's guide to the international criminal tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, note 605 supra, pp. 
523 et subs. (“Protective Orders”). 
701  Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Trial Chamber, 27 January 1997, note 635 supra. 
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ongoing investigations or be contrary to the public interest or affect the security 
interests of any State” in the meaning of Rule 66 (C).702 This ruling was obviously 
contra legem.703 The Chamber, however, did not bother to explain its ruling. In fact, it 
extended, also without explanation, the assumed scope of applicability of Rule 66 (C) as 
to cover exculpatory evidence according to Rule 68 also. 704 It took almost two more 
years until Rule 66 (C) was adapted in such a way as to harmonize it with the 
Chamber’s holding in Blaškić, when, in the 17th Revision of the Rules (17 November 
1999), it was amended to its current wording. Since then any disclosure obligation may 
be restrained if this “may be” in the “public interest” or if the disclosure “may affect of 
the security interest of any state”. The vagueness of this wording is quite striking and it 
is highly questionable if this, in the light of the right of the defendant to a fair trial, can 
be justified. Even though the effective exception of the disclosure obligation according 
to Sub-rule (C) is subjected to the control of the Trial Chamber, this wording makes 
sub-rule (C) a “blank-form” Rule which can be easily abused. In addition to that, the 
decision of the Trial Chamber according to Sub-rule (C) is issued in camera, thus not 
even the decision as such will be published entirely. Needless to say, it may be also 
stated that by extending the scope of application of Sub-rule (C) to all disclosure 
obligations under the Rules, the latter is now systematically in the wrong place. Since it 
is meant to be applied to all disclosure obligations, it should rather constitute a Rule of 
its own or be included in Rule 70. 
While the Rule 66 (C) RPE-ICTY thus now covers all disclosure obligations of the 
prosecution, the scope of the corresponding Rule 66 (C) at the ICTR and the SCSL 
retain some limits in this regard. Rule 66 (C) RPE-ICTR, though originally also 
referring to disclosure according to Rule 66 (B) only, was amended in 1998 to its 
current wording. Thus, the term “materials” (“information or materials”) was included, 
corresponding with a change in the heading of Rule 66 (from “Disclosure by the 
Prosecutor” to “Disclosure of materials by the Prosecutor”); at the same time, the scope 
of Rule 66 (C) was widened as to encompass disclosure according to Rule 66 (A) as 
well. Interestingly enough, the judges of the SCSL chose to implement the somewhat 
strictest regime in this regard. Since the SCSL had originally taken over the Rules of the 
ICTR, the amendment of Rule 66 (C) RPE-SCSL meant a step ‘back’ to a stricter 
provision. Additionally, and perhaps more importantly, the procedure differs from the 
other Tribunals in that the application of the Prosecutor is not made to the Trial 
                                                 
702  Ibid., par. 39. 
703  See also Moranchek, Protecting National Security Evidence While Prosecuting War Crimes: Problems 
and Lessons for International Justice from the ICTY, note 638 supra, p. 487. 
704  See Prosecutor v. Blaškić, ibid., p. 24; and section 5.2.3 infra. 
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Chamber, but ex parte to an especially designated judge; thus retaining a more 
adversarial notion: the Trial Chamber does not even get to see the respective 
information, presumably in order not to be biased.  
 
5.2.2 Rule 66 (B) RPE-ICTY/R / Rule 66 (A) (iii) RPE-SCSL 
Rule 66 (B) deals with the disclosure of other material not comprised by Sub-rule (A). It 
currently provides as follows: 
 
ICTY, 20 October 2011 ICTR, 1 October 2009 SCSL, 28 May 2010 
The Prosecutor shall, on request,  
 
 
permit the defence to inspect any 
books, documents, photographs 
and tangible objects in the 
Prosecutor’s custody or control,  
which are material to the 
preparation of the defence, or  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
are intended for use by the 
Prosecutor as evidence at trial or 
were obtained from or belonged 
to the accused. 
At the request of the Defence, the 
Prosecutor shall, subject to Sub-
Rule (C),  
permit the Defence to inspect any 
books, documents, photographs 
and tangible objects in his 
custody or control,  
which are material to the 
preparation of the defence, or  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
are intended for use by the 
Prosecutor as evidence at trial or 
were obtained from or belonged 
to the accused. 
At the request of the defence, 
subject to Sub-Rule (B),  
 
permit the defence to inspect any 
books, documents, photographs 
and tangible objects in his 
custody or control,  
which are material to the 
preparation of the defence, upon 
a showing by the defence of 
categories of, or specific, books, 
documents, photographs and 
tangible objects which the 
defence considers to be material 
to the preparation of a defence, 
or to inspect any books, 
documents, photographs and 
tangible objects in his custody or 
control which  
are intended for use by the 
Prosecutor as evidence at trial or 
were obtained from or belonged 
to the accused.. 
 
The provision mentions three different categories of material: material “for the 
preparation of the defence”, material “intended for use by the Prosecutor as evidence at 
trial”, and material that was “obtained from or belonged to the accused”. In contrast to 
Rule 66 (A), all of the material mentioned in Sub-rule (B) need only be disclosed if 
requested by the defence. 
While the second and third of the mentioned categories are self-explanatory, the Rules 
contain no guidance as to how the phrase “material to the preparation of the defence” 
can be defined. However, in the already mentioned decision in the proceedings against 
Delalić et al.705, the Trial Chamber defined this term by recurring to Rule 16(a)(1)(C)706 
                                                 
705  See note 633 supra. 
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of the United States’ Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the related jurisprudence 
of US-American federal courts, as well as British jurisprudence. Based mainly on the 
latter, the chamber ruled that in order to determine the materiality of the evidence, the 
prosecution could recur to the following test: the evidence is material, if (1) it is 
relevant or possibly relevant to an issue in the case, (2) it raises or possibly raises a new 
issue whose existence is not apparent from the evidence the prosecution proposes to use 
[this would fall into the second category of sub-rule (B)], or (3) it holds out a real, as 
opposed to fanciful, prospect of providing a lead on evidence which goes to (1) or (2).707 
The Chamber also stated that, if the materiality of the evidence is disputed among the 
parties, it is the obligation of the defence to identify the specific material in the 
possession of the Prosecutor and to make a prima facie showing of its materiality.708 It 
must be questioned, however, how the defence can reasonably be expected to fulfil 
these obligations, since in many cases it will hardly be able to specify material which it 
has not seen. At the same time, the ICTR Appeals Chamber held that materiality should 
in any case be considered as a wide concept, and that it does not require the material to 
be counter the prosecution Case.709 
The original wording of Rule 66 (B) was as follows: 
The Prosecutor shall on request permit the defence to inspect any books, 
documents, photographs and tangible objects in his custody or control, which 
are material to the preparation of the defence, or are intended for use by the 
Prosecutor as evidence at trial or were obtained from or belonged to the 
accused. 
This wording, which is practically identical with the current one, in turn, goes back to 
the proposal of the American Government. Its Rule 17.1 (B) was drafted as follows: 
Documents, tangible objects, and reports. Upon request of the defense the 
Prosecutor shall, within a reasonable time thereafter, permit the defense to 
inspect any books, papers, documents, photographs, tangible objects, buildings 
or places, or copies or portions thereof, which are in the possession, custody or 
control of the Prosecutor, and which are either material to the preparation of 
the defense, are intended for use by the Prosecutor as evidence at trial on the 
                                                                                                                                               
706  Now Rule 16(a)(1)(E) FRCP (2010). 
707  Ibid. (note 633 supra), par. 6-8; see also Tochilovsky, Jurisprudence of the International Criminal 
Courts: Procedure and Evidence, p. 115. 
708  Ibid. (note 633), par. 9, 10. 
709  Prosecutor vs. Bagosora et al., Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Relating to Disclosure under Rule 
66(B) of The Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence, ICTR Case No. 98-41-AR73, App. Ch., 25 
September 2006, par. 9. 
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issue of guilt, or were obtained from or belonged to the accused. For purposes 
of this subsection matters filed with the Registry by the Prosecutor are 
considered in the control of the Prosecutor and subject to disclosure.710 
This proposal, for its part, was obviously strongly inspired by the American Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure.711  
Rule 66 (B) was amended together with the introduction of Rule 66 (C), as to include 
the already mentioned subjection under the latter: 
The Prosecutor shall on request, subject to Sub-rule (C), permit the defence 
to inspect any books, […].712 
This amendment corroborates the above-mentioned finding that sub-rule (C) referred to 
sub-rule (B) only. The 17th revision of the Rules, which changed sub-rule (C) as to 
comprise all disclosure obligations of the Prosecutor, rendered the subjection clause in 
sub-rule (B) superfluous, it was accordingly stricken again. Since then, apart from one 
minor amendment713, sub-rule (B) has remained unchanged. 
As regards the ICTR and SCSL, both have retained the explicit subjection of sub-rule 
(B) to sub-rule (C) (or, in the case of the SCSL, sub-rule (B), which however is parallel 
to sub-rule (C) ICTY/RPE-ICTR). For those, however, sub-rule (C) and sub-rule (B), 
respectively, refer to all other disclosure obligations under Rule 66. The material 
difference between the ICTY and the other two courts thus lies only in the relationship 
between Rule 66 (C) (for the SCSL: Rule 66 (B)) and Rule 68 (disclosure of 
exculpatory materials); this will be discussed below. 
Tochilovsky’s conclusion that the right to inspection according to Rule 66 (B) is 
“subject to Sub-rule (C)”714, is therefore correct, yet not going far enough. The 
jurisprudence715 which he cites refers to the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the 
ICTR, in which, until today, the explicit references of Sub-rule (B) to Sub-Rule (C) are 
                                                 
710  Proposal by the American Government, note 606 supra, p. 533. 
711  See Rule 16(a)(1)(C) FRCP 1994. 
712  Wording of Rule 66 (B) after the 3rd revision of the Rules, 30 January 1995. 
713  The change in 12th revision of the RPE-ICTY in October/November 1997, by which the word “his” 
was amended to “the Prosecutor’s”, was obviously for reasons of clarification and gender neutrality 
only. After all, Louise Arbour had become Chief Prosecutor in 1996. It is noteworthy, though, that 
neither the ICTR nor the SCSL have, until this day, amended their respective Rules accordingly. 
714  Tochilovsky, Note 707, p. 114. 
715  Prosecutor vs. Rutaganda, Decision on the urgent defence motion for disclosure and admission of 
additional evidence and scheduling order, Case No. ICTR-96-3-A, App. Ch., 12 December 2002. 
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contained, however, in this case together with Sub-rule (A), subjecting the scope of 
application of Sub-rule (C) to both Sub-rules (B) and (A).  
 
5.2.3 Rule 68 RPE 
Rule 68 establishes disclosure duties with regard to exculpatory evidence or material. 
The ICTY has defined exculpatory evidence as meaning “such material which is known 
to the Prosecutor and which is favourable to the accused in the sense that it tends to 
suggest the innocence or mitigate the guilt of the accused or may affect the credibility of 
prosecution evidence“716. It must, of course, be questioned, whether this definition goes 
beyond the wording of Rule 68 and is therefore helpful in and of itself.717  
In light of the mentioned jurisprudence of the international human rights authorities, it 
appears only logical that the Ad Hoc Tribunals had to implement an obligatory 
disclosure of exculpatory material. In procedural regimes adhering to the Roman-
Germanic tradition, the finding of exculpatory material is comprised in the investigation 
duties of the prosecutor718 and thus treated like any other evidence (which means that it 
must be included in the dossier).The fact that the Rules of the Ad Hoc Tribunals contain 
such an obligation is, nevertheless, surprising to a certain extent: as we have seen, in the 
traditional adversarial system on which the Ad-hoc-Tribunals’ criminal procedure is 
based, it is still primarily the task of the defence to gather exculpatory evidence.719  
The Appeals Chamber of the ICTY, for its part, has emphasized that the disclosure of 
exculpatory material is “fundamental to the fairness of proceedings before the Tribunal, 
and considerations of fairness are the overriding factor in any determination of whether 
the governing Rule has been breached“720 and that “[t]he prosecution’s obligation under 
                                                 
716  Prosecutor vs. Delalić et al., Decision on the request of the accused Hazim Delić pursuant to rule 68 
for exculpatory information, ICTY Case No. IT-96-21-T, Trial Chamber, 24 June 1997, par. 12; 
affirmed in Prosecutor vs. Krstić, Appeals Judgment, ICTY Case No. IT-98-33-A, Appeals Chamber, 
19 April 2004, par. 178. 
717  See Harmon/Karagiannakis, The Disclosure of Exculpatory Material by the Prosecution to the 
Defence under Rule 68 of the ICTY Rules, p. 319.  
718  See, e.g., § 160 (2) StPO (German Code of Criminal Procedure). 
719  Prosecutor vs. Blagojević´et al., Joint Decision on Motions Related to Production of Evidence, 12 
December 2002, par. 26. 
720  Prosecutor vs. Krstić, see note 716 above, par. 180. 
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Rule 68 is not a secondary one, to be complied with after everything else is done; it is as 
important as the obligation to prosecute.“721 
The current wording of Rule 68 is as follows: 
 
ICTY, 20 October 2011 ICTR, 1 October 2009 SCSL, 28 May 2010 
Rule 68: Disclosure of 
Exculpatory and Other Relevant 
Material  
 
Subject to the provisions of 
Rule 70,  
 
(i) the Prosecutor shall, as soon 
as practicable, disclose to the 
defence any material which in the 
actual knowledge of the 
Prosecutor may suggest the 
innocence or mitigate the guilt of 
the accused or affect the 
credibility of prosecution 
evidence;  
 
(ii) without prejudice to 
paragraph (i), the Prosecutor 
shall make available to the 
defence, in electronic form, 
collections of relevant material 
held by the Prosecutor, together 
with appropriate computer 
software with which the defence 
can search such collections 
electronically;  
 
 
 
(iii) the Prosecutor shall take 
reasonable steps, if confidential 
information is provided to the 
Prosecutor by a person or entity 
under Rule 70 (B) and contains 
material referred to in paragraph 
(i) above, to obtain the consent of 
the provider to disclosure of that 
material, or the fact of its 
existence, to the accused;  
 
(iv) the Prosecutor shall apply to 
the Chamber sitting in camera to 
be relieved from an obligation 
under paragraph (i) to disclose 
information in the possession of 
the Prosecutor, if its disclosure 
Rule 68: Disclosure of 
Exculpatory and Other Relevant 
Material 
 
 
 
 
(A) The Prosecutor shall, as soon 
as practicable, disclose to the 
defence any material, which in 
the actual knowledge of the 
Prosecutor may suggest the 
innocence or mitigate the guilt of 
the accused or affect the 
credibility of prosecution 
evidence. 
 
(B) Where possible, and with the 
agreement of the defence, and 
without prejudice to paragraph 
(A), the Prosecutor shall make 
available to the defence, in 
electronic form, collections of 
relevant material held by the 
Prosecutor, together with 
appropriate computer software 
with which the defence can 
search such collections 
electronically. 
 
(C) The Prosecutor shall take 
reasonable steps, if confidential 
information is provided to the 
Prosecutor by a person or entity 
under Rule 70 (B) and contains 
material referred to in paragraph 
(A) above, to obtain the consent 
of the provider to disclosure of 
that material, or the fact of its 
existence, to the accused. 
 
(D) The Prosecutor shall apply to 
the Chamber sitting in camera to 
be relieved from an obligation 
under the Rules to disclose 
information in the possession of 
the Prosecutor, if its disclosure 
Rule 68: Disclosure of 
Exculpatory Evidence 
 
 
 
 
 
(A) The Prosecutor shall, within 
14 days of receipt of the defence 
Case Statement, make a 
statement under this 
Rule disclosing to the defence 
the existence of evidence known 
to the Prosecutor which may be 
relevant to issues raised in the 
defence Case Statement. 
(B) The Prosecutor shall, within 
30 days of the initial appearance 
of the accused, make a 
statement under this 
Rule disclosing to the defence 
the existence of evidence known 
to the Prosecutor which in any 
way tends to suggest the 
innocence or mitigate the guilt 
of the accused or may affect the 
credibility of prosecution 
evidence. The Prosecutor shall 
be under a continuing obligation 
to disclose any such exculpatory 
material. 
 
                                                 
721  Prosecutor vs. Kordić and Čerkez, Decision on motions to extend time for filing appellant’s briefs, 
ICTY Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Pre-Appeal Judge, 11 May 2001, par. 14. 
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may prejudice further or ongoing 
investigations, or for any other 
reason may be contrary to the 
public interest or affect the 
security interests of any State, 
and when making such 
application, the Prosecutor shall 
provide the Trial Chamber (but 
only the Trial Chamber) with the 
information that is sought to be 
kept confidential;  
 
(v) notwithstanding the 
completion of the trial and any 
subsequent appeal, the Prosecutor 
shall disclose to the other party 
any material referred to in 
paragraph (i) above.  
may prejudice further or ongoing 
investigations, or for any other 
reason may be contrary to the 
public interest or affect the 
security interests of any State, 
and when making such 
application, the Prosecutor shall 
provide the Trial Chamber (but 
only the Trial Chamber) with the 
information that is sought to be 
kept confidential. 
 
(E) Notwithstanding the 
completion of the trial and any 
subsequent appeal, the Prosecutor 
shall disclose to the other party 
any material referred to in 
paragraph (A) above. 
 
The provision has changed fundamentally during the existence of the Tribunals. It 
appears therefore advisable to analyze it piece by piece in a chronological order. 
The original wording of Rule 68 RPE-ICTY was the following: 
Disclosure of Exculpatory Evidence 
The Prosecutor shall, as soon as practicable, disclose to the defence the 
existence of evidence known to the Prosecutor which in any way tends to suggest 
the innocence or mitigate the guilt of the accused of a crime charged in the 
indictment.722 
This wording can be traced back to the Suggestion made by the Government of the 
United States in 1993. The wording contained in the suggestion was as follows: 
17.2 Exculpatory evidence. The Prosecutor shall, as soon as practicable, 
disclose to the defense the existence of evidence known to the Prosecutor which 
reasonably tends to: 
(A) negate the guilt of the accused of an offense charged in the indictment; or 
(B) mitigate the guilt of the accused regarding an offense charged in the 
indictment.723 
As already briefly mentioned, this proposal comes as a little surprise, since many other 
disclosure provisions resemble, more or less, in some way the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. In this case, however, no role model can be identified. The commentary of 
                                                 
722  Printed in ILM 33 (1994), pp. 493-546 (523).  
723  Printed in: Morris/Scharf, An insider's guide to the international criminal tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia vol. 2, p. 533. 
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the American proposal contains no further information. It has been remarked that 
Rule 68 was intended to cover the so-called ‘Brady-Material’.724 The ABA Task Force 
Report725 mentions the Jencks Act726 as well as the US Supreme Court Judgment in 
United States v. Giglio727, recommending that these two legal sources be received by the 
Tribunal via a commentary. The latter legal source may be seen to be mirrored in the 
current wording: “may [...] affect the credibility of prosecution evidence”. 
It is obvious that the content of Rule 68 and the foregoing US suggestion is almost 
identical – Sub-rules (A) and (B) have been merged and instead of the phrase 
“reasonably tends to suggest”, the ICTY Judges opted for the broader “in any way tends 
to suggest”. A little later, in January 1995, they decided to include an additional 
category of material, which relates not directly to the guilt or innocence of the accused, 
but to the credibility of prosecution evidence: 
Disclosure of Exculpatory Evidence  
The Prosecutor shall, as soon as practicable, disclose to the defence the 
existence of evidence known to the Prosecutor which in any way tends to suggest 
the innocence or mitigate the guilt of the accused or may affect the credibility of 
prosecution evidence.728 
Also, the phrase “[guilt of the accused] of a crime charged in the indictment” was left 
out. These amendments broadened scope of application of Rule 68.729  
The original wording of Rule 68 for the ICTR was identical to the one of the ICTY after 
its first amendment in 1995. However, the original wording of Rule 68 for the SCSL, 
                                                 
724  Morris/Scharf, An insider's guide to the international criminal tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, p. 
249. See also section 4.2.1.6 wbove above. 
725  See above note 630, in Morris/Scharf, An insider's guide to the international criminal tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia, p. 594. 
726  See section 4.2.1.3 above. 
727  See section 4.2.1.8 above. 
728  Rule 68 RPE-ICTY as of 30 January 1995 (Rev. 3).  
729  “Similarly, rule 68 was amended so that the Prosecutor’s obligation to disclose to the defence 
exculpatory evidence which tended "to suggest the innocence or mitigate the guilt of the accused", 
now extends to any evidence which "may affect the credibility of prosecution evidence", Annual 
Report 1995, par. 26. Apparently the suggestion to amend Rule 68 accordingly was made by the 
International Law Committee of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, see 
Harmon/Karagiannakis, The Disclosure of Exculpatory Material by the Prosecution to the Defence 
under Rule 68 of the ICTY Rules (p. 316, note 2). 
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introduced in March 2003, was considerably different and will be briefly analysed 
below.730 
The difference between the original and the current version of Rule 68 ICTY/RPE-
ICTR is palpable.731 Whereas the original one is simple, short and concise, the current 
one establishes a sophisticated system of exceptions, checks and balances. Furthermore, 
the new wording included a duty to disclose exculpatory evidence in electronic form – 
legally not a significant difference (the material as such remains the same, for that 
matter), but for the practice of the discovery procedure the importance of this 
amendment can probably not be underestimated. It was introduced in order to limit the 
‘flood’ of documents which would be disclosed to the defence under Rule 68. 
Particularly in conjunction with the former (wider) scope of the provision,732 the defence 
would regularly be drowned with material which was ultimately useless; this was true 
especially for Rule 68 material.733 
It is interesting to note that, from January 1995, which was before the ICTY had its first 
proceedings against Tadić, Rule 68 RPE-ICTY remained practically unchanged until 
December 2003. It underwent only one change: the expression “evidence” within the 
heading and the legal text was amended to “material” with the 21st revision of the Rules 
in July 2001. This could mean a substantial change insofar as the term “material” is 
wider than the term “evidence”. “Evidence” may be understood as meaning just 
material which can be introduced as evidence in the trial proceedings, i.e. evidence in 
the formal sense, whereas “material” comprises also such material that could not be 
introduced as evidence in the trial because of inadmissibility. It is obvious, however, 
that material, even though in itself it is not admissible as evidence, is still of help to the 
defence, as a starting point for its own investigations. In any case, the Tribunal had 
already ruled in 1999 that exculpatory material must be disclosed regardless of whether 
that material would be in itself admissible as evidence in trial proceedings or not.734 The 
ICTR retained the original wording (“evidence”) until April 2004.  
                                                 
730  5.2.3.6 below. 
731  Indeed, it has been held that a “new Rule 68” was adopted, Zappalà, The Prosecutor's Duty to 
Disclose Exculpatory Materials and the Recent Amendment to Rule 68 ICTY RPE, p. 620. 
732  See instantly (5.2.3.1). 
733  Möller, Das Vorverfahren im Strafprozess vor dem Internationalen Straftribunal für das ehemalige 
Jugoslawien (''Pre-Trial and Preliminary Proceedings''), pp. 42 et seq. 
734  Prosecutor vs. Krnojelac, Decision on Motion by prosecution to Modify Order for Compliance with 
Rule 68, ICTY Case No. IT-97-25-PT, Pre-Trial Judge, 1 November 1999, paras. 2, 11; affirmed in 
Prosecutor vs. Krstić, Appeals Judgment, note 716, par. 178. 
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By the 29th Revision of the Rules (December 2003), Rule 68 RPE-ICTY was radically 
amended; just a little later, on 15 May 2004, the ICTR amended Rule 68 in a very 
similar way, with slight differences which we will take a look at. 
The heading of the provision was changed, once again, to “Disclosure of Exculpatory 
and Other Relevant Material“, this time also in the Rules of the ICTR, which had 
retained the term “evidence” until then. Structurally, 5 sub-rules were introduced. It can 
be noted that, instead of following the usual pattern of ICTY-Rules, which is the 
division by capital letters, Rule 68 RPE-ICTY was divided by Roman numbers instead 
– Roman numbers are usually used to specify sub-paragraphs. This latter observation is 
particularly noticeable in the light of Rule 68 RPE-ICTR, where the usual division by 
capital letters was kept.  
 
5.2.3.1 Sub-rule (i)/(A) ICTY/ICTR 
The wording of Sub-rule (i)/(A) resembles the wording of Rule 68 after its first 
amendment in January 1995. Indeed, three material changes can be asserted.  
Whereas according to the original version of the Rule only “the existence of evidence” 
had to be disclosed, which must probably be understood as some kind of notification, 
now the prosecution must disclose the material itself. However, the Appeals Chamber 
stated in its Blaskić -judgment that even under the previous wording, for reasons of 
fairness, it would not be sufficient to merely inform the defence of the existence of 
exculpatory material if this material was in the sole possession of the prosecution, but 
the material itself would have to be disclosed also.735 This decision coincides with the 
30th Revision of the Rules in April 2004. The new wording appears to be favourable to 
the defendant because it seems to widen the disclosure duties of the Prosecutor. 
However, one could also understand the new wording in the way that now the 
prosecution must merely disclose the exculpatory material in its possession, yet without 
being obliged to inform the defence about the existence of exculpatory material which is 
not in its possession, but rather in the hands of a third person and of which the 
prosecution has knowledge.736 Understood like this, the amendment of the provision, as 
a matter of fact, cut down on the rights of the accused. It has, however, been held that 
this understanding would entail that this interpretation would “allow countless motions” 
with the effect as to force the Prosecutor to investigate and actively search for 
                                                 
735  Prosecutor vs. Blaskić, note 654, par. 41. 
736  For this understanding apparently Prosecutor vs. Krnojelac, Decision on Motion by prosecution to 
Modify Order for Compliance with Rule 68, note 734 supra, paras. 8, 10, 11-2. 
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exculpatory evidence, and that this consequence would run contrary to Art. 15 ICTYSt, 
which stipulates the independence of the Prosecutor as regards orders from third 
persons.737 
The second change lies in what might be called “level of knowledge” of the 
prosecution. The wording “the existence of evidence [material] known to the 
Prosecutor” was changed into “material which in the actual knowledge of the 
Prosecutor”. It must be inferred from the new wording that “actual knowledge” requires 
a higher level of knowledge than “known”. However, “actual knowledge” of the 
Prosecutor may be difficult, if not impossible to prove by the defence in the case of a 
dispute between the parties over this issue. Yet the main difference rather appears to lie 
in the change of the object of the knowledge of the Prosecutor: originally, the 
knowledge of the Prosecutor referred to the evidence itself, i.e. the knowledge of the 
existence of the evidence, whereas its exculpatory character would be something to be 
assessed objectively. With the new wording, the exculpatory character is, to some 
extent, subjectified, in that the material must only be disclosed if not only the 
Prosecutor knows of its existence, but has is also aware of the fact that it is exculpatory. 
Nevertheless, some authors believe the amendment to be meaningless in practice, 
stating that the amendment only followed the interpretation of the Rule by the 
Tribunal.738  
It has been stated that the main reason to amend Rule 68 in the present way, together 
with the introduction of electronic disclosure, was to relieve the defence from being 
“drowned” in irrelevant material, since the Prosecutor, under the previous wording, 
tended to “play safe” and hand over to the defence large quantities of material, the 
exculpatory relevance of was doubtful.739 At the same time, the new approach to the 
disclosure of exculpatory material also may also save resources of the Prosecutor. Other 
authors hold that, in fact, instead of adapting the Tribunal’s (or, for that matter, the 
prosecution’s) practice in accord with the Rule, the Judges did not tackle the underlying 
problems in the application of Rule 68 in its former form, but rather avoided them by 
easing down the pressure on the prosecution.740 
                                                 
737  Khan/Dixon/Fulford, Archbold: International Criminal Courts - Practice, Procedure and Evidence, 7-
198. 
738  Khan/Dixon/Fulford, Archbold: International Criminal Courts - Practice, Procedure and Evidence, 7-
199, albeit without citing relevant jurisprudence. 
739  Möller, Das Vorverfahren im Strafprozess vor dem Internationalen Straftribunal für das ehemalige 
Jugoslawien (''Pre-Trial and Preliminary Proceedings''), p. 43. 
740  Zappalà, The Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose Exculpatory Materials and the Recent Amendment to 
Rule 68 ICTY RPE, p. 624. 
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Thirdly, the passage “which in any way tends to suggest the innocence or mitigate the 
guilt of the accused or may affect the credibility of prosecution evidence” was converted 
into “[which] may suggest the innocence or mitigate the guilt of the accused or affect 
the credibility of prosecution evidence”. It is doubtful what the substantial difference 
between the two wordings is. It must be kept in mind, however, that it is the 
responsibility of the Prosecutor to determine whether certain pieces of evidence in fact 
are exculpatory.741 The new wording must be read in conjunction with what has been 
said concerning the second change: overall, the new wording appears to aim to reduce 
the quantity of material which must be disclosed by the prosecutor, striving to rule out 
the ‘doubtful’ documents.  
 
5.2.3.2 Sub-rule (ii)/(B) RPE-ICTY/RPE-ICTR 
Sub rule (ii)/B contains the duty to disclose “collections of relevant material” in 
electronic form, the so-called “Electronic Disclosure System” (EDS). As has been stated 
concerning Sub-rule (i)/A above, the introduction of the EDS appears to be part of the 
effort to make disclosure more efficient for both parties. Since Sub-rule (ii)/B is 
“independent” from sub-rule (i) (“without prejudice to sub-rule (i)/A), it could be 
concluded that “relevant material” is not the exculpatory material itself but rather 
material in which exculpatory material may be contained.742 It could, however, just aim 
to clarify that the disclosure performed pursuant to Sub-rule (ii)/B does not exempt the 
Prosecutor from discharging his duties pursuant to Sub-rule (i)/A.743 
As concerns the RPE-ICTR, Rule 68 (B) was amended soon after the amendment of the 
RPE-ICTY. It slightly differs from the new ICTY wording. First, it appears to 
incorporate a ‘restriction’ in that the prosecution is only obliged to disclose “where 
possible”. The meaning of this phrase is unclear, since an ‘impossible’ disclosure 
obligation can obviously not be imposed (impossibilium nulla est obligatio). The second 
difference lies in the phrase “with the agreement of the defence”, meaning that the 
defence can insist on a submission of the material in an ‘analogous’ form. 
                                                 
741  See, e. g., Prosecutor vs. Blaskic, note 654, par. 39; Prosecutor vs. Kvocka et al., Decision, 22 March 
2004, p. 3; Prosecutor vs. Musema, arrêt (“defence motion under rule 68 requesting the appeals 
chamber to order the disclosure of exculpatory material and for leave to file supplementary grounds of 
appeal”), 18 May 2001. 
742  In this sense apparently Prosecutor vs. Halilović, Decision on motion for enforcement of court order 
re electronic disclosure suite, 27 July 2005, p. 4; Prosecutor vs. Karemera et al., Decision on Joseph 
Nzirorera’s motion to compel inspection and disclosure, 5 July 2005, p. 15. 
743  Möller, Das Vorverfahren im Strafprozess vor dem Internationalen Straftribunal für das ehemalige 
Jugoslawien (''Pre-Trial and Preliminary Proceedings''), p. 43. 
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5.2.3.3 Subjection to Rule 70; Sub-rule (iii)/(C) 
With the introduction of sub-rule (iii)/C in the 29th revision of the ICTY Rules, Rule 68 
was implicitly subjected to Rule 70. Presumably for clarification purposes, with the 32nd 
revision of the Rules, the subjection of Rule 68 was made explicit. 744 The latter did not 
happen at the ICTR, where the subjection thus remains implicit only. The SCSL does 
not feature a similar provision. 
We will below come to some more detailed observations concerning Rule 70.745 
However, the inclusion of Rule 70 within the framework of Rule 68 warrants a few 
remarks. It is arguably connected with a decision in the proceedings against Brđanin in 
2002.746 Even though also before its amendment Rule 68 could have been interpreted as 
being subject to Rule 70, the competent Chamber clearly stated that Rule 70 did not 
apply to disclosure of exculpatory material according to Rule 68: 
[…] the public interest immunity discussed above is excluded where its 
application would deny to the accused the opportunity to establish his or her 
innocence. This is of paramount importance because it must be emphasised that 
the exception to disclose found in paragraphs 70 (B) to (E) applies only to 
information provided on a confidential basis which has been used solely for the 
purpose of generating new evidence and, in any event, does not relieve the 
prosecution of the obligation, pursuant to Rule 68 […].747 
The relevant Annual Report, in turn, does not even count this amendment of the Rule 68 
under the “most significant” ones.748  
Sub-rule (iii)/(C) obliges the Prosecutor to take “reasonable steps” to obtain the consent 
of the provider of confidential material to disclosure of that material. What these 
reasonable steps may be remains unclear; and the Chamber has not really got any say as 
to the procedure and the production of the evidence. As to the general critique of 
                                                 
744  28 July/12 August 2004. According to the versions of the Rules available on the ICTY website. 
O'Sullivan/Montgomery, The Erosion of the Right to Confrontation under the Cloak of Fairness at the 
ICTY, who note that the explicit subjection to Rule 70 came about with the above mentioned 29th 
revision (at p. 529), appear to be mistaken. 
745  5.4.3 below. 
746  See also O'Sullivan/Montgomery, The Erosion of the Right to Confrontation under the Cloak of 
Fairness at the ICTY, note 744 supra, at pp. 528 et subs. 
747  Prosecutor v. Brđanin, ICTY Case No. IT-99-36-T, Public Version of the Confidential Decision on 
the Alleged Illegality of Rule 70 of 6 May 2002, Trial Chamber, 23 May 2002, par. 19. Footnote 
omitted, emphasis in the original. 
748  ICTY Annual Report, A/58/297–S/2003/829, par. 33. 
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Rule 70 and the intrusion of (political) third party interests into the trial proceedings, 
these will be discussed generally below.749 
 
5.2.3.4 Sub-rule (iv)/D 
The wording of Sub-rule (iv)/D resembles almost literally the wording of Rule 66 (C), 
which we have discussed already (see 5.2.1.7.4 supra). The substantial meaning must 
concluded to be identical. However, the existence of Rule 68 (iv) might actually be an 
argument against our point that Rule 66 (C) refers to all disclosure obligations contained 
in the Rules – if this were the case, the introduction of Sub-rule (iv) would have been 
superfluous, given the fact that the amendment of Rule 68750 was put into effect three 
years after the amendment of Rule 66 (C)751. Nevertheless, we do not see how the 
wording of Rule 66 (C) could be interpreted in any other way than we have done above. 
Therefore, Sub-rule (iv)/D must in fact be concluded to be superfluous and certainly not 
clarifying. 
 
5.2.3.5 Sub-rule (v)/E 
Sub-rule (v)/E establishes a continuing obligation of the Prosecutor to disclose 
exculpatory material, even in and after the appeals phase. However, whether the 
conclusions of the Trial Chamber in Blagojević, that “the prosecution must, on a 
continuo[u]s basis, search ‘all material known to the Prosecutor’, in whatever form and 
in relation to the accused, for the existence of material which in any way tends to 
mitigate the guilt of the accused or may affect the credibility of prosecution evidence, 
and disclose the existence of such material completely to the defence”, is highly 
questionable in the light of the amendments to Rule 68. 
 
5.2.3.6 SCSL 
The wording of Rule 68 RPE-SCSL diverts from the wording of the other Tribunals in 
that it speaks of a Defence Case Statement according to Rule 67 RPE-SCSL, which we 
                                                 
749  5.4.3 below. See also once more O'Sullivan/Montgomery, The Erosion of the Right to Confrontation 
under the Cloak of Fairness at the ICTY, ibid. 
750  29th and 30th Revision of the Rules, December 2003, July 2004. 
751  16th Revision of the Rules, July 1999. 
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will take a look at below.752 Sub Rule (A) refers to this defence Case Statement which is 
unknown at the other Tribunals. Sub-Rule (B) says substantially the same as Rule 68 in 
the RPE of the other two Tribunals, setting a disclosure obligation regarding 
exculpatory material in a strict time-frame of 30 days of the initial appearance and also 
stating a continuing disclosure obligation. 
 
5.2.4 Rule 94 bis 
Rule 94 bis, which deals with the testimony of expert witnesses and its disclosure, is 
contained in the Rules of all three Ad Hoc Tribunals. Currently, it provides as follows: 
 
ICTY, 20 October 2011 ICTR, 1 October 2009 SCSL, 28 May 2010 
Testimony of Expert Witnesses 
(A)  
 
 
 
The full statement and/or report  
of any expert witness to be 
called by a party shall be 
disclosed within the time-limit 
prescribed by the Trial Chamber 
or by the pre-trial Judge.  
 
 
 
(B) Within thirty days of 
disclosure of the statement 
and/or report of the expert 
witness, or such other time 
prescribed by the Trial Chamber 
or pre-trial Judge, the opposing 
party shall file a notice 
indicating whether:  
(i) it accepts the expert witness 
statement and/or report; or  
 
(ii) it wishes to cross-examine 
the expert witness; and  
(iii) it challenges the 
qualifications of the witness as 
an expert or the relevance of all 
or parts of the statement and/or 
report and, if so, which parts.  
(C) If the opposing party accepts 
the statement and/or report of the 
expert witness, the statement 
and/or report may be admitted 
into evidence by the Trial 
Testimony of Expert Witnesses 
(A) Notwithstanding the 
provisions of Rule 66 (A) (ii), 
Rule 73 bis (B)(iv)(b) and Rule 
73 ter (B) (iii) (b) of the present 
Rules, the full statement  
of any expert witness called by a 
party shall be disclosed to the 
opposing party as early as 
possible and shall be filed with 
the Trial Chamber not less than 
twenty-one days prior to the date 
on which the expert is expected 
to testify. 
(B) Within fourteen days of 
filing of the statement of the 
expert witness, the opposing 
party shall file a notice to the 
Trial Chamber indicating 
whether: 
 
 
(i) It accepts or does not accept 
the witness’s qualification as an 
expert; 
(ii) It accepts the expert witness 
statement; or 
(iii) It wishes to cross-examine 
the expert witness. 
 
 
 
(C) If the opposing party accepts 
the statement of the expert 
witness, the statement may be 
admitted into evidence by the 
Trial Chamber without calling 
Testimony of Expert Witnesses  
(A) Notwithstanding the 
provisions of Rule 66(A), Rule 
73 bis (B)(iv)(b) and Rule 73 ter 
(B)(iii)(b) of the present Rules, 
the full statement  
of any expert witness called by a 
party shall be disclosed to the 
opposing party as early as 
possible and shall be filed with 
the Trial Chamber not less than 
twenty-one days prior to the date 
on which the expert is expected 
to testify. 
(B) Within fourteen days of 
filing of the statement of the 
expert witness, the opposing 
party shall file a notice to the 
Trial Chamber indicating 
whether: 
 
 
(i) It accepts the expert witness 
statement; or 
 
(ii) It wishes to cross-examine 
the expert witness. 
 
 
 
 
 
(C) If the opposing party accepts 
the statement of the expert 
witness, the statement may be 
admitted into evidence by the 
Trial Chamber without calling 
                                                 
752  Section 5.3.1 below. 
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Chamber without calling the 
witness to testify in person.  
 
the witness to testify in person. the witness to testify in person. 
 
The Rule was first introduced at the ICTR with the amendment of 8 June 1998. The 
ICTY soon followed with the 13th revision on 10 July 1998. The original ICTR rule was 
worded as follows: 
Rule 94 bis: Testimony of Expert Witnesses 
(A) Notwithstanding the provisions of Rule 66(A)(ii), Rule 73 bis (B)(iv)(b) and 
Rule 73 ter (B)(iii)(b) of the present Rules, the full statement of any expert 
witness called by a party shall be disclosed to the opposing party as early as 
possible and shall be filed with the Trial Chamber not less than twenty-one days 
prior to the date on which the expert is expected to testify. 
(B) Within fourteen days of filing of the statement of the expert witness, the 
opposing party shall file a notice to the Trial Chamber indicating whether: 
(i) it accepts the expert witness statement; or 
(ii) it wishes to cross-examine the expert witness. 
(C) If the opposing party accepts the statement of the expert witness, the 
statement may be admitted into evidence by the Trial Chamber without calling 
the witness to testify in person. 
The original ICTY rule only differed from the one of the ICTR in that the notions of 
Rule 66 (A)(ii), the words “of the present Rules” in par. (A), and the words “Trial 
Chamber” in par. (B) were left out, presumably because they were thought to be 
obsolete. 
The introduction of the Rule came with a general restructuring of the pre-trial procedure 
at the Ad Hoc Tribunals, which will be described in a little more detail below.753  
The general purpose of Rule 94 bis, as of other provisions adopted around this time, is 
obviously to streamline the proceedings and enhance judicial economy, in that the 
opposing party gets the chance to “accept” the statement of the expert witness and thus 
waive its right to cross-examination, so that the expert need not be examined at all, and 
his statement can be taken into evidence without much further ado; at the same time, it 
provides that the Chamber gets the evidence as well. Rule 94 bis applies to both parties. 
The wording of the ICTR Rule has remained almost unaltered, the sole exception being 
the inclusion of sub-rule (B)(i), which relates to the qualification of the expert 
                                                 
753  See Excursus, instantly. 
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witness;754 the same holds true for the SCSL, albeit the other way round; i.e. that the 
wording was changed back to the wording of the original ICTR Rule.755 
At the ICTY, Rule 94 bis was amended a few more times. With the 18th revision of the 
Rules, the references to Rules 73 bis (B)(iv)(b) and 73 ter (B)(iii)(b) (pre-trial and pre-
defence conference) were replaced by references to Rule 65 ter (E)(iv)(b) and 
65 ter (G)(i)(b). Indeed, this was necessary, because already with the 17th revision of the 
Rules, Rules 73 bis (B)(iv)(b) and 73 ter (B)(iii)(b) as contained in sub-rule (A) of 
Rule 94 bis RPE-ICTY had been stricken, meaning that the reference still contained in 
Rule 94 bis as of the 17th revision went into the void. At this point, for a better 
understanding, it appears justified to very briefly756 describe a few general changes in 
the Rules put in place in order to enhance judicial economy within the trials; these 
changes related to the pre-trial proceedings. 
 
                                                 
754  As of 27 May 2003. There appears to have been a little confusion in the revision of the ICTR Rules as 
of 1 July 1999, where apparently the (B) of Rule 73 ter (B) as contained in sub-rule (A) was 
misinterpreted as belonging to Rule 94 bis itself:  
 “Rule 94 bis: Testimony of Expert Witnesses 
 (A) Notwithstanding the provisions of Rule 66 (A) (ii), Rule 73 bis (B) (iv) (b) and Rule 73 ter  
 (B) (iii) (b) of the present Rules, the full statement of any expert witness called by a party shall be 
disclosed to the opposing party as early as possible and shall be filed with the Trial Chamber not less 
than twenty-one days prior to the date on which the expert is expected to testify. 
 (C) Within fourteen days of filing of the statement of the expert witness, the opposing party shall file a 
notice to the Trial Chamber indicating whether: 
 (i) It accepts the expert witness statement; or 
 (ii) It wishes to cross-examine the expert witness. 
 (D) If the opposing party accepts the statement of the expert witness, the statement may be admitted 
into evidence by the Trial Chamber without calling the witness to testify in person.”  
 The mistake was corrected with the next revision (21 February 2000). 
755  As of 1 August 2003. 
756  See generally on some of the changes of the Rules in order to expedite the proceedings Boas, Creating 
Laws of Evidence for International Criminal Law - The ICTY and the Principle of Flexibility, Meron, 
Procedural Evolution in the ICTY, Mundis, Improving the Operation and Functioning of the 
International Criminal Tribunals, as well as Harmon, The Pre-Trial Process at the ICTY as a Means of 
Ensuring Expeditious Trials. 
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Excursus: Pre-Trial Regulations (Rules 65 ter, 73 bis, ter RPE) 
The Judges of the Tribunals recognized that disclosure, not only between the parties but 
also the communication of evidence to the court itself, had clear advantages as regards 
trial management and judicial economy. Some important reforms to this end came, like 
Rule 94 bis, in the summer of 1998.757 The most significant reforms were the 
introduction of the Pre-Trial Judge (Rule 65 ter RPE-ICTY) as well as the Pre-Trial and 
Pre-Defence Conferences (Rules 73 bis and ter) RPE-ICTY/R. The Pre-Trial Judge is a 
designated member of the Trial Chamber dealing with the matter (Rule 65 ter (A) RPE-
ICTY). Even though the ICTR and SCSL do not have Pre-Trial Judges stricto sensu, 
Rule 73 bis (A) RPE-ICTR/SCSL does foresee that a single Judge may be designated by 
the Chamber in order to supervise the Pre-Trial Conference, making the ICTR system 
similar to the one of the ICTY. Rules 65 ter and 73 bis and ter RPE-ICTY are closely 
connected, indeed, at the ICTY, some of the provisions originally contained in 
Rule 73 bis RPE-ICTY have ‘wandered’ to Rule 65 ter (which is why the above-
mentioned original reference in Rule 94 bis RPE-ICTY to Rules 73 bis and ter had to be 
changed). The construction between the two is quite complicated and has been 
described elsewhere.758 Suffice it here that the Pre-Trial Judge as a judicial organ 
obviously servers the interest of judicial economy; decisions taken by a bench sitting 
with three judges at the same time is logically more time consuming.759 The Pre-Trial 
Judge is in charge of most of the issues that arise between the parties during the pre-trial 
phase, among them with disclosure according to Rules 66 and 67.760 Other than that, 
Rules 65 ter and 73 bis and ter are quite closely related to disclosure to the Chamber, or, 
for that matter, communication of information to the Chamber before the trial.  
                                                 
757  ICTR: 8 June 1998, ICTY: 10 July 1998 (13th revision). See regarding the efforts to enhance the 
judicial economy of the Tribunals also Report of the Expert Group to Conduct a Review of the 
Effective Operation and Functioning of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, U.N. Doc. A/541634, 22 November 1999, as well as the 
critical remarks of Mundis, Improving the Operation and Functioning of the International Criminal 
Tribunals. 
758  See once again the references cited in note 756, particularly Boas, Creating Laws of Evidence for 
International Criminal Law - The ICTY and the Principle of Flexibility, pp. 61, 86 et subs. 
759  In fact, some of the tasks of the Pre-Trial Judge can, according to Rule 65 ter (D)(i) RPE-ICTY even 
be delegated to a Senior Legal Officer, which is frequently done, but also has its downsides, see 
Harmon, The Pre-Trial Process at the ICTY as a Means of Ensuring Expeditious Trials, p. 387. 
760  Rule 65 ter (C) RPE-ICTY as of rev. 44: “The pre-trial Judge shall be entrusted with all of the pre-
trial functions set forth in Rule 66, 67, Rule 73 bis and Rule 73 ter, and with all or part of the 
functions set forth in Rule 73.” 
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Rule 73 bis RPE-ICTR761 as well as Rule 65 ter (E)762 in conjunction with Rule 73 bis 
RPE-ICTY basically require the Prosecutor to lay out his case in considerable detail, 
                                                 
761  Rule 73 bis RPE-ICTR 
 (A) The Trial Chamber shall hold a Pre-Trial Conference prior to the commencement of the trial. 
 (B) At the Pre-Trial Conference the Trial Chamber or a Judge, designated from among its members, 
may order the Prosecutor, within a time limit set by the Trial Chamber or the said Judge, and before 
the date set for trial, to file the following: 
 (i) A pre-trial brief addressing the factual and legal issues; 
 (ii) Admissions by the parties and a statement of other matters not in dispute; 
 (iii) A statement of contested matters of fact and law; 
 (iv) A list of witnesses the Prosecutor intends to call with: 
 (a) The name or pseudonym of each witness; 
 (b) A summary of the facts on which each witness will testify; 
 (c) The points in the indictment on which each witness will testify; and 
 (d) The estimated length of time required for each witness; 
 (v) A list of exhibits the Prosecutor intends to offer stating, where possible, whether or not the 
Defence has any objection as to authenticity. 
 The Trial Chamber or the Judge may order the Prosecutor to provide the Trial Chamber with copies of 
written statements of each witness whom the Prosecutor intends to call to testify. 
 (C) The Trial Chamber or the designated Judge may order the Prosecutor to shorten the examination-
in-chief of some witnesses. 
 (D) The Trial Chamber or the designated Judge may order the Prosecutor to reduce the number of 
witnesses, if it considers that an excessive number of witnesses are being called to prove the same 
facts. 
 (E) After commencement of Trial, the Prosecutor, if he considers it to be in the interests of justice, 
may move the Trial Chamber for leave to reinstate the list of witnesses or to vary his decision as to 
which witnesses are to be called. 
 (F) At the Pre-Trial Conference, the Trial Chamber or the designated Judge may order the Defence to 
file a statement of admitted facts and law and a pre-trial brief addressing the factual and legal issues, 
not later than seven days prior to the date set for trial.” 
762  “(E) Once any existing preliminary motions filed within the time-limit provided by Rule 72 are 
disposed of, the pre-trial Judge shall order the Prosecutor, upon the report of the Senior Legal Officer, 
and within a time-limit set by the pre-trial Judge and not less than six weeks before the Pre-Trial 
Conference required by Rule 73 bis, to file the following: 
 (i) the final version of the Prosecutor’s pre-trial brief including, for each count, a summary of the 
evidence which the Prosecutor intends to bring regarding the commission of the alleged crime and the 
form of responsibility incurred by the accused; this brief shall include any admissions by the parties 
and a statement of matters which are not in dispute; as well as a statement of contested matters of fact 
and law; 
 (ii) the list of witnesses the Prosecutor intends to call with : 
224 
 
including witness lists, and summaries of the facts on which they will testify. The 
material must also be supplied to the defence. The latter, in turn, according to 
Rule 65 ter (F),763 must answer, laying out the nature of the defence, and regarding 
which matters it takes issue with the Prosecutor and in what way. It is, according to 
Rule 63 ter (L)764 RPE-ICTY, collected by the Pre-Trial Judge in a file, which is then 
transmitted to the Trial Chamber. The same, according to Rule 73 ter RPE-ICTR, and 
Rule 63 ter (G)765 in conjunction with Rule 73 ter RPE-ICTY, happens after the 
                                                                                                                                               
 (a) the name or pseudonym of each witness; 
 (b) a summary of the facts on which each witness will testify; 
 (c) the points in the indictment as to which each witness will testify, including specific references to 
counts and relevant paragraphs in the indictment; 
 (d) the total number of witnesses and the number of witnesses who will testify against each accused 
and on each count; 
 (e) an indication of whether the witness will testify in person or pursuant to Rule 92 bis or Rule 92 
quater by way of written statement or use of a transcript of testimony from other proceedings before 
the Tribunal; and 
 (f) the estimated length of time required for each witness and the total time estimated for presentation 
of the Prosecutor’s case. 
 (iii) the list of exhibits the Prosecutor intends to offer stating where possible whether the defence has 
any objection as to authenticity. The Prosecutor shall serve on the defence copies of the exhibits so 
listed. 
763  (F) After the submission by the Prosecutor of the items mentioned in paragraph (E), the pre-trial Judge 
shall order the defence, within a time-limit set by the pre-trial Judge, and not later than three weeks 
before the Pre-Trial Conference, to file a pre-trial brief addressing the factual and legal issues, and 
including a written statement setting out: 
 (i) in general terms, the nature of the accused’s defence; 
 (ii) the matters with which the accused takes issue in the Prosecutor’s pre-trial brief; and 
 (iii) in the case of each such matter, the reason why the accused takes issue with it. 
764  “(L) (i) After the filings by the Prosecutor pursuant to paragraph (E), the pre-trial Judge shall submit 
to the Trial Chamber a complete file consisting of all the filings of the parties, transcripts of status 
conferences and minutes of meetings held in the performance of his or her functions pursuant to this 
Rule. 
  (ii) The pre-trial Judge shall submit a second file to the Trial Chamber after the defence filings 
pursuant to paragraph (G).” 
765  “(G) After the close of the Prosecutor’s case and before the commencement of the defence case, the 
pre-trial Judge shall order the defence to file the following: 
 (i) a list of witnesses the defence intends to call with: 
 (a) the name or pseudonym of each witness; 
 (b) a summary of the facts on which each witness will testify; 
 (c) the points in the indictment as to which each witness will testify; 
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prosecution case, when the defence, in the so-called defence conference, must provide 
an outline of its case, again including a list of witnesses and summaries of the facts on 
which they will testify. 
We will instantly take a look at the regime of disclosure by the defence ad the Ad Hoc 
Tribunals; however, we can see at this point already, that the judges of the Tribunals 
have adopted a relatively firm position as regards their own role, in the interest of trial 
management and judicial economy. Even though the named pre-trial provisions do not 
concern disclosure in the technical sense, since the evidence itself is not submitted to 
the Chamber, the development nevertheless shows the intertwinement between 
disclosure between the parties and trial management, as well as the growing relevance 
of the chamber in the process.  
 
Rule 94 bis (continued) 
Coming back to the amendments of Rule 94 bis RPE-ICTY, we can state that by the 19th 
revision of the Rules (1/13 December 2000), the mentioning of the Trial Chamber was 
removed; with the 22nd revision (13 December 2001), it came back in, albeit together with 
the notion of the Pre-Trial Judge (see current wording above). Other than that, the time-
limit of sub-rule (A) was replaced by a flexible “time-limit prescribed by the Trial 
Chamber or by the pretrial Judge”; at the same time, the time-limit contained in sub-
rule (B) was doubled to 30 days, albeit also including the possibility of the Chamber or 
Judge imposing a flexible time limit. With the 26th revision (30 December 2002), the 
already mentioned possibility for the opposing party to challenge the qualification of the 
expert was included (albeit in sub-rule (B)(iii), and not, as at the ICTR, as a new sub-
rule (B)(i)). Finally, with the 39th revision (22 September 2006), the provision was 
amended so as to also refer to reports of the expert witnesses. Since then, the wording 
of Rule 94 bis has remained unchanged. 
                                                                                                                                               
  (d) the total number of witnesses and the number of witnesses who will testify for each accused and 
on each count; 
  (e) an indication of whether the witness will testify in person or pursuant to Rule 92 bis or Rule 92 
quater by way of written statement or use of a transcript of testimony from other proceedings before 
the Tribunal; and 
  (f) the estimated length of time required for each witness and the total time estimated for presentation 
of the defence case; and 
 (ii) a list of exhibits the defence intends to offer in its case, stating where possible whether the 
Prosecutor has any objection as to authenticity. The defence shall serve on the Prosecutor copies of 
the exhibits so listed.” 
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The Rule is, once again, a good example of the intertwinement between disclosure 
between the parties and ‘disclosure to’, or information of the Chamber; it serves the 
preparation of both the parties and the Court.  
 
5.3 Disclosure by the Defence 
As noted above, the main burden of disclosure lies on the prosecution. However, there 
are situations in which the defence for its part is obliged to disclose certain material to 
the prosecution. Defence disclosure mainly relates to special defences, such as alibi or 
mental incapacity. It is (though wrongly, as we have seen in the introduction766) partly 
grounded in the principle of the equality of arms; however, its main purpose appears to 
be to secure an expeditious trial, by enabling the prosecution to adequately prepare its 
case, as well as the mentioned truth finding functionality. Indeed, while at the beginning 
of the Ad Hoc Tribunals the disclosure duties of the defence were very limited, they 
have been broadened considerably, especially as far as the ICTY is concerned. 
 
5.3.1 Rule 67 
The most prominent of the Rules regarding disclosure by the defence is Rule 67. It 
currently reads as follows: 
 
ICTY, 20 October 2011 ICTR, 1 October 2009 SCSL, 28 May 2010 
Rule 67 Additional Disclosure  
 
 
 
(A) Within the time-limit 
prescribed by the Trial Chamber, 
at a time not prior to a ruling 
under Rule 98 bis, but not less 
than one week prior to the 
commencement of the defence 
case, the defence shall:  
(i) permit the Prosecutor to 
inspect and copy any books, 
documents, photographs, and 
tangible objects in the defence’s 
custody or control, which are 
intended for use by the defence 
as evidence at trial; and  
(ii) provide to the Prosecutor 
Rule 67: Reciprocal Disclosure 
of Evidence 
Subject to the provisions of 
Rules 53 and 69: 
 
(A) As early as reasonably 
practicable and in any event prior 
to the commencement of the 
trial: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(i) The Prosecutor shall notify 
Rule 67: Reciprocal Disclosure 
of Evidence  
Subject to the provisions of 
Rules 53 and 69: 
 
(A) As early as reasonably 
practicable and in any event prior 
to the commencement of the 
trial: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(i) The Prosecutor shall notify 
                                                 
766  See section 1.3.1.4 above. 
227 
 
copies of statements, if any, of 
all witnesses whom the defence 
intends to call to testify at trial, 
and copies of all written 
statements taken in accordance 
with Rule 92 bis, Rule 92 ter, or 
Rule 92 quater, which the 
defence intends to present at 
trial. Copies of the statements, if 
any, of additional witnesses shall 
be made available to the 
Prosecutor prior to a decision 
being made to call those 
witnesses.  
(B) Within the time-limit 
prescribed by the Trial Chamber 
or by the pre-trial Judge 
appointed pursuant to Rule 65 
ter:  
(i) the defence shall notify the 
Prosecutor of its intent to offer:  
(a) the defence of alibi; in which 
case the notification shall specify 
the place or places at which the 
accused claims to have been 
present at the time of the alleged 
crime and the names and 
addresses of witnesses and any 
other evidence upon which the 
accused intends to rely to 
establish the alibi;  
(b) any special defence, 
including that of diminished or 
lack of mental responsibility; in 
which case the notification shall 
specify the names and addresses 
of witnesses and any other 
evidence upon which the accused 
intends to rely to establish the 
special defence; and  
(ii) the Prosecutor shall notify 
the defence of the names of the 
witnesses that the Prosecutor 
intends to call in rebuttal of any 
defence plea of which the 
Prosecutor has received notice in 
accordance with paragraph (i) 
above.  
(C) Failure of the defence to 
provide notice under this 
Rule shall not limit the right of 
the accused to testify on the 
above defences.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
the defence of the names of the 
witnesses that he intends to call 
to establish the guilt of the 
accused and in rebuttal of any 
defence plea of which the 
Prosecutor has received notice in 
accordance with Sub-Rule (ii) 
below; 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(ii) The defence shall notify the 
Prosecutor of its intent to enter: 
(a) The defence of alibi; in which 
case the notification shall specify 
the place or places at which the 
accused claims to have been 
present at the time of the alleged 
crime and the names and 
addresses of witnesses and any 
other evidence upon which the 
accused intends to rely to 
establish the alibi; 
(b) Any special defence, 
including that of diminished or 
lack of mental responsibility; in 
which case the notification shall 
specify the names and addresses 
of witnesses and any other 
evidence upon which the accused 
intends to rely to establish the 
special defence. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(B) Failure of the defence to 
provide such notice under this 
Rule shall not limit the right of 
the accused to rely on the above 
defences. 
(C) If the defence makes a 
request pursuant to Rule 66 (B), 
the Prosecutor shall in turn be 
entitled to inspect any books, 
documents, photographs and 
tangible objects, which are 
the defence of the names of the 
witnesses that he intends to call 
to establish the guilt of the 
accused and in rebuttal of any 
defence plea of which the 
Prosecutor has received notice in 
accordance with Sub-Rule (ii) 
below, or any defence pleaded in 
the defence Case Statement 
served under Sub-Rule (C); 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(ii) The defence shall notify the 
Prosecutor of its intent to enter: 
(a) The defence of alibi; in which 
case the notification shall specify 
the place or places at which the 
accused claims to have been 
present at the time of the alleged 
crime and the names and 
addresses of witnesses and any 
other evidence upon which the 
accused intends to rely to 
establish the alibi; 
(b) Any special defence, 
including that of diminished or 
lack of mental responsibility; in 
which case the notification shall 
specify the names and addresses 
of witnesses and any other 
evidence upon which the accused 
intends to rely to establish the 
special defence. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(B) Failure of the defence to 
provide such notice under this 
Rule shall not limit the right of 
the accused to rely on the above 
defences. 
(C) To assist the Prosecutor with 
its disclosure obligations 
pursuant to Rule 68, the defence 
may prior to trial provide the 
Prosecutor with a defence Case 
Statement. The defence Case 
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(D) If either party discovers 
additional evidence or material 
which should have been 
disclosed earlier pursuant to the 
Rules, that party shall 
immediately disclose that 
evidence or material to the other 
party and the Trial Chamber.  
 
within the custody or control of 
the defence and which it intends 
to use as evidence at the trial. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(D) If either party discovers 
additional evidence or 
information or materials which 
should have been produced 
earlier pursuant to the Rules, that 
party shall promptly notify the 
other party and the Trial 
Chamber of the existence of the 
additional evidence or 
information or materials. 
 
Statement shall: 
(i) set out in general terms the 
nature of the accused’s defence; 
(ii) indicate the matters on which 
he takes issue with the 
prosecution; and Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence of the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone 
(iii) set out, in the case of each 
such matter, the reason why he 
takes issue with the prosecution. 
(D) If either party discovers 
additional evidence or 
information or materials which 
should have been produced 
earlier pursuant to the Rules, that 
party shall promptly notify the 
other party and the Trial 
Chamber of the existence of the 
additional evidence or 
information or materials. 
 
 
Just as most other provisions on disclosure, Rule 67 has changed considerably during 
the existence of the Tribunals. Originally, its wording in the RPE-ICTY was as follows: 
Reciprocal Disclosure 
(A) As early as reasonably practicable and in any event prior to the 
commencement of the trial: 
(i) the Prosecutor shall notify the defence of the names of the witnesses that he 
intends to call in proof of the guilt of the accused and in rebuttal of any defence 
plea of which the Prosecutor has received 
notice in accordance with Sub-rule (ii) below; 
(ii) the defence shall notify the Prosecutor of its intent to offer: 
(a) the defence of alibi; in which case the notification shall specify the place or 
places at which the accused claims to have been present at the time of the 
alleged crime and the names and addresses of witnesses and any other evidence 
upon which the accused intends to rely to establish the alibi; 
(b) any special defence, including that of diminished or lack of mental 
responsibility; in which case the notification shall specify the names and 
addresses of witnesses and any other evidence upon which the accused intends 
to rely to establish the special defence. 
(B) Failure of the defence to provide notice under this Rule shall not limit the 
right of the accused to testify on the above defences. 
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(C) If the defence makes a request pursuant to Sub-rule 66(B), the Prosecutor 
shall be entitled to inspect any books, documents, photographs and tangible 
objects, which are within the custody or control of the defence and which it 
intends to use as evidence at the trial. 
(D) If either party discovers additional evidence or material which should have 
been produced earlier pursuant to the Rules, that party shall promptly notify the 
other party and the Trial Chamber of the existence of the additional evidence or 
material. 
Part of this provision can be traced back to the suggestion made by the United States 
Government: 
17.4 Disclosure by the defense. Except as otherwise provided in these Rules, the 
defense is required to provide disclosure only in the following situations: 
(A) Notice of defenses. No later than the date set by the Trial Chamber for the 
completion of production of evidence, the defense shall notify the Prosecutor its 
intent to offer: 
(1) the defense of alibi, including the specific place or places at which the 
accused claims to have been present at the time of the alleged offense and the 
names and addresses of witnesses upon which the defense intends to rely to 
establish the alibi; 
(2) the defense of diminished or lack of mental responsibility, including the 
names and addresses of witnesses upon which the defense intends to rely to 
establish the diminished, or lack of, mental responsibility; 
(3) a special defense, including the names and addresses of witnesses and 
documentary evidence upon which the defense intends to rely to establish the 
special defense; however, failure of the defense to provide notice under this 
Rule shall not limit the right of the accused to testify. 
(B) Inadmissibility of withdrawn notice. Evidence of the fact that the defense 
previously provided and then withdrew notice of a defense is not admissible at 
trial. 
(C) Reciprocal production of evidence. If the defense requests disclosure under 
Rule 17.1 (B), the Prosecutor, upon compliance with the defense request, is 
entitled to inspect any books, papers, documents, photographs, tangible objects, 
or copies or portions thereof, which are within the possession, custody, or 
control of the accused and which the defense intends to introduce at trial on the 
issue of guilt.767 
                                                 
767  Morris/Scharf, An insider's guide to the international criminal tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, vol. 
2, p. 534. 
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This proposal, in turn, resembles, in part, the American disclosure regulations. As to the 
reciprocal disclosure obligations, we find similar provisions in 
Rule 16 (b)(1)(A) FRCP768; concerning the disclosure in cases of special defences, in 
Rules 12.1. and 12.2. FRCP. 
One notices that, indeed, the disclosure obligations of the defence were limited. As far 
as disclosure relating to special defences is concerned, the defence is apparently only 
obliged to “notify” the prosecution of its evidence, and not necessarily disclose it stricto 
sensu. It is then up to the prosecution to investigate the defences further. However, the 
“notification” must indeed imply the names and addresses of the witnesses upon which 
the defence intended to rely. It is noticeable that the defence would have to disclose to 
the Prosecutor the names and addresses of these witnesses, whereas the Prosecutor 
would only need to disclose their names. This fact is quite obviously contrary to the 
equality of arms of the parties. In Delalić, the Trial Chamber had previously stated that 
the defence could adequately conduct its own investigations in preparation for trial 
without knowing the addresses of the witnesses.769 The explanation for the fact that the 
defence must disclose the addresses of the witnesses also given by the same Chamber, 
namely that this is due to the very fact that it is only in the case of special defences that 
names and addresses of the witnesses need to be disclosed,770 is not satisfactory.  
Other than that, however, the defence was originally not obliged to disclose any of its 
evidence, if it opted against requesting disclosure according to Rule 66 (B), which was 
frequently done.771 The original wording of the Rule is a little ‘odd’ in that it starts out 
with a notification obligation of the Prosecutor which itself is only triggered if the 
defence raises a special defence according to sub-rule (A) (ii). The wording thus 
resembles a provision relating to prosecution disclosure; however, it is actually the 
defence who triggers the application of the provision. Sub-rule (A) (i) could only be 
applied if sub-rule (A) (ii) had been applied first. The structure of the norm was 
therefore somewhat ‘upside down’. Since this was not contained in the American 
                                                 
768  1994. Despite of this, Findlay, Internationalised Criminal Trial and the Access to Justice, p. 255, calls 
the reciprocal disclosure obligations as concerns tangible objects etc. “unusual”. 
769  Prosecutor v. Delalić et al., ICTY Case No. IT-96-21-T, Decision on the defence Motion to Compel 
the Discovery of the Identity and Location of Witnesses, Trial Chamber, 18 March 1997, par. 20. 
770  See Prosecutor v. Delalić et al., ICTY Case No. IT-96-21-T, Decision On The Motion To Compel 
The Disclosure Of The Addresses Of The Witnesses, Trial Chamber, 13 June 1997, par. 10. See also 
Kamardi, Die Ausformung einer Prozessordnung sui generis durch das ICTY unter Berücksichtigung 
des Fair-Trial-Prinzips, p. 314. 
771  See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Blaskić, footnote 636 above, p. 4. 
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proposal, it appears that it was introduced in order to stress that in any case the 
prosecution carries the main burden of disclosure obligations.  
At the SCSL, even though the provision is named “Reciprocal Disclosure of Evidence”, 
there is in fact no reciprocal disclosure regime comparable to the other Tribunals in 
place. The SCSL does have the usual notification requirements of the defence in the 
case of special defences; there is, however, no disclosure obligation as regards books, 
reports, tangible objects etc. Nevertheless, the SCSL features a “Defence Case 
Statement” by which the defence “may” give the prosecution a ‘general outline’ of its 
case, in order to “assist the Prosecutor with its [sic!] disclosure obligations”. The 
defence is thus not technically obliged provide this statement; however, if it does, it 
triggers an obligation of the prosecution to disclose “the existence of evidence [...] 
which may be relevant to issues raised in the defence Case Statement.” Because the 
statement of the prosecution according to Rule 68 (A) RPE-SCSL need only be 
provided if the defence has made an according defence Case Statement, one can indeed 
speak of a reciprocal system as in the heading of the provision. The concept of a 
defence Case Statement cannot be found in the statutory law of Sierra Leone.772 
However, it is known to English criminal procedure. As a matter of fact, Rule 67 (C) 
RPE-SCSL bears a strong resemblance with Sections 6 and 6 A of the Criminal 
Procedure and Investigations Act 1996, which provide: 
Section 6: Voluntary disclosure by accused 
(1) […] 
(2) The accused— 
(a) may give a defence statement to the prosecutor, and 
(b) if he does so, must also give such a statement to the court. 
 
Section 6 A: Contents of defence statement 
(1) For the purposes of this Part a defence statement is a written statement— 
(a) setting out the nature of the accused’s defence, including any particular 
defences on which he intends to rely, 
(b) indicating the matters of fact on which he takes issue with the prosecution, 
(c) setting out, in the case of each such matter, why he takes issue with the 
prosecution, and 
                                                 
772  The Criminal Procedure Acts, 1965, to be found on the internet at http://www.sierra-
leone.org/Laws/1965-32.pdf. 
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(d) indicating any point of law (Including any point as to the admissibility of 
evidence or an abuse of process) which he wishes to take, and any authority on 
which he intends to rely for that purpose. 
From this wording, one must assume that the English law served as an inspiration for 
the RPE-SCSL. In contrast to the English law, according to which the defence Case 
Statement, if given, must also be made to the court (which, by the way, just one more 
time shows the connection between disclosure and case management/truth finding), the 
defence Case Statement at the SCSL is made only to the prosecution.  
The first minor change of Rule 67 RPE-ICTY consisted in changing the word ‘he’ in 
sub-rule (i) to “the Prosecutor”, obviously for reasons of gender neutrality.773 However, 
this was only done at the ICTY, and to this day, not at the ICTR. The SCSL also 
maintains the male wording. 
The first substantial change to Rule 67 took place not at the ICTY, but the ICTR. The 
new version as of 08 June 1998 had the following wording: 
Rule 67: Reciprocal Disclosure of Evidence 
Subject to the provisions of Rules 53 and 69;  
(A) As early as reasonably practicable and in any event prior to the 
commencement of the trial:  
(i) the Prosecutor shall notify the defence of the names of the witnesses that he 
intends to call to establish the guilt of the accused and in rebuttal of any defence 
plea of which the Prosecutor has received notice in accordance with Sub-
Rule (ii) below; 
(ii) the defence shall notify the Prosecutor of its intent to enter:  
(a) the defence of alibi; in which case the notification shall specify the place or 
places at which the accused claims to have been present at the time of the 
alleged crime and the names and addresses of witnesses and any other evidence 
upon which the accused intends to rely to establish the alibi;  
(b) any special defence, including that of diminished or lack of mental 
responsibility; in which case the notification shall specify the names and 
addresses of witnesses and any other evidence upon which the accused intends 
to rely to establish the special defence.  
(B) Failure of the defence to provide such notice under this Rule shall not limit 
the right of the accused to rely on the above defences. 
                                                 
773  RPE-ICTY Rev. 12, 12 November 1997. 
233 
 
(C) If the defence makes a request pursuant to Rule 66(B), the Prosecutor shall 
in turn be entitled to inspect any books, documents, photographs and tangible 
objects, which are within the custody or control of the defence and which it 
intends to use as evidence at the trial. 
(D) If either party discovers additional evidence or information or materials 
which should have been produced earlier pursuant to the Rules, that party shall 
promptly notify the other party and the Trial Chamber of the existence of the 
additional evidence or information or materials. 
The heading was changed to ‘reciprocal disclosure of evidence’. This amendment 
coincides with the above mentioned change of the heading of Rule 66, where the phrase 
‘disclosure of evidence by the prosecutor’ was changed to ‘disclosure of materials by 
the prosecutor’. It must be concluded that the Judges of the ICTR intended to stress the 
idea that the Prosecutor must disclose all kinds of material, even if in itself it would not 
be admissible in evidence, whereas the disclosure obligations of the defence according 
to Rule 67 refer only to evidence in the formal sense. 
Furthermore, together with Rule 66, the disclosure obligations according to Rule 67 
were expressly subjected to Rules 53 and 69. 
Thirdly, the term “offer” in sub-rule (A) (ii) was replaced by “enter”. 
In sub-rules (B) and (C), the words “such” and “in turn” were introduced, presumably 
meant to be clarifying. Finally, sub-rule (D) was amended, adding the terms “or 
information” as additional to “evidence”, and ‘pluralizing’ the word “material” to 
become “materials”. The Annual Report states that the amendments of the Rules 
generally were intended to speed up the trials as well as harmonizing the RPE-ICTR 
with those of the ICTY. 774 As far as these objectives are concerned, it is difficult to see 
how the mentioned amendments should work towards them. For one, the new wording 
does not appear to simplify the disclosure procedure; and secondly, by the new wording, 
the RPE-ICTR actually digress from the RPE-ICTY.  
The RPE-ICTY, though having introduced the named exceptions (Rules 53 and 69) to 
Rule 66 quite early, did not amend Rule 67 at first. One small change that happened 
until 2003 was the twofold replacement of the word “sub-rule” by “paragraph” in 
Rule 66 (A) (i) and by “Rule” in Rule 67 (C).775 Another amendment ‘tightened’ 
Rule 67 (D) (ongoing duty to disclose) to state the following: 
                                                 
774  A/53/429 – S/1998/857, 23 September 1998, paras. 11, 13-15. 
775  Rev. 19, 1/13 December 2000. 
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(D) If either party discovers additional evidence or material which should have 
been disclosed earlier pursuant to the Rules, that party shall immediately 
disclose that evidence or material to the other party and the Trial Chamber.776 
The first fundamental change of Rule 67 RPE-ICTY came with the 29th Revision on 
12 December 2003: 
Rule 67  
Additional Disclosure  
(A) Within the time-limit prescribed by the Trial Chamber or by the pre-trial 
Judge appointed pursuant to Rule 65 ter:  
(i) the defence shall notify the Prosecutor of its intent to offer:  
(a) the defence of alibi; in which case the notification shall specify the place or 
places at which the accused claims to have been present at the time of the 
alleged crime and the names and addresses of witnesses and any other evidence 
upon which the accused intends to rely to establish the alibi;  
(b) any special defence, including that of diminished or lack of mental 
responsibility; in which case the notification shall specify the names and 
addresses of witnesses and any other evidence upon which the accused intends 
to rely to establish the special defence; and  
(ii) the Prosecutor shall notify the defence of the names of the witnesses that the 
Prosecutor intends to call in rebuttal of any defence plea of which the 
Prosecutor has received notice in accordance with paragraph (i) above.  
(B) Failure of the defence to provide notice under this Rule shall not limit the 
right of the accused to testify on the above defences.  
(C) If either party discovers additional evidence or material which should have 
been disclosed earlier pursuant to the Rules, that party shall immediately 
disclose that evidence or material to the other party and the Trial Chamber.  
By this amendment, the Judges of the ICTY changed both the name and the structure of 
the provision. From “reciprocal disclosure”, Rule 67 was renamed to “additional 
disclosure”. The mentioned ‘odd’ structure of the provision, consisting in the fact that 
sub-paragraph (A) (i), the notification obligation of the prosecution, had to be triggered 
by the notification obligation of the defence (A) (ii), was set straight. The norm now 
starts out with obligations of the defence.  
The change of the name is consistent with the fact that by the new Rule 67 the 
reciprocal disclosure obligations were given up. The former sub-rule (C) was deleted. 
                                                 
776  Rev. 22, 13 December 2001. 
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At the same time, Rule 66 (B) was not amended, so that the defence could now request 
the disclosure of material which was material for the defence without taking the risk of 
having to show its own material.  
As recently as 2008, Rule 67 was substantially amended once more, obtaining the 
above-cited wording. A new sub-rule (A) was inserted, making the old sub-rule (A) the 
new sub-rule (B) and so on. What had disappeared from the defence disclosure 
obligations according to Rule 67 RPE-ICTY in 2003, namely the ‘other’ disclosure 
material, such as books, documents, tangible objects etc., was now re-introduced, and 
now without any reciprocal ‘trigger mechanism’, but not only that: the defence 
disclosure obligations now practically mirror the complete disclosure obligations of the 
prosecution with the exceptions of supporting and exculpatory material, which are 
actually logical, and would otherwise contradict the privilege against self-incrimination 
(Art. 21 (4)(g) ICTYSt). According to the new Rule 67 (A), the defence must now 
permit the prosecution to inspect and copy (the latter right actually going unwarrantedly 
beyond the wording of the corresponding Rule 66 (B)) any books, documents etc. which 
it intends to use at trial,777 as well as the statements of all witnesses which the defence 
intends to call and use at trial.778 This wording is thus not only a step back towards the 
regime of defence disclosure as it used to be, but actually an entirely new Rule, 
imposing disclosure obligations on the defence which were previously unheard of. 
This development of the statutory provisions must be seen in conjunction with the 
relevant jurisprudence of the Tribunals, particularly the ICTY. 
It has been noted that at the very beginning, the Judges at the ICTY had contemplated a 
‘modern’ approach towards disclosure, requiring disclosure from both parties.779 Indeed, 
the first President of the ICTY, Judge Antonio Cassese, stated in 1994: 
We have made considerable efforts to put both the prosecution and the defence 
on the same footing, with full disclosure of documents and witnesses by both 
sides, so as to safeguard the rights of the accused and ensure a fair trial. In this 
                                                 
777  Rule 67 (A)(i) RPE-ICTY. It is questionable what happens if this material also includes incriminating 
evidence. Since the accused has the privilege against self-incrimination, he may obviously not be 
forced to hand this material to the prosecution. The Rules appear to suppose that this will not happen, 
since the accused would never intend to rely on incriminating evidence. 
778  Rule 67 (A)(ii) RPE-ICTY. 
779  Kamardi, Die Ausformung einer Prozessordnung sui generis durch das ICTY unter Berücksichtigung 
des Fair-Trial-Prinzips, p. 315. 
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respect we have made a conscious effort to make good the flaws of Nuremberg 
and Tokyo.780 
However, it is questionable whether this view can be upheld looking at the original 
wording of Rule 67. As we have seen, the disclosure obligations of the defence were 
somewhat ‘hidden’ in Rule 67 (A) (ii); and applied only either in the case of special 
defences or reciprocally.  
In the proceedings against Tadić, as the first case before the ICTY, the Chamber, though 
at first manifestly undecided on the matter, in the end held accordingly. During the 
hearing of 19 September 1996, the Chamber was confronted with an oral motion raised 
by the prosecution seeking the production of prior statements of defence witnesses after 
these witnesses had testified at trial, as well as the permission to question defence 
witnesses about matters discussed with the defence.781 It is important to note that this 
was not a disclosure situation in the technical or formal sense, since it did not involve 
pre-trial disclosure: the Rules did not provide for disclosure of defence witnesses and 
the witness has already testified. However, the request related to a statement which had 
been made before the trial hearing and was thus certainly narrowly intertwined with the 
disclosure regime of the Tribunal. At first, overruling the objection raised by the 
defence, the motion was granted by the Chamber. Following a request by the defence, 
the Chamber later reversed its oral decision and, by majority, rejected the motion.782 
Each of the three Judges handed down a separate opinion. Judges Stephen and Vohra 
held that the RPE-ICTY did not provide for disclosure of witness statements by the 
defence, and that, according to the Rules, defence disclosure had to be considered an 
exception.783 Citing the disclosure regimes of several Anglo-American procedural 
systems as persuasive or even as a ‘general principle of law’ according to Rule 89 (B) 
                                                 
780  Statement by the President Made at a Briefing to Members of Diplomatic Missions IT/29, 11 February 
1994. Summary of the Rules of Procedure of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia, printed in Morris/Scharf, An insider's guide to the international criminal tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia, p. 649, 650. 
781  See the introduction of Prosecutor v. Tadić, Decision On prosecution Motion For Production Of 
defence Witness Statements, ICTY Case No. IT-94-1-T, Trial Chamber, 27 November 1996, par. I. 
The motion and the decision were made in closed session. 
782  Ibid., note 781, II. 
783  See Prosecutor v. Tadić, ICTY Case No. IT-94-1-T, Separate Opinion of Judge Stephen on 
prosecution Motion for Production Of defence Witness Statements, Trial Chamber, 27 November 
1996; Prosecutor v. Tadić, ICTY Case No. IT-94-1-T, Separate Opinion of Judge Vohrah on 
prosecution Motion for Production Of defence Witness Statements, Trial Chamber, 27 November 
1996, passim. 
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RPE-ICTY784, they held that all communication between the defence and its witnesses 
must be regarded as privileged, even after the witness had testified. Presiding Judge 
McDonald, dissenting, stressed that under the Rules reciprocal disclosure was, in 
contrast to the jurisprudence cited by her fellow Judges, generally recognized, and that 
this jurisprudence was therefore not persuasive.785 Stating that the development on the 
national level had moved away from the “adversarial cat-and-mouse-approach”, she 
strongly argued for a ‘modern’ or ‘cards-on-the-table’ approach and held that according 
to Rule 54786 in connection with Rule 98, as well as by its inherent authority, the 
Chamber could order the production of a defence witness statement.787 In this regard, 
and indeed in the context of this thesis, it is remarkable that Judge McDonald explicitly 
refers to the truth-finding aspect of disclosure: 
The modern approach, and one embraced by the Rules of the International 
Tribunal, is to facilitate full disclosure of all relevant facts to enhance the truth-
finding process that is at the core of all criminal justice systems. This approach 
does not contravene the equality of arms principle contained in the ICCPR and 
the ECHR.788 
[...] By this statement, the Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia reveals 
his predisposition toward the production of all relevant evidence that will aid 
the court in arriving at the truth. This concept lies at the heart of my decision.789 
[...] Indeed, the search for truth is so paramount that after the proceedings 
before a Trial Chamber or the Appeals Chamber have been concluded, Rule 119 
authorises the parties to file a motion with that Chamber to review its judgement 
if a new fact has been discovered which was not known to the moving party at 
the time of the proceeding.790 
                                                 
784  Prosecutor v. Tadić, ICTY Case No. IT-94-1-T, Separate Opinion of Judge Stephen on prosecution 
Motion for Production Of defence Witness Statements, note 783, p. 6. 
785  See Prosecutor v. Tadić, ICTY Case No. IT-94-1-T, Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge 
McDonald on prosecution Motion for Production Of defence Witness Statements, Trial Chamber, 27 
November 1996, par. 11. 
786  Rule 54 provides: “General Rule: At the request of either party or proprio motu, a Judge or a Trial 
Chamber may issue such orders, summonses, subpoenas, warrants and transfer orders as may be 
necessary for the purposes of an investigation or for the preparation or conduct of the trial.”. Rule 98 
at the time provided: “Power of Chambers to Order Production of Additional Evidence: A Trial 
Chamber may order either party to produce additional evidence. It may itself summon witnesses and 
order their attendance.” (Rule 98 as of 25 June/5 July 1996). 
787  Ibid., note 785, paras. 6, 9, 34, 39 et subs. 
788  Ibid., par. 6. 
789  Ibid., par. 18. 
790  Ibid., par. 39. 
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Finally, almost three years later, the Appeals Chamber stated its opinion on the matter 
for future reference, holding that once a witness has testified, the Trial Chamber has an 
inherent power to order his prior statements in order to ascertain his credibility.791 The 
Appeals Chamber opined that since the matter had not technically to do with pre-trial 
disclosure, the tenets of equality of arms were not applicable,792 and that it was therefore 
only a matter of ascertaining the credibility of a witness.793 As Judge McDonald in her 
dissenting opinion, the Appeals Chamber invoked the truth-finding aspect of this 
‘disclosure’ (in the material sense): 
Further, it is the view of the Appeals Chamber that this question impinges upon 
the ability of a Trial Chamber to meet its obligations in searching for the truth 
in all proceedings under the jurisdiction of the International Tribunal, with due 
regard to fairness.794 
[...] If [the witness] has made a prior statement, a Trial Chamber must be able 
to evaluate the testimony in the light of this statement, in its quest for the truth 
and for the purpose of ensuring a fair trial.795 
This finding is in harmony with the general development within the jurisprudence of the 
ICTY. In the proceedings against Dokmanović, a Trial Chamber as early as in 
November 1997, thus between the Trial Chamber decision and the Appeals Chamber 
decision in Tadić, ordered: 
the defence shall, through the Registry, deliver to the Trial Chamber Witness 
Statements taken from witnesses whom the defence intends to call for trial and 
other material that they intend to rely on at trial796 
This is, mildly speaking, unheard of. In contrast to the above mentioned situation in 
Tadić, this is not about the credibility of a witness who has already testified, but about 
disclosing the complete defence evidence to the Trial Chamber (and not the 
prosecution!). Indeed, the prosecution does not even appear to have made a motion to 
this end. It may be noted that two of the Judges sitting in this Trial Chamber, Judges 
Cassese and Mumba, were later also members of the Appeals Chamber in Tadić. The 
Judges did not bother to explain their ruling very profoundly: 
                                                 
791  Prosecutor v. Tadić, ICTY Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Judgment, Appeals Chamber, 15 July 1999, 
par. 326. 
792  Ibid., par. 320. 
793  Ibid., par. 322. 
794  Ibid., par. 316. 
795  Ibid., par. 322. 
796  Prosecutor v. Dokmanović, ICTY Case No. IT-95-13a-PT, Order, Trial Chamber, 28 November 1997, 
No. 5. 
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PURSUANT to the provisions of Article 21(4)(c) of the Statute, which 
guarantees the accused's right "to be tried without undue delay"; Article 20(1) 
of the Statute which enshrines the right to "a fair and expeditious" trial; and the 
principle of equality of arms between the Prosecutor and defence797 
The cited Articles of the Statute in and of themselves certainly do not confer any 
specific procedural rights upon the Trial Chamber. As to the approach to derive 
disclosure obligations of the accused from his basic procedural rights, we have rejected 
it in the introduction, however, we will come to another example shortly. 
The Chamber continues: 
NOTING the importance of clarifying the issues that will be argued before the 
Trial Chamber in the course of the trial of Slavko Dokmanovic; 
CONSIDERING that the Trial Chamber will benefit from having access to 
Witness Statements and other documentary materials which will be relied on by 
the parties at trial and the production of Pre-Trial Briefs setting out the 
positions of the Parties; 
NOTING that perusal of such documents by the Trial Chamber is primarily for 
the purpose of promoting better comprehension of the issues and more effective 
management of the trial;  
The Chamber thus states that the order is made in order to improve the trial 
management, one of the main purposes of disclosure. Other than that, the Chamber 
generally sees a “benefit” in having access to the material. 
With the next paragraph, it singlehandedly wipes away any doubts as to a possible bias 
of the Judges and the fact that one might see a collision with the prohibition798 of an 
ICTY Judge confirming the indictment later sitting in the Trial or Appeals Chamber: 
NOTING FURTHER that the rationale behind Rule 15(C) of the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence does not necessarily prevent the Trial Chamber from 
examining material supporting the Indictment. As was stated by the European 
Court of Human Rights in Hauschildt [...]799 
Then, as if to corroborate the determination of the Chamber not to be biased, the 
Chamber concludes: 
                                                 
797  Ibid., p. 2. 
798  Rule 15 (C) as of 12 November 1997 provided: „The Judge of the Trial Chamber who reviews an 
indictment against an accused, pursuant to Article 19 of the Statute and Rules 47 or 61, shall not sit as 
a member of the Trial Chamber for the trial of that accused.“ This Rule has since been amended and 
now states the opposite. 
799  Ibid. 
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CONSIDERING that this material will not be regarded as evidence by the Trial 
Chamber unless and until submitted in the course of trial […]800 
In and of itself, this decision appears not to have had very much of an impact, since the 
Parties seem to have been content with it,801 and the accused passed away relatively 
soon afterwards, so the trial ended without a judgment. However, apparently this was 
the first time that the Tribunal ordered the submission of pre-trial briefs, a feature which 
is now contained in today’s Rule 65 ter;802 in this regard, the decision should not be 
underestimated. It has been said Rule 73 ter entails a ‘codification’ of the above-
mentioned approach in Dokmanović;803 which is, in the light of the described 
development, true to some extent; however, Rule 73 ter indeed only obliges the defence 
to provide a witness list and a summary of their expected statements, and not, as in the 
Dokmanović decision, the previous statements themselves. 
As a matter of fact, in the proceedings against Delalić, we find reference to this decision 
and also to the procedure according to Rule 54 which had been proposed by Judge 
McDonald in her dissenting opinion in Tadić.804 Faced with yet another motion of the 
prosecution for the disclosure of a witness list, the Chamber, in a decision granting the 
motion, stressed the assumed difference between the disclosure of evidence during the 
pre-trial phase and the trial phase. Confronted with the argument of the defence that to 
order the defence to disclose its witness list in application of the general provision of 
Rule 54 would mean a circumvention of the special rule contained in Rule 67, the 
Chamber held: 
[T]he special provision of Subrules 67(A)(i) and (ii) which deal with pre-trial 
reciprocal disclosure are completely different from the exercise of a general 
power by the Trial Chamber to require the Defence to furnish the Prosecution 
with a list of witnesses at trial. There is no way Rule 54 can be exercised to 
affect the special provisions of Rule 67. The fact that Rule 54 is found in Part 
Five of the Rules, entitled “Pre - Trial Proceedings”, can not alter the plain 
literal meaning of its terms. Such headings are only intended to be used as 
guidance to the content of the Rules. Accordingly, there is no doubt that the 
Rules are silent on the issue of reciprocal disclosure after the commencement of 
                                                 
800  Ibid. 
801  Ibid.: „HAVING HEARD the willingness of the Prosecutor and defence Counsel to assist in the 
expeditious conduct and management of the trial and having consulted them as to the proposed 
measures to achieve this purpose.“ 
802  See as to Rule 65 ter Excursus, p. 223 supra. 
803  May/Wierda, International Criminal Evidence, p. 83. 
804  See note 785 supra. 
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the trial and there is a lacuna in the procedure which can be filled by exercise of 
powers under Rule 54.805 […] 
This reminds us of what we have called disclosure in the formal sense as opposed to 
disclosure in the material sense.806 However, the Chamber says more than that: it treats 
disclosure happening after the commencement of the trial as if it were something 
completely different. This line of argument (if in fact it is one) is not convincing. It is 
probably, as it is done in this thesis, helpful to differentiate between disclosure in the 
formal sense and disclosure in the material sense, in order to avoid misconceptions, 
especially as regards comparative legal considerations. However, to say that, at the 
bottom line, disclosure which takes place after the commencement of the trial ‘is not 
disclosure at all,’ seems to go too far. After all, it involves exactly the same activities, 
just at a different time. Functionally, disclosure before and during the trial must thus be 
treated equally. One may especially question this reasoning in the light of the 
jurisprudence of the very same Trial Chamber which had held that the Prosecutor’s 
disclosure duties are continuing, on-going during the trial and even the appeal stage.807 
At that point, the Chamber certainly did not base this obligation of the prosecution on 
its own power to order it according to Rule 54, but on the general disclosure rules. 
However, the Chamber did not stop there: 
The Trial Chamber is of the opinion that this is not a matter of reciprocity but a 
matter of the concept of fair trial. The rationale of Article 21 paragraph 1, of the 
Statute is to ensure a fair trial in accordance with the Rules. One of the 
minimum guarantees for the accused in Article 21 paragraph 4(e), of the Statute, 
is equality of arms, which is the most important criteria of a fair trial. This 
principle requires the maintenance of a fair balance between the parties and 
applies to both civil and criminal cases.808 
Article 21 (4)(e), as a matter of fact and of course, does not contain the notion of 
equality of arms, but enshrines the right of the accused to examine witnesses.809 We 
sense that from here, it can still get worse, and it does:  
                                                 
805  Prosecutor v. Delalić et al., ICTY Case No. IT-96-21-T, Decision On The prosecution’s Motion For 
An Order Requiring Advance Disclosure Of Witnesses By The defence, Trial Chamber, 4 February 
1998, par. 43. 
806  See section 1.1.1 supra. 
807  Prosecutor v. Delalić et al., 26 September 1996 (note 633 supra), ibid. 
808  Ibid., par. 45. 
809  “In the determination of any charge against the accused pursuant to the present Statute, the accused 
shall be entitled to the following minimum guarantees, in full equality: 
 […] 
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There is no doubt that procedural equality means what it says, equality between 
the prosecution and the defence. To suggest […] an inclination in favour of the 
defence is tantamount to a procedural inequality in favour of the defence and 
against the prosecution, and will result in inequality of arms. This will be 
inconsistent with the minimum guarantee provided for in Article 21 paragraph 
4(e), of the Statute. In the circumstances of the International Tribunal, the 
Prosecutor and the defence rely on State co-operation for their investigation, so, 
prima facie, the basis for the inequality argument does not arise.810  
This reasoning is, to put it mildly, breathtaking, and, from a systematic, functional and 
normative viewpoint, can be called a catastrophe. Finally, adding the sentence that, 
since both defence and prosecution in international criminal proceedings are dependent 
on state cooperation, inequality cannot arise, is downright cynical. 
As Judge Vohrah had rightly pointed out: 
It seems to me [...] that the application of the equality of arms principle 
especially in criminal proceedings should be inclined in favour of the defence 
acquiring parity with the prosecution in the presentation of the defence case 
before the Court to preclude any injustice against the accused.811 
As these examples drastically show, to derive ‘fair trial rights’ for the prosecution from 
the fair trial rights of the accused as provided by human rights treaties, is plainly 
untenable.812 Nevertheless, the ICTY Chambers have held accordingly in a number of 
instances.813 
A bench of the Appeals Chamber, (somewhat ironically presided by Judge Vohrah) 
dismissed the appeal of the defence against the said decision on formal grounds; obiter, 
it approved of the reasoning of the Trial Chamber as regards the application of 
Rule 54.814 The bench remained silent, however, as to the fairness issue. 
                                                                                                                                               
 (e) to examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and 
examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; […]”. 
810  Prosecutor v. Delalić et al., ibid., par. 49. 
811  Prosecutor v. Tadić, Separate Opinion of Judge Vohrah on prosecution Motion for Production Of 
defence Witness Statements, note 783 above. 
812  See already section 1.3.1.4. above. 
813  See references in Tochilovsky, Jurisprudence of the international criminal courts and the European 
Court of Human Rights, p. 278. 
814  Prosecutor v. Delalić et al., ICTY Case No. IT-96-21-AR 73.3, Decision On Application Of 
Defendant Zejnil Delalić For Leave To Appeal Against The Oral Decision Of The Trial Chamber Of 
12 January 1998 Requiring Advance Disclosure Of Witnesses By The defence, Bench of the Appeals 
Chamber, 3 March 1998, paras. 14 et subs. 
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It elucidates from this analysis that the disclosure obligations of the defence have been 
expanded considerably at the Ad Hoc Tribunals, especially at the ICTY. The Chambers, 
even without having the statutory means to do so, have forced the defence time and 
again to disclose part of their evidence to the prosecution, and, notably, to the Chamber 
also. This has been based upon truth-finding and fair trial considerations. Particularly 
the latter reasoning, as we have seen, is untenable. In this sense, the expansion of the 
Rules must be welcomed as serving as a clarification. However, the right of the accused 
to silence as well as his privilege against self-incrimination must not be violated. It must 
therefore be clear that only if the accused decides to defend himself actively, he can be 
obliged to disclose part of his evidence beforehand so as to enable a reasonable 
preparation of the trial. 
 
5.3.2 Rule 94 bis 
Rule 94 bis has been dealt with above; it applies to both parties.815 
 
5.4 Exceptions and limitations to Disclosure 
5.4.1 Rule 66 (C) 
While the disclosure restriction contained in Rule 66 (C) now covers all disclosure 
obligations of the Prosecutor, it originally only applied to disclosure according to 
Rule 66 (B). For this reason, it has been dealt with above.816 
 
5.4.2 Rule 69 
As Rule 69 is specifically mentioned as an exception in Rule 66(A), it has also been 
dealt with above.817 
 
                                                 
815  See 5.2.4 supra. 
816  See 5.2.1.7.4 supra. 
817  See 5.2.1.7.1 supra. 
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5.4.3 Rule 70 
Rule 70 deals with “matters not subject to disclosure”. It currently provides as follows: 
 
ICTY, 20 October 2011 ICTR, 1 October 2009 SCSL, 28 May 2010 
Matters not Subject to 
Disclosure  
(A)  
Notwithstanding the provisions 
of Rules 66 and 67, reports, 
memoranda, or other internal 
documents prepared by a party, 
its assistants or representatives 
in connection with the 
investigation or preparation of 
the case, are not subject to 
disclosure or notification under 
those Rules.  
 
(B)  
If the Prosecutor is in possession 
of information which has been 
provided to the Prosecutor on a 
confidential basis and which has 
been used solely for the purpose 
of generating new evidence, that 
initial information and its origin 
shall not be disclosed by the 
Prosecutor without the consent 
of the person or entity providing 
the initial information and shall 
in any event not be given in 
evidence without prior 
disclosure to the accused. 
(C)  
If, after obtaining the consent of 
the person or entity providing 
information under this Rule, the 
Prosecutor elects to present as 
evidence any testimony, 
document or other material so 
provided, the Trial Chamber, 
notwithstanding Rule 98, may 
not order either party to produce 
additional evidence received 
from the person or entity 
providing the initial information, 
nor may the Trial Chamber for 
the purpose of obtaining such 
additional evidence itself 
summon that person or a 
representative of that entity as a 
witness or order their attendance. 
A Trial Chamber may not use its 
power to order the attendance of 
witnesses or to require 
production of documents in 
Matters Not Subject to 
Disclosure 
(A) 
Notwithstanding the provisions 
of Rules 66 and 67, reports, 
memoranda, or other internal 
documents prepared by a party, 
its assistants or representatives 
in connection with the 
investigation or preparation of 
the case, are not subject to 
disclosure or notification under 
the aforementioned provisions. 
 
(B) 
If the Prosecutor is in possession 
of information which has been 
provided to him on a 
confidential basis and which has 
been used solely for the purpose 
of generating new evidence, that 
initial information and its origin 
shall not be disclosed by the 
Prosecutor without the consent 
of the person or entity providing 
the initial information and shall 
in any event not be given in 
evidence without prior 
disclosure to the accused. 
(C)  
If, after obtaining the consent of 
the person or entity providing 
information under this Rule, the 
Prosecutor elects to present as 
evidence any testimony, 
document or other material so 
provided, the Trial Chamber, 
notwithstanding Rule 98, may 
not order either party to produce 
additional evidence received 
from the person or entity 
providing the initial information, 
nor may the Trial Chamber for 
the purpose of obtaining such 
additional evidence itself 
summon that person or a 
representative of that entity as a 
witness or order their attendance. 
 
 
 
 
Matters not Subject to 
Disclosure  
(A) 
Notwithstanding the provisions 
of Rules 66 and 67, reports, 
memoranda, or other internal 
documents prepared by a party, 
its assistants or representatives 
in connection with the 
investigation or preparation of 
the case, are not subject to 
disclosure or notification under 
the aforementioned provisions. 
 
(B) 
If the Prosecutor is in possession 
of information which has been 
provided to him on a 
confidential basis and which has 
been used solely for the purpose 
of generating new evidence, that 
initial information and its origin 
shall not be disclosed by the 
Prosecutor without the consent 
of the person or entity providing 
the initial information and shall 
in any event not be given in 
evidence without prior 
disclosure to the accused. 
(C)  
If, after obtaining the consent of 
the person or entity providing 
information under this Rule, the 
Prosecutor elects to present as 
evidence any testimony, 
document or other material so 
provided, the Trial Chamber 
may not order either party to 
produce additional evidence 
received from the person or 
entity providing the initial 
information, nor may the Trial 
Chamber for the purpose of 
obtaining such additional 
evidence itself summon that 
person or a representative of that 
entity as a witness or order their 
attendance. The consent shall be 
in writing. 
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order to compel the production 
of such additional evidence.  
(D)  
If the Prosecutor calls a witness 
to introduce in evidence any 
information provided under this 
Rule, the Trial Chamber may not 
compel that witness to answer 
any question relating to the 
information or its origin, if the 
witness declines to answer on 
grounds of confidentiality. 
(E)  
The right of the accused to 
challenge the evidence presented 
by the prosecution shall remain 
unaffected subject only to the 
limitations contained in 
paragraphs (C) and (D). 
(F)  
The Trial Chamber may order 
upon an application by the 
accused or defence counsel that, 
in the interests of justice, the 
provisions of this Rule shall 
apply mutatis mutandis to 
specific information in the 
possession of the accused.  
(G)  
Nothing in paragraph (C) or (D) 
above shall affect a Trial 
Chamber’s power under Rule 89 
(D) to exclude evidence if its 
probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the need to 
ensure a fair trial.  
 
 
(D) 
If the Prosecutor calls as a 
witness the person providing or a 
representative of the entity 
providing information under this 
Rule, the Trial Chamber may not 
compel the witness to answer 
any question the witness 
declines to answer on grounds of 
confidentiality. 
(E)  
The right of the accused to 
challenge the evidence presented 
by the prosecution shall remain 
unaffected subject only to 
limitations contained in Sub-
Rules (C) and (D). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(F)  
Nothing in Sub-Rule (C) or (D) 
above shall affect a Trial 
Chamber’s power under Rule 89 
(C) to exclude evidence if its 
probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the need to 
ensure a fair trial. 
 
 
(D)  
If the Prosecutor calls as a 
witness the person providing or a 
representative of the entity 
providing information under this 
Rule, the Trial Chamber may not 
compel the witness to answer 
any question the witness 
declines to answer on grounds of 
confidentiality. 
(E)  
The right of the accused to 
challenge the evidence presented 
by the prosecution shall remain 
unaffected subject only to 
limitations contained in Sub-
Rules (C) and (D). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(F)  
Nothing in Sub-Rule (C) or (D) 
above shall affect a Trial 
Chamber's power to exclude 
evidence under Rule 95. 
 
Rule 70 lays down exceptions to disclosure. Its aim has been described by the ICTY as 
to  
permit the use, as and when appropriate, of certain information which, in the 
absence of explicit provisions, would either not have been provided to the 
Prosecutor or have been unusable on account of its confidential nature or its 
origin818 
and to 
encourage States, organisations, and individuals to share sensitive information 
with the Tribunal. The Rule creates an incentive for such cooperation by 
permitting the sharing of information on a confidential basis and by 
                                                 
818  Prosecutor v. Blaškić, ICTY Case No. IT-95-14-T, Decision of Trial Chamber I on the Prosecutor’s 
Motion for Video Deposition and Protective Measures, Trial Chamber I, 11 November 1997, par. 10. 
See on the question of obtaining evidence in international trials specifically using the example of the 
Blaškić Case Katz Cogan, The Problem of Obtaining Evidence for International Courts and Tribunals. 
246 
 
guaranteeing information providers that the confidentiality of the information 
they offer and of the information's sources will be protected.819 
Or, as drastically put by the Trial Chamber in the proceedings against Brđanin: 
It is indeed almost impossible to envisage this Tribunal, of which the 
prosecution is an integral organ, being able to fulfil its functions without having 
provisions like Rule 66(C) and 70 in place.820 
This latter statement is remarkable in the light of the history of the ICTY.  
Rule 70 is one of those Rules which radically changed their content in the course of the 
ICTY. Its original wording was the following: 
Rule 70 
Matters not Subject to Disclosure 
Notwithstanding the provisions of Rules 66 and 67, reports, memoranda, or 
other internal documents prepared by a party, its assistants or representatives in 
connection with the investigation or preparation of the case, are not subject to 
disclosure or notification under those Rules. 
This wording, for its part, goes back to Rule 17.6 of the American proposal for the RPE-
ICTY, copying it practically verbatim.821 The latter is, in turn, partially based on Rule 16 
(a) (2) of the US FRCP.822  
As one can see, there was, at the beginning no mention whatsoever concerning state 
security or confidential information. 
Rule 70 RPE-ICTY was, however, amended to this end already at a very early stage, in 
autumn 1994.823 Sub-Rule (B) was added, which provided: 
(B) If the Prosecutor is in possession of information which has been provided to 
him on a confidential basis and which has been used solely for the purpose of 
                                                 
819  Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milošević, ICTY Case No. IT-02-54-AR108bis & AR73.3, Public Version of 
the Confidential Decision on the Interpretation and Application of Rule 70, Appeals Chamber, 23 
October 2002, par. 19. 
820  Prosecutor v. Brđanin, Public Version of the Confidential Decision on the Alleged Illegality of Rule 
70 of 6 May 2002, note 747 above, par. 18. 
821  See Morris/Scharf, An insider's guide to the international criminal tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, 
note 615 supra, p. 535.  
822  “Except as provided in paragraphs (A), (B), (D) and (E) of subdivision (a)(1), this rule does not 
authorize the discovery or inspection of reports, memoranda, or other internal government documents 
made by the attorney for the government or other government agents in connection with the 
investigation or prosecution of the case. […]” (16 (a) (2) US FRCP as of 1994. 
823 2nd Revision of the Rules, 4 October 1994. 
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generating new evidence, that initial information and its origin shall not be 
disclosed by the Prosecutor without the consent of the person or entity providing 
the initial information. 
In fact, Rule 70 was the very first of the disclosure provisions to be amended. The 
judges of the ICTY obviously saw a specific need to protect, or enable the Prosecutor to 
protect, confidential information which itself would not be introduced as evidence in the 
trial but which under the Rules of the Tribunal would have to be disclosed. It was 
already in the next revision of the Rules a few months later that this fact was made clear 
by the addition of the second sentence of the provision: “and shall in any event not be 
given in evidence without prior disclosure to the accused”.824 Since then, apart from the 
already mentioned gender amendment (replacing “him” by “the Prosecutor”)825, Rule 70 
(B) has not been amended anymore.  
The amendment to Rule 70 as concerns confidential information, from an ex-post 
perspective, appears understandable, since at the ICC, as we shall see in the following 
Chapter, a similar rule (Art. 54 (3)(e) ICCSt) existed from the very beginning, and has 
in fact played a major, if not decisive, practical role.826 The 1995 Annual Report of the 
ICTY does mention the amendment of Rule 70 specifically, albeit without much further 
explanation: Rule 70 (B) was introduced in order to “improve the working of the 
Tribunal”.827 However, one sees from the general content of the Report that the need to 
protect the confidentiality of information gathering appears to have played a major role 
at the time, which obviously had not been recognized to this extent at the beginning of 
the Tribunal. In a number of places, the Report addresses confidentiality concerns 
regarding the protection of victims and witnesses as well as the interests of NGOs 
providing information for the investigation of crimes.828 However, as other authors note, 
the amendments to Rule 70 may also have had to do with the reluctance of state 
governments to share their (intelligence) information;829 this is in line with the above 
cited jurisprudence of the ICTY. This fact, however, raises the question of the 
relationship between Rule 70 (B) and Rule 66 (C). To be sure, both provisions were 
introduced with the 3rd revision of the Rules in January 1995. As we have seen above830, 
                                                 
824  3rd Revision of the Rules, 30 January 1995. 
825  See already p. 233 above. 
826  See section 6.6.4 below. 
827  Annual Report of the ICTY, A/50/365 S/1995/728, 23 August 1995, par. 24. 
828  Ibid., paras. 108 et subs. and 154 et subs. 
829  Jones, The practice of the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, p. 
248. 
830  5.2.1.7.4 supra. 
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however, Rule 66 (C) originally only applied to material in the meaning of Rule 66 (B), 
which historically explains its systematically wrong position in the Rules. The general 
content, however, of Rule 70 (B) is highly criticisable in the sense that the Prosecutor 
and (possibly even more so) the Chamber are thereby dependent on the goodwill of 
third parties. Whereas Rule 66 (C) does allow a certain control of the Prosecutor by the 
Trial Chamber and in fact even supplies a specific procedure for it, Rule 70 constitutes a 
point for intrusion of third parties with the Chamber hardly being able to intervene, a 
fact that is further corroborated by sub-rules (C) and (D). These, again, were introduced 
at a very early stage, with the 6th revision of the ICTY Rules , in October 1995. 
Sub-rule (C) at first provided: 
(C) If, after obtaining the consent of the person or entity providing information 
under this Rule, the Prosecutor elects to present as evidence any testimony, 
document or other material so provided, the Trial Chamber, notwithstanding 
Rule 98, may not order either party to produce additional evidence received 
from the person or entity providing the initial information, nor may the Trial 
Chamber for the purpose of obtaining such additional evidence itself summon 
that person or a representative of that entity as a witness or order their 
attendance. 
It thus expressly limits the powers of the Trial Chamber as regards its authority to 
demand the production of additional evidence according to Rule 98, both concerning 
additional evidence obtained by the Prosecutor from that source or from the source (a 
witness etc.) itself. This was further corroborated by the later introduction of a further 
sentence, stating: 
A Trial Chamber may not use its power to order the attendance of witnesses or 
to require production of documents in order to compel the production of such 
additional evidence.831 
This sentence prevents any circumvention of the Rule by forbidding the Judges to get 
the wanted information from other sources. Apart from the fact that this restriction has a 
serious impact on the possibilities of the defendant to prepare his case concerning the 
finding of evidence, especially as regards exculpatory evidence,832 one can say that the 
Judges divested themselves to a considerable part of a means of truth-finding. This is 
particularly undesirable in the sense that, in the end, a third party can decide which 
part(s) of evidence will be available to the accused and the Chamber, thereby causing 
the effect that the participants will not get to see ‘the whole picture’, but only parts of it, 
which is often worse than not getting any evidence at all. As to the motivation of the 
                                                 
831  Added in the 11th revision, 25 July 1997. 
832  See as to the relationship between Rule 68 and Rule 70 5.2.3.3 above. 
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Judges, the Annual Report explicitly mentions the amendment of Rule 70, yet confines 
itself to summarizing the content of the amendment.833 The ICTR and SCSL have not 
introduced this sentence. 
Sub-rule (D) was originally framed as follows: 
(D) If the Prosecutor calls as a witness the person providing, or a representative 
of the entity providing, information under this Rule, the Trial Chamber may not 
compel the witness to answer any question the witness declines to answer on 
grounds of confidentiality. 
This is just a further ‘elaboration’ of the restrictions introduced by the 6th revision of the 
Rules, and completes the picture that the Tribunal exposes itself to the mercy of the 
provider of the respective evidence. The respective witness can basically refuse to 
answer any question. As sub-rule (C), sub-rule (D) was revised again by the 11th 
revision of the Rules834, now stating: 
(D) If the Prosecutor calls a witness to introduce in evidence any information 
provided under this Rule, the Trial Chamber may not compel that witness to 
answer any question relating to the information or its origin, if the witness 
declines to answer on grounds of confidentiality. 
This amendment goes hand in hand with the above-mentioned amendment of sub-rule 
(C), in that it prevents the circumvention of the Rule by compelling a witness which is 
not or does not pertain to the provider of the information concerned, to answer questions 
that relate to the origin of the information (in substance, one could also generally say: 
questions the witness does not wish to answer).835 
Together with sub-rules (C) and (D) came sub-rules (E) and (F), which were originally 
drafted in the following way: 
(E) The right of the accused to challenge the evidence presented by the 
prosecution shall remain unaffected subject only to limitations contained in Sub-
rules (C) and (D). 
                                                 
833  ICTY Annual Report 1996, A/51/292 S/1996/665, 16 August 1996, par. 66. 
834  25th July 1997. 
835  In the proceedings against Milutinović et al., the Chamber rightly “recognize[d] the prerogative of the 
Rule 70 provider to invoke Rule 70 at its discretion”, Prosecutor v. Milutinović et al., ICTY Case No. 
IT-05-87-T, Second Decision on prosecution Motion for Leave to Amend its Rule 65 ter Witness List 
to Add Wesley Clark, Trial Chamber, 16 February 2007, par. 26. 
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(F) Nothing in Sub-rule (C) or (D) above shall effect [sic!]836 a Trial Chamber's 
power under Rule 89(D) to exclude evidence if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the need to ensure a fair trial. 
The wording of these provisions has since then remained unchanged, except for the 19th 
revision of the Rules (December 2000), by which the term “sub-rules” was replaced by 
“paragraphs”. This change applied to the entire Rules of the ICTY; the term “sub-rule” 
was stricken from the RPE-ICTY entirely.837 At the other Ad Hoc Tribunals, this was 
not done. The deeper meaning of this amendment will hopefully be revealed when the 
motives of the Judges will be published. With the 11th revision of the ICTY Rules in 
July 1997, additionally, a new sub-rule (E) was included into Rule 70, stating: 
The Trial Chamber may order upon an application by the accused or defence 
counsel that, in the interests of justice, the provisions of this Rule shall apply 
mutatis mutandis to specific information in the possession of the accused. 
This sub-rule shall presumably work towards the equality of arms between the two 
parties. At the ICTR and SCSL, it was not included. By the inclusion at the ICTY, 
former sub-rule (E) has now become sub-rule (F).  
The two sub-rules (or paragraphs) are meant to counterbalance the manifest intrusion of 
third party interests contained in sub-rules (C) and (D) into the trial proceedings. Sub-
rule (E), however, providing that the right of the accused to challenge the evidence is 
“only” subject to sub-rules (C) and (D), states the obvious and arguably has an almost 
cynical sound to it. Sub-rule (G) (ICTR/SCSL: sub-rule (F)), in turn, gives the Chamber 
a certain power to exclude this incomplete and ‘tailor-made’ evidence, if it considers the 
trial to become unfair if this evidence is admitted. The issue became virulent especially 
in two more recent cases of the ICTY, namely Milutinović and Milošević, to which we 
will come instantly. 
In the light of the criticism just expressed, it is somewhat surprising that in the early 
jurisprudence of the Tribunals one quite scarcely finds decisions in which sub-rules 70 
(B) et subs. would have been an issue of dispute. It could well be that since it was 
accepted that the Trial Chamber had no power to enforce disclosure of material covered 
by Rule 70 (B) anyway, any efforts to challenge such exceptions would have seemed 
pointless. The first decisions in which Rule 70 (B) played a role appear to have been 
made in the proceedings against Blaskić. Here, the Trial Chamber laid down the 
requirements for the application of Rule 70, i.e. that the concerned information must be 
                                                 
836  The spelling mistake was corrected with the 9th revision of the Rules, in July 1996. 
837  With one exception: Rule 77 bis (E). It must be assumed that this was simply forgotten. However, it 
remains there up to the moment of this writing. 
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in the possession of the Prosecutor, that it indeed was supplied on a confidential basis 
and that it was used solely for the purpose of generating new evidence.838 Rule 70 (B) 
was also applied by the ICTR, however, also merely stating that Rule 70 (B) needs to be 
observed, meaning that if the Prosecutor can prove that material which regularly needs 
to be disclosed under the Rules was obtained on a confidential basis it is exempt from 
disclosure.839 In any case, until the above-mentioned decision in Brđanin840, there 
seemed to be no general dispute as to the scope of sub-rules (B)-(E), also regarding their 
relationship with Rule 68.  
The most demonstrative example for the implications of Rule 70 on disclosure, 
however, is certainly a comparison of the just mentioned proceedings against Milošević 
on the one hand and Milutinović on the other. In both cases, the issue revolved around 
the testimony of General Wesley Clark, who had been the commander of the NATO 
forces in the air campaign against Yugoslavia in 1999.  
In the Milošević proceedings, the prosecution (on behalf of the American Government) 
had demanded that: the witness’ testimony be treated as information protected by 
Rule 70 (C) and (D), the hearing be partially held in closed session, the witness or US 
Government representatives could, at any given time, require that the testimony be 
moved into closed session, the testimony itself be “temporarily” held in closed session 
with the public gallery being closed, the delay of the broadcast of the testimony be 
expanded from 30 minutes to 48 hours to enable the US Government to demand 
redactions, the prosecution’s testimony limited to the content of a document handed in 
beforehand, the cross-examination and questioning by the amici curiae to underlie the 
same restrictions except with prior agreement of the US Government, and two US 
Government representatives to be present at the trial.841 The motion was granted; (then 
Ex-) General Clark, who had already published a book and given countless interviews 
about his experiences in the Yugoslav Wars, testified for two days. The accused was not 
allowed to ask the witness questions about the air campaign against Yugoslavia, while 
central elements of his defence were the allegation that the Yugoslav army had acted in 
self-defence against the supposed aggression by the NATO campaign and that it had 
                                                 
838  Decision of Trial Chamber I on the Prosecutor’s Motion for Video Deposition and Protective 
Measures, note 818. 
839  Prosecutor v. Nyiramasuhuko et al., ICTR Case No. 97-21-T, Decision on defence Motion for 
Disclosure of Evidence, Single Judge, 1 November 2000, par. 51. 
840  Note 747 above. 
841  Prosecutor v. Milošević, ICTY Case No. IT-02-54-T, Confidential Decision on prosecution’s 
Application for a Witness Pursuant to Rule 70 (B), Trial Chamber, 30 October 2003.  
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actually been this campaign that had caused civilians to flee from Kosovo.842 The course 
of action taken by the Trial Chamber has, and rightly so, been harshly criticised.843 
A few years later, in the trial against Milutinović, the competent Chamber was faced 
with an almost entirely parallel situation. Here, the Chamber, in application of Rules 54, 
70(G), and 89(D) and Articles 20 and 21 of the Statute denied the motion of the 
prosecution and declined to even hear the witness, specifically on the two grounds of 
the limitation of both examination in chief and cross-examination, and the requirement 
of prior agreement of the information provider if the defence wanted this limitation to 
be altered. The Chamber opined that this would entail an unwarranted disclosure by the 
defence of its cross-examination strategy.844 The Chamber specifically rejected the 
intrusion by third parties to such a degree, seizing control over the proceedings. It held: 
The result of the application of these conditions would be to wrest a measure of 
control of the proceedings from the Chamber and hand it to the Rule 70 
provider. […] To restrict cross-examination to the subject matter predetermined 
by anyone other than the Chamber with the approval, at least tacit, of the 
prosecution is inevitably unfair to the defence.845 
And: 
It is also essential that the trial should not only be fair but be seen to be fair. 
Justice must be seen to be done. The trial process under the Tribunal's Statute is 
seen worldwide as an essential ingredient in the efforts of the international 
community to restore and maintain peace in the region and to bring healing and 
reconciliation to the territories and peoples of the former Yugoslavia. The 
Tribunal's mission is to try individuals accused of committing serious violations 
of international humanitarian law in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 
1991. Any neutral interested bystander would be bound to view as unfair a trial 
in which one of the parties to a conflict insisted upon controlling the cross-
examination of its citizen who commanded one force in the trial of Accused from 
the other, thus depriving them of their full right to confront the witnesses against 
them.846 
                                                 
842  See for references and on the issue of Rule 70 in the trials against Milošević and Milutinović in detail 
O'Sullivan/Montgomery, The Erosion of the Right to Confrontation under the Cloak of Fairness at the 
ICTY, note 744 supra, at pp. 528 et subs. 
843  Ibid. 
844  Prosecutor v. Milutinović et al., ICTY Case No. IT-05-87-T, Second Decision on prosecution Motion 
for Leave to Amend its Rule 65 ter Witness List to Add Wesley Clark, note 835 above, paras. 26 et 
seq. 
845  Ibid. 
846  Ibid., par. 30, footnotes omitted. 
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The Appeals Chamber upheld the decision against the appeal of the prosecution.847 
 
5.4.4 Rule 97 
Rule 97, concerning the lawyer-client privilege, currently provides as follows: 
ICTY, 20 October 2011 ICTR, 1 October 2009 SCSL, 28 May 2010 
Lawyer-Client Privilege 
All communications between 
lawyer and client shall be 
regarded as privileged, and 
consequently not subject to 
disclosure at trial, unless: 
(i) the client consents to such 
disclosure; or 
(ii) the client has voluntarily 
disclosed the content of the 
communication to a third 
party, and that third party 
then gives evidence of that 
disclosure. 
Lawyer-Client Privilege 
(A) All communications 
between lawyer and client 
shall be regarded as privileged, 
and consequently disclosure 
cannot be ordered, unless: 
(i) The client consents to such 
disclosure; or 
(ii) The client has voluntarily 
disclosed the content of the 
communication to a third 
party, and that third party 
then gives evidence of that 
disclosure. 
(B) Nothing in this rule shall 
be interpreted as permitting 
the use of confidentiality 
between Counsel and Client to 
conceal the participation of 
Counsel in illegal practices 
such as fee-splitting with 
client. 
Lawyer-Client Privilege  
All communications between 
lawyer and client shall be 
regarded as privileged, and 
consequently disclosure cannot 
be ordered, unless: 
(i) The client consents to such 
disclosure; or 
(ii) The client has voluntarily 
disclosed the content of the 
communication to a third 
party, and that third party 
then gives evidence of that 
disclosure. 
(iii) The client has alleged 
ineffective assistance of 
counsel, in which case the 
privilege is waived as to all 
communications relevant to 
the claim of ineffective 
assistance. 
 
The confidentiality of communication between the client and his lawyer is known in 
most jurisdictions to a greater or lesser extent; it is recognized as a general principle of 
international law.848 
Rule 97 RPE-ICTY has retained its original wording. The proposal of the American 
Government, had been framed as follows: 
25.11 Lawyer-client privilege 
An individual has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other 
person from disclosing confidential communications made for the purpose of 
facilitating the rendition of professional legal services to that individual.849 
                                                 
847  Prosecutor v. Milutinović et al., ICTY Case No. IT-05-87-AR73.1, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal 
Against Second Decision Precluding the prosecution from Adding General Wesley Clark to its 65ter 
Witness List, Appeals Chamber, 20 April 2007. 
848  See Benzing, Das Beweisrecht vor internationalen Gerichten und Schiedsgerichten in 
zwischenstaatlichen Streitigkeiten, p. 426 et seq. with further references. 
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This wording, for its part, had obviously been based on the American Federal Rules of 
Evidence.850 We do not see any striking similarities here. In this somewhat rare case, 
however, an NGO  proposal proved more successful. The Lawyers Committee for 
Human Rights had submitted comments on the adoption of the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence,851 including the following proposal: 
Privilege: All communications between a suspect or witness and his lawyer in 
connection with obtaining legal advice should be regarded as privileged, and 
hence, not subject to discovery or admission at trial, unless (1) the suspect 
consents to such discovery or admission or (2) one or both parties to the 
communication has voluntarily disclosed the content of the communication to 
one or more third parties.852 
Rule 97 RPE-ICTY is thus a simplified version of the Lawyers Committee for Human 
Rights’ proposal: “discovery” was renamed to “disclosure”, the explicit admissibility 
limitation was apparently seen as superfluous in the light of Rule 89 (C) which 
establishes an untechnical approach to the admissibility of evidence. 
Rule 97 RPE-ICTY is mostly self-explanatory. Generally, the lawyer-client privilege is 
recognized, however, it can be waived, the voluntary disclosure to a third person 
considered a waiver. 
Both ICTR and SCSL have amended the Rule. In June 1998, the ICTR amended sub-
rule 1 to its current wording, thereby doing away with the limitation to disclosure “at 
trial”.853 Another amendment came about in May 2003, when the ICTR Judges added 
sub-rule (B), obviously in an attempt to fight the practice of “fee-splitting”854 and 
apparently trying to facilitate investigations as to this matter.855  
The SCSL adopted the ICTR Rule as of after the 1998 amendment with an immediate 
revision in that a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel shall also be considered a 
                                                                                                                                               
849  Printed in Morris/Scharf, An insider's guide to the international criminal tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia, Vol. 2, p. 546. 
850  See Art. V of the former Rules of Evidence, still contained in many States’ Rules of Evidence (usually 
under Rule 501, 502 or 503). 
851  Memorandum of the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights to the ICTY, IT/INF 4, 19 November 
1993, printed in Morris/Scharf, An insider's guide to the international criminal tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia, Vol. 2, pp. 565-569. 
852  Ibid., at p. 566. 
853  RPE-ICTR as amended on 8 June 1998. 
854  This term describes the illegal practice that the accused and his defence counsel share the legal aid 
provided by the respective court or tribunal for the defence of the (supposedly indigent) accused. 
855  RPE-ICTR as amended on 27 May 2003. 
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waiver of confidentiality. Whether there was a specific reason or occasion for this 
amendment is unclear.  
 
5.5 Disclosure ‘via the Chamber’ – Rules 54/98 
We have already briefly seen above that as early as in the proceedings against Tadić 
there have been attempts to circumvent the disclosure provisions of Rules 66 et subs. as 
regards an extension of disclosure obligations of the defence.856 There, chiefly the 
general provision of Rule 54 was relied upon to force the defence to disclose certain 
documents during the trial. While this is, as we noted, an example of the intertwinement 
of disclosure in the formal and disclosure in the material sense, it also shows the 
intertwinement of disclosure and truth-finding, in that it is the competent chamber who 
enforces the revelation of certain information: disclosure is to take place between those 
participants of the proceedings who are responsible for the finding of the truth. Rule  54 
contains the general power of the competent Trial Chamber to make decisions 
concerning the proceedings as necessary.857 Rule 98858 provides as follows: 
 
ICTY, Rev. 46, 20 October 2011 ICTR, 1 October 2009 
Power of Chambers to Order Production of 
Additional Evidence 
 
A Trial Chamber may order either party to produce 
additional evidence.  
It may proprio motu summon witnesses and order 
their attendance. 
Power of Chambers to Order Production of 
Additional Evidence 
 
A Trial Chamber may proprio motu order either 
party to produce additional evidence. 
It may itself summon witnesses and order their 
attendance. 
 
It thus implies the specific empowerment of the Trial Chamber to extend the evidence 
for the trial on its own accord. While this power is somewhat unusual in Anglo-
American jurisdictions, it has always been a ‘feature’ of international procedural 
frameworks and is an indispensable right for any judge working in a Romano-Germanic 
procedural system, as it is a means of truth-finding.859 
                                                 
856  See 5.3.1 above. 
857  See note 786 above. 
858  Only the ICTY and ICTR provisions are cited, since the SCSL RPE do not contain a similar provision. 
859  See Prosecutor v. Blaškić, ICTY Case No. IT-95-14, Decision of Trial Chamber I in Respect of the 
Appearance of General Enver Hadžihasanović, Trial Chamber, 25 March 1999: “in order to ascertain 
the truth in respect of the crimes of which the accused has been charged”; see also Artt. 17 (b), (c) and 
24(f) IMT Charter, Artt. 11 (a) to (c) IMTFE Charter; Art. 64 (6) (b) and (c) ICC Statute, Rule 140 (2) 
(b) ICC RPE; §§ 244 (2), 238 (1) StPO (German Code of Criminal Procedure). 
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Originally, Rule 98 RPE-ICTY was framed in the following way: 
A Trial Chamber may order either party to produce additional evidence. It may 
itself summon witnesses and order their attendance.860 
Obviously the amendment of the wording to its current form did not produce any 
substantial difference. The wording of Rule 98 RPE-ICTR looks like a mixture between 
the original and the amended version of Rule 98 RPE-ICTY. It must be concluded that 
there is also no substantial difference between the two.861 
The practice of trial chambers to make use of Rule 98 for disclosure purposes, however, 
appears to have developed predominantly at the ICTR. Already in the proceedings 
against Akayesu, the Chamber had ordered the prosecution to  
submit all available written witness statements to the Chamber in the case and 
that all such statements to which reference had been made by either the 
Prosecutor or the defence shall be admitted as evidence and form part of the 
record.862 
This the prosecution at first refused to do, stating that the Chamber could, under 
Rule 98, only order the production of specific, as opposed to all, evidence.863 The 
Chamber, however, held otherwise, however, it did make a significant step backwards 
in that it stated that its decision should be interpreted as comprising only witness which 
had already been disclosed to the defence.864 Nevertheless, a practice developed, by 
which the ICTR Trial Chambers regularly rely on Rule 98 – both proprio motu and 
upon request of the defence.865 
This practice is, as stated, a good example of the development of truth-finding in 
international criminal proceedings. The Court makes use of a rule which systematically 
has not got anything to do with disclosure in order to, on the one hand, make 
information available to a party of the proceedings, while taking advantage of this 
                                                 
860  Wording of Rule 98 before the 11th revision of the Rules, 25 July 1997. 
861  As rightly stated by Gibson/Lusiaá-Berdou, Disclosure, at note 185. 
862  Prosecutor v. Akayesu, ICTR Case No. 96-4-T, Decision by the Tribunal on its Request to the 
Prosecutor to Submit the Written Witness Statements, Trial Chamber I, 28 January 1997. 
863  Prosecutor v. Akayesu, ICTR Case No. 96-4-T, Prosecutor's Motion to Reconsider and Rescind the 
Order of 18 January 1997, prosecution, cited according to the Akayesu Judgment, 2 September 1998. 
864  Prosecutor v. Akayesu, ICTR Case No. 96-4-T, Decision on the Prosecutor's Motion to Reconsider 
and Rescind the Order of 18 January 1997, Trial Chamber I, 6 March 1997. 
865  See Gibson/Lusiaá-Berdou, Disclosure, pp. 345 et subs. with further references. 
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information for truth-finding purposes on the other. In fact, some of these decisions 
even literally refer to “disclosure according to Rule 98”.866 
 
5.6 Violations of Disclosure Obligations 
A major point of controversy at the Tribunals has been what the consequences are and 
should be, in the case that the disclosure obligations of the parties are not fulfilled. In 
national jurisdictions, failure to disclose evidence before the trial (disclosure in the 
procedural sense) oftentimes results in an exclusion of the evidence in court.867 In the 
practice of the international tribunals, this is practically never the case.868 It has been 
stated that the exclusion of evidence is “at the extreme end of measures available” to the 
respective chamber.869 The only ‘sanction’ usually imposed by the Chambers is a 
postponement of the examination of the witness in order to give the other party (usually 
the defence) the opportunity to prepare its case accordingly.870 
In 2001, the ICTY adopted a provision concerning remedies for non-compliance with 
disclosure obligations, which is Rule 68 bis. It provides: 
The pre-trial Judge or the Trial Chamber may decide proprio motu, or at the 
request of either party, on sanctions to be imposed on a party which fails to 
perform its disclosure obligations pursuant to the Rules. 
Notably, however, Rule 68 bis RPE-ICTY does not contain any specifics. The Annual 
Report is of similar usefulness, merely stating that the adoption took place on the 
recommendation of the Committee.871 Admittedly, in the light of Rule 89 (D) it would 
not have made much sense to include the fact that the Trial Chamber can indeed exclude 
evidence if the fairness of the proceedings is at stake; a reference to Rules 46 and 77 
(misconduct of counsel, contempt of the Tribunal) would also merely have stated the 
obvious. Possibly for the reason of this apparent needlessness, neither the ICTR nor the 
SCSL have adopted a similar provision. 
                                                 
866  See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Karera, ICTR Case No. 01-74-T, Decision on the defence Motion for 
Additional Disclosure (Rule 98),Trial Chamber, 1.9.2006 
867  Gibson/Lusiaá-Berdou, Disclosure, at p. 320. 
868  Except for occasional decisions such as the one in Milutinović cited above (note 844). 
869  Prosecutor v. Karemera et al., ICTR Case No. 98-44-T, Decision on defence Motion to Report 
Government of a Certain State to the United Nations Security Council and on prosecution Motions 
Under Rule 66(C) of the Rules, Trial Chamber, 15 February 2006, par. 25. 
870  Gibson/Lusiaá-Berdou, Disclosure, p. 321. 
871  ICTY Annual Report 2002, A/57/379–S/2002/985, 4 September 2002, par. 41. 
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Indeed, it is hard to think of any other ‘real’ sanctions than the ones just alluded to: 
exclusion of the evidence and sanctions for personal misconduct of those who do not 
comply with their disclosure obligations. As regards the exclusion of evidence, one will 
generally have to agree with the above-mentioned opinion of the Chamber in 
Karemera.872 In the light of one of the paramount goals of international criminal justice, 
which is the establishment of the truth, it must generally be considered necessary that 
the decision maker gets to see the whole picture in order to reach their decision. 
Exclusion of evidence must therefore be avoided. To be sure, decisions as the one in 
Milutinović are no exception to this rule, because while it is of course unfair to 
unnecessarily restrict the scope of the interrogation of a witness, it is also counter-
productive for the truth-finding process, since in that case the Chamber would actually 
knowingly have deprived itself of seeing the whole picture. Also, one may think of a 
different treatment of the prosecution and defence in this regard. As Rule 67 (C) shows, 
the accused is not excluded from testifying on defences of alibi and special defences, 
even if he had not previously disclosed that he was going to do so. It therefore appears 
possible to exclude prosecution evidence only. 
However, from a partially ex-post perspective, one may also think of an even more 
extreme sanction, which is the stay of proceedings. In Lubanga, as we will see below in 
more detail,873 Trial Chamber I of the ICC even twice stayed the proceedings because of 
non-compliance with disclosure obligations of the prosecution. This is surely partially 
due to the fact that at the ICC, the judges play a more active role than at the Ad Hoc 
Tribunals and arguably also had their own (as opposed to the accused’s) information on 
the facts of the case in mind. However, if the prosecution not only complies late, but 
fails to comply with its disclosure obligations, particularly as regards exculpatory 
evidence, in such a way that “it is not possible anymore to piece together the elements 
of a fair trial”874, fair trial aspects take precedence over truth finding considerations and 
the Chamber must have the right to stay the proceedings, also at the Ad Hoc Tribunals. 
                                                 
872  Note 869 above. 
873  See sections 6.10 and 6.6.4 below. 
874  Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, ICC Case No. 01/04-01/06, Decision on the consequences of non-
disclosure of exculpatory materials covered by Article 54(3)(e) agreements and the application to stay 
the prosecution of the accused, together with certain other issues raised at the Status Conference on 10 
June 2008, Trial Chamber I, 13 June 2008, paras. 92 et subs., paragraph numbers omitted. 
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As regards the sanctions for personal misconduct (i.e. Rules 46 and 77), the Chambers 
should not be too hesitant. It is certainly not only the most extreme cases in which 
personal sanctions can be imposed.875 
 
5.7 Conclusion 
The history of disclosure at the Ad Hoc Tribunals shows very well the dilemmas of 
disclosure and adversarial criminal proceedings as a whole. Gigantic amounts of 
evidence need to be gathered, which is much more difficult in an international setting 
than within a national system, this holds especially true for the defence. It is thus all the 
more difficult to conduct fair trials than on the national level, which means that the 
prosecution is called upon to support the defence, by supplying the defence with the 
relevant evidence, particularly exculpatory evidence, and making this evidence 
manageable. This process must be controlled by the Chambers, which, as we have seen, 
by the shaping of the Rules and by their judicial practice, have played an increasingly 
active role in the proceedings, forcing both prosecution and defence to cooperate. The 
latter point, however, disclosure by the defence, must be looked at cautiously. While the 
widening trend of defence disclosure in the international proceedings of the Ad Hoc 
Tribunals is in line with the development in the national systems we have looked at in 
previous chapters, defence disclosure is a sensitive matter. The Chambers of the 
Tribunals have more often than not demanded more from the defence than they should 
have; this is particularly irksome in the light of the fact that they regularly relied on fair 
trial considerations for these decisions. 
 
                                                 
875  To this end, however, Prosecutor v. Furundžija, ICTY Case No. IT-95-17/1-PT, The Trial Chamber's 
Formal Complaint to the Prosecutor Concerning the Conduct of the prosecution, Trial Chamber, 5 
June 1998, par. 11. 
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6 Disclosure of Evidence at the ICC 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The procedural law of the ICC is in many aspects remarkably different from the one of 
the Ad-Hoc Tribunals. While the latter, as we have seen above, though having 
implemented some features of the Continental European tradition, such as the less 
technical rules concerning the admissibility of evidence, is strongly based on the Anglo-
American model of procedure, the former is much more influenced by the Romano-
Germanic tradition.876 However, the ‘legislator’ of the ICC, meaning the 
plenipotentiaries at the Rome Conference and the Assembly of States Parties877 still 
chose not to implement a dossier system, but retained the procedural feature of 
disclosure in the formal sense. In the following, as in the former chapters, we will take a 
look at the genesis of the legal framework of the ICC’s disclosure regime, and analyse 
the relevant provisions in some detail. Furthermore, as was to be expected, the ICC Pre-
Trial and Trial Chambers have already produced quite a large amount of jurisprudence 
concerning disclosure, on which we will also shed some light. In contrast to the 
disclosure regime of the Ad Hoc Tribunals, there is no need to discuss any changes in 
the relevant provisions, because the Rules of Procedure and Evidence878 are, in 
principle, not drafted and amended by the Judges of the Court, but, according to Art. 51 
ICCSt, by the Assembly of States Parties;879 and the latter has, as of this writing, 
amended neither the Statute nor the Rules with regard to disclosure provisions. 
Nevertheless, however, the relevant provisions of the Statute and the Rules were 
naturally amended several times within the drafting process, on which we will shed 
some light. 
                                                 
876  See generally on the procedural law of the ICC, also vis-à-vis the Ad Hoc Tribunals Kreß, The 
Procedural Texts of the International Criminal Court, as well as Ambos, The Structure of International 
Criminal Procedure: ‘Adversarial’, ‘Inquisitorial’ or Mixed?. See also Arsanjani, The Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court. 
877  Hereinafter: ASP. 
878  Hereinafter: RPE-ICC. 
879  Except for the possibility of the Judges of the ICC to adopt, by two-thirds majority, provisional Rules 
according to Art. 51 (3) ICCSt; however, these provisional Rules also need to be adopted by  the ASP 
at its respective next meeting. 
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6.2 General Overview over the Legal Framework – Applicable 
Law 
The sources of applicable law for the ICC are enumerated in Art. 21 ICCSt in a 
hierarchical manner.880 The primary sources of law are thus the Rome Statute and the 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence (par. 1 (a)). Applicable treaties as well as principles 
and rules of international law are only a secondary source of law (par. 1 (b)); general 
principles may only be applied if these sources prove to be fruitless (par. 1 (c)). In 
addition, the Court “may” apply principles and rules of law as interpreted in its previous 
decisions (par. 2). 
 
6.2.1 The Rome Statute 
As the Ad-Hoc Tribunals, the Rome Statute reaffirms the basic procedural rights of the 
accused to information and preparation of his defence, which, as we have seen above,881 
form today’s basis for the human rights aspect of the disclosure rights of the accused.882 
However, in contrast to the respective Statutes of the Ad Hoc Tribunals, the Rome 
Statute makes, on several occasions, explicit reference to disclosure. Though leaving 
most of the details of disclosure to the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, the Statute 
addresses at least two aspects of disclosure which we have also analyzed in the context 
                                                 
880  Article 21 ICCSt: Applicable law 
 1. The Court shall apply: 
 (a) In the first place, this Statute, Elements of Crimes and its Rules of Procedure and Evidence; 
 (b) In the second place, where appropriate, applicable treaties and the principles and rules of 
international law, including the established principles of the international law of armed conflict; 
 (c) Failing that, general principles of law derived by the Court from national laws of legal systems of 
the world including, as appropriate, the national laws of States that would normally exercise 
jurisdiction over the crime, provided that those principles are not inconsistent with this Statute and 
with international law and internationally recognized norms and standards. 
 2. The Court may apply principles and rules of law as interpreted in its previous decisions. […] 
881  See section 1.3.1. above. 
882  Art. 67 ICCSt: In the determination of any charge, the accused shall be entitled to [...] the following 
minimum guarantees, in full equality: 
(a) To be informed promptly and in detail of the nature, cause and content of the charge, in a language 
which the accused fully understands and speaks; 
(b) To have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of the defence [...]. 
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of the Ad-Hoc Tribunals: Procedural disclosure rights of the accused, and limitations to 
disclosure, due to witness protection as well as the protection of security interests of 
national states and third parties.  
A particular feature of the ICC’s procedural law worth mentioning at this point already 
is the two-stage approach of its criminal procedure. The crafters of the ICC opted for a 
system with two separate public and oral procedures: the confirmation of the charges 
according to Art. 61 ICCSt, held before a pre-trial chamber, and the trial according to 
Articles 62 et subs., held before a trial chamber. In contrast to the Ad Hoc Tribunals, the 
ICC thus has, as it were, two pre-trial stages (before the confirmation hearing as 
opposed to after the confirmation hearing but before the trial883). This occasionally 
makes it a little more complicated to determine at what time and to what extent 
disclosure must take place. Hereinafter, for reasons of unambiguousness, we will, when 
appropriate, differentiate between “pre-confirmation” and “pre-trial” disclosure, 
respectively.  
The first hint to disclosure contained in the Statute can be seen in the duty of the 
Prosecutor to submit to the accused, together with the document containing the charges 
(Regulation 52 of the Regulations of the Court), “information” on the evidence on 
which the Prosecutor intends to rely at the confirmation hearing, Art. 61 (3)(b) ICCSt, 
which is followed by an affirmation of the competent Pre-Trial Chamber to rule on any 
issues on the matter of disclosure at this stage.884  
Another central provision is the duty of the Prosecutor to disclose exculpatory evidence, 
which, as we have seen, proved to be a very important aspect in the disclosure regime of 
the Ad Hoc Tribunals. The legislator of the ICC, however, obviously considered this 
disclosure duty important enough to include it in the Statute itself, in the same Article, 
though in a separate paragraph, as the fair trial rights of the accused (Art. 67 (2) 
ICCSt)885. The formulation thus not merely stipulates an obligation of the Prosecution, 
but indeed a positive right of the accused.886 Flanked by the duty of the Prosecutor not 
only to disclose but also to actively investigate exonerating circumstances (Art. 54 
                                                 
883  See, for example, article 64(3) or 64(6), “prior to trial”. 
884  This is further elaborated by Rule 121 RPE-ICC; see for more details on this below. 
885  “In addition to any other disclosure provided for in this Statute, the Prosecutor shall, as soon as 
practicable, disclose to the defence evidence in the Prosecutor's possession or control which he or she 
believes shows or tends to show the innocence of the accused, or to mitigate the guilt of the accused, 
or which may affect the credibility of prosecution evidence. In case of doubt as to the application of 
this paragraph, the Court shall decide.” 
886  See also Zappalà, The Rights of the Accused, at p. 1352. 
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(1)(a) ICCSt), Art. 67 (2) ICCSt demonstrates a strong case of the crafters of the ICC 
for both fairness and truth-finding.  
The same holds true for Art. 64 (3)(c) and (6)(d) ICCSt887, which reiterate the power of 
the Trial Chamber to rule on disclosure issues before it and is thus in parallel with 
Art. 61 (3). Art. 64 (6)(b) and (d)888, in turn, reaffirm the power of the Trial Chamber to 
order the attendance of witnesses as well as the production of evidence ex officio, even 
exceeding the material already collected and presented by the parties.889 This reminds us 
of the feature already contained in the American FRCP (Rule 17(c)) and the Ad Hoc 
Tribunals (Rule 98), and reaffirms the view that the Court has been provided with far-
reaching inquisitorial powers by the ICC legislator. 
Aspects limiting disclosure, however, have also found their way into the Statute. 
Directly after the rights of the accused as enumerated in Art. 67 follow the rights of 
victims and witnesses, indeed, as compared with the Ad Hoc Tribunals, where victims 
do not enjoy participation rights, the ICC marks a fundamentally new development in 
international criminal law.890 Art. 68 (5)891 serves as a counter-weight to prosecution 
                                                 
887  “Upon assignment of a case for trial in accordance with this Statute, the Trial Chamber assigned to 
deal with the case shall: […] 
 (c) Subject to any other relevant provisions of this Statute, provide for disclosure of documents or 
information not previously disclosed, sufficiently in advance of the commencement of the trial to 
enable adequate preparation for trial.” 
888  “In performing its functions prior to trial or during the course of a trial, the Trial Chamber may, as 
necessary: […] 
 (b) Require the attendance and testimony of witnesses and production of documents and other 
evidence by obtaining, if necessary, the assistance of States as provided in this Statute; […] 
 (d) Order the production of evidence in addition to that already collected prior to the trial or presented 
during the trial by the parties; […].” 
889  It is to be noted that the Appeals Chamber of the ICC has expressed the view that this wording 
envisions that “the right to lead evidence pertaining to the guilt or innocence of the accused […] lies 
primarily with the parties”, see Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, ICC Case No. 01/04-01/06 (OA 9, 
OA 10), Judgment on the appeals of The Prosecutor and The Defence against Trial Chamber I's 
Decision on Victims' Participation of 18 January 2008, Appeals Chamber, 11 July 2008, par. 93. 
890  See regarding victims Safferling, Das Opfer völkerrechtlicher Verbrechen: Die Stellung der 
Verbrechensopfer vor dem Internationalen Strafgerichtshof. 
891  “Where the disclosure of evidence or information pursuant to this Statute may lead to the grave 
endangerment of the security of a witness or his or her family, the Prosecutor may, for the purposes of 
any proceedings conducted prior to the commencement of the trial, withhold such evidence or 
information and instead submit a summary thereof. Such measures shall be exercised in a manner 
which is not prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the accused and a fair and impartial trial.” 
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disclosure if the safety of victims and witnesses is at stake. Art. 54 (3)(e)892 represents a 
consequence of the Ad Hoc Tribunals’ experience that international trials can hardly be 
conducted satisfactorily if states and international organizations are unwilling to share 
their information. This is closely related with the aspect of the protection of national 
security interests, as elaborated in Artt. 72, 73, 93 and 99 ICCSt. We will discuss these 
aspects in some more detail below. 
 
6.2.2 The Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
The particulars of the disclosure regime at the ICC are, as observed, regulated in the 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICC. Most of the relevant provisions are to be 
found in Chapter 4 (“Provisions relating to various stages of the proceedings”), 
Section II, i.e. Rules 76-84 of the RPE-ICC (“Disclosure”). Rules 76 to 80 cover 
prosecution and defence disclosure and differentiate according to different types of 
material (witness statements and other material), as well as between disclosure stricto 
sensu and inspection. At least at the beginning of the ICC, as we shall see, this latter 
differentiation has played a certain role in the ICC’s jurisprudence, which it apparently 
did not have at the Tribunals. Rules 81 and 82 deal with restrictions on disclosure, 
whereas Rule 83 relates to rulings of the competent chamber regarding exculpatory 
evidence on request of the Prosecutor. Furthermore, Rule 84 regulates details of the 
disclosure between the confirmation hearing and the trial as well as during trial. 
Moreover, Rule 73 deals with the impact of privileged communications and information 
on disclosure, whereas Rule 121 (2) through (6) govern the disclosure procedure to be 
followed in preparation of the confirmation hearing. As regards the differentiation 
between pre-confirmation hearing disclosure and pre-trial disclosure, the Rules are not 
always entirely clear. Chapter 4 of the Rules, which contains most of the Rules relating 
to disclosure, comprises “provisions relating to various stages of the proceedings” – and 
thus not necessarily to all of them. This somewhat ambiguous title for the Chapter was 
chosen on purpose.893 Finally, Rules 121 (2)(c), 129 and 130 regulate important details 
concerning the role of the respective chambers in the disclosure process, comprising 
                                                 
892  “The Prosecutor may […] [a]gree not to disclose, at any stage of the proceedings, documents or 
information that the Prosecutor obtains on the condition of confidentiality and solely for the purpose 
of generating new evidence, unless the provider of the information consents […].” 
893  Brady, Disclosure of Evidence, at p. 404. At the beginning of the negotiations, however, France had 
proposed the creation of a general part of the Rule, containing provisions common to all phases of the 
proceedings, see Proposal by France. General Outline of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 
PCNICC/1999/DP.2, 1 February 1999, A, par. 9 (p. 2). 
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what in previous chapters has been called “disclosure to/via the court”. These provisions 
are intimately related to the record of the proceedings pursuant to Rules 15 and 131, 
which, as we will see, was originally framed as a kind of ‘down-sized’ dossier. Related 
to the record of the proceedings, we also find an entirely new feature of disclosure in 
international criminal proceedings, as well as of the ICC as an institution, which is the 
participation of victims in the disclosure procedure. According to Rule 121 (10) RPE-
ICC, the legal representatives of the victims enjoy, under certain conditions, a right to 
access the record.  
 
6.2.3 The Regulations 
On 26 May 2004, the Judges of the Court adopted, according to Art. 52 ICCSt, the 
Regulations of the Court894, which are to contain rules “necessary for its routine 
functioning”.895 They contain quite a few references to “disclosure”. Reg. 42 (2) RegCt 
deals with the continuing protective measures concerning previous proceedings; other 
provisions relate to the disclosure of records of closed proceedings (Reg. 20 (3)), the 
disclosure of the detention record of a detained person (Reg. 92 (3)), as well as the 
prohibition of contact between a detained person and other persons, when a breach of an 
order for non-disclosure is to be feared (Reg. 101 (2)(d)). These latter examples, 
however, do not relate to disclosure between the parties, but rather to the public. 
However, Reg 54 RegCt896, on the face of it, may have a lot do with disclosure, 
                                                 
894  Hereinafter RegCt. 
895  ICC-BD/01-01-04. 
896  Regulation 54 
 Status conferences before the Trial Chamber 
 At a status conference, the Trial Chamber may, in accordance with the Statute and the Rules, issue 
any order in the interests of justice for the purposes of the proceedings on, inter alia, the following 
issues: 
 (a) The length and content of legal arguments and the opening and closing statements; 
 (b) A summary of the evidence the participants intend to rely on; 
 (c) The length of the evidence to be relied on; 
 (d) The length of questioning of the witnesses; 
 (e) The number and identity (including any pseudonym) of the witnesses to be called; 
 (f) The production and disclosure of the statements of the witnesses on which the participants propose 
to rely; 
 (g) The number of documents as referred to in article 69, paragraph 2, or exhibits to be introduced 
together with their length and size; 
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particularly regarding the role and involvement of the Trial Chamber in the disclosure 
process. Taken seriously, it appears to authorize the Trial Chamber to order the parties 
to submit to the Chamber virtually anything before the trial; indeed, the regulation is 
quite reminiscent of the pre-trial and pre-defence conferences at the Ad Hoc 
Tribunals.897 In connection with defence disclosure, Reg 54 RegCt has already appeared 
in the jurisprudence of the ICC.898 It should be remembered, however, that the legal 
status and enforceability of the Regulations of the Court are not entirely clear. 
According to Reg. 1 (1) RegCt, they must be read “subject to the Statute and the Rules”; 
the fact that they are not mentioned in the applicable law of the ICC according to 
Art. 21. Art. 52 (1) ICCSt additionally shows that the Regulations are lower in rank than 
both the Statute and the Rules, which is also underlined by relatively low threshold for 
their adoption.899 The drafting history of Art. 52 ICCSt is of little use for determining 
the true scope of the Regulations, or, for that matter, to what extent an issue can be 
considered to be comprised in the “routine functioning” of the Court.900 As a matter of 
fact, however, issues covered by the Regulations of the Court arguably go beyond what 
could be considered “routine functioning” of the Court, such as the authority of the 
Chamber to modify the legal characterization of the facts before it according to 
Regulation 55.901 Furthermore, Art. 52 (3) ICCSt speaks of their being “in force”,902 and 
                                                                                                                                               
 (h) The issues the participants propose to raise during the trial; 
 (i) The extent to which a participant can rely on recorded evidence, including the transcripts and the 
audio- and video-record of evidence previously given; 
 (j) The presentation of evidence in summary form; 
 (k) The extent to which evidence is to be given by an audio- or videolink; 
 (l) The disclosure of evidence; 
 (m) The joint or separate instruction by the participants of expert witnesses; 
 (n) Evidence to be introduced under rule 69 as regards agreed facts; 
 (o) The conditions under which victims shall participate in the proceedings; 
 (p) The defences, if any, to be advanced by the accused.” 
897  Compare Chapter 5 - excursus supra. 
898  See Section 6.5 infra. 
899  Absolute majority of the Judges vs. two thirds majority of the members of the ASP, see Articles 51 (1) 
and 52 (1), respectively. 
900  See as to different wording proposals Behrends/Staker, in: Triffterer, Commentary on the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court: Observers' Notes, Article by Article, Article 52, mn. 10. 
901  See Kreß, The Procedural Texts of the International Criminal Court, p. 541 et seq. This issue has 
already become virulent before the Court, see The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC Case 
No.  ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment on the appeals of Mr Lubanga Dyilo and the Prosecutor against the 
Decision of Trial Chamber I of 14 July 2009 entitled "Decision giving notice to the parties and 
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it must be concluded that they are binding upon the Court as well as the parties, as long 
as they do not contradict the Statute or the Rules. 
The Office of the Prosecutor as well as the Registry have also issued Regulations for 
their specific scopes of responsibility.903 They are based on Rules 9 and 14 RPE-ICC, 
respectively, and can therefore be concluded to be even lower in rank than the 
Regulations of the Court.904 The RegOTP contain various references to disclosure, the 
main provision in this regard being Reg. 55 RegOTP905. As may be seen, it does not 
have a major substantial content, but merely states that internal procedures shall be 
established in order to dispose of properly with the Prosecutor’s disclosure obligations; 
furthermore, it is reaffirmed that confidential exculpatory or incriminatory material 
must be identified “at the earliest possible occasion”. 
The Regulations of the Registry also contain numerous direct and indirect references to 
disclosure; most importantly, the Registry is in charge of maintaining the record of the 
proceedings (Rules 15, 121 (10) RPE-ICC, 131; Reg. 16, 28 RegRegistry). Another 
important aspect in this regard is the preparatory assessment of the possible 
endangerment of victims and witnesses for decisions of the competent Chamber (Art. 68 
(1) ICCSt, Rule 81 RPE-ICC, Reg. 99 RegRegistry). 
                                                                                                                                               
participants that the legal characterisation of the facts may be subject to change in accordance with 
Regulation 55(2) of the Regulations of the Court", Appeals Chamber, 8 December 2009 
Doc. No. ICC-01/04-01/06-2205. See also Stahn, Modification of the Legal Characterization of Facts 
in the ICC System. 
902  See as to the nomenclature of Art. 52 ICCSt Behrends/Staker, ibid., mn. 16. 
903  Regulations of the Office of the Prosecutor, hereinafter RegOTP, ICC-BD/05-01-09, 23 April 2009; 
Regulations of the Registry, hereinafter RegRegistry, ICC-BD/03-01-06-Rev.1 (current version), 25 
September 2009. 
904  Kreß, The Procedural Texts of the International Criminal Court, at p. 541, speaks of a “quartenary 
level” of legal texts. 
905  “Disclosure procedures 
 1. The Office shall establish standardised internal procedures to ensure prompt, reliable and efficient 
disclosure in accordance with technical protocols and standards as defined for the Office. Those 
protocols shall be compatible with applicable technical standards as promulgated by the Court. 
 2. Such procedures shall ensure that all relevant disclosure and inspection obligations are fulfilled on 
an ongoing basis until the conclusion of the proceedings, and that a full and accurate record of the 
disclosure process and any preparatory steps is maintained.  
 3. The Office shall identify at the earliest possible occasion documents or information provided under 
article 54, paragraph 3(e) that may have incriminatory or exculpatory value in order to enable the 
timely processing of requests for the lifting of restrictions on disclosure.” 
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The basic provisions regarding disclosure are contained in the Statute and the Rules; 
therefore, the Regulations will in the following not be looked at in detail. Where 
appropriate, reference will be made when discussing the provisions of the ICC Statute 
as well as the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. 
 
6.2.4 Jurisprudence of the Ad Hoc Tribunals? 
It has been held that the jurisprudence of the Ad Hoc Tribunals as regards the 
interpretation of the ICC’s procedural provisions is, due to the history of the drafting 
process and the general similarity of some of the ICC rules with the ones of the Ad Hoc 
Tribunals, “undoubtedly applicable” to the procedure of the ICC.906 While, as we will 
see instantly, it is certainly true that the Ad Hoc Tribunals’ rules and jurisprudence 
played an immensely important role in the drafting process of the ICC’s legal 
provisions, it must for methodological reasons be strongly doubted whether the above 
conclusion to applicability is justified. As was explained above, the sources of law 
which shall be applied by the ICC are enumerated in Art. 21 ICCSt. Only Art. 21 par. 2 
makes explicit reference to previous decisions – however, referring only to those 
handed down by the ICC itself, and thus not the ones by the Ad Hoc Tribunals. The 
jurisprudence of the Ad Hoc Tribunals can also not fall under “principles and rules of 
international law” (Art. 21 par. 1 (b)) since customary international law907 is identified 
by (national) State practice carried by opinio juris. This would only be thinkable if the 
decisions of the Ad Hoc Tribunals in themselves could be regarded as an expression of 
customary international law, which, however, will hardly ever be the case, at least 
concerning the interpretation of a particular legal norm the wording of which is similar 
or even equal in the Rules of the Tribunals and the ICC. The same must be concluded as 
regards the general principles according to Art. 21 par. 1 (c), since this provision 
explicitly refers only to those derived from national legal systems  
                                                 
906  Tochilovsky, Prosecution Disclosure Obligations in the ICC and Relevant Jurisprudence of the Ad 
Hoc Tribunals, at p. 844. Tochilovsky, however, bases his analysis exclusively on jurisprudence of the 
Ad Hoc Tribunals, without making reference to ICC decisions. 
907  What exactly the terms “principles and rules of international law” mean is not entirely clear; the same 
holds true for the relation between Art. 21 paras. 1 (b) and (c). However, all authors appear to agree 
that customary international law is meant to be included in par. 1 (b); the uncertainty is to what extent 
there is a difference between “principles of international law” and “general principles of law”. See 
Pellet in Cassese/Gaeta/Jones, The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary, 
at pp. 1070 et subs., McAuliffe de Guzman in Triffterer, Commentary on the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court: Observers' Notes, Article by Article, Art. 21, mn. 11 et subs. As 
mentioned, however, these cannot be construed to include the jurisprudence of the Ad Hoc Tribunals. 
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It is therefore to be concluded that the jurisprudence of other international tribunals 
cannot be considered to be an applicable source of law for the ICC regarding procedure. 
This does not mean, of course, that the ICC must entirely disregard the legal argument 
contained in the respective jurisprudence; however, the relevant sources of law in this 
regard remain the Rome Statute and the Rules, nothing else. 
 
6.3 The Making of the Legal Provisions 
In contrast to the Ad-Hoc Tribunals, the legal provisions of the ICC took far more time 
to be drafted and were discussed much more deeply. Their level of regulation is 
considerably higher and more complex than that of the Tribunals, at least compared 
with the law of the Tribunals in its original form. This impression is corroborated by the 
sheer scope of the documents. The ICTY Statute has merely 34 Articles, whereas the 
ICC Statute has 128. The original Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICTY as 
adopted on 11 February 1994 contained 125 Rules comprising roughly 10.500 words; 
after the 44th revision of the Rules as of 12 December 2009, their scope has increased to 
165908 Rules comprising roundabout 32.000 words, meaning that the content of the 
original has tripled. The latter number more or less equals the original size of the ICC 
Rules: approximately 32.500 words. However, these are contained in 225 Rules; and it 
must be kept in mind that the ICC Statute, which is far more elaborate than its Ad Hoc 
counterparts, contains numerous procedural provisions, too. In the following 
subsections, we will take an introductory and general overview of the making of the 
Rome Statute as well as the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. A more detailed 
description of the genesis of the respective norms will be left to the discussion of the 
provisions.  
 
6.3.1  The Rome Statute 
The Rome Statute was passed by the Plenipotentiaries at the Rome Conference on 
17 July 1998. It was the result of a process of five weeks of negotiations at the Rome 
Conference, which, for their part, were based on the ILC Draft Statute of 1994909, as 
                                                 
908  Counting the bis, ter, quater and quinquies Rules separately. 
909  Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court  U.N. Doc. A/49/10 (1994), published in: Yearbook 
of the International Law Commission, Vol. II, Part Two, A/CN.4/SER.A/1994/Add.l (Part 2), pp. 26 
et subs., hereinafter: 1994 Draft. See on the genesis of the ILC Draft also Crawford, The ILC's Draft 
Statute for an International Criminal Tribunal. 
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further elaborated by an Ad Hoc Committee and, from 1996 onwards, by a Preparatory 
Committee (PrepCom).910 The ILC Draft of 1994, in turn, had a predecessor in another 
ILC Draft of 1993911. All in all, we may distinguish nine different proposals or 
commentaries on the matter between 1993 and 1998.912 Apparently, there was a general 
consensus during most of the drafting process that general issues of disclosure were 
important enough to be covered by the Rome Statute itself.913 
In the following, we will take a look at the two ILC drafts (1993 and 1994), the Report 
of the Preparatory Committee for the preparation of the Rome Conference,914 and the 
Rome Statute itself; occasionally, reference will be made to proposals contained in the 
PrepCom reports of 1996.915 This limitation appears justified for several reasons. The 
1993 Draft is of interest because it constitutes the first comprehensive draft statute for a 
future ICC, and was in fact issued just after the ICTY Statute had been implemented.916 
The 1994 Draft, for its part, is based on the 1993 Draft and was the working basis for 
the Preparatory Committee, which issued its draft statute in 1998.917 Even though 
                                                 
910  See on the emergence of the ICC Statute generally Bassiouni, The Legislative History of the 
International Criminal Court Vol. 1, pp. 61 et subs., 66 et subs.; as well as Lee, The International 
Criminal Court: The Making of the Rome Statute: Issues, Negotiations, Results. See also Ahlbrecht, 
Geschichte der völkerrechtlichen Strafgerichtsbarkeit im 20. Jahrhundert, pp. 335 et subs. 
911  Draft statute for an international criminal tribunal and commentaries thereto, contained in: Report of 
the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-fifth session, 3 May - 23 July 1993, 
Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-eighth session, Supplement No. 10, Annex A: 
Report of the Working Group on a Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, UN Doc. 
A/48/10 (1993), pp. 100 et subs., hereinafter: 1993 Draft. A copy is also published as United Nations 
Documents A/CN.41L.490 and A/CN.4/L.490/Add.1, July 19, 1993 in: 6 Pace International Law 
Review (1994), pp. 169 et subs. 
912  See the list in Bassiouni, The Legislative History of the International Criminal Court, Vol. II, pp. xv 
and seq., plus the 1993 Draft, note 911, which is not contained in the said list. 
913  See Behrends in Lee, The International Criminal Court: The Making of the Rome Statute: Issues, 
Negotiations, Results, at p. 240. 
914  U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/2, 14 April 1998, hereinafter: PrepCom Report. 
915  Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 
Volume I, Proceedings of the Preparatory Committee during March-April and August 1996, General 
Assembly Official Records, Fifty-first Session, Supplement No.22 (A/51/22), 13 September 1996 
(hereinafter 1996 PrepCom Report Vol. I), as well as Report of the Preparatory Committee on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Volume II (Compilation of proposals), General 
Assembly Official Records, Fifty-first Session, Supplement No. 22A (A/51/22), 13 September 1996 
(hereinafter: 1996 PrepCom Report Vol. II). 
916  The ICTY Statute was adopted as UNSC Resolution 808 on 25 May 1993. Indeed, the commentary 
contains various references to UNSC Resolution 808. 
917  U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/2/Add.1, hereinafter: PrepCom Draft 
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officially the 1994 ILC Draft remained the working basis for the Rome Conference as 
well, many differing viewpoints had left their marks on it between 1994 and 1998, and 
thus the PrepCom Draft can be called, as elucidates from the drafting history as set out 
below, the factual working basis of the Rome Conference. 
 
6.3.1.1 The 1993 Draft 
As was just mentioned, the 1993 Draft, which dates from July 1993, is only slightly 
younger than the ICTY Statute and older than the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of 
the ICTY, which were adopted only in February 1994.918 Even though it apparently 
“borrowed” from the ICTY Statute,919 quite in contrast to the latter, the 1993 Draft 
already contained numerous procedural provisions, some of which related to disclosure. 
Overall, it consisted of 67 articles. We find two provisions relating to the disclosure of 
evidence between the parties, and one relating to the relationship between the 
Prosecutor and the States. The latter, to be sure, does not have anything to do with 
disclosure in the procedural sense, but, however, shows that the nomenclature used by 
the drafters was far from precise; which is another reason why we should not stick to 
the strictly formal meaning of the term. The provision was worded as follows: 
Article 30. Investigation and preparation of the indictment 
[…] 
2. The Prosecutor shall have the power to request the presence of and to 
question suspects, victims and witnesses, to collect evidence, including the 
disclosure and production of any documentation or exhibits relevant to the 
complaint, and to conduct onsite investigations. 
[…] 
This draft provision obviously developed into what is now Art. 54 ICCSt, which, 
however, does not contain this specific power of the Prosecutor to demand the 
production of evidence anymore. It is not quite clear against whom this power could be 
exercised – whether only against the State which had made the complaint according to 
Art. 29 of the 1993 Draft920, or against any State. In any case, the ICC Statute today 
                                                 
918  See original version of the RPE-ICTY, p. 1. 
919  See, e.g., Scharf, Getting Serious About an International Criminal Court, at pp. 108 et subs. 
920  “Article 29. Complaint:  
 Any State Party with jurisdiction over a particular crime under the terms of an international 
convention and which has accepted the jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to article 23 of the Statute 
with respect to the crime or other State with such jurisdiction and which has accepted the jurisdiction 
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grants less powers to the Prosecutor, a trend which was already initiated with the next 
draft, as we will see instantly.921  
The two provisions dealing with disclosure of material between the parties were draft 
Articles 39 and 44 (3). Art. 39 provided: 
Article 39. Duty of the Chamber 
1. If the Bureau922 has not already done so under article 32, the Chamber shall 
decide, as early as possible in each case: 
(a) the place at which the trial is to be held, having regard to article 36; 
(b) the language or languages to be used during the trial, having regard to 
article 18 and article 44, paragraphs 1 (f) and 2. 
2. The Chamber may order: 
(a) the disclosure to the defence of documentary or other evidence available to 
the Prosecutor, having regard to article 44, paragraph 3; 
(b) the exchange of information between the Prosecutor and the defence, so that 
both parties are sufficiently aware of the issues to be decided at the trial. 
3. At the commencement of the trial, the Chamber shall read the indictment, 
satisfy itself that the rights of the accused are respected, and allow the accused 
to enter a plea of guilty or not guilty. 
The basic principle that the chamber dealing with the matter should be in charge of 
ruling on disclosure was thus already contained in the 1993 Draft. Furthermore, an 
“exchange of information” (but not evidence, as the latter would apparently be covered 
by sub-paragraph (a)) was envisaged by draft Art. 39 (2)(b). The purpose of this was 
apparently to prepare both parties for the trial, which can easily be reconciled with the 
procedural management aspect of disclosure; this is corroborated by the commentary 
                                                                                                                                               
of the Court pursuant to article 23; or any State which has consented to the Court's jurisdiction under 
article 26; or the Security Council pursuant to article 25; may by submission to the Registrar bring to 
the attention of the Court in the form of a complaint, with such supporting documentation as it deems 
necessary, that a crime, within the jurisdiction of the Court, appears to have been committed.” 
921  The question of the powers of the Prosecutor and its limitations was generally a much disputed issue 
in the genesis of the ICC and not least the Rome Conference, see, e.g., Werle, Principles of 
international criminal law, mn. 65 with further references. 
922  The “Bureau” of the Tribunal would be equivalent to the Presidency, see Art. 10 (3) 1993 Draft: “3. 
The President and the Vice-Presidents shall constitute the Bureau which, subject to this Statute and 
the Rules, shall be responsible for the due administration of the Court, and other functions assigned to 
it under the Statute.” 
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relating to Art. 39 of the 1993 Draft.923 Regarding the nomenclature of the provision, it 
is noteworthy that the draft obviously took the position that there should be an 
“exchange of information” between the Prosecutor and the defence, whereas an explicit 
disclosure obligation was only to be imposed onto the Prosecutor. On the other hand, as 
we have seen above, the transmittal of information to the Prosecutor by a State would 
also be called “disclosure”. 
Art. 44 (3) of the Draft, to which Art. 39 (2)(a) makes reference, and which was the 
second direct reference to disclosure between the parties contained in the draft, was 
worded as follows: 
Article 44. Rights of the accused 
[…] 
3. All incriminating evidence on which the prosecution intends to rely and all 
exculpatory evidence available to the prosecution prior to the commencement of 
the trial shall be made available to the defence as soon as possible and in 
reasonable time to prepare for the defence. 
We can thus state that the principle of compulsory disclosure of exculpatory evidence 
was already contained in the 1993 Draft, which is quite remarkable, given the fact that 
the ICTY-RPE had not yet been adopted and the ICTY Statute does not contain an 
according provision. As Art. 67 (2) ICCSt today, this duty of the Prosecutor was 
established within the framework of the rights of the accused. Draft Art. 44 (3) only 
refers to “exculpatory evidence available to the prosecution”; the draft statute does not 
establish a positive duty of the Prosecutor to search for exculpatory evidence. Even 
though the Working Group of the ILC was aware that “the purpose of the trial is to 
determine the truth of the charges against the accused”924, the truth finding aspect of 
disclosure was thus apparently not on the mind of the drafters. They based their 
considerations entirely on the human rights aspect, a fact which is corroborated by the 
commentary regarding Articles 39 and 44 of the Draft.925  
                                                 
923  1993 Draft, commentary regarding Art. 39, par. 4, p. 118: “The Chamber may also issue orders 
requiring the defence and the prosecution to exchange information so that both parties are aware of 
the issues to be decided at the trial and adequately prepared to present their arguments on those issues 
at the commencement of the proceedings. This will ensure that the trial is conducted efficiently and 
without unnecessary delays.” 
924  1993 Draft, commentary regarding Art. 52, p. 124. 
925  1993 Draft, commentary regarding Art. 39, p. 118: “The Chamber may issue pre-trial orders to ensure 
the right of the accused to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of the defence. Prior to 
the commencement of the trial, the accused has the right to receive all incriminating evidence on 
which the prosecution intends to rely and all exculpatory evidence available to the prosecution, 
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Furthermore, we note that the disclosure of incriminating evidence was also conceived 
of as a general matter of fair trial, as it is also included in the general provision on 
“rights of the accused”. Substantially, according to the Draft, the incriminating evidence 
which would need to be disclosed would comprise only such material on which the 
prosecution intended to rely. In contrast to the Ad Hoc Tribunals, we find no reference 
as regards disclosure of the material which supported the indictment when its 
confirmation was sought or any other evidentiary information; at the beginning of the 
proceedings, the accused was basically only informed of the charges against him and of 
his rights.926 Another difference to the Ad Hoc Tribunals at the time would be the fact 
that the indictment was not to be confirmed by a judge of the Trial Chamber (as in 
Art. 19 ICTYSt), but by the Bureau927, so that the Trial Chamber would not get to see 
any evidence beforehand. In any case, while it was envisaged that the indictment should 
be accompanied by supporting material, it is not entirely clear how much evidence 
would have to be transmitted to the Bureau for the indictment to be confirmed.928 
                                                                                                                                               
according to article 44, paragraph 3. Article 39 authorizes the Chamber to order the Prosecutor to 
provide such information.”; See also the commentary regarding Art. 44, p. 120: “The accused is also 
entitled to receive all incriminating evidence on which the prosecution intends to rely and all 
exculpatory evidence available to the prosecution in reasonable time to prepare for the defence, 
according to paragraph 3 of this article. Whereas the prosecution is required to provide the accused 
with all exculpatory evidence to give effect to the right to prepare and present a defence, the 
prosecution is not required to provide incriminating evidence which may be privileged or may 
jeopardize the safety of victims or witnesses if it is not going to be used by the prosecution during the 
trial.” 
926  In fact, the 1993 Draft foresaw that the indictment was to be transmitted to the accused via the 
respective national State (Art. 33 (2) of the 1993 Draft) together with the following documents 
(Art. 33 (1)(b) of the 1993 Draft: 
 “(i) the indictment and any order relating to the accused that may have been issued by the Court; 
 (ii) a copy of the Statute of the Court; 
 (iii) a copy of the rules of evidence and procedure of the Court; 
 (iv) a statement of the accused's right to obtain legal assistance as set out in article 44, paragraph 1 (b) 
of the Statute; and 
 (v) if one of the working languages of the Tribunal is not the principal language understood and 
spoken by the accused, a translation under the auspices of the Tribunal of the indictment and other 
documents referred to in the preceding subparagraphs.” 
927  See note 922 supra. 
928  The Draft merely provided:  
 “Article 32. The indictment 
 1. The indictment together with the necessary supporting documentation shall be submitted by the 
Prosecutor to the Bureau of the Court.” 
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What we also find in the 1993 Draft is the power of the chamber dealing with the matter 
to order the production of evidence which, as mentioned, is an integral part of the Ad 
Hoc Tribunals’ procedural regime as well as the American FRCP: 
Article 47. Powers of the Court 
1. The Court shall, subject to the provisions of the Statute and in accordance 
with the rules of procedure and evidence of the Court, have, inter alia, the power 
to: 
(a) require the attendance and testimony of witnesses; 
(b) require the production of documentary and other evidentiary materials; 
(c) rule on the admissibility or relevance of issues, evidence and statements; 
(d) maintain order in the course of a trial. 
[…] 
In contrast to Rule 98 of the RPE of the Ad Hoc Tribunals, however, this provision does 
not explicitly mention that the production of the evidence can also be required from one 
of the parties; it therefore appears possible that the drafters rather had third persons in 
mind. The commentary929 does not contain any information on this point. 
In the 1993 Draft we also find no reference to the relation and possible conflict of 
disclosure and the protection of national security information, as well as the protection 
of victims and witnesses. While national security interests are not mentioned at all, the 
protection of victims and witnesses is only spelt out in general terms.930  
 
6.3.1.2 The 1994 Draft 
The ILC Draft of 1994931 followed the basic structure of the 1993 Draft, even though it 
consisted only of 60 articles (as compared to 67 of the 1993 Draft). It thus also 
contained some procedural provisions relating to disclosure. As to the above mentioned 
power of the Prosecutor to require the disclosure of material from States which had 
been included in the 1993 Draft, the 1994 Draft did not retain it, thereby limiting the 
                                                 
929  1993 Draft, commentary regarding Art. 47, p. 122. 
930  See Article 46 of the 1993 Draft:  
 “Protection of the accused, victims and witnesses. 
 The Chamber shall take all necessary measures available to it to protect the accused, victims and 
witnesses, and may to that end conduct proceedings in camera or allow the presentation of evidence 
by electronic or other special means.” 
931  See note 909 supra. 
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powers of the Prosecutor.932 This is undoubtedly one of the attenuations due to political 
concerns for which the 1994 Draft has been referred to as “less satisfactory” than its 
1993 predecessor.933  
As regards disclosure between the parties, we once more find the power of the Court to 
rule on matters of disclosure. In contrast to the 1993 Draft, however, the 1994 Draft did 
not confer this power upon the chamber dealing with the matter, but upon the 
Presidency.934 Art. 27 of the 1994 Draft provided: 
Article 27: Commencement of prosecution 
[…] 
5. The Presidency may make any further orders required for the conduct of the 
trial, including an order: 
[…] 
(b) Requiring the disclosure to the defence, within a sufficient time before the 
trial to enable the preparation of the defence, of documentary or other evidence 
available to the Prosecutor, whether or not the Prosecutor intends to rely on 
that evidence; 
(c) Providing for the exchange of information between the Prosecutor and the 
defence, so that both parties are sufficiently aware of the issues to be decided at 
the trial; 
                                                 
932  Art. 26 (2) (“Investigation of alleged crimes”) of the 1994 Draft, which is a successor of Art. 30 (2) of 
the 1993 Draft, see section 6.3.1.1 above, was framed as follows:  
 “The Prosecutor may: 
 (a) Request the presence of and question suspects, victims and witnesses; 
 (b) Collect documentary and other evidence; 
 (c) Conduct on-site investigations; 
 (d) Take necessary measures to ensure the confidentiality of information or the protection of any 
person; 
 (e) As appropriate, seek the cooperation of any State or of the United Nations.” 
933  Bassiouni, The Legislative History of the International Criminal Court, Vol. I, at p. 63. See as to the 
difficulties in reaching consensus as regards the powers of the Prosecutor Guariglia in Lee, The 
International Criminal Court: The Making of the Rome Statute: Issues, Negotiations, Results, pp. 227 
et subs. 
934  The 1994 Draft now speaks of “Presidency” instead of “Bureau”. The composition, however, 
remained the same, see Art. 8 (3) of the 1994 Draft: “The President and the Vice-Presidents shall 
constitute the Presidency which shall be responsible for: (a) The due administration of the Court; 
(b) The other functions conferred on it by this Statute.” 
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(d) Providing for the protection of the accused, victims and witnesses and of 
confidential information. 
Some of the substantial content of this provision is now contained in Articles 57 (3)(c)935 
and 61 (3)936 of the ICC Statute. The differentiation between the confirmation stage and 
the trial stage was not yet known at the time of this draft. Therefore, there was no 
‘proper’ pre-trial stage, and accordingly also no pre-trial division or pre-trial chamber. 
In this regard, it must be noted that practically all of the functions which are fulfilled by 
the Pre-Trial Chamber under the Rome Statute were intended to be performed by the 
Presidency according to the 1994 Draft.937 The fact that the rulings on disclosure were to 
be taken away from the chamber dealing with the matter is quite remarkable. This does 
of course have the advantage that the chamber remains as unbiased as possible; 
however, to let the Presidency rule on these procedural matters might have resulted in 
being quite cumbersome – the chamber dealing with the matter is naturally, as it were, 
‘closer to the action’. Unfortunately, the commentary accompanying the 1994 Draft 
does not contain any information on this matter. 
Regarding the substantial scope of disclosable material, we note that the 1994 Draft 
went further than the 1993 Draft, in that “documentary or other evidence available to 
the Prosecutor, whether or not the Prosecutor intends to rely on that evidence” would 
need to be disclosed – as we have seen above, the 1993 Draft had specifically envisaged 
that only such evidence on which the Prosecutor intended to rely would have to be 
disclosed. Taken literally, however, this would have meant an all-embracing disclosure 
                                                 
935  “Article 57: Functions and powers of the Pre-Trial Chamber 
 […] 
 3. In addition to its other functions under this Statute, the Pre-Trial Chamber may: 
 […] 
 (c) Where necessary, provide for the protection and privacy of victims and witnesses, the preservation 
of evidence, the protection of persons who have been arrested or appeared in response to a summons, 
and the protection of national security information; […]” 
936  “Within a reasonable time before the hearing, the person shall: 
 (a) Be provided with a copy of the document containing the charges on which the Prosecutor intends 
to bring the person to trial; and 
 (b) Be informed of the evidence on which the Prosecutor intends to rely at the hearing. 
 The Pre-Trial Chamber may issue orders regarding the disclosure of information for the purposes of 
the hearing.” 
937  See Art. 8 (4) of the ILC Draft: “Unless otherwise indicated, pre-trial and other procedural functions 
conferred under this Statute on the Court may be exercised by the Presidency in any case where a 
chamber of the Court is not seized of the matter.” See also Guariglia in Lee, The International 
Criminal Court: The Making of the Rome Statute: Issues, Negotiations, Results, pp. 233 et subs. 
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duty – given the fact that in that case it would have been unnecessary to provide for the 
disclosure of exculpatory material (see draft Art. 41), it must be doubted if this was 
intended by the drafters. Concerning the evidence to be presented to the Presidency for 
the confirmation of the indictment, the 1994 Draft contained even less information than 
the 1993 Draft, apparently even leaving open whether any specific information would 
have to be presented at all.938 
As to the “exchange of information” contained in para. 5 (c), the provision remained 
substantially unaltered vis-à-vis Art. 39 (2)(b) of the 1993 Draft; also the apparent 
dichotomy of terms (“disclosure” obligation only from the Prosecutor to the defence, 
“exchange of information” both ways) was kept.  
A ‘new’ provision in this context was para. 5 (d), bestowing upon the Presidency to 
provide for “the protection of the accused, victims and witnesses and of confidential 
information”. Art. 46 of the 1993 Draft939 might to a certain extent be seen as a 
predecessor of para. 5 (d). However, Art. 46 of the 1993 Draft was actually retained in 
the 1994 Draft as Art. 43, situated in a somewhat unclear context, between provisions 
regarding double jeopardy and general “Powers of the Court”. It may therefore be 
concluded that this provision was meant to be closely related to the trial proceedings. 
Any reference to “confidential information” is lacking. However, the latter has, as we 
shall see, played a decisive role in the further development of the Rome Statute as well 
as in the practice of the ICC. 
The 1994 Draft maintained the principle of compulsory disclosure of exculpatory 
material, and also retained the systematical structure of this principle being phrased as a 
procedural right of the accused: 
Article 41. Rights of the accused 
[…] 
                                                 
938  “Article 27: Commencement of prosecution 
 1. If upon investigation the Prosecutor concludes that there is a prima facie case, the Prosecutor shall 
file with the Registrar an indictment containing a concise statement of the allegations of fact and of 
the crime or crimes with which the suspect is charged. 
 2. The Presidency shall examine the indictment and any supporting material and determine: 
 (a) Whether a prima facie case exists […]”. See in comparison, once again, Art. 32 of the 1993 Draft, 
note 928 supra. 
939  “Article 46. Protection of the accused, victims and witnesses 
 The Chamber shall take all necessary measures available to it to protect the accused, victims and 
witnesses, and may to that end conduct proceedings in camera or allow the presentation of evidence 
by electronic or other special means.” 
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2. Exculpatory evidence that becomes available to the Procuracy940 prior to the 
conclusion of the trial shall be made available to the defence. In case of doubt as 
to the application of this paragraph or as to the admissibility of the evidence, the 
Trial Chamber shall decide. 
The 1993 Draft (Art. 44 (3)) had lacked a provision regarding the competent authority 
to rule on matters of the disclosure of exculpatory evidence. In this respect, and in light 
of the fact that general matters of disclosure, according to Art. 27 (5)(b) of the Draft, 
should be ruled upon by the Presidency, it is remarkable that disputes between the 
parties regarding the disclosure of exculpatory materials should be settled by the Trial 
Chamber instead. In the light of the above mentioned possible argument of a 
“separation of powers” which should ensure that the Chamber dealing with the case 
remains as unbiased as possible, this separation is not understandable. A solution may, 
of course, lie in the substantive amendment of Art. 41 (2) vis-à-vis Art. 44 (3) of the 
1993 Draft as considers the time frame: Disclosure should now take place before the 
conclusion of the trial, as opposed to “as soon as possible and in reasonable time to 
prepare for the defence” as contained in the 1993 Draft; which may, regardless of the 
extremely wide margin of applicability of the provision (after all, before the conclusion 
of the trial can mean anything, if the Prosecutor is not forced to disclose as soon as 
practicable) explain the competence of the Trial Chamber941 Additionally, the Trial 
Chamber was also put in a position to control the fulfilment of the disclosure duties of 
the Prosecutor (which before trial would be up to the Presidency) – Art. 38 (1)(b) of the 
1994 Draft provided: 
Article 38. Functions and powers of the Trial Chamber 
1. At the commencement of the trial, the Trial Chamber shall: 
[…] 
(b) Ensure that articles 27, paragraph 5 (b), and 30 have been complied with 
sufficiently in advance of the trial to enable adequate preparation of the 
defence; 
[…] 
5. The Chamber shall, subject to this Statute and the Rules have, inter alia, the 
power on the application of a party or of its own motion, to: 
                                                 
940  The “Procuracy” is what we know today as the Office of the Prosecutor; see Art. 13 of the 1993 Draft 
as well as Art. 12 of the 1994 Draft: “1. The Procuracy is an independent organ of the Court 
responsible for the investigation of complaints brought in accordance with this Statute and for the 
conduct of prosecutions. […] 2. The Procuracy shall be headed by the Prosecutor, assisted by one or 
more Deputy Prosecutors, […]”. 
941  See for a more detailed discussion of the genesis of Art. 67 (2) ICCSt 6.4.4 infra. 
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[…] 
(b) Require the attendance and testimony of witnesses; 
(c) Require the production of documentary and other evidentiary materials; 
(d) Rule on the admissibility or relevance of evidence; 
(e) Protect confidential information; 
[…] 
To start “ensuring” that the disclosure duties have been fulfilled only when the trial has 
already started would, however, have been quite pointless, since the trial would have to 
be adjourned immediately if this were not the case. It is probable that at some point in 
time during the proceedings, in fact after the commencement of the prosecution 
(Art. 27), but before the trial, the responsibility to watch over the disclosure and 
exchange procedures would shift from the Presidency to the Trial Chamber. It should be 
presumed that this moment would be the constitution of the Chamber. Apart from the 
provision that the members of the Trial Chamber should be nominated by the 
Presidency,942 however, the 1994 Draft did not contain any information about the 
constitution of the Chamber; this was left to the prospective rules.943 This said and 
regarding the fact that the point when exactly exculpatory material would have to be 
disclosed was unclear, it must be concluded that the drafters at this point did not yet 
have a clear vision of the procedural ‘architecture’ of the future Court. 
Apart from that, we notice that the general power of the Chamber to require the 
production of evidence was kept. The only material difference apart from the notion that 
powers of the Court were now explicitly bestowed upon the Trial Chamber (i.e. not “the 
Court” as such) appears to be the inclusion of a power to “protect confidential 
information”. In future drafts of the Statute, as we will see, this issue gained importance 
and in fact developed a life of its own. 
 
6.3.1.3 The PrepCom Report 1998 
The 1994 Draft was extended and refined, at first by the Ad Hoc Committee established 
by the UN General Assembly,944 later by a Preparatory Committee (PrepCom), which 
                                                 
942  Art. 9 (5) of the 1994 Draft: “The Presidency shall nominate in accordance with the Rules five such 
judges to be members of the Trial Chamber for a given case. A Trial Chamber shall include at least 
three judges elected from among the persons nominated as having the qualification referred to in 
article 6, paragraph 1 (a).” 
943  See also the commentary relating to Art. 9 of the 1994 Draft, par. 5, p. 32. 
944  U.N. Doc. A/RES/49/53, 9 December 1994. 
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also had been established by the UN General Assembly.945 The latter had been given the 
task to prepare a consolidated text, based on the 1994 Draft, for the preparation of a 
conference of plenipotentiaries.946 However, even though the PrepCom was officially 
working on the basis of the 1994 Draft, many delegations introduced new proposals 
which oftentimes differed substantially from the original text, making the four years 
overall drafting process very difficult.947  
The work of the PrepCom was concluded by the presentation of the “Report of the 
Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court”948, 
which as its first addendum contained a comprehensive draft statute for the prospective 
ICC.949 It included, for many of its articles, several different “options” or alternatives for 
the discussions at the Rome Conference. 
In the PrepCom Draft we find the same basic system of disclosure provisions as in its 
predecessors. The general empowerment of the Court to rule on disclosure issues 
(Art. 29 (5) of the 1994 Draft) was now contained in Art. 58 (10)of the PrepCom Draft, 
which for its part contained two different options. They were framed as follows: 
10. The [Presidency] [Pre-Trial Chamber] [Trial Chamber] may make any 
further orders required for the conduct of the trial, including an order: 
(a) determining the language or languages to be used during the trial; 
(b)Option 1 
requiring the disclosure to the defence [of the relevant evidence that the 
defence requests] within a sufficient time before the trial to enable the 
preparation of the defence, of [relevant] documentary or other evidence 
available to the Prosecutor [, whether or not the Prosecutor intends to rely 
on that evidence] [which the Prosecutor intends to rely upon]; [if the 
Prosecutor fails to comply with an order under this subparagraph, the 
evidence in question will be inadmissible at the trial;] 
Option 2 
save in respect of documents or information referred to in article 54, 
paragraph 4 (g), and subject to subparagraph (f) below, requiring the 
disclosure to the defence of documents or information which are either 
                                                 
945  U.N. Doc. A/RES/50/46, 11 December 1995. 
946  Ibid., par. 2. 
947  See Fernández de Gurmendi in Lee, The International Criminal Court: The Making of the Rome 
Statute: Issues, Negotiations, Results, pp. 217 et subs., 224 et subs.  
948  Note 914 supra. 
949  Note 949 supra. 
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considered [material] [relevant] to the preparation of the defence, or are 
intended for use by the Prosecutor at trial or were obtained from the 
accused; 
(c) providing for the exchange of information between the Prosecutor and the 
defence, so that both parties are sufficiently aware of the issues to be decided at 
the trial; 
(d) providing [, at the request of either party or a State, or at the instance of the 
Court on its own volition,] for the protection of the accused, victims and 
witnesses and of confidential information;  
(e) providing [, at the request of either party or a State, or at the instance of the 
Court on its own volition,] for the protection and privacy of victims and 
witnesses; 
[(f) providing, at the request of either party or a State, or at the instance of the 
Court of its own volition, for the non-disclosure or protection of documents or 
information provided by a State the disclosure of which would [endanger] 
[prejudice] the national security or national defence interests of a State in 
accordance with criteria to be specified in rules made pursuant to this 
Statute.]950 
First of all, we note that the PrepCom, in preparation of the Rome Conference, and 
instead of opting for a specific model of pre-trial procedure, now leaves open the 
question of which entity within the Court should be competent to rule on the issues 
mentioned in paragraph 10 of Art. 58. This is arguably due to the fact that in the 
PrepCom Draft a hearing on the confirmation of the indictment951 was seriously 
contemplated, instead of a confirmation decision without a hearing as contained in both 
                                                 
950  Square brackets in original. 
951  In the present ICC nomenclature, there is no “indictment“, but rather “charges” and a “document 
containing the charges”, see Art. 61 (3) ICCSt. The PrepCom Draft, however, as well as its 
predecessors, still generally speak of an “indictment”, thus using the Anglo-American nomenclature, 
which is also utilised by the Ad Hoc Tribunals. 
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the 1993 and 1994 ILC Drafts;952 this thought seems to have first appeared in the 
PrepCom Report of 1996.953 
The different options regarding disclosure as foreseen in paragraph (b) are apparently 
partially based on the 1994 Draft and Rule 66 RPE-ICTY, respectively.  
Option 1 takes up the 1994 Draft with a few modifications, which were, however, put in 
square brackets so as to embrace several different alternatives. These include a 
limitation as to “relevant” evidence and/or evidence specifically requested by the 
defence; also a limitation to evidence intended for use by the Prosecutor was 
contemplated, meaning a step backwards compared to the 1994 Draft, which had 
widened the scope of disclosure obligations in this regard. An entirely new feature 
which had not been contained in the 1994 Draft is the contemplated inclusion of a 
possible sanction for non-compliance of the Prosecutor: the mandatory inadmissibility 
of previously undisclosed evidence at trial. 
Option 2, as mentioned, was apparently partially based on Rule 66 (B) RPE-ICTY954 (or, 
for that matter, Rule 16 (a)(1)(C) of the American FRCP), comprising disclosure 
obligations concerning material relevant for the preparation of the defence, planned to 
be used by the Prosecutor, or obtained from the accused. Option 2, however, also makes 
                                                 
952  See Art. 58 (4) of the PrepCom Draft: “[4. After the filing of an indictment, the Pre-Trial Chamber 
shall [in any case] [if the accused is in custody or has been judicially released by the Court pending 
trial] notify the indictment to the accused, [set a deadline prior to the confirmation hearing, until 
which the Prosecutor and the defence may add new evidence [for purposes of such confirmation 
hearing]], and set a date for the review of the indictment. The hearing shall be held in the presence of 
the Prosecutor and the accused, as well as his/her counsel, subject to the provisions of paragraph 8. In 
the hearing, the accused shall be allowed to object to the indictment and criticize the material on 
which it is based. […]” 
953  See 1996 PrepCom Report Vol. I, note 915 supra, par. 233, p. 51: “As regards the reviewing body, 
concerns were expressed over the concentration of authority vested with the Presidency as envisaged 
in the draft statute, and it was suggested that it would be more appropriate to give certain pre-trial 
responsibilities to another body, independent of the Prosecutor and the trial, and appeals chambers. In 
this connection, it was proposed that a pre-trial, indictment or investigations chamber be established to 
examine the indictment and to hold confirmation hearings, which would provide the accused with 
further necessary guarantees considering the very public nature of an indictment for serious crimes. 
The point was made that a permanent reviewing chamber would have the advantages of consistency of 
approach and avoidance of difficulties associated with a rotation of judges.” 
954  Which in April 1998 was worded as follows: “The Prosecutor shall on request, subject to Sub-rule 
(C), permit the defence to inspect any books, documents, photographs and tangible objects in the 
Prosecutor’s custody or control, which are material to the preparation of the defence, or are intended 
for use by the Prosecutor as evidence at trial or were obtained from or belonged to the accused.”, 
RPE-ICTY, 12th revision, November 1997. 
284 
 
reference to possible exceptions to disclosure based on confidentiality or national 
security concerns, as spelt out in Draft Articles 54 (4)(g) and 58 (10)(f). 
Art. 54 of the PrepCom Draft contained in option 2 (g), for the first time, a specific 
provision regarding the possible non-disclosure of evidence which had been provided to 
the Prosecutor on a confidential basis. The draft, which, with some modifications, 
ultimately made its way into the Rome Statute as Art. 54 (3)(e), was worded as follows: 
(g) where documents or information have been obtained by the Prosecutor upon 
a condition as to their confidentiality, which are, or are intended to be, used 
solely for the purposes of generating new evidence, agree that such documents 
or information will not be disclosed at any stage of the proceedings unless the 
provider of the information consents.955 
It is very reminiscent of Rule 70 RPE-ICTY,956 acknowledging the crucial importance of 
national security concerns in international criminal trials, which had only been fully 
recognized only after the ICTY had started its work. It is to be noted that the according 
amendment of Rule 70 RPE-ICTY took place in autumn 1994, thus at a very early 
stage, however too early to be reflected by the 1994 Draft of the ILC, even though the 
latter contains, in Art. 38 (5)(e), a general empowerment of the Trial Chamber to 
“protect confidential information”.  
The importance given to the security and confidentiality concerns of states and other 
providers of information, certainly at least partially based on the practical experience of 
the Ad Hoc Tribunals, runs like a thread through the PrepCom Draft. Indeed, while the 
1994 Draft had only occasionally made reference to national security or confidential 
information, from 1996 to 1998, in turn, the issue aroused rising interest and caused 
particular controversy.957 It has been noted that the relation between the Court and 
national systems was the most difficult task as concerns the drafting of the procedural 
provisions of the Rome Statute.958 In fact, Art. 71 of the PrepCom Draft, which 
                                                 
955  PrepCom Draft Art. 54 (4)(g) [option 2], p. 77. 
956  See section 5.3.4 above. 
957  Piragoff, Evidence, pp. 270 et subs., describes the discussions surrounding the topic as a “storm”. See 
also the nota bene accompanying draft Article 54 (g): “This paragraph, as well as articles 58, 
paragraph 10 (d) and (f) (Commencement of prosecution), 61, paragraph 2 (Notification of the 
indictment), 67, paragraph 2, 68, paragraph 9 (Protection of the [accused], victims and witnesses [and 
their participation in the proceedings]), 71 (Confidential information), 90, paragraphs 2 and 6 (Other 
forms of cooperation [and judicial and legal [mutual] assistance]) all relate to confidentiality and they 
should be examined with a view to avoiding any duplication or contradiction.” 
958  Fernández de Gurmendi in Lee, The International Criminal Court: The Making of the Rome Statute: 
Issues, Negotiations, Results, p. 226: “The most controversial issues […] pertained not so much to the 
exercise of powers of the Court over individuals, but to the relation between the Court and States.” 
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developed into Art. 72 ICCSt, is entirely dedicated to the protection of national security 
interests, and would possibly have a massive impact on disclosure.959  
In addition to the possible non-disclosure of evidence due to security interests, we also 
find the notion of the protection of victims and witnesses and its possible impact on 
disclosure in a more explicit manner than in the preceding drafts. Whereas the 1993 and 
1994 Drafts had only contained the general notion that the Chamber could rule on the 
protection of these persons, the 1998 PrepCom Draft, for the first time, contained a 
provision that particulars of witnesses and their statements could be withheld under 
certain circumstances. As we have seen above, the ICTY had, between 1994 and 1998, 
issued some decisions as to the anonymization of witnesses, which is probably one of 
the reasons why the drafters of the Statute saw a specific need for regulating this 
issue.960 
Article 68: Protection of the [accused], victims and witnesses [and their 
participation in the proceedings]  
[6. Notwithstanding paragraph 1 of article 58, if disclosure of any evidence 
and/or any of the particulars referred to in that paragraph will probably lead to 
the security of any witness or his/her family being gravely endangered, the 
Prosecutor may, for purposes of these proceedings, withhold such particulars 
and submit a summary of such evidence. Such a summary shall, for purposes of 
any later trial proceedings before the Court, be deemed to form part of the 
particulars of the indictment.] 
This provision obviously represents the predecessor of Art. 68 (5) ICCSt; we will shed 
some more light on the differences between the two provisions below.961 
Other than that, Art. 58 (10) of the PrepCom Draft kept the notion of “exchange” of 
information in preparation of the trial (draft Art. 58 (10)(c)) as opposed to “disclosure”; 
the same holds true for the general empowerment of the respective body (i.e. 
Presidency, Pre-Trial Chamber or Trial Chamber) to rule on “the protection of the 
accused, victims and witnesses and of confidential information” (draft Art. 58 (10)(d) 
and (e)).962 
                                                 
959  See as to the genesis of draft Art. 71 Piragoff, Evidence, pp. 275 et subs. 
960  See also 1996 PrepCom Report Vol. I, supra note 915, paras. 274, 281. 
961  6.6 infra. 
962  Why sub-paragraph (e) contains an additional notion of “protection and privacy” of victims and 
witnesses as opposed to “protection” of victims and witnesses as contained in sub-paragraph (d), 
remains unclear. 
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There was, however, an alternative option for Articles 58 to 61 according to the 
PrepCom Report put forward, which had been the result of an informal meeting of 
PrepCom members in Siracusa in April 1998,963 and meant to simplify the previous 
proposals regarding the pre-trial proceedings of the future Court.964 In substance, this 
alternative option for Articles 58 to 61 made their way into the Rome Statute. Draft 
Art. 61 (2) provided: 
A reasonable time before the hearing, the person shall be provided with a copy 
of the charges on which the Prosecutor intends to seek trial, and be informed of 
the evidence on which the Prosecutor intends to rely at the hearing. The Pre-
Trial Chamber may make orders regarding the disclosure of information for 
purposes of the hearing as may be appropriate under the Statute and the Rules. 
This wording constituted not only a simplification of Option 1 of Art. 58 (10)(b) of the 
PrepCom Draft, but also a limitation of prosecution disclosure, since it was now made 
clear that only the evidence on which the Prosecutor intends to rely at the hearing is to 
be notified to the defence – and indeed, the provision in this new wording does not 
contain the word “disclose” anymore, but only the word “inform”, which leaves plenty 
of room for interpretation at the expense of the accused. 
On the other hand and in any case, Art. 67 (2) of the PrepCom Draft maintained the 
right of the accused to disclosure of exculpatory evidence, as already featured in the 
preceding drafts: 
[Exculpatory evidence] [Evidence which shows or tends to show the innocence] 
[or mitigate the guilt] of the accused or may affect the credibility of prosecution 
evidence that becomes available to the Procuracy prior to the conclusion of the 
trial shall be [made available] [disclosed] to the defence. In case of doubt as to 
the application of this paragraph or as to the admissibility of the evidence, the 
Trial Chamber shall decide. [The provisions of article 58, paragraph 10 (f), will 
apply mutatis mutandis for the purposes of a decision made under this 
subparagraph.] 
It appears that the different options are, similar to Art. 58 (10) of the PrepCom Draft 
described above, a mix of the 1994 Draft and Rule 68 RPE-ICTY, the corresponding 
provision of the ICTY.965  
                                                 
963  “Further option for articles 58 to 61”, PrepCom Draft pp. 93 et subs., see Fernández de Gurmendi in 
Lee, The International Criminal Court: The Making of the Rome Statute: Issues, Negotiations, 
Results, p. 223 et seq. 
964  “Further option for articles 58 to 61”, ibid., note 25. 
965  “Disclosure of Exculpatory Evidence 
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As to the powers of the Trial Chamber, we find, as in the predecessors of the PrepCom 
Draft, the authority of the Chamber to proprio motu demand the production of 
(additional evidence): 
Article 64 
Functions and powers of the Trial Chamber 
1. At the commencement of the trial, the Trial Chamber shall: 
[…] 
(b) ensure that articles 58, paragraph 10 (b), and 61 have been complied with 
sufficiently in advance of the trial to enable adequate preparation of the 
defence; 
[…] 
6. The Trial Chamber shall, subject to this Statute and the Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence, have, inter alia, the power on the application of a party or of its 
own motion to: 
[…] 
(b) require the attendance and testimony of witnesses, and the production of 
documents and other evidentiary materials by obtaining, if necessary, the 
assistance of States as provided in this Statute; 
[(b) bis order the production of further evidence to that already collected prior 
to the trial or presented during the trial by the parties;] 
(c) rule on the admissibility or relevance of evidence; 
(d) protect confidential information;[…] 
The provisions of article 58, paragraph 10 (f), will apply mutatis mutandis for 
the purposes of orders sought under subparagraph (d) above. 
We see that these provisions follow the structure and, for the most part, the wording of 
the 1994 Draft. A major development must be seen in the further elaboration concerning 
confidential information according to sub-paragraph (d), which is now explicitly linked 
to disclosure. With regard to the powers of the Chamber, it is warranted to mention 
another interesting new feature of the PrepCom Draft, which is the explicit notion of 
truth-finding contained in the draft version of Art. 69 (3): 
                                                                                                                                               
 The Prosecutor shall, as soon as practicable, disclose to the defence the existence of evidence known 
to the Prosecutor which in any way tends to suggest the innocence or mitigate the guilt of the accused 
or may affect the credibility of prosecution evidence.”, Rule 68 RPE-ICTY as of the 12th revision, 
December 1997. 
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3. The Court has the authority to call all evidence that it considers necessary for 
the determination of the truth. 
Indeed, this “authority” complements the “powers” of the Trial Chamber listed in 
Art. 64 of the PrepCom Draft. It apparently goes back to French and German proposals 
which were contained for the first time in the PrepCom Report of 1996.966  
In this context, it also appears worth mentioning the developments regarding the role of 
the respective chamber, its involvement in the disclosure process and particularly its 
own access to evidentiary material in the preparation of the trial. As stated above, the 
1993 and 1994 ILC Drafts were somewhat unclear concerning the information which 
the confirming authority (i.e. the Bureau or the Presidency) would get to see in order to 
be able to confirm the indictment. The original version of Art. 58 of the PrepCom 
Draft967 is helpful in visualising the different options contemplated by the drafters: 
Art. 58: Commencement of prosecution 
1.[…] the Prosecutor shall file with the Registrar an indictment containing a 
concise statement of the allegations of fact and of the crime or crimes with 
which the suspect is charged in respect of each of the persons referred to, their 
name and particulars, a statement of the allegations of fact against them, and 
the characterization of these facts within the jurisdiction of the Court and shall 
be accompanied by [relevant] [sufficient] evidence collected by the Prosecutor 
                                                 
966  See draft Art. 121, proposed by France, in: 1996 PrepCom Report Vol. II, supra note 915, p. 187: 
 “Powers of the Chamber 
 1. The Trial Chamber may of its own motion call witnesses or experts to appear or have placed before 
it any new evidence which it deems useful for ascertainment of the truth. 
 2. The Prosecutor or the accused may request the appearance of a witness or of an expert who was not 
summoned to appear in accordance with article 118. The Chamber may deny such an appearance only 
if it can show that, for stated reasons, the appearance is not possible or if it will not contribute to 
ascertainment of the truth. The decision of the Chamber shall not be subject to appeal.”;  
 as well as the German proposal, ibid., p. 207:  
 “Determination of proof 
 In order to determine the truth, the court shall, ex officio, extend the taking of evidence to all facts and 
evidence that are important for the decision. The court will decide on the taking of evidence according 
to its [free] conviction obtained from the entire trial.”  
 This wording is a clearly a translation of a combination of sections 244 par. 2 and 261 of the German 
Code of Criminal Procedure. See also Piragoff in Triffterer, Commentary on the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court: Observers' Notes, Article by Article, Art. 69, mn. 4. 
967  As opposed to the alternative version, which in substance made its way into the Statute, see note 963 
supra and accompanying text. 
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for the purposes of confirmation [of the indictment] by the [Presidency] [Pre-
Trial Chamber].968 
In the 1996 PrepCom Report969 the preceding options had been framed as follows: 
A. I(i) The indictment shall be accompanied by all evidence collected by the 
Prosecutor. Other evidence may be freely added by the Prosecutor up until the 
time when the indictment is considered by the Preliminary Investigations 
Chamber. However, without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph (iii) of this 
article, no evidence submitted to the Registrar for purposes of accompanying the 
indictment may be withdrawn by the Prosecutor].970 
It thus appears that a very far-reaching information of the respective confirming 
authority had been contemplated occasionally, which was later given up in favour of a 
more limited disclosure or information towards the accused and the respective organ of 
the court. In the end, the ‘alternative proposal’ for the confirmation proceedings 
prevailed, in which the information necessary for the confirmation is not presented by 
the Prosecutor to the Court ex parte, but within an adversary hearing. 
The mentioned authority of the Court to call all evidence which it considers necessary 
for truth finding goes along with a corresponding duty of the Prosecutor to investigate 
‘neutrally’. Article 54 (12) of the PrepCom Draft provided: 
[12. (a) The Prosecutor shall fully respect the rights of suspects under the 
Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. 
(b) [To establish the truth the Prosecutor shall [ex officio] extend the 
investigation to cover all facts and evidence that are relevant to an assessment 
of the charge and to the legal consequences that may follow. The Prosecutor 
shall investigate equally incriminating and exonerating circumstances.] 
The notion of the named powers of the Court also appeared for the first time in the 
PrepCom Report of 1996; apparently the proposal also came from the French 
delegation.971 As previously mentioned, the combination of the duty of the Prosecutor to 
                                                 
968  Original draft of Art. 58, square brackets except “[…]” in original. The provision is followed by the 
different options of confirmation (i.e. with or without a confirmation hearing). 
969  1996 PrepCom Report Vol. II, supra note 915. 
970  Ibid., p. 120. 
971  1996 PrepCom Report Vol. II, supra note 915, p. 113: 
 “B. Duty of the Prosecutor 
 5. (a) The Prosecutor shall fully respect the rights of suspects under the Statute and the rules. 
 (b) [To establish the truth the Prosecutor shall [ex officio] extend the investigation to cover all facts 
and evidence that are relevant to an assessment of the charge and to the legal consequences that may 
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investigate neutrally with his duty to disclose exculpatory material, brings, at least in 
theory, the protection of the rights of the defence in international criminal procedure to 
a new level.  
Interestingly, the PrepCom Draft (as well as the Rome Statute) makes no reference 
whatsoever to disclosure by the defence, even though, as we have seen above, defence 
disclosure was implemented in the ICTY disclosure regime, and a reciprocal disclosure 
duty of the defence had in fact been contemplated during the drafting process of the 
Statute at least as early as 1996.972 It is quite probable that this issue was considered too 
controversial or too technical to be included in the Statute, and that it was rather left to 
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.973 
 
6.3.1.4 The Rome Conference 
Two months after the presentation of the PrepCom Report, on 15 June 1998, the Rome 
Conference started. Even though the provisions of Part 2 of the Rome Statute 
(jurisdiction, admissibility and applicable law), due to their political implications, were 
certainly the most difficult in reaching a consensus,974 the negotiations concerning the 
procedural provisions of the Statute at the Rome Conference were far from easy. Even 
though it was possible to agree on general principles, such as the need to compromise 
between the main legal systems of the world, the actual implementation of these 
principles, as we will see instantly, proved to be more difficult.975  
It had occasionally been contemplated to pass both the ICC Statute and the Rule of 
Procedure and Evidence as its annex at the same time.976 There had been proposals for 
                                                                                                                                               
follow. He shall investigate equally incriminating and exonerating circumstances.” It appears from the 
surrounding provisions that the proposal indeed came from France. 
972  See 1996 PrepCom Report Vol. I (note 915 supra), par. 274, p. 58. 
973  See 6.3.2 infra. See as to the efforts not to overburden the Rome Statute with too many technical 
details Fernández de Gurmendi in Lee, The International Criminal Court: The Making of the Rome 
Statute: Issues, Negotiations, Results, pp. 224 et subs. 
974  See Bassiouni, The Legislative History of the International Criminal Court Vol. 1, pp. 84, 89; see also 
Kirsch/Holmes, The Rome Conference on an International Criminal Court: The Negotiating Process, 
pp. 3 et subs. 
975  Fernández de Gurmendi in Lee, The International Criminal Court: The Making of the Rome Statute: 
Issues, Negotiations, Results, pp. 217 et subs.; Fernández de Gurmendi, The Elaboration of the Rules 
of Procedure and Evidence, at p. 251. 
976  See PrepCom Draft Art. 52, Option 1: “The Rules of Procedure and Evidence, including an 
elaboration of the elements of offenses that must be proven, annexed at ____, shall be an integral part 
of this Statute.]”; see also Fernández de Gurmendi in Lee, The International Criminal Court: The 
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the RPE during the drafting process; a complete set of rules had, for example, been 
jointly proposed by Australia and the Netherlands as early as 1996.977 This proposal also 
contained a complete disclosure regime, which, however, reiterated the disclosure 
provisions of the ICTY practically verbatim.978 Notwithstanding, to pass both the Statute 
and the Rules at the same time proved materially impossible.979 One principal means of 
compromise at the Rome Conference was thus to eliminate disputed details by leaving 
them for the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.980 
The differences concerning disclosure issues between the PrepCom Draft and its 
predecessors on the one hand and the Rome Statute on the other mainly lie in the 
definitive decision of the Rome Conference to adopt the above mentioned system of an 
oral confirmation hearing. Therefore, pre-trial disclosure as regulated in the Rome 
Statute now refers to pre-confirmation hearing disclosure as contained in Article 61 (3) 
ICCSt: 
Within a reasonable time before the hearing, the person shall: 
(a) Be provided with a copy of the document containing the charges on which 
the Prosecutor intends to bring the person to trial; and 
(b) Be informed of the evidence on which the Prosecutor intends to rely at the 
hearing. 
The Pre-Trial Chamber may issue orders regarding the disclosure of 
information for the purposes of the hearing. 
Obviously, this is very similar to the above cited alternative option for Art. 61 (2) of the 
PrepCom Draft. In fact, there appears to be no material difference between the PrepCom 
Draft and the ICCSt on this point, as Art. 61 (3) ICCSt is apparently even simpler than 
the draft. Along with the decision as to the model of pre-trial procedure came as a 
logical consequence that the Pre-Trial Chamber would be the competent authority to 
rule on the matter. The Trial Chamber, however, once it is constituted and dealing with 
the matter, according to Art. 64 (3)(c) ICCSt retains the competence to rule on 
disclosure issues. A “separation of powers”, involving a third or, for that matter, fourth 
                                                                                                                                               
Making of the Rome Statute: Issues, Negotiations, Results, p. 225. On the other hand, it had also been 
considered in the negotiation process of the Statute that the ICC, like the Ad Hoc Tribunals, should 
opt for judge-made Rules of Procedure and Evidence; see e.g., Art. 19 of the 1994 Draft. 
977  Draft set of rules of procedure and evidence for the Court, working paper submitted by Australia and 
the Netherlands, A/AC.249/L.2; see 1996 PrepCom Report Vol. I (note 915 supra), p. 3. 
978  See 1996 PrepCom Report Vol. II, note 915 supra, Rules 82 et subs., pp. 177 et subs. 
979  Fernández de Gurmendi, note 976 supra, ibid. 
980  Fernández de Gurmendi, ibid. 
292 
 
instance deciding over disclosure issues, as still contained in the 1994 Draft, was thus 
ultimately rejected.  
We also note that, in contrast to Option 1 for Art. 58 (10)(b) of the PrepCom Report 
Draft, the delegates at the Rome Conference refrained from including a mandatory 
sanction for the Prosecutor’s non-compliance with his disclosure obligations. Indeed, a 
mandatory non-admissibility of evidence in the case of non-disclosure generally 
conflicts, as we have stated regarding the situation at the Ad Hoc Tribunals, with the 
mandate of truth finding. 
The disclosure obligation of the Prosecutor regarding exculpatory evidence as contained 
in Art. 67 (2) ICCSt and in all previous drafts of the Rome Statute from the beginning, 
was kept: 
In addition to any other disclosure provided for in this Statute, the Prosecutor 
shall, as soon as practicable, disclose to the defence evidence in the 
Prosecutor's possession or control which he or she believes shows or tends to 
show the innocence of the accused, or to mitigate the guilt of the accused, or 
which may affect the credibility of prosecution evidence. In case of doubt as to 
the application of this paragraph, the Court shall decide. 
The plenipotentiaries opted for a simplification, and, to some extent, restriction of the 
wording of the PrepCom Draft.981 As to the competent authority within the Court, any 
notion of the Trial Chamber or the Presidency as contained in previous drafts was given 
up, merely stating that “the Court” is to decide. Even though this theoretically leaves 
room for a competence of the Presidency, in the light of the overall procedural 
architecture of the ICC as contained in the Statute982 (and, by now, further elaborated by 
the Rules), one would have to assume that the Chamber dealing with the matter would 
also be competent to rule on matters according to Art. 67 (2). 
Without explicitly mentioning disclosure, the respective chambers dealing with the 
matter are empowered to rule on the protection of victims and witnesses (Art. 57 (3)(c), 
as well as Art. 64 (6)(e); a general provision regarding the protection of victims and 
witnesses was introduced by Art. 68). Other than that, the Trial Chamber has, according 
to Art. 64 (6)(b) and (c) and Art. 69 (3), the authority to demand the (additional) 
production of evidence.983 While this is, as we have seen, not a new feature,984 the 
                                                 
981  See for the substantive details 6.4.4 infra. 
982  See only Art. 61 (3) S. 2, as well as Art. 64 (3)(c). 
983  This is in contrast to the Pre-Trial Chamber, which can be inferred from the general procedural 
framework of the ICC, and e.g., Art. 61 (7)(c)(i), whereby the Pre-Trial Chamber can “request the 
Prosecutor to consider providing further evidence”.  
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explicit reference to truth finding also made its way from the PrepCom Draft into the 
Rome Statute;985 the same holds true for the neutrality obligation and the explicit 
commitment of the Prosecutor to the finding of the truth.986 The ICC is thus the first 
international criminal court which incorporates truth finding explicitly as a fundamental 
principle laid down in its statute.  
The power of the Chamber to rule on confidentiality issues as contained in both the 
1994 Draft and the PrepCom Draft, was stricken from the Statute. However, the power 
is now contained in the already mentioned provision of Art. 54 (3)(e); the same holds 
true for Art. 72, the successor of the above cited Art. 71 of the PrepCom Draft. National 
security matters may thus also implicate severe restrictions concerning disclosure.  
As already mentioned, disclosure by the defence is not explicitly contained in the Rome 
Statute. On the other hand, the Statute obviously does not prohibit disclosure by the 
defence either; and provisions like Art. 64 (6)(d), which allows the Trial Chamber to 
order the production of additional evidence, leave room for disclosure by the defence. 
Finally, the notion of the “exchange” of evidence in preparation of the trial, which had 
been contained in all the predecessors of the Statute, was not kept; in fact, it does not 
appear in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, either. 
 
6.3.1.5 Conclusion 
It appears from this overview that almost all basic disclosure provisions contained in the 
Rome Statute were, in one form or another, present in all relevant drafts since 1993. 
From the beginning onwards, disclosure as a procedural feature was contemplated to 
become a part of the Statute itself, not merely of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. 
The acknowledgment that disclosure to the defence is an integral part of the fair trial 
rights of the accused, was contained in the drafts from the beginning. The relevant 
provisions were, in the course of the negotiations, structured and simplified. During the 
drafting process, however, while the overall procedural structure was widened, witness 
                                                                                                                                               
984  See, once again, Art. 47 (1) of the 1993 Draft, Art. 38 (5)(b) and (c) of the 1994 Draft, Rule 98 RPE-
ICTY as well as 17 (c) FRCP. 
985  See Art. 69 (3): “The Court shall have the authority to request the submission of all evidence that it 
considers necessary for the determination of the truth.” See also, once again, the legal obligation of 
the Prosecutor to truthfulness contained in Art. 54 (1) ICCSt. 
986  See, once again, Art. 54 (1(a) ICCSt: “The Prosecutor shall […], [i]n order to establish the truth, 
extend the investigation to cover all facts and evidence relevant to an assessment of whether there is 
criminal responsibility under this Statute, and, in doing so, investigate incriminating and exonerating 
circumstances equally […].” 
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protection became a stronger issue; the same holds true to an even larger degree 
concerning the protection of national security interests and confidential information, 
which often run counter to the interests of the defence. On the other hand, the truth 
finding means of the Court were strengthened and emphasized; this also entails the 
described empowerment of the Court to watch over the disclosure process. In this 
regard, one must also mention the commitment of the Prosecutor to the truth and his 
obligation to investigate incriminating and exonerating circumstances equally. Probably 
the most particular or even peculiar feature of the procedural architecture of the ICC is 
the separation between the confirmation stage and the trial stage. This obviously has 
significant practical consequences for disclosure; not only concerning disclosure 
between the parties, but also the role of the respective Chamber and its involvement in 
the disclosure process – not least as regards the Chamber’s own access to evidentiary 
information. However, the Statute is not clear about any structural differences 
concerning disclosure in the two stages, leaving the regulation of these and other issues, 
such as the question of whether the defence can also be obliged to disclose part of its 
evidence, to the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.  
 
6.3.2 The Rules of Procedure and Evidence987 
The work on the details of the procedural law of the ICC apart from the Rome Statute 
was thus left until after the Rome Conference. In order to draft the supplementary legal 
framework, a Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court 
(abbreviated, like the Preparatory Committee, PrepCom) was established by the UN 
                                                 
987  On the general process of negotiations concerning the Rules of Procedure and Evidence see 
Fernández de Gurmendi, The Elaboration of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence as well as 
Fernández de Gurmendi/Friman, The Rules of Procedure and Evidence and the Regulations of the 
Court. The following considerations are partially based on the cited works. Ms. Silvia Fernández de 
Gurmendi (who is now a judge at the ICC) served as Coordinator for the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence; see Summary of the proceedings of the Preparatory Commission at its first session (16–26 
February 1999), PCNICC/1999/L.3/Rev.1, 22 March 1999, par. 12. 
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General Assembly via Resolution F of the Final Act of the Rome Conference.988 All in 
all, between 1999 and 2002, the PrepCom gathered ten times.989 
The first session of the PrepCom took place from 16 to 26 February 1999, which was 
also when the ‘Working Group on Rules of Procedure and Evidence’, which naturally 
was in charge of elaborating the procedural rules relating to disclosure, took up its 
work.990 
The draft text of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence was, together with the Elements 
of Crimes, finalized and adopted at the end of the fifth session on 30 June 2000;991 the 
Rules were adopted by the Assembly of States Parties at the first session of the ASP in 
2002.992 
Generally, the discussions of the PrepCom on disclosure issues993 evolved around four 
questions: who should be under an obligation to disclose, what material should be 
disclosed, when should disclosure take place, and how, the latter question 
predominantly concerned with the role of the respective (pre-trial or trial) chamber 
within the disclosure process; it appears that the discussions were relatively difficult.994 
Quite a few questions could not be agreed on conclusively, and so were left 
“constructively ambiguous” to be further developed by the jurisprudence of the Court.995 
                                                 
988  Final Act of the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of 
an International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/10 (17 July 1998); Resolution F:  
 1. There is hereby established the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court. [...] 
 5. The Commission shall prepare proposals for practical arrangements for the establishment and 
coming into operation of the Court, including the draft texts of:  
 (a) Rules of Procedure and Evidence; [...]. 
989  See Bassiouni, The Legislative History of the International Criminal Court, Vol. 1, pp. 103-110. 
990  See Summary of the proceedings of the Preparatory Commission at its first session, note 987 supra.  
991  See Guide to the report of the Preparatory Commission, PCNICC/2002/3 (25 July 2002), B. 1. No. 7 
(p. 5), as well as the finalized draft, PCNICC/2000/INF/3/Add.1, (reissued as PCNICC/2000/1/Add.1, 
2 November 2000).  
992  New York, 3-10 October 2002, Official Records ICC-ASP/1/3. 
993  See generally on the negotiations in the PrepCom concerning disclosure Brady, Disclosure of 
Evidence. 
994  See Brady, Disclosure of Evidence, note 990, at pp. 403 et seq., as well as Fernández de Gurmendi, 
The Elaboration of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, at pp. 251 et seq., and Fernández de 
Gurmendi/Friman, The Rules of Procedure and Evidence and the Regulations of the Court, at p. 806. 
995  Brady, Disclosure of Evidence, ibid., at p. 404; see also Fernández de Gurmendi, The Elaboration of 
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. p. 240. 
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The first comprehensive proposal for the future Rules of Procedure and Evidence came 
from Australia, some weeks before the start of the session;996 a week later France also 
submitted a general outline for the future Rules.997 The Australian and French proposals 
proved to be the working basis for the overall drafting process of the Rules as a 
whole;998 as we will see below, this also holds true as regards the disclosure of evidence. 
The Australian draft Rules in their Part 5 (draft Rules 66-73) contained a detailed set of 
provisions concerning disclosure, systematizing, like the ICTY and the other Ad Hoc 
Tribunals, the different disclosure duties of the parties according to different types of 
evidence, as well as including a detailed set of exceptions to disclosure (Rule 71 of the 
draft Rules). Nevertheless, the system of the provisions on disclosure contained in the 
Australian proposal differs from the ICTY Rules, which is certainly due to the fact that 
the ICC Statute was already in place and the provisions had to be regulated according to 
it.999 The technical provisions regarding disclosure as now contained in the RPE-ICC 
can, for the most part, be traced back to the original Australian proposal. It is important 
to note that the Australian proposal was based on the assumption that the ‘bulk’ of 
disclosure should not take place before the confirmation hearing but before the Trial.1000  
A different approach was taken by two French proposals1001 which had been presented 
on 12 February 1999 and put much more emphasis on the confirmation hearing, and 
thus opined that a large part of the disclosure was to occur prior to it;1002 this of course 
                                                 
996  Proposal submitted by Australia, Draft Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal 
Court, PCNICC/1999/DP.1, 26 January 1999. This proposal followed a request to update Australia’s 
above-mentioned earlier draft which had been submitted jointly with the Netherlands (see, once again, 
the 1996 PrepCom Report Vol. I (note 915 supra), p. 3, as well as Vol. II, pp. 177 et subs.), 
Fernández de Gurmendi, The Elaboration of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, p. 241. 
997  Proposal by France. General Outline of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, PCNICC/1999/DP.2, 1 
February 1999. 
998  Fernández de Gurmendi, The Elaboration of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, p. 241. 
999  See also Fernández de Gurmendi, The Elaboration of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, passim. 
1000  See Brady, Disclosure of Evidence, note 990, at 405, as well as 6.3.2.1 infra. 
1001  Proposal by France on Rules of Procedure and Evidence: Part 3, section 3, subsection 2 and 3, 
respectively, PCNICC/1999/DP.7 (hereinafter: “first French proposal”) and PCNICC/1999/DP.8 
(hereinafter: “second French proposal”), both dated 12 February 1999. 
1002  See French General Outline of the RPE (note 997 supra) par. 10: “It would not be advisable to 
include a section on disclosure of evidence in the general provisions. Rather, it would seem that the 
Pre-Trial Chamber, during the pre-trial phase, should settle such matters, so that the trial itself is not 
disrupted by problems related to disclosure.” See also Brady, Setting the Record Straight: A Short 
Note on Disclosure and 'the Record of the Proceedings', at p. 263 et seq., Fernández de Gurmendi, 
The Elaboration of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, at p. 243, as well as Tochilovsky, 
297 
 
also would have had a strong impact on the question of the relation between the Pre-
Trial Chamber and the Trial Chamber.1003 The two French proposals apparently 
functioned as a kind of ‘counterweight’ vis-à-vis the Australian proposal, as far as 
disclosure was concerned.1004 They contain the “ancestors” of the procedural provisions 
regarding the Confirmation hearing, and the ones systematically ‘complementing’ the 
technical pre-trial disclosure provisions, such as the principle that the Chamber dealing 
with the matter should get to see the material disclosed between the parties.1005  
Finally, a week after the two proposals, an addendum to the second French proposal 
was filed,1006 which contained the ancestors of Rules 129 and 130, these two being the 
bridging provision for the transition from the confirmation hearing to the trial phase. 
Before we look at the development of the disclosure provisions in the RPE-ICC more 
specifically, it appears useful, for a better understanding, to describe in some detail the 
mentioned drafts of Australia and France, taking these two conceptually different 
proposals as a starting point for our overall analysis. After that, we will briefly 
enumerate the relevant documents containing draft versions of disclosure provisions, 
which for their part represent further developments of the Australian and French 
proposals, in order to enable the reader to better understand the synopses which we will 
use below to illustrate the development of each of the respective legal norms in some 
detail. For the further analysis, it is important to keep in mind the said different 
conceptions as regards the function of the confirmation hearing as well as the role of the 
respective Chamber – a divide which is most probably due to differences stemming 
from Anglo-American and Roman-Germanic legal thinking.1007 
                                                                                                                                               
Prosecution Disclosure Obligations in the ICC and Relevant Jurisprudence of the Ad Hoc Tribunals, 
at p. 844 et seq. 
1003  See Fernández de Gurmendi/Friman, The Rules of Procedure and Evidence and the Regulations 
of the Court, at p. 806. 
1004  Compare Brady, Disclosure of Evidence, at pp. 405 et seq. 
1005  Rule 121 (10) as well as Rule 131 (1) RPE-ICC. 
1006  PCNICC/1999/DP.8/Add. 1. Draft Rule 66.1 provided: 
 “Rule 66.2. Constitution of the Trial Chamber 
 Upon receipt of the decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber and the record of the proceedings, the 
Presidency shall constitute the Trial Chamber and shall refer the case to it. 
 The Presidency may also refer the case to a previously constituted Trial Chamber. 
 The decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber and the record of the proceedings shall be transmitted to the 
Trial Chamber.” 
1007  Hinting to this conclusion Brady, Setting the Record Straight: A Short Note on Disclosure and 
'the Record of the Proceedings', note 1002, at p. 264; see also Fernández de Gurmendi, The 
Elaboration of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, pp. 251 et subs. 
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6.3.2.1 The Australian Proposal 
As briefly mentioned, the Australian draft was, as far as disclosure is concerned, 
systematically modelled after the RPE-ICTY, a fact which was also expressly stated in a 
nota bene preceding the proposed rules for disclosure,1008 as well as in the nota bene 
which accompanied the respective provisions. The first nota bene contains a note 
concerning the envisaged purpose of disclosure in general – once again, the human 
rights aspect of disclosure, and in fact only the human rights aspect, is emphasized:  
The disclosure of evidence goes to the heart of the right of an accused person to 
a fair trial. Many issues are raised in this area.1009  
The fact that the numbering of the disclosure provisions contained in the Australian 
draft (Rules 66-73) is reminiscent of the numbering of the Rules of the Ad-Hoc 
Tribunals is coincidental. Even though the Australian draft was strongly influenced by 
the RPE-ICTY as concerns disclosure, the rest of the draft, for the most part, 
structurally does not resemble the RPE-ICTY. Just like the RPE-ICTY, the draft 
differentiates between disclosure obligations according to the kind of material that is to 
be disclosed: disclosure relating to prosecution witnesses (draft Rule 671010), inspection 
of material in possession of the Prosecutor (draft Rule 681011), disclosure by the defence 
                                                 
1008  See Australian Proposal, Note 996, before Rule 66 (p. 36): “The following rules seek to 
elaborate on the principles relating to disclosure laid down in the Statute. In doing so, they draw on, 
but do not adopt without amendment, ICTY Rules.”; see also Brady, Disclosure of Evidence, Note 
990, at 409 (note 17). 
1009  Australian Proposal, note 996, ibid. 
1010  “Rule 67: Pre-trial disclosure relating to prosecution witnesses 
 (a) The Prosecutor shall provide the defence with the names and addresses of witnesses whom the 
Prosecutor intends to call to testify at trial and copies of the statements made by those witnesses. This 
shall be done sufficiently in advance of the commencement of the trial to enable the adequate 
preparation of the defence. 
 (b) The Prosecutor shall subsequently advise the defence of the names and addresses of any additional 
prosecution witnesses and provide copies of their statements when the decision is made to call those 
witnesses. 
 (c) The statements of prosecution witnesses shall be made available in a language which the accused 
fully understands and speaks. 
 (d) This rule shall be read subject to rule 71.”  
 As expressly stated in a nota bene, sub-rule (a) is modelled after Rules 66 (A)(ii) and 67 (A)(i) RPE-
ICTY; sub-rule (b) resembles Rule 66 (A)(ii) RPE-ICTY. 
1011  “Rule 68: Inspection of material in possession or control of the Prosecutor 
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regarding ‘special defences’/grounds for excluding criminal responsibility according to 
Art. 31 (1) ICCSt (Rule 691012), restrictions on disclosure (draft Rule 711013), as well as a 
                                                                                                                                               
 (a) The Prosecutor shall on request permit the defence to inspect any books, documents, photographs 
and tangible objects in his or her possession or control which are material to the preparation of the 
defence or are intended for use by the Prosecutor as evidence at trial or were obtained from or 
belonged to the person. 
 (b) This rule shall be read subject to rule 71.” 
 This provision strongly resembles Rule 66 (B) RPE-ICTY, albeit without imposing reciprocal 
disclosure duties on the defence. 
1012  “Rule 69: Disclosure by the defence regarding the defence of alibi and certain grounds for 
excluding criminal responsibility recognized under article 31, paragraph 1 
 The defence shall notify the Prosecutor of its intent to: 
 (i) Plead the existence of an alibi; in which case the notification shall specify the place or places at 
which the accused claims to have been present at the time of the alleged crime and the names and 
addresses of witnesses and any other evidence upon which the accused intends to rely to establish the 
alibi; or 
 (ii) Raise a ground for excluding criminal responsibility provided for in article 31, paragraph 1 (a) or 
(b); in which case the notification shall specify the names and addresses of witnesses and any other 
evidence upon which the accused intends to rely to establish the ground. 
 This shall be done sufficiently in advance of the commencement of the trial to enable the Prosecutor 
to prepare adequately for trial.” 
 As the nota bene states, the wording of Sub-Rule (i) is identical to Rule 67 (A)(ii)(a) RPE-ICTY. Sub-
Rule (b) resembles Rule 67 (A)(ii)(b) RPE-ICTY, treating the “grounds for excluding responsibility” 
as special defences as understood in Anglo-American criminal law. See more on this below, 6.5.2. 
1013  “Rule 71: Restrictions on disclosure 
 (a) Reports, memoranda or other internal documents prepared by a party, its assistants or 
representatives in connection with the investigation or preparation of the case are not subject to 
disclosure. 
 (b) Where material or information is in the possession or control of the Prosecutor, the disclosure of 
which may prejudice further or ongoing investigations, the Prosecutor may apply to the Chamber 
dealing with the matter at the time for a ruling on whether the material must be disclosed to the 
defence. The matter shall be heard on an ex parte basis by the Chamber. If the Chamber rules against 
disclosure, the Prosecutor may not subsequently introduce such material or information into evidence 
during the trial without adequate prior disclosure to the accused. 
 (c) Where material or information is in the possession or control of the Prosecutor which is withheld 
under article 68, paragraph 5, such material or information may not be subsequently introduced into 
evidence during the trial without adequate prior disclosure to the accused. 
 (d) Where material or information is hi the possession or control of the defence which is subject to 
disclosure, it may be withheld in circumstances which would allow the Prosecutor to rely on article 
68, paragraph 5, and a summary thereof submitted instead. Such material or information may not be 
subsequently introduced into evidence during the trial without adequate prior disclosure to the 
Prosecutor. 
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reaffirmation that disclosure duties are ongoing (Rule 731014). The main difference to the 
ICTY disclosure regime of the time (14th revision of the RPE-ICTY, 4 December 1998) 
appears to be the lack of reciprocal defence disclosure obligations regarding tangible 
objects as was contained in Rule 67 (C) RPE-ICTY. In this regard, it may be noted that 
the proposal bases the limited disclosure obligation of the defence, i.e. concerning 
grounds for excluding criminal responsibility under Art. 31 (1) ICCSt, once again, on 
“fair trial rights for the Prosecutor”: 
The argument in support of the defence being required to notify its intent to offer 
such a defence is that it would be unfair for the Prosecutor to meet these 
defences on the run.1015 
                                                                                                                                               
 (e) Where material or information is in the possession or control of the Prosecutor which fells within 
the scope of article 72, its treatment shall be governed by the provisions of that article. 
 (f) Where material or information is in the possession or control of the Prosecutor which is protected 
under article 54, paragraph 3 (e), the Prosecutor may not subsequently introduce such material or 
information into evidence during the trial without adequate prior disclosure to the accused. 
 (g) If the Prosecutor introduces material or information protected under article 54, paragraph 3 (e), 
into evidence, the Trial Chamber may not order the production of additional evidence received from 
the provider of the initial material or information, nor may the Trial Chamber for the purpose of 
obtaining such additional evidence itself summon the provider or a representative of the provider as a 
witness or order their attendance. 
 (h) If the Prosecutor calls a witness to introduce in evidence any material or information which has 
been protected under article 54, paragraph 3 (e), the Trial Chamber may not compel that witness to 
answer any question relating to the material or information or its origin, if the witness declines to 
answer on grounds of confidentiality. 
 (i) The right of the accused to challenge evidence which has been protected under article 54, 
paragraph 3 (e), shall remain unaffected subject only to the limitations contained in sub-rules (g) and 
(h). 
 (j) The Trial Chamber may order upon an application by the defence that, in the interests of justice, 
material or information hi the possession of the accused, which has been provided under the same 
conditions as those set down in article 54, paragraph 3 (e), and is to be introduced into evidence, shall 
be subject to sub-rules (f), (g) and (h).” 
 This very detailed and voluminous set of exceptions to disclosure obligations is partially based on 
ICTY law, partially it aims at elaborating limitations contained in the ICC Statute. See nota bene to 
draft Rule 71 for details. 
1014  “Rule 73: Continuing requirement to disclose 
 If either party discovers additional evidence or material which should have been disclosed earlier 
pursuant to the Statute or the Rules, that party shall promptly notify the other party and the Chamber 
dealing with the matter at the time of the existence of the additional evidence or material.” 
 This Rule, as the nota bene states, is based on Rule 67 RPE-ICTY. 
1015  Australian proposal, note 996 supra, nota bene accompanying draft Rule 69. 
301 
 
This line of argument, as was shown in the introduction, must be rejected.1016 
Furthermore, the wording of the Australian draft proves that indeed, it focuses on pre-
trial disclosure, as opposed to pre-confirmation disclosure. It merely contains a nota 
bene addressing this latter point, doubting that a more specific provision than the one 
already contained in the Statute, Art. 61 (3) ICCSt, was needed: 
Rule 66 
Issue of disclosure orders by the Pre-Trial Chamber prior to hearing under 
article 61 
(N.B. Article 61, paragraph 3, provides, in part, that the Pre-Trial Chamber may 
issue orders regarding the disclosure of information for the purposes of a 
hearing under article 61. Consideration needs to be given to whether this 
provision needs to be elaborated.) 
The Australian proposal formed the basis for a working paper1017, which for its part is an 
“ancestor” of the technical disclosure provisions contained in Rules 76-83 RPE-ICC.1018 
 
6.3.2.2 The French Proposals 
In contrast to the Australian proposal, the two French papers, obviously inspired by 
Continental European legal thinking, do not contain any technical disclosure provisions, 
but merely state that the Chamber dealing with the matter should keep watch over the 
obligations as provided in the Statute concerning disclosure according to Art. 61 (3).1019 
The first one of the two French proposals, however, also contains the notion that the 
Chamber, in contrast to all jurisdictions we have looked at until this point, as a matter of 
principle should receive and get to see all of the evidence disclosed between the parties 
before trial.1020 This indeed demonstrates a fundamental break from adversarial 
principles which aim to involve the court as little as possible. Notably, the draft placed 
this part of the disclosure obligations under the section “Conduct of investigations and 
                                                 
1016  See section 1.3.1.4. above. 
1017  PCNICC/1999/WGRPE/RT.4, 25 February 1999. 
1018  Brady, Disclosure of Evidence, p. 406, note 8. Rule 84 has a different history, see more on this 
below. 
1019  See Rule 58.1 of the French draft, PCNICC/1999/DP.7: “In accordance with article 61, 
paragraph 3, the Pre-Trial Chamber shall take the necessary decisions regarding disclosure between 
the Prosecutor and the person […].  
 The Pre-Trial Chamber shall hold status conferences to ensure that disclosure takes place under 
satisfactory conditions. […]” See as to the second paper instantly. 
1020  PCNICC/1999/DP.7, note 1001 supra, Rule 58.2. 
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proceedings”, thus not explicitly referring to the confirmation hearing at this point, 
except from citing Art. 61 (3) – the investigations, according to Art. 61 (4) ICCSt, may 
continue until the confirmation hearing.1021 At the same time, it would be dysfunctional 
if the Prosecutor were allowed to go into the confirmation hearing with new evidence, 
without having to disclose it beforehand. The French approach is remarkable in the 
sense that the Rome Statute, as we have seen above, is unclear regarding differences 
concerning disclosure obligations during the respective phases of proceedings. The 
Statute does not explicitly envisage disclosure obligations during the investigation 
phase, except for the general obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence according to 
Art. 67 (2), which has to be fulfilled “as soon as practicable”. In addition to that, the 
disclosure procedures explicitly related to the confirmation hearing are contained in 
more detail in the second French proposal, which, for its part, explicitly adverts to the 
confirmation hearing, as its sub-heading reads “Preparation of the hearing on 
confirmation of charges”1022. This paper, consisting of two draft Rules on the preparation 
of the confirmation hearing (draft Rule 61.1) and the conduction of the hearing itself 
(draft Rule 61.2), however, goes somewhat beyond the communication of the material 
disclosed inter partes to the Chamber, and indeed probably further than anything 
previously known at international criminal courts. The relevant parts of the first 
provision of the proposal in this regard were drafted as follows: 
Subsection 3. Closure of the pre-trial phase 
Rule 61. Confirmation proceedings (in the presence of the person) 
Rule 61.1. Preparation of the hearing on confirmation of charges 
(a) […] 
Between this first appearance and the hearing on confirmation of charges, 
evidence shall be exchanged in accordance with rules 58 (1) to 58 (3). 
                                                 
1021  E contrario, one would be tempted to say that after the start of the confirmation hearing, further 
investigations must, at least at first, stop; however, the ICC Appeals Chamber held that this is not the 
case. Based on Art. 61 (9) ICCSt, the Chamber argues that while “ideally, it would be desirable for the 
investigation to be complete by the time of the confirmation hearing”, it is “not a requirement of the 
Statute.” Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, ICC Case No. 01/04-01/06, Judgment on the Prosecutor's 
appeal against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I entitled "Decision Establishing General Principles 
Governing Applications to Restrict Disclosure pursuant to Rule 81 (2) and (4) of the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence", Appeals Chamber, 13 October 2006, par. 54. See also 
Prosecutor v. Mbarushimana, ICC Case No. 01/04-01/10, Judgement on the appeal of the Prosecutor 
against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 16 December 2011 entitled "Decision on the 
confirmation of charges", Appeals Chamber, 30 May 2012, par. 44. 
1022  PCNICC/1999/DP.8, 12 February 1999. 
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(b) The Prosecutor shall make a list of the evidence which he or she has 
gathered and shall provide it to the Pre-Trial Chamber no later than 30 days 
before the date of the hearing on confirmation of charges. A precise description 
of the charges on which he or she intends to seek trial shall be attached to this 
list. 
The Pre-Trial Chamber, by virtue of article 61, paragraph 3, shall take the 
necessary steps to notify the person of the charges on which the Prosecutor 
intends to bring him or her to trial, and to transmit to him or her the list of the 
evidence gathered by the Prosecutor. This notification and this transmittal shall 
take place no later than 21 days before the date of the hearing on confirmation 
of charges. In accordance with article 61, paragraph 4, the Prosecutor may 
amend the charges or bring new evidence, but such amendments and new 
evidence must always be brought to the knowledge of the person and transmitted 
to the Pre-Trial Chamber no later than two weeks before the date of the hearing. 
(c) The person shall also make a list of the evidence which he or she has 
gathered and shall provide it to the Pre-Trial Chamber no later than two weeks 
before the date of the hearing on confirmation of charges. The list shall be 
transmitted to the Prosecutor no later than a week before the hearing.  
The two-week time-limit set in the preceding paragraph shall be reduced to one 
week if the Prosecutor amends the charges or brings new evidence under 
paragraph (b) of this rule. The transmittal provided for in the preceding 
paragraph shall then take place no later than the day before the hearing. 
[…] 
(f) The Registry shall put together the record of the proceedings before the Pre-
Trial Chamber. This record shall consist of all documents transmitted to the 
Pre-Trial Chamber pursuant to paragraphs (a) to (e) of this rule. It may be 
consulted by the Prosecutor and by the person. 
(g) Victims and their legal representatives, who shall have access to the 
proceedings by virtue of article 68 of the Statute and in accordance with the 
conditions laid down in rules (x) to (xx), shall be notified of the date of the 
hearing on confirmation of charges and of any postponements. 
They may consult the record of the proceedings put together in accordance with 
paragraph (f) of this rule. They may lodge written submissions with the Pre-
Trial Chamber no later than two weeks before the beginning of the hearing. 
Such submissions shall be added to the record of the proceedings and 
transmitted to the Prosecutor and the person.  
[…] 
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The relevant part of sub-rule (a) of the draft simply refers to the first French proposal,1023 
which, as said, provided that between the first appearance and the confirmation hearing 
disclosure (presumably according to Articles 67 (2) and 61 (3) ICCSt [exculpatory 
evidence and information regarding such evidence that the Prosecutor intends to present 
at the confirmation hearing]) shall take place inter partes between the Prosecutor and 
the defence, with the Chamber watching over the procedure and receiving all the 
evidence disclosed between the parties.  
What is particularly interesting, however, are sub-rules (b) and (c).  
Draft sub-rule (b) imposed upon the Prosecutor an obligation to submit a list of 
evidence to the Court; however, this list was, according to the French plans, not only to 
contain the evidence which the Prosecutor intended to present (which is the wording of 
Art. 61 (3)), but a list of “all evidence gathered by the Prosecutor”. It was thus 
apparently not planned to oblige the Prosecutor to provide the Court with the evidence 
itself, which practically would have resulted in a dossier approach, since a disclosure 
obligation of this magnitude can only be complied with by the handing over of a 
dossier, and would thus have departed entirely from disclosure in the formal sense 
(while, of course, resulting in full disclosure in the material sense). One is tempted to 
think that the handing over of a mere list of evidence was just to serve the procedural 
management of the confirmation proceedings; however, for this purpose, it would have 
been enough to only provide a list of the evidence the Prosecutor was planning to “rely 
on” at the confirmation hearing, as framed by Art. 61 (3), and not all of the gathered 
evidence. It may be that a balance between truth-finding and trial management was 
meant to be stricken, by enabling the Chamber to proprio motu take ‘investigative’ 
steps based on the information contained in the list of evidence. 
The comprehensive list of evidence was also to be supplied to the accused person, albeit 
not directly from the Prosecutor to the defence, but rather via the Chamber dealing with 
the matter, which would also have had the task to notify the accused of the charges 
brought by the Prosecutor against him, underlining the central function of the Chamber 
which was envisaged by the proposal. The question of an amendment of the charges as 
foreseen in Art. 61 (4) ICCSt, however, raises new doubts as to the envisioned relation 
between the list of the evidence and the evidence itself, since the draft was worded in 
the sense that the new evidence, pertaining to the new charges, had to be “brought to the 
knowledge of the accused” and “transmitted” to the Chamber – here, the draft sub-rule 
does not mention a list, but rather appears to refer to the evidence itself. 
                                                 
1023  See footnote 1019. 
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According to the draft, not only the Prosecutor, but also the person was obliged to 
“make a list of the evidence which he or she has gathered” (draft Rule 61 (1)(c)), 
meaning, just like the one of the Prosecutor, an all-encompassing duty. The list for its 
part was to be transmitted to the Prosecutor (presumably via the Chamber dealing with 
the matter, this notion can still be found in Rule 121 (6) RPE-ICC). The distinction 
between the duty of the Prosecutor and the duty of the defence apparently merely lay in 
the different time limits. It goes without saying that a mandatory disclosure duty of the 
accused of this magnitude would have been seriously conflicting with his privilege 
against self-incrimination. 
The draft thus envisaged independent (as opposed to only reciprocal) disclosure duties 
of the Prosecutor and the Defence, albeit only referring to “lists of evidence”. Whether 
this was supposed to be sufficient for a fulfilment of Art. 61 (3) ICCSt, is not quite clear 
– after all, Art. 61 (3) does not, as its predecessor, speak of “disclosure”, but of 
“information”. 
Sub-rule (f) imposed upon the Court, i.e., the Registrar, to create and maintain a record 
of the proceedings, which should contain all of the evidence disclosed between the 
parties via the Chamber. To be sure, the Rome Statute does not contain the notion of a 
record of the proceedings during the pre-trial phase, as Art. 64 (10)1024 refers only to the 
Trial Chamber and the trial proceedings. According to the French proposal, the 
Prosecutor and the accused would be entitled to consult the record; draft sub-rule (g) 
also envisioned a right of access to the record of the proceedings by the victims. 
The record of the proceedings would, according to the French draft, have been the 
central document of reference for all participants in the trial. It elucidates from the 
proposal that the delegation had something very close to a dossier system in mind.1025 
This view is corroborated by draft Rule 61.2 as contained in the second French 
proposal, which was framed as follows: 
Rule 61.2. Hearing on confirmation of charges 
(a) The President of the Pre-Trial Chamber shall ask the hearing Registrar to 
read out the charges as presented by the Prosecutor. The President shall then 
determine how the hearing is to be conducted and, in particular, establish the 
order and the conditions in which he or she intends the parties to explain the 
documentary evidence contained in the record of the proceedings. 
                                                 
1024  “The Trial Chamber shall ensure that a complete record of the trial, which accurately reflects the 
proceedings, is made and that it is maintained and preserved by the Registrar.” 
1025  In fact, the “record of the proceedings” in the French version of the RPE-ICC is called “le 
dossier de la procédure”. 
306 
 
(b) Before examining the record on the merits, the President of the Pre-Trial 
Chamber shall ask the Prosecutor and the person, and possibly the 
representatives of States, whether they intend to raise objections or make 
observations concerning the jurisdiction of the Court or the admissibility of the 
case, or concerning an issue related to the proper conduct of the proceedings 
prior to the hearing on confirmation of charges. 
[…] 
(d) During the examination of the record on the merits, and for each element of 
this record which the President of the Pre-Trial Chamber deems it necessary to 
present to the hearing, the Prosecutor's observations shall be heard, and then 
the person. The Prosecutor and the person shall present their arguments in 
accordance with paragraphs 5 and 6 of article 61. 
The President of the Pre-Trial Chamber may also invite victims or their legal 
representatives to speak, if they have been allowed to participate in the hearing. 
In this case, the person and the Prosecutor shall always have the right to speak 
again after the victims or their legal representatives. 
The Pre-Trial Chamber may order the appearance of a witness or an expert, on 
its own initiative or at the request of the Prosecutor or the person. The President 
shall question the witness or expert and then ask the Prosecutor and, 
subsequently, the person whether they have any questions to put to the witness 
or expert.  
When he or she considers the elements of the record of the proceedings to have 
been sufficiently argued, the President of the Pre-Trial Chamber shall ask the 
victims or their legal representatives to present their final observations. He or 
she shall then ask the Prosecutor to present his oral submissions, and then the 
person to present his or her defence. The President of the Pre-Trial Chamber 
may, in exceptional cases, authorize a party to speak again. In all cases, the 
person shall be the last to speak. 
The hearing was thus envisaged to be conducted “according to the record of the 
proceedings”, and indeed this principle is still contained in Rule 122 (1) RPE-ICC.1026 
Draft Rule 61.2 (b), however, which stated that the hearing should be conducted by 
“examining the record on the merits” would have given the procedural framework yet 
another ‘inquisitorial twist’; the same holds true for draft sub-rule (d), which reiterated 
the wording of draft sub-rule (b) and also spoke of “elements of the record of the 
                                                 
1026  “The Presiding Judge shall determine how the hearing is to be conducted and, in particular, may 
establish the order and the conditions under which he or she intends the evidence contained in the 
record of the proceedings to be presented.” 
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proceedings” being “sufficiently argued”. To be sure, the notion of a “record on the 
merits” is not contained in the procedural framework of the ICC anymore. 
It is doubtful why draft sub-rule (a) referred specifically to the documentary evidence 
contained in the record of the proceedings, given the fact that other evidence, such as 
witness statements, would in any case have been disclosed by this stage and therefore 
contained in the record. This may, however, be due to the fact that witnesses would be 
heard by the Court anyway, whereas documentary evidence would require comments 
from the parties. In any case, draft Rule 61.2 taken as a whole shows the predominant 
role envisaged for the Presiding Judge by the French draft. 
As may be seen from this short overview, the draft Rules contained in the two French 
papers of 12 February 1999 (draft Rules 58 and 61), were the early ancestors of 
Rules 121 and 122 RPE-ICC.1027  
 
6.3.2.3 The further developments1028 
6.3.2.3.1 Rules 76 to 83, Rule 121 
As shortly mentioned above, the further development of the disclosure provisions took 
place based on the Australian proposal on the one hand, and the French proposals on the 
other. Whereas the Australian proposal contained the ancestors of Rules 76 to 84, which 
are the principal technical disclosure provisions in the procedural framework of the 
ICC, the French proposals predominantly tried to introduce a ‘limited’ or ‘down-sized’ 
dossier system, one of whose principal features, namely the information of the Chamber 
dealing with the matter, however, has made its way into the criminal procedure of the 
ICC. 
At the end of the First Session of the PrepCom, these two ‘roots’ developed into two 
discussion papers, one of which was based on the French proposals and thus mainly 
concerned with the confirmation hearing,1029 the other chiefly on the Australian one 
containing more general disclosure rules.1030 It has been stated that the first discussion 
                                                 
1027  See also Brady, Disclosure of Evidence, at p. 406, note 7. 
1028  The following remarks regarding the drafting process are chiefly based on Brady, Disclosure of 
Evidence, pp. 405 et subs., as well as Brady, Setting the Record Straight: A Short Note on Disclosure 
and 'the Record of the Proceedings'. 
1029  PCNICC/1999/WGRPE/RT.3, 25 February 1999, hereinafter: “Discussion Paper 1” or “the first 
discussion paper”, chiefly relevant for Rule 121. 
1030  PCNICC/1999/WGRPE/RT.4, 25 February 1999, hereinafter: “Discussion Paper 2” or “the 
second discussion paper”.  
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paper contained the ancestors of Rule 121 RPE-ICC, which determines the role of the 
responsible chamber concerning the disclosure process before the confirmation hearing, 
whereas the second discussion paper contained the ancestors of the technical provisions 
of Rules 76 to 83 RPE-ICC.1031 While this is correct, it is worth mentioning that the 
second discussion paper, which was based on the Australian proposal, already contained 
the feature of communication of the evidence disclosed between the parties to the 
Chamber; which originally was a French idea, and also made its way into Rule 121 
RPE-ICC.1032  
The two discussion papers were incorporated into the annex to the summary of the first 
session of the PrepCom1033 without further modifications.  
The next discussions of the disclosure provisions took place during the second PrepCom 
session. They resulted in a “revised discussion paper”1034, which, again, was taken over 
unmodified into the annex of the second report of the PrepCom.1035 The Rules were not 
amended during the third and forth sessions of the PrepCom, and hence appeared in the 
respective reports in an unmodified way.1036 
At an inter-sessional meeting in Mont Tremblant, Canada, the disclosure rules were 
discussed again and obtained a separate chapter, between the confirmation hearing and 
the trial, as elucidates from the outcome report of that meeting.1037 At the Mont 
Tremblant meeting, the Rules were also restructured in that the sub-rules, which until 
that point had been identified by letters, now obtained numbers. 
Finally, at the fifth session of the PrepCom in June 2000, the disclosure provisions were 
modified once more. The “informal” and “informal-informal” discussions held at the 
fifth session1038 led to, as far as our context is concerned, two more discussion papers,1039 
                                                 
1031  Brady, Disclosure of Evidence, p. 406, notes 7 and 8. 
1032  Compare draft Rule 5.12 of Discussion Paper 2, note 1030 supra. 
1033  PCNICC/1999/L.3/Rev.1, 2 March 1999. 
1034  PCNICC/1999/WGRPE/RT.6, 5 August 1999. 
1035  PCNICC/1999/L.4/Rev.1, 18 August 1999. 
1036  PCNICC/1999/L.5/Rev.l/Add.1 (22 December 1999), as well as PCNICC/2000/L.1/Rev.1/Add.1 
(10 April 2000), see also Brady, Disclosure of Evidence, p. 406, note 10. 
1037  “Outcome of the inter-sessional meeting held at Mont Tremblant, Canada, from 30 April to 
5 May 2000, circulated at the request of Canada”, PCNICC/2000/WGRPE/INF/1, 24 May 2000. 
1038  Brady, Disclosure of Evidence, p. 406. 
1039  “Discussion paper proposed by the Coordinator regarding rules of procedure and evidence 
relating to Part 5 of the Rome Statute, concerning investigation and prosecution, Chapter 6: 
Disclosure”, PCNICC/2000/WGRPE(5)/RT.2, 23 June 2000; as well as “Discussion paper proposed 
by the Coordinator regarding rules of procedure and evidence relating to Part 5 of the Rome Statute, 
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which, with only one further change, were incorporated into the different parts of the 
report of the Working Group on Rules of Procedure and Evidence.1040 Without further 
amendments, the finalized wording of the Working Group report was attached as an 
addendum to the report of the PrepCom.1041 As mentioned previously, this draft was 
adopted as the RPE-ICC by the ASP.1042 
Theoretically, counting the drafts from the first proposals to the final RPE, we could 
thus discern twelve different versions of the respective norms. However, as previously 
mentioned, the respective wording contained in the Working Group reports, in all but 
one case,1043 equals the one contained in the respective discussion papers. Furthermore, 
there were no changes in the third and fourth sessions of the PrepCom. At last, the 
finalized draft and the final RPE have, except for the different numbering, the exact 
same wording as the last Working Group report of 27 June 2000. It therefore suffices 
for most provisions that we compare five different draft versions: 
 1. The respective Australian1044 and French1045 Proposals 
 2. The annex to the Summary of the first session of the PrepCom1046, equalling 
the respective discussion papers1047 
 3. The appendix to the Summary of the second session of the PrepCom1048, 
equalling the “revised discussion paper”1049 
 4. The outcome of the inter-sessional meeting in Mont Tremblant,1050 and 
                                                                                                                                               
concerning investigation and prosecution, Chapter 5: Investigation and prosecution”, 
PCNICC/2000/WGRPE(5)/RT.3, 23 June 2000. 
1040  Hereinafter: “Working Group Report”; in our context, three different parts of the working group 
report are relevant: “Chapter 5: Investigation and prosecution”, PCNICC/2000/WGRPE/L.5; 
“Chapter 6: Disclosure”, PCNICC/2000/WGRPE/L.6; as well as “Chapter 8: Evidence”, 
PCNICC/2000/WGRPE/L.8; all dated 27 June 2000. The only change vis-à-vis the discussion paper of 
23 June appears to be the inclusion of the last sentence of Rule 5.32 (3), equalling Rule 81 (3) RPE-
ICC. See more on this below (section 6.6.2). 
1041  Report of the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, 
PCNICC/2000/INF/3/Add.1, 12 July 2000. 
1042  See note 992 above. 
1043  See note 1040 supra. 
1044  See note 996 supra, relevant for all synoptical overviews except for Rules 121, 73 and 84. 
1045  See note 1001 supra, relevant for the synoptical overview of Rule 121. 
1046  See note 1033 supra. 
1047  See notes 1029 and 1030 supra. 
1048  See note 1035 supra. 
1049  See note 1034 supra. 
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 5. The final version of the RPE, which equals, with the said exception 
concerning Rule 81, both the Working Group report1051 and the respective preceding 
discussion papers1052. 
For Rule 81, there is a difference between the discussion paper of 23 June 2000 and the 
Working Group report, between which we have to distinguish; we will in this case thus 
have to compare six different versions.  
 
6.3.2.3.2 Rules 73 and 84 
As regards Rules 73 (dealing with privileged information) and 84 (“disclosure and 
additional evidence for trial”), the structure is a little different, because these two Rules 
were not discussed during the meetings specifically on disclosure, but rather during 
those on the trial proceedings;1053 there are therefore no references as to these provisions 
in some of the above-mentioned documents dealing with disclosure.  
The starting point regarding Rule 73, however, remains the Australian Draft of 
26 January 1999.1054  
At the first session of the PrepCom, the trial provisions were notmade an issue; the first 
discussions, which took place in Siracusa, and were apparently influenced by informal 
proposals by France and Italy,1055 resulted in a discussion paper of 1 July 2000,1056 
which, in addition to the ancestor of Rule 73, contains the original version of Rule 84 
(which had not been contained in the Australian Draft). The paper was revised shortly 
afterwards,1057 and, a few days later, corrected once more.1058 With this wording, it 
                                                                                                                                               
1050  See note 1037 supra. 
1051  See note 1040 supra; the one on “Chapter 8: Evidence” is relevant for Rule 73; the one on 
“Chapter 5: Investigation and prosecution” is relevant for Rule 121; and “Chapter 6: Disclosure” is 
relevant for all other provisions. 
1052  See note 1039 supra. 
1053  See Lewis, Trial Procedure, p. 539.  
1054  Note 1001 supra; the French papers did not play any role in this regard. 
1055  Lewis, Trial Procedure, ibid. 
1056  “Discussion paper proposed by the Coordinator, Part 6 of the Rome Statute: The Trial”, 
PCNICC/1999/WGRPE/RT.5, 1 July 1999. 
1057  “Revised Discussion paper proposed by the Coordinator, Part 6 of the Rome Statute: The Trial”, 
PCNICC/1999/WGRPE/RT.5/Rev.1/Add.1, 6 August 1999. 
1058  “Revised discussion paper proposed by the Coordinator, Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
related to Part 6 of the Statute”, PCNICC/1999/WGRPE/RT.5/Rev.1, 11 August 1999. Lewis, Trial 
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appeared in the appendix of the summary of the second PrepCom.1059 The said 
provisions were also covered in the Mont Tremblant meeting and thus appear, 
renumbered, in the “outcome” of the inter-sessional meeting.1060 After that, they appear 
in the relevant Working Group reports1061 and, of course, in the final draft of the RPE. 
While, again, there are theoretically nine different versions of the respective provisions 
to compare, in practice it is sufficient to take a look at four versions as regards Rule 73, 
and only two different versions of Rule 84, the content of which was not altered 
anymore after the revised discussion paper of 6 August 1999.1062 
 
6.3.2.3.3 Rules 129, 130 
Rules 129 and 130 deal with the transition from the confirmation proceedings to the 
trial phase, and determine the fate of the record of the proceedings before the Pre-Trial 
Chamber. The starting point of their history is different from all other provisions. Both 
Rules go back to an addendum to the second French proposal,1063 which was later 
revised.1064 Without any changes, they are next contained in the revised discussion paper 
of 5 August 1999 which also contained the mentioned general disclosure provisions.1065 
Naturally, they are also contained in the report of the second PrepCom and the Mont 
Tremblant meeting outcome, as well as in the discussion paper of 23 June concerning 
Chapter 5 (investigation and prosecution), which also contained the ancestors of 
Rule 121 RPE-ICC.1066 As is the case with most other provisions, there were no changes 
of the provisions after that discussion paper, i.e. that the text of the discussion paper 
equals that of the final rules. 
 
In the following, we will, similar to our analysis of the Ad Hoc Tribunals’ disclosure 
regimes, look at the relevant provisions one by one, in a systematical order. We will 
                                                                                                                                               
Procedure, at p. 539, note 3, appears to be mistaken when he states that this document dates from 
12 August 1999. 
1059  Note 1035 supra. 
1060  Note 1037 supra. 
1061  Note 1040 supra. 
1062  Note 1057 supra. 
1063  PCNICC/1999/DP.8/Add.l, 19 February 1999. 
1064  PCNICC/1999/DP.8/Add.1/Rev.1, 29 June 1999. 
1065  Note 1034 supra. 
1066  Note 1039 supra. 
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move from “more specific” to “less specific”, since the more general disclosure 
obligations, like the one to disclose exculpatory material, may serve as residuary 
clauses. Where appropriate, reference to relevant jurisprudence will be made. 
 
6.4 Disclosure by the Prosecutor 
As is the case at the Ad Hoc Tribunals as well as in national jurisdictions, also at the 
ICC the Prosecutor carries the main burden of disclosure obligations. As previously 
mentioned, disclosure by the Prosecutor is regulated in the Rome Statute and the Rules 
of Procedure and Evidence. In fact, it appears that in virtually all cases of disclosure, the 
Statute and the Rules need to be applied jointly.  
Especially in the early jurisprudence of the ICC, disclosure was apparently occasionally 
based on provisions of the Rome Statute alone, or even just on general principles. In the 
early phase of the Lubanga proceedings, the Single Judge without further ado based a 
pre-confirmation disclosure obligation of the Prosecutor, ‘abstractly’, as it were, on 
Art. 61 (3)(b) ICCSt, where the latter norm, at least on the face of it, only imposes a 
duty of information1067 regarding the evidence the Prosecutor intends to rely on during 
the confirmation hearing.1068 The same Single Judge, even though also citing provisions 
contained in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, applied Art. 67 (1)(b), which 
guarantees the right of the defence to have adequate time and facilities for the 
preparation of the defence, apparently as directly granting a right to disclosure.1069 To 
                                                 
1067  This is arguably less than disclosure, see already 6.3.1.3 supra; the term “disclosure”, which was 
originally contained, was replaced. 
1068  Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, ICC Case No. 01/04-01/06, Decision Requesting Observations of 
the Prosecution and the Duty Counsel for the Defence on the System of Disclosure and Establishing 
an Interim System of Disclosure, Pre-Trial Chamber (Single Judge), 23 March 2006, p. 3: “[…] the 
prosecution's obligation to disclose to the defence within a reasonable period of time the Incriminating 
Evidence pursuant to article 61 (3) (b) of the Statute […]”. It is also highly questionable if one can, as 
the Single Judge apparently does, equalise “the evidence on which the Prosecutor intends to rely at the 
hearing” with “incriminating evidence”. 
1069  See Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, ICC Case No. 01/04-01/06, Decision on the Final System of 
Disclosure and the Establishment of a Timetable, Pre-Trial Chamber (Single Judge), 15 May 2006, 
par. 53: “Hence, while articles 67 (1) (b) and 67 (2) of the Statute and rule 77 of the Rules impose on 
the Prosecution the obligation to disclose to the Defence before the confirmation hearing those 
materials that are potentially exculpatory or are otherwise material for the Defence's preparation for 
the confirmation hearing, […]”, as well as par. 73: “In respect of the materials which the Prosecution 
must disclose to the Defence under articles 67 (1) (b) and 67 (2) of the Statute and rule 77 of the Rules 
and which neither party intends to use at the confirmation hearing, […]”. 
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interpret disclosure provisions contained in the Statute and the Rules in accordance with 
general principles laid down in the Statute or elsewhere is one thing; to apply them 
directly as granting specific and concrete procedural rights is quite another. 
It therefore appears reasonable, as previously signalized, to start with the specific 
disclosure provisions as contained predominantly in the Rules, for it is these norms 
which, for their part, shape the content of norms such as Art. 61 (3)(b) ICCSt.1070 
 
6.4.1 Rule 76 RPE-ICC: Pre-trial disclosure relating to prosecution 
witnesses 
Rule 76 RPE-ICC relates to prosecution witnesses and their prior testimony. Its wording 
can be traced back to the very first proposal of Australia of 26 January 1999, which for 
its part, as mentioned above, was based on the RPE-ICTY,1071 to be more precise, on 
Rules 66 (A)(ii) and 67 (A)(i), a fact that is also expressly stated in the proposal.1072 Few 
substantive changes were made in the course of the negotiations. For ease of reference, 
the development shall be demonstrated by a synoptical overview: 
                                                 
1070  See also Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, ICC Case No. 01/04-01/06, Judgment on the appeal of 
Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I entitled "Second Decision on 
the Prosecution Requests and Amended Requests for Redactions under Rule 81", Separate Opinion by 
Judge Georghios M. Pikis, Appeals Chamber, 14 December 2006, p. 25, par. 4. 
1071  See, once again, Australian Proposal, note 996 supra. 
1072  Ibid., nota bene 3. 
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Australian Proposal, 
26 January 19991073 
Discussion Paper, 
25 February 1999 / 
PrepCom First Session 
Summary, Annex 1, 
2 March 1999 
Revised Discussion 
Paper, 5 August 1999 / 
PrepCom Second Session 
Summary, Appendix, 
18 August 1999 
Mont Tremblant meeting 
outcome, 24 May 2000 
Discussion Paper, 23 June 
2000 / Working Group 
Report, 27 June 2000 / 
Final Draft, 30 June 2000 
/ RPE-ICC 
Rule 67  
Pre-trial disclosure 
relating to prosecution 
witnesses 
(a) The Prosecutor shall 
provide the defence with 
the names and addresses  
 
 
of witnesses whom the 
Prosecutor intends to call 
to testify at trial  
 
and copies of  
 
the statements made by 
those witnesses.  
 
This shall be done 
sufficiently in advance  
of the commencement of 
the trial  
 
to enable the adequate 
preparation of the 
defence. 
 
(b) The Prosecutor shall 
subsequently advise the 
defence of the names and 
addresses  
 
of any additional 
prosecution witnesses and 
provide copies of their 
statements when the 
decision is made to call 
those witnesses. 
 
(c) The statements of 
prosecution witnesses 
shall be made available in  
 
a language which the 
accused fully understands 
and speaks. 
 
(d) This rule shall be read 
subject to rule 71. 
Rule 5.15 
Pre-trial disclosure 
relating to prosecution 
witnesses 
(a) The Prosecutor shall 
provide the defence with 
the names  
 
 
of witnesses whom the 
Prosecutor intends to call 
to testify at trial  
 
and copies of  
 
the statements made by 
those witnesses.  
 
This shall be done 
sufficiently in advance  
of the commencement of 
the trial  
 
to enable the adequate 
preparation of the 
defence. 
 
(b) The Prosecutor shall 
subsequently advise the 
defence of the names  
 
 
of any additional 
prosecution witnesses and 
provide copies of their 
statements when the 
decision is made to call 
those witnesses. 
 
(c) The statements of 
prosecution witnesses 
shall be made available in  
 
a language which the 
accused fully understands 
and speaks. 
 
(d) This rule is subject to 
the protection and privacy 
of victims and witnesses 
and the protection of 
confidential information 
as provided for in the 
Statute and rule 5.19. 
Rule 5.28 
Pre-trial disclosure 
relating to prosecution 
witnesses 
(a) The Prosecutor shall 
provide the defence with 
the names  
 
 
of witnesses whom the 
Prosecutor intends to call 
to testify  
 
and copies of  
 
any prior statements made 
by those witnesses.  
 
This shall be done 
sufficiently in advance  
 
 
 
to enable the adequate 
preparation of the 
defence. 
 
(b) The Prosecutor shall 
subsequently advise the 
defence of the names  
 
 
of any additional 
prosecution witnesses and 
provide copies of their 
statements when the 
decision is made to call 
those witnesses.  
 
(c) The statements of 
prosecution witnesses 
shall be made available in  
 
a language which the 
accused fully understands 
and speaks. 
 
(d) This rule is subject to 
the protection and privacy 
of victims and witnesses 
and the protection of 
confidential information 
as provided for in the 
Statute and rule 5.32. 
Rule 5.28 
Pre-trial disclosure 
relating to prosecution 
witnesses 
1. The Prosecutor shall 
provide the defence with 
the names  
 
 
of witnesses whom the 
Prosecutor intends to call 
to testify  
 
and copies of  
 
any prior statements made 
by those witnesses.  
 
This shall be done 
sufficiently in advance  
 
 
 
to enable the adequate 
preparation of the 
defence.  
 
2. The Prosecutor shall 
subsequently advise the 
defence of the names  
 
 
of any additional 
prosecution witnesses and 
provide copies of their 
statements when the 
decision is made to call 
those witnesses. 
 
3. The statements of 
prosecution witnesses 
shall be made available in  
 
a language which the 
accused fully understands 
and speaks. 
 
4. This rule is subject to 
the protection and privacy 
of victims and witnesses 
and the protection of 
confidential information 
as provided for in the 
Statute and rule 5.32. 
Rule 76 
Pre-trial disclosure 
relating to prosecution 
witnesses 
1. The Prosecutor shall 
provide the defence with 
the names  
 
 
of witnesses whom the 
Prosecutor intends to call 
to testify  
 
and copies of  
 
any prior statements made 
by those witnesses.  
 
This shall be done 
sufficiently in advance  
 
 
 
to enable the adequate 
preparation of the 
defence. 
 
2. The Prosecutor shall 
subsequently advise the 
defence of the names  
 
 
of any additional 
prosecution witnesses and 
provide copies of their 
statements when the 
decision is made to call 
those witnesses. 
 
3. The statements of 
prosecution witnesses 
shall be made available in 
original and in  
a language which the 
accused fully understands 
and speaks. 
 
4. This rule is subject to 
the protection and privacy 
of victims and witnesses 
and the protection of 
confidential information 
as provided for in the 
Statute and rules 5.32 / 81 
and 5.32 bis / 82. 
 
In comparison with the ICTY Rules at the time1074, we note that the Australian proposal 
imposed wider disclosure obligations upon the Prosecutor, in that not only the 
statements of the witnesses were to be disclosed, but also their names and addresses. 
During the negotiation process, the requirement to disclose the address of the respective 
witnesses was given up again at an early stage, which had to do with the fact that many 
                                                 
1073  See section 6.3.2 and particularly 6.3.2.3 for details and references regarding the different 
documents. 
1074  14th revision, 4 December 1998 
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delegations expressed concern on this point.1075 This is in line with the explicit 
mentioning of witness protection in sub-rule (D) of the next version; as a matter of fact, 
however, witness protection was obviously already contained in the restrictions on 
disclosure as envisaged by the Australian draft.1076 A footnote was kept in the following 
drafts that further discussion might be required.1077 In the revised discussion paper of 
5 August 1999, the issue was connected with the general discussion on victims and 
witnesses;1078 however, in the end, the footnote was deleted, which apparently had to do 
with expert advice from the ICTY given to the PrepCom at the time.1079 Apart from this, 
the specific mentioning of the “protection and privacy of victims and witnesses” as well 
as the “protection of confidential information” has only a clarifying function. The fact 
that the versions until the discussion paper of 23 June only relate to one provision 
(Rule 5.32) and later to two (Rules 5.32 and 5.32 bis or Rules 81 and 82, respectively) is 
because the restrictions on disclosure were originally contained in one provision, which 
was later divided.1080 The change from “the statements made by those witnesses” to “any 
prior statements by those witnesses” (emphasis added) had probably also a clarifying 
function – it is hard to imagine that a statement made by a witness at some point before 
a trial should not be a “prior statement”. 
                                                 
1075  Brady, Disclosure of Evidence, p. 410. 
1076  Australian draft, Rule 71: Restrictions on disclosure 
 […] 
 (c) Where material or information is in the possession or control of the Prosecutor which is withheld 
under article 68, paragraph 5, such material or information may not be subsequently introduced into 
evidence during the trial without adequate prior disclosure to the accused. 
 (d) Where material or information is hi the possession or control of the defence which is subject to 
disclosure, it may be withheld in circumstances which would allow the Prosecutor to rely on article 
68, paragraph 5, and a summary thereof submitted instead. Such material or information may not be 
subsequently introduced into evidence during the trial without adequate prior disclosure to the 
Prosecutor.”  
1077  See footnote in the Second Discussion Paper of 25 February 1999: “The question of the non-
disclosure of the identity of witnesses needs further discussion.” 
1078  See footnote 47 in the Revised Discussion Paper: “This rule may need to be revised after the 
comprehensive discussion 47 on victims, in particular on the issue of non-disclosure of the identity of 
witnesses.” 
1079  See Brady, Disclosure of Evidence, p. 410; Contributions of the Chambers of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, PCNlCC/1999IWGRPE/DP.38, par. 30: “Rule 67(a) of 
the Australian Draft requires the Prosecutor to provide the defence with the name and address of 
witnesses whom the Prosecutor intends to call to testify at trial. The ICTY strongly urges the 
Preparatory Commission to not make this a mandatory requirement, as this could intimidate witnesses 
who may be in need of protection.” 
1080  See more on this below (6.6). 
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Other than that, a substantial change can be seen in the requirement to make the 
statements of prosecution witnesses available to the accused not only in a language 
which he fully understands and speaks, but additionally in original (change from the 
Mont Tremblant Draft to the discussion paper of 23 June 2000). This must be 
welcomed, as many uncertainties in international proceedings can obviously be caused 
by translation mistakes. In this regard, it is worth mentioning that, according to an early 
decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber in the proceedings against Lubanga, not all relevant 
documents within the proceedings need to be made available to the accused in a 
language which the accused fully understands and speaks, but only those concerning 
which the applicable law explicitly so demands, on the other hand, however, that a 
translator must be made available to the accused on a permanent basis.1081 This may in 
fact put the accused in a better position, than just providing him with a translation, since 
doubts as to the proper translation of documents are usually easier to solve with the 
permanent personal assistance of an interpreter. 
One other substantial change is the one from “this shall be done sufficiently in advance 
of the commencement of the trial” to just “this shall be done sufficiently in advance”, 
leaving out the explicit reference to the trial phase of the proceeding. Even though the 
heading of the provision (“Pre-trial disclosure relating to prosecution witnesses”) was 
not changed, it was most probably to make clear that this provision should not only 
apply to pre-trial disclosure in the technical sense, but also to pre-confirmation-hearing 
disclosure. This assumption is in line with a nota bene contained in the revised 
discussion paper of 5 August 1999, referring to all disclosure provisions: 
N.B. Following the provisional structure of document 
PCNICC/1999/L.3/Rev.1[1082], the rules below are given numbers referring to 
Part 5 of the Statute. Since the provisions on disclosure are primarily of a 
general nature, they may better be placed in a separate chapter of the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence. This question will be addressed at a later stage when 
the general structure of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence is discussed.1083 
Without making reference to this historical development of the Rule, the Appeals 
Chamber of the ICC came to the same conclusion on the very grounds that Chapter 4 of 
the RPE refers to “various stages of the proceedings”.1084 This line of argument, 
                                                 
1081  Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC Case No. 01/04-01/06, Decision on the Request of 
the Defence of 3 and 4 July 2006, Pre-Trial Chamber I, 4 August 2006. 
1082  That is the summary of the first session of the PrepCom, see note 987 above. 
1083  Note 1034 supra, p. 15. 
1084  Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC Case No. 01/04-01/06, Judgment on the Prosecutor’s 
appeal against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I entitled “Decision Establishing General Principles 
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however, is, from an historical perspective, not entirely correct, since, as we have seen, 
“various stages of the proceedings” was a title deliberately chosen by the drafters as not 
necessarily meaning all stages.1085 The fact that, in principle, Rule 76 applies to the pre-
confirmation stage as well, does, however, not mean that there are no differences 
between the pre-trial and pre-confirmation stages in this regard. This is evidenced, for 
example, by Art. 68 (5), which states that summaries of materials may be used instead 
of the underlying materials “for the purposes of any proceedings prior to the trial”, if 
this is necessitated by the protection of witnesses. This was also endorsed by the 
Appeals Chamber of the ICC.1086 In such a case, the Prosecutor will, in fact, “rely” on 
the summary of the evidence in the meaning of Art. 61 (3)(b). According to the Appeals 
Chamber, the same holds true for witness statements which are redacted for possible 
prejudice of ongoing investigations (Rule 81 (2) RPE-ICC), the unredacted parts of 
which may be relied upon, even though the Defence has only received the redacted 
versions of the statements in advance.1087 As the interests of the accused are usually 
better served with receiving redacted evidence than not receiving any evidence at all, 
the view that Rule 81 (2) does not allow for redactions but only the complete non-
disclosure of evidence together with a prohibition of its use,1088 must be rejected.1089 In 
the same case, the competent Pre-Trial Chamber had stated previously that Rule 76 (1) 
must be interpreted widely, holding that even though the provision speaks only of 
“witnesses whom the Prosecutor intends to call to testify”, names and statements which 
the Prosecutor intends to rely on in the confirmation hearing without calling the witness 
in person must also be disclosed according to Rule 76 (1), albeit with the said 
                                                                                                                                               
Governing Applications to Restrict Disclosure pursuant to Rule 81 (2) and (4) of the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence”, Appeals Chamber, 13 October 2006, par. 34. 
1085  See note 893 and related text and references supra. 
1086  Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC Case No. 01/04-01/06 (OA 5), Judgment on the 
appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I entitled “First 
Decision on the Prosecution Requests and Amended Requests for Redactions under Rule 81”, Appeals 
Chamber, 14 December 2006, paras. 35 et subs. 
1087  Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC Case No. 01/04-01/06 (OA 6), Judgment on the 
appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I entitled “Second 
Decision on the Prosecution Requests and Amended Requests for Redactions under Rule 81”, Appeals 
Chamber, 14 December 2006, paras. 35 et subs. 
1088  As held by Judge Pikis in his separate opinion (ibid., note 1087 supra, pp. 24 et subs., at §§ 13 et 
subs.) It must be admitted that the wording of Rule 81 (2) indeed does not mention redactions. 
1089  The view that the possibility of redactions can be inferred from Rule 81 (2) RPE-ICC has been 
applied generally by the ICC, see, e.g., Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC Case No. 01/04-
01/06, Redacted Decision on the application to disclose the identity of intermediary 143, Trial 
Chamber I, 10 December 2009, par. 20. 
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possibility of redactions.1090 As regards so-called “pre-assessment interviews”, in which 
the witness, before testifying, is examined, in order to decide whether he should testify 
or not, the ICC Trial Chamber held that they are not witness statements, but may qualify 
as exculpatory evidence or fall under Rule 77.1091 
The exceptions to the obligatory disclosure of witness statements will be looked at in 
more detail below.1092 
 
6.4.2 Prior Statements of the accused? 
The specific RPE-ICC disclosure provisions do not contain any reference as to prior 
statements of the accused. As we have seen above, the question of disclosure of prior 
statements of the accused himself was, particularly in national jurisdictions, a disputed 
issue; and even at the Ad Hoc Tribunals, the mandatory disclosure of the accused’s own 
prior statements were not included in the RPE before 1995.1093 The original Australian 
proposal of 26 January 1999, just like the RPE-ICTY by then, did contain an according 
provision, which was worded as follows: 
Rule 65 
Prior statements of a person subject to a hearing under article 61 
The Prosecutor, where such material will not otherwise be provided in 
accordance with article 61, paragraph 3, shall provide the person before the 
Court with copies of all prior statements given by that person to the Prosecutor. 
This shall be done within a reasonable time before the hearing to confirm 
charges against the person. This requirement is without prejudice to the 
application of rule 59. 
                                                 
1090  Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC Case No. 01/04-01/06, Decision on the Final System 
of Disclosure and the Establishment of a Timetable, Pre-Trial Chamber I, 15 May 2006, paras. 93 et 
subs. See also Prosecutor v. Katanga/Chui, ICC Case No. 01/04-01/07, Corrigendum to the Decision 
on Evidentiary Scope of the Confirmation Hearing, Preventive Relocation and Disclosure under 
Article 67(2) of the Statute and Rule 77 of the Rules, Pre-Trial Chamber I, 25 April 2008, paras. 143 
et seq., as well as Prosecutor v. Gbagbo, ICC Case No. 02/11-01/11-30, Pre-Trial Chamber III, 
24 January 2012, paras. 51 et subs. 
1091  Prosecutor v. Bemba, ICC Case No. 01-05/01-08, Public redacted version of "Decision on the 
Defence Request for disclosure of pre-interview assessments and the Consequences of non-
disclosure"(ICC-01/05-01/08-750-Conf), Trial Chamber III, 9 April 2010, par. 33. 
1092  See sections 6.6, and particularly 6.6.1 infra. 
1093  See section 5.2.1.2 supra. 
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Notably, however, this provision was originally not contained in Part 5 (“Disclosure”) 
of the Australian Draft, but in Part 4 (“Investigation and prosecution”), and within this 
part, in Section 5 “Confirmation of the charges”. As we have mentioned at various 
occasions, the Australian proposal envisaged disclosure to take place mainly before the 
trial, but after the confirmation hearing, and in fact, gave very little importance to the 
confirmation hearing as such.1094 However, the purpose of the handing over of previous 
witness statements, according to a nota bene, was apparently the same as the one given 
to the disclosure provisions: the adequate preparation of the accused for the trial.1095 
Given the fact that the disclosure provisions in the Australian proposals were mostly 
based on the RPE-ICTY, this structural deviation is noteworthy. Draft Rule 65 only 
referred to “statements given by that person to the Prosecutor”, whereas Rule 66 (A)(i) 
RPE-ICTY would oblige the Prosecutor to disclose “all prior statements obtained by the 
Prosecutor from the accused”, which, as we have seen above, was interpreted by the 
ICTY as comprising all statements of the accused, regardless of how they were 
obtained, albeit only statements given in formal legal proceedings.1096 The Australian 
Draft thus, in terms of possible legitimate interests of the accused, lagged behind the 
ICTY Rules, not comprising, for example, any of the accused’s statements uttered in 
national proceedings. In the summary of the report of the first session of the PrepCom, 
the draft rule is still contained as Rule 5.14 in an unaltered wording.1097 As elucidates 
from the revised discussion paper of 5 August 1999, however, it was from this point 
onwards absorbed by draft Rule 5.10, an ancestor to Rule 112 (“recording of 
questioning in particular cases”).1098 The latter prescribes the modalities of questioning a 
suspect and provides, among other things, that his statements must be audio-recorded 
and transcribed, and then handed over to the accused. While it is true that the content of 
draft Rule 65 as contained in the Australian proposal does not go beyond what is now 
contained in Rule 112, wherefore the dropping of the original provision is sensible, the 
question of disclosure of the accused’s own statements uttered towards national 
authorities remains. The argument that the Court, when it requests national co-operation 
                                                 
1094  See, once again, section 6.3.2.3.1 supra; Section 5 (“Confirmation hearing”) of the Australian 
proposal contains no more than two provisions. 
1095  “N.B. This rule seeks to ensure that a person has a complete record of statements he or she has 
given to the Prosecutor prior to a hearing under article 61. The reference to "within a reasonable time 
before the bearing" reflects the wording used in the chapeau of article 61, paragraph 3.”, Australian 
Draft, p. 35. 
1096  See section 5.2.1.2 above. 
1097  See Rule 5.14 in the report, note 987 supra. 
1098  Note 14 of the revised discussion paper relating to Rule 5.10 states: “This rule replaces […] rule 
5.14 in document PCNICC/1999/L.3/Rev.1 […]”.  
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from a State according to Articles 93 (1)(d), and 99, can request the national authorities 
to follow the procedure as envisaged by Rule 112,1099 is not entirely convincing, because 
it may well be that a person is questioned by national authorities without a previous 
request for co-operation or the issuance of an arrest warrant concerning that person. The 
fact that statements of this kind will oftentimes be subject to other disclosure provisions, 
such as Art. 67 (2), is also not entirely satisfactory, because while “prior statements” is 
a descriptive element and a reasonably straightforward formula, a normative element 
such as “exculpatory character” will usually be harder to prove. 
 
6.4.3 Rule 77 RPE-ICC: Inspection of material in possession or control of 
the Prosecutor 
Rule 77 deals with certain materials in his possession to which the Prosecutor must 
allow inspection. As with Rule 76, the wording of Rule 77 can be traced back to the 
Australian proposal and, for that matter, to the disclosure provisions of the ICTY. In a 
synoptical overview, the drafting history can be visualized as follows: 
                                                 
1099  As done by Brady, Disclosure of Evidence, pp. 411 et seq. 
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Australian Proposal, 
26 January 1999 
Discussion Paper 2, 
25 February 1999 / 
PrepCom First Session 
Summary, Annex 1, 
2 March 1999 
Revised Discussion Paper, 
5 August 1999/PrepCom 
Second Session Summary, 
Appendix, 18 August 1999 
Mont Tremblant meeting 
outcome, 24 May 2000 
Discussion Paper, 23 June 
2000/Working Group 
Report, 27 June 2000/Final 
Draft, 30 June 2000 / RPE-
ICC 
Rule 68 
Inspection of material in 
possession or control of 
the Prosecutor 
 
(a) The Prosecutor shall  
 
on request  
 
 
 
 
 
 
permit the defence to 
inspect any books, 
documents, photographs 
and tangible objects  
 
 
in his or her  
 
possession or control  
 
 
 
which are material to the 
preparation of the defence 
or are intended for use by 
the Prosecutor as evidence  
 
 
 
 
at trial  
 
or were obtained from or 
belonged to the person. 
 
(b) This rule shall be read 
subject to rule 71. 
Rule 5.16.  
Inspection of material in 
possession or control of 
the Prosecutor 
 
(a) The Prosecutor shall  
 
on request  
 
 
 
 
 
 
permit the defence to 
inspect any books, 
documents, photographs 
and tangible objects  
 
 
in his or her  
 
possession or control  
 
 
 
which are material to the 
preparation of the defence 
or are intended for use by 
the Prosecutor as evidence  
 
for the purposes of the 
confirmation hearing or  
 
at trial  
 
or were obtained from or 
belonged to the person. 
 
(b) This rule is subject to 
the protection and privacy 
of victims and witnesses 
and the protection of 
confidential information as 
provided for in the Statute 
and rule 5.19. 
Rule 5.29 
Inspection of material in 
possession or control of 
the Prosecutor 
 
The Prosecutor shall,  
 
 
subject to the restrictions 
on disclosure as provided 
for in the Statute and in 
rule 5.32,  
 
 
permit the defence to 
inspect any books, 
documents, photographs 
and tangible objects  
 
 
in the Prosecutor’s  
 
possession or control  
 
 
 
which are material to the 
preparation of the defence 
or are intended for use by 
the Prosecutor as evidence  
 
for the purposes of the 
confirmation hearing or  
 
at trial, as the case may be,  
 
or were obtained from or 
belonged to the person. 
Rule 5.29 
Inspection of material in 
possession or control of 
the Prosecutor 
 
The Prosecutor shall,  
 
 
subject to the restrictions 
on disclosure as provided 
for in the Statute and in 
rule 5.32,  
 
 
permit the defence to 
inspect any books, 
documents, photographs 
and other tangible objects  
 
 
in the  
 
possession or control  
 
of the Prosecutor,  
 
which are material to the 
preparation of the defence 
or are intended for use by 
the Prosecutor as evidence  
 
for the purposes of the 
confirmation hearing or  
 
at trial, as the case may be,  
 
or were obtained from or 
belonged to the person. 
Rule 5.29 / 77 
Inspection of material in 
possession or control of 
the Prosecutor 
 
The Prosecutor shall,  
 
 
subject to the restrictions 
on disclosure as provided 
for in the Statute and in 
rules 5.32 / 81 and 5.32 bis 
/ 82,  
 
permit the defence to 
inspect any books, 
documents, photographs 
and other tangible objects 
 
 
in the  
 
possession or control  
 
of the Prosecutor,  
 
which are material to the 
preparation of the defence 
or are intended for use by 
the Prosecutor as evidence  
 
for the purposes of the 
confirmation hearing or  
 
at trial, as the case may be,  
 
or were obtained from or 
belonged to the person. 
 
Rule 77, just like the corresponding provision of the RPE-ICTY (Rule 66 (B)), imposes 
upon the Prosecutor a duty to make available for inspection specific material. In fact, 
the Australian proposal copied Rule 66 (B) RPE-ICTY almost verbatim.1100 Materially, 
the provision did not change significantly during the drafting process. The reference to 
restrictions on disclosure for reasons of witness protection and confidentiality were 
moved from the end to the beginning. As regards the temporal scope of application of 
Rule 77, we find a parallel development also, as the exclusive mentioning of “evidence 
at trial” was given up in favour of “evidence for the purposes of the confirmation 
hearing or at trial”. Why the drafters chose to include the phrase “as the case may be” in 
the revised discussion paper of 5 August 1999, is difficult to say.  
                                                 
1100  Only the explicit subjection to Art. 66 Sub-Rule (C) RPE-ICTY was moved into an extra phrase. 
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Presumably for reasons of equal gender treatment and simplicity, “his or her” was 
replaced by just “the Prosecutor”. To what extent the wording “in the possession or 
control of the Prosecutor” represents a substantial difference vis-à-vis “in the 
Prosecutor’s possession or control”, remains unclear. 
In contrast to Rule 76 and most other disclosure provisions, Rule 77 does not give the 
defence a right to disclosure stricto sensu, but only to inspection, meaning that the 
defence is not entitled to receive the material from the Prosecutor, but only to literally 
inspect them in the premises of the Prosecutor. This distinction is known also in the 
relevant provisions of the Ad Hoc Tribunals as well as, e.g., in the English legal system; 
indeed, we have, in the chapters on disclosure in England, seen that there were detailed 
provisions as to how many copies of the inspected material the defence could obtain and 
at what price.1101 Other than that, however, the distinction between inspection and 
disclosure stricto sensu apparently did not gain much practical relevance. In any case, 
the ICC in Lubanga took a similar approach, stating that “inspection” must be 
interpreted to comprise the handing over of copies of those materials which the defence, 
after or during inspection, requests.1102 
Regarding the substantial content of the norm, the alternatives “obtained from or 
belonged to the accused” are quite straightforward. The meaning of the phrase 
“intended for use by the Prosecutor as evidence for the purposes of the confirmation 
hearing” is not entirely clear, given the fact that Art. 61 (3) speaks of the “reliance” of 
the Prosecutor on the evidence at the confirmation hearing; and also Rule 76 speaks of 
the witnesses whom the Prosecutor “intends to call”. It would thus have seemed natural 
to also phrase Rule 77 in a way such as ‘evidence intended to be relied on by the 
Prosecutor at the confirmation hearing’. This fact suggests that “for the purposes of the 
confirmation hearing or at trial” may have a wider scope than Art. 61 (3). It could, for 
example, be construed to comprise material which would only be used for purposes of 
cross-examination, even though the ICC has held that such evidence already falls under 
the materiality clause which is also contained in Rule 77.1103 The wording “for the 
                                                 
1101  See section 2.1.1 supra. 
1102  Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC Case No. 01/04-01/06, Decision on the Final System 
of Disclosure and the Establishment of a Timetable, Pre-Trial Chamber I, 15 May 2006, paras. 113 et 
seq., see as to the differentiation also Prosecutor v. Bemba Gombo, ICC Case No. 01/05-01/08-55, 
Decision on the Evidence Disclosure System and Setting a Timetable for Disclosure between the 
Parties, Pre-Trial Chamber III, 31 July 2008, par. 45. 
1103  See Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC Case No. 01/04-01/06, Decision on the scope of 
the prosecution's disclosure obligations as regards defence witnesses, Trial Chamber I, 12 November 
2010. See also Prosecutor v. Katanga, ICC Case No. 01/04-01/07. In the Katanga case, Judge Steiner, 
again Single Judge, transferred the Lubanga disclosure regime to the Katanga case, compare ICC-
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purposes of the confirmation hearing or at trial” reappears both in Rules 78 and 
121 (3)(c) (the latter referring to the confirmation hearing only), which we will take a 
look at below. 
As regards the “materiality” of evidence, ICC, like the Ad Hoc Tribunals, appears to 
favour a wide interpretation. As was just mentioned, material which may serve to 
impeach witnesses and may thus be of use in cross-examination can be considered 
“material”;1104 the decision of the Trial Chamber, quite correctly, was based on the 
aspect of trial management, in that it encourages the defence to call only those witnesses 
which are reliable.1105 Needless to say, this is also in the interest of truth finding. The 
same holds true regarding the identity of so-called “intermediaries” as well, which serve 
as a liaison between the investigators and a witness. If it appears that an intermediary 
has had contact with one or more witnesses whose incriminating evidence has been 
materially called into question by other evidence, the identity of the intermediary needs 
to be disclosed.1106. According to the ICC Appeals Chamber, even material which is not 
directly related to the case but rather tends to explain the overall situation in a conflict 
scenario may be “material” in the sense of Rule 77.1107  
 
                                                                                                                                               
01/04-01/07-T-12-ENG. See also Prosecutor v. Abu Garda, ICC Case No. 2/05-02/09, Second 
Decision on issues relating to Disclosure, Pre-Trial Chamber I, 15 July 2009, which was copied in 
Prosecutor v. Banda/Jerbo, ICC Case No. 02/05-03/09, Decision on issues relating to disclosure, Pre-
Trial-Chamber I, 29 June 2010, as well as Prosecutor v. Mbarushimana, ICC Case No. 01/04-01/10, 
Decision on issues relating to disclosure, Pre-Trial Chamber I, 30 March 2011. 
1104  Note 1103, ibid. 
1105  Ibid., par. 18. 
1106  Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC Case No. 01/04-01/06, Redacted Decision on 
Intermediaries, Trial Chamber I, 31 May 2010, par. 139 b. This issue led to a serious controversy 
between the competent Trial Chamber and the Prosecutor, which finally culminated in a temporary 
stay of proceedings in the Lubaga trial, see Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC Case 
No. 01/04-01/06, Redacted Decision on the Prosecution's Urgent Request for Variation of the Time-
Limit to Disclose the Identity of Intermediary 143 or Alternatively to Stay Proceedings Pending 
Further Consultations with the VWU, Trial Chamber I, 8 July 2010 
1107  See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC Case No. 01/04-01/06, Judgment on the 
appeal of Mr. Lubanga Dyilo against the Oral Decision of Trial Chamber I of 18 January 2008, 
Appeals Chamber, 11 July 2008, paras. 76-82; the decision dealt with material which showed the use 
of child soldiers in the situation of the DRC in general, without being specifically connected with the 
charges against Mr. Lubanga. Swoboda, The ICC Disclosure Regime, at p. 454 appears to hold that 
this is only the case after the confirmation hearing; in our opinion, there is no compelling reason why 
this should not apply to pre-confirmation disclosure as well. 
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6.4.4 Art. 67 (2) ICCSt, Rule 83 RPE-ICC: Exculpatory Evidence 
Art. 67 (2) deals with the duty of the Prosecutor to disclose exculpatory evidence. The 
overall genesis of this provision has been dealt with above when discussing the general 
history of the Rome Statute.1108 It appears justified, however, to take a look at the 
different drafts in a little more detail, once again in a synoptical overview, which is 
complemented by a synopsis of Rule 83 RPE-ICC: 
                                                 
1108  See 6.3.1 supra and the respective drafts. 
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1993 Draft 1994 Draft 1998 PrepCom Report 1998 Rome Statute 
Article 44. Rights of the accused 
[…] 
 
 
 
3. All incriminating evidence on 
which the prosecution intends to 
rely and all  
exculpatory evidence  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
available to the prosecution prior 
to  
 
the commencement  
 
of the trial shall be made available 
to the defence  
 
as soon as possible and in 
reasonable time to prepare for the 
defence. 
Article 41. Rights of the 
accused 
[…] 
 
2.  
 
 
 
Exculpatory evidence  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
that becomes  
 
available to the Procuracy prior 
to  
 
the conclusion  
 
of the trial shall be made 
available to the defence.  
 
 
 
 
In case of doubt as to the 
application of this paragraph or 
as to the admissibility of the 
evidence, the Trial Chamber 
shall decide. 
Article 67 Rights of the 
Accused […] 
 
 
 
 
 
[Exculpatory evidence] 
[Evidence which  
 
 
 
shows or tends to show the 
innocence] [or mitigate the guilt] 
of the accused or  
 
may affect the credibility of 
prosecution evidence  
 
 
that becomes  
 
available to the Procuracy prior 
to  
 
the conclusion  
 
of the trial shall be [made 
available] [disclosed] to the 
defence.  
 
 
 
In case of doubt as to the 
application of this paragraph or 
as to the admissibility of the 
evidence, the Trial Chamber shall 
decide.  
 
[The provisions of article 58, 
paragraph 10 (f), will apply 
mutatis mutandis for the 
purposes of a decision made 
under this subpara-graph.] 
Article 67 Rights of the 
Accused […] 
 
In addition to any other 
disclosure provided for in this 
Statute,  
the Prosecutor shall,  
as soon as practicable, disclose 
to the defence  
evidence in the Prosecutor's 
possession or control which he 
or she believes  
shows or tends to show the 
innocence of the accused, or to 
mitigate the guilt of the accused, 
or which  
may affect the credibility of 
prosecution evidence.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In case of doubt as to the 
application of this paragraph, the 
Court shall decide. 
 
 
Australian Proposal, 
26 January 19991109 
Discussion Paper, 
25 February 1999 / 
PrepCom First Session 
Summary, Annex 1, 
2 March 1999 
Revised Discussion Paper, 
5 August 1999 / PrepCom 
Second Session Summary, 
Appendix, 18 August 1999 
Mont Tremblant meeting 
outcome, 24 May 2000 
Discussion Paper, 23 June 
2000 / Working Group 
Report, 27 June 2000 / 
Final Draft, 30 June 2000 / 
RPE-ICC 
Rule 72 
Ruling on exculpatory 
evidence 
 
 
The Prosecutor may 
request  
 
for good cause  
 
 
 
a hearing on an ex parte 
basis before the Chamber  
 
 
dealing with the matter at 
the time for the purpose of 
obtaining a ruling under 
article 67, paragraph 2. 
Rule 5.20  
Ruling on exculpatory 
evidence 
 
 
The Prosecutor may 
request  
 
 
 
as soon as practicable  
 
a hearing on an ex parte 
basis before the Chamber  
 
 
dealing with the matter for 
the purpose of obtaining a 
ruling under article 67, 
paragraph 2. 
Rule 5.33 
Ruling on exculpatory 
evidence 
 
 
The Prosecutor may 
request  
 
 
 
as soon as practicable  
 
a hearing on an ex parte 
basis before the Chamber 
of the Court  
 
dealing with the matter for 
the purpose of obtaining a 
ruling under article 67, 
paragraph 2. 
Rule 5.33 
Ruling on exculpatory 
evidence under article 
67, paragraph 2 
 
The Prosecutor may 
request  
 
 
 
as soon as practicable  
 
a hearing on an ex parte 
basis before the Chamber  
 
 
dealing with the matter for 
the purpose of obtaining a 
ruling under article 67, 
paragraph 2. 
Rule 83 
Ruling on exculpatory 
evidence under article 
67, paragraph 2 
 
The Prosecutor may 
request  
 
 
 
as soon as practicable  
 
a hearing on an ex parte 
basis before the Chamber 
 
 
dealing with the matter for 
the purpose of obtaining a 
ruling under article 67, 
paragraph 2. 
 
                                                 
1109 See section 6.3.2 and particularly 6.3.2.3 for details and references regarding the different documents. 
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The material difference between Art. 44 (3) of the 1993 Draft and Art. 41 (2) of the 
1994 Draft regarding the time of disclosure has been briefly mentioned above in relation 
with the somewhat confusing question of competences within the Court.1110 From the 
wording of the latter provision, we must conclude that the disclosure of exculpatory 
material was envisaged to take place not necessarily at the earliest possible opportunity, 
but possibly only at a point in time when the trial would already have started. This is in 
stark contrast to the wording contained in the 1993 Draft which had provided that the 
disclosure of exculpatory material should take place “as soon as possible and in 
reasonable time to prepare for the defence”. The modification must be regarded as 
weakening the rights of the accused. In this context, it should be noted once again that 
when the ILC Draft was issued, the RPE-ICTY were already in place; and their Rule 68 
explicitly foresaw the disclosure of exculpatory material to take place “as soon as 
practicable”; a fact which was apparently ignored by the ILC drafters: The commentary 
is, once again, silent in this regard. What it does tell, however, is the fact that obviously 
the drafters understood the provision to comprise only material which in itself would be 
admissible as evidence,1111 and thus not material which might be used by the defence 
only as a starting point for its own investigation. This, also, obviously restricts the right 
to preparation of the accused. These material amendments concerning the disclosure of 
exculpatory evidence, i.e. the deletion of the disclosure duty to be fulfilled as soon as 
possible before the commencement of the trial as well as to comprise only admissible 
evidence, however, may, as said above, to a certain extent explain the envisaged 
competence of the Trial Chamber as opposed to the Presidency. 
In the PrepCom Draft, the regulation regarding the timing of the disclosure (“prior to 
the conclusion of the trial”) remained. From the wording, we can furthermore conclude 
that the drafters still had in mind that the provision should relate to evidence in the 
technical sense only, for otherwise it would not have made sense to include a notion as 
to its admissibility. An important exemption as to the disclosure of exculpatory material 
lies in the reference to Art. 58 (10)(f), regarding material relevant to national security, a 
feature, as we have seen, which was omnipresent in the PrepCom Draft.1112 
                                                 
1110  See 6.3.1.2 supra. 
1111  Commentary relating to Art. 41 of the 1994 Draft, par. 3, p. 57: “Paragraph 2 lays down a 
general duty of disclosure on the Prosecutor in relation to exculpatory evidence that becomes 
available at any time prior to the conclusion of the trial, whether or not the Procuracy chooses to 
adduce that evidence itself. In case of doubt (for example, as to whether the information would be 
admissible as evidence), the Prosecutor should seek direction from the trial chamber. On the other 
hand there is no obligation to disclose incriminating evidence if it is not going to be used by the 
Prosecutor during the trial.”, emphasis added. 
1112  See 6.3.1.3 supra. 
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As concerns substantial changes from the PrepCom Draft to the Rome Statute, it was 
decided that the disclosure should be stricto sensu, i.e. the material should be 
“disclosed” as opposed to “made available”.1113 Also, the notion of admissibility of the 
disclosable evidence was given up. The expression “evidence”, however, was kept, thus 
still leaving open the question whether Art. 67 (2) ICCSt should refer to evidence stricto 
sensu as opposed to ‘material’ in general. The Appeals Chamber of the ICC rightly 
favours a wider interpretation of the norm, arguing that at least the Chamber must be 
put in a position to evaluate the material in order to rule on the applicability of 
Art. 67 (2) ICCSt, and that otherwise the Prosecutor could, e.g. on the grounds of 
confidentiality agreements, withhold large amounts of material without control.1114  
The substantial scope of the provision, however, was altered in that the assessment and 
decision on the exculpatory nature of the evidence would be primarily up to the 
Prosecutor (“which he or she believes shows or tends to show the innocence of the 
accused […]”). This results in a restriction of the scope of Art. 67 (2). It is reminiscent 
of the amendments of Rule 68 (i)(A) RPE-ICTY in 2004.1115 This issue is quite 
intimately intertwined with the question of which evidence must be communicated to 
the Chamber according to Rule 121 (2)(c) RPE-ICC, to which we will come below 
when looking at the role of the judges in the disclosure proceedings in more detail.1116 
The notion of evidence “becoming available” to the Prosecutor was given up in favour 
of a probably clearer “in possession or control” of the Prosecutor. This wording, 
however, is also more restrictive, since “availability” is much wider than “possession or 
control”. Nevertheless, the Prosecutor must, by virtue of Art. 54 (1)(a), investigate 
incriminating and exonerating circumstances equally; we must therefore conclude that 
he would have to ‘bring the exculpatory evidence under his control’ and subsequently 
disclose it to the defence. 
As to the timing of disclosure, the delegates at the Rome Conference opted for the 
disclosure to take place “as soon as practicable”, which, in the light of the necessary 
protection of the rights of the accused, must be welcomed. 
                                                 
1113  See as to the difference 6.4.3 supra. 
1114  Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, ICC Case No. 01/04-01/06 OA 13, Judgment on the appeal of the 
Prosecutor against the decision of Trial Chamber I entitled "Decision on the consequences of non-
disclosure of exculpatory materials covered by Article 54(3)(e) agreements and the application to stay 
the prosecution of the accused, together with certain other issues raised at the Status Conference on 10 
June 2008", Appeals Chamber, 21 October 2008, paras. 43 et subs. 
1115  See section 5.2.3.1 supra. 
1116  6.8 infra. 
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The explicit exemption from disclosure of confidential material as contained in the 
PrepCom Draft was not upheld. However, Art. 54 (3)(e) ICCSt, in principle allowing 
the Prosecutor to withhold (‘springboard’) evidence on grounds of confidentiality, was 
implemented into the Statute, establishing an overreaching possibility to protect 
information on grounds of confidentiality. The latter provision, as mentioned above, 
represents the successor of Art. 54 Option 2 (g) of the PrepCom Draft, without 
substantial modifications.  
As regards the genesis of Rule 83, which is the corresponding provision for Art. 67 (2) 
in the Rules, we note that the Australian proposal made it to the RPE-ICC with only 
minor substantial amendments. The heading was changed as to now explicitly referring 
to Art. 67 (2); the “good cause” requirement was given up, as it is quite self-evident that 
the Chamber may only make exceptions to the general rule of full disclosure of 
exculpatory evidence if there is good cause to do so. The ‘interim’ inclusion of the term 
“Chamber of the Court” instead of just “Chamber” is substantially meaningless. The 
purpose of the inclusion of the phrase “as soon as practicable” is not entirely clear. 
Since the obligation of the Prosecutor to disclose exculpatory evidence according to 
Art. 67 (2) must be understood to be continuing1117 throughout the proceedings, it must 
be concluded that the Prosecutor in fact must request a hearing before the Chamber if he 
has doubts concerning the application of Art. 67 (2); it may thus be understood that the 
term “may” just refers to the authority of the Prosecutor to make the request ex parte.  
Substantially, like in the Ad Hoc Tribunals, Art. 67 (2) comprises three kinds of 
material: evidence which shows or tends to show the innocence of the accused, or to 
mitigate the guilt of the accused, or which may affect the credibility of prosecution 
evidence.1118  
A major issue with regard to exculpatory evidence has proved to be the question of 
whether and to what extent the assessment of an exculpatory character of the given 
evidence may depend on the procedural conduct of the defence, especially regarding 
                                                 
1117  See also Prosecutor v. Bemba Gombo, ICC Case No. 01/05-01/08-55, Decision on the Evidence 
Disclosure System and Setting a Timetable for Disclosure between the Parties, Pre-Trial Chamber III, 
31 July 2008, p. 24, order no. 1. 
1118  See also, Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Blattmann attached to Decision on 
Disclosure Issues, Responsibilities for Protective Measures and other Procedural Matters, Trial 
Chamber I, 28 April 2008, par. 12, later endorsed by the complete Chamber, Prosecutor v. Lubanga 
Dyilo, ICC Case No. 01/04-01/06, Decision on the consequences of non-disclosure of exculpatory 
materials covered by Article 54(3)(e) agreements and the application to stay the prosecution of the 
accused, together with certain other issues raised at the Status Conference on 10 June 2008, Trial 
Chamber I, 13 June 2006, par. 56. 
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disclosure by the defence of its general defence strategy.1119 As we have seen, the 
disclosure regime of the Statute and the Rules does not provide for reciprocal 
disclosure, i.e. (full) disclosure by the Prosecutor is, in principle, not dependent upon 
disclosure by the defence.1120 In the proceedings against Lubanga, the Trial Chamber, in 
an oral ‘decision’1121, held that  
[t]he Defence declined an invitation from the Chamber to set out the defences 
the accused is likely to rely on, together with the anticipated issues in the case. 
At this stage his stance is that he relies on the right to silence, which is his 
undoubted entitlement. However, unreasonable decisions by the Defence to 
make late disclosure may have an effect on determinations by the Chamber as to 
what constitutes a fair trial. For instance, given the need to protect witnesses 
and others who have provided information to the Court, if the Bench is — let me 
start that part again – if the Bench is put in a position at a late stage of the 
proceedings, without any proper justification, of being asked to order the 
disclosure of exculpatory witnesses when at that point in time it is impossible to 
secure their necessary protection, the possibility exists that the Court will 
conclude that the continued trial is fair notwithstanding the failure to reveal 
their identities to the accused. Accordingly, if the Defence identifies lines of 
defence or issues at a significantly and unnecessarily advanced stage this may 
have consequences for decisions that relate to disclosure to the accused.1122  
An application for leave to appeal by the defence was granted, with the Chamber 
explaining that it had not been its intention to impose a disclosure duty on the defence, 
but rather to address 
whether the prosecution has an inflexible obligation to disclose material, 
irrespective of whether or not the defence has acted unreasonably in revealing 
relevant aspects of the defence or the issues to be raised late in the case.1123  
The Appeals Chamber, by majority, upheld the ‘decision’ of the Trial Chamber.1124 It 
stressed that it constituted no “direct” infringement of the accused’s right to remain 
                                                 
1119  See as to defence disclosure in more detail 6.5 infra. 
1120  See also Swoboda, The ICC Disclosure Regime, p. 457. 
1121  In his separate opinion attached to the appeals judgment (see note 1124 infra, pp. 40 et subs.), 
Judge Song quite convincingly held that the relevant part of the transcript did not constitute a decision 
of the Trial Chamber in a technical sense and was therefore not appealable. 
1122  Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, ICC Case No. 01/04-01/06, Transcript 18 January 2008, ICC-
01/04-01/06-T-71-ENG ET WT, p. 9, lines 4 to 21, emphasis added. 
1123  Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, ICC Case No. 01/04-01/06, Decision on the defence request for 
leave to appeal the Oral Decision on redactions and disclosure of 18 January 2008, Trial Chamber I, 
6 March 2008, par. 12. 
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silent, and that there may be cases in which the exculpatory nature of evidence will only 
become “apparent as a result of something the defence has disclosed”.1125 In the end, the 
Appeals Chamber saw itself 
unable categorically to rule out the possibility that if a factual situation arises in 
which it could be demonstrated that the Defence had unjustifiably and 
unreasonably held back the revelation of a line of defence or issue in 
circumstances that made it impossible for the Court to ensure the protection of 
the exculpatory witnesses, it may conceivably be possible for the accused to 
receive a fair trial notwithstanding the non-disclosure of certain limited 
material. Such a situation clearly does not arise from the Impugned Decision 
and is therefore not being considered by the Appeals Chamber in this appeal.1126 
It accordingly held that such situations would have to be solved on a case-by-case 
basis.1127 In his partially dissenting opinion, Judge Pikis held that this view constitutes 
an unjustified infringement upon the accused’s right to silence and the presumption of 
innocence;1128 the decision has also been criticised elsewhere.1129 Indeed, it is difficult to 
call the revelation of a line of defence “unjustifiably late”, if there is no duty of the 
defence to reveal anything at all in the first place. Notwithstanding, the view of the 
Chamber must, in essence, be endorsed – as a matter of fact, a situation as described by 
the Appeals Chamber may arise, making a certain witness or other evidence ultimately 
unavailable. This, in turn, is a natural occurrence in a criminal trial, and it does not per 
se render the proceedings as a whole unfair. However, it must be kept in mind that the 
Prosecutor must investigate incriminating and exonerating circumstances equally 
(Art. 54 (1)(a) ICCSt). His prerogative of assessment whether evidentiary material is 
exculpatory (Art. 67 (2)) carries with itself a corresponding duty. This means that he 
must carefully assess every piece of evidence vis-à-vis every reasonably thinkable line 
of defence. If in such a case a line of defence is revealed at a late stage of the 
proceedings and was not reasonably foreseeable, the trial may have to go on without the 
(then) unavailable evidence, and quite possibly might still have to be considered to be 
                                                                                                                                               
1124  Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, ICC Case No. 01/04-01/06 (OA 11), Judgment on the appeal of 
Mr. Lubanga Dyilo against the Oral Decision of Trial Chamber I of 18 January 2008, Appeals 
Chamber, 11 July 2008. 
1125  Ibid., paras. 35, 37. 
1126  Ibid., par. 54. This passage also shows quite well the reason why Judge Song declined to see an 
appealable issue: the Appeals Chamber is forced to confine itself to abstract and speculative 
statements. 
1127  Ibid., par. 53. 
1128  Partially dissenting opinion of Judge Georghios M. Pikis, ibid., pp. 32 et subs., paras. 14 et subs. 
1129  Swoboda, The ICC Disclosure Regime, p. 458. 
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fair. This, however, is for the Court to decide, and must indeed be done on a case-by-
case basis.1130 
This consequence is related to another issue which appeared in the Lubanga case, in 
which the Trial Chamber had indicated that, though it stressed that it remained the 
‘ultimate arbiter of the facts’, it might be willing to accept admissions of facts regarding 
potentially exculpatory evidence, whereby the evidence itself would not need to be 
disclosed anymore, in the interest, e.g., of witness protection.1131 Dissenting, Judge 
Blattmann held that exculpatory evidence could never be ‘replaced’ by other pieces of 
evidence, both in the interests of the preparation of the defence and in the interests of 
truth-finding by the Chamber; and that “the concession of facts without the ability to 
investigate those facts does not contribute to the finding of the truth which is a main 
object and purpose of the trial as such.”1132 This view, which once again shows the 
perceived truth-finding aspect of disclosure, must be endorsed. 
Other jurisprudence of the ICC oftentimes related to the question whether exculpatory 
material disclosed between the parties needs to be communicated to the Chamber; these 
issues will be dealt with below when highlighting the role of the Chamber in the 
disclosure proceedings.1133 
 
                                                 
1130  See also Kuschnik, International Criminal Due Process in the Making: New Tendencies in the 
Law on Non-Disclosure in the Proceedings of the ICC, pp. 161 et seq. 
1131  Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, ICC Case No. 01/04-01/06, Decision on Disclosure Issues, 
Responsibilities for Protective Measures and other Procedural Matters, Trial Chamber I, 24 April 
2008, par. 90. The issue evolved mainly around witnesses who would refuse to co-operate with the 
Court for security concerns. 
1132  Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, ICC Case No. 01/04-01/06, Separate and Dissenting Opinion of 
Judge Blattmann attached to Decision on Disclosure Issues, Responsibilities for Protective Measures 
and other Procedural Matters, Trial Chamber I, 28 April 2008, paras. 17 et seq. Judge Blattmann 
instead proposes a ‘normal’ approach allowing redactions, which could be lifted upon application by 
the defence to the Chamber, see ibid., par. 26. For the purposes of the confirmation hearing, however, 
in Katanga, Pre-Trial Chamber I held that the disclosure of ‘analogous evidence’ in lieu of actual 
evidence was acceptable, see Prosecutor v. Katanga & Ngudjolo Chui, ICC Case No. 01/04-01/07, 
Decision on Article 54(3)(e) Documents Identified as Potentially Exculpatory or Otherwise Material 
to the Defence's Preparation for the Confirmation Hearing, Pre-Trial Chamber I, 20 June 2008, 
paras. 65 et subs.  
1133  6.8 infra. 
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6.5 Disclosure by the Defence 
As previously mentioned, the ICC Statute does not contain any explicit notion of 
defence disclosure which would go beyond the general right of the respective Chambers 
to order the production of evidence (see Articles 64 (6)(b), (d), 69 (3) ICCSt). The 
Rules, however, contained this feature from the first Australian Draft onwards. We can 
distinguish four different provisions within the Rules which specifically deal with 
disclosure by the defence: Rule 78, which partially mirrors disclosure by the Prosecutor 
regarding documents, tangible objects etc. according to Rule 77; Rule 79 (1)-(3), which 
deal with alibi and grounds for excluding criminal responsibility, Rule 80, which 
specifically deals with grounds for excluding responsibility under Art. 31 (3) ICCSt, as 
well as Rule 79 (4), which allows the Chamber to order the disclosure of “any other 
evidence”, and may thus serve as a residuary clause. Whereas the Australian proposal 
did contain the ancestors of Rule 79 (1)-(3) and 80, which regard ‘special defences’,1134 
a predecessor of Rule 78 was not contained, let alone any provision equalling 
Rule 79 (4).  
At the beginning of the first PrepCom Session, notwithstanding the Australian proposal, 
it was apparently discussed whether the defence should be required to disclose any 
evidence at all.1135 Given the fact that in practically all jurisdictions which we have 
looked at until now at least the disclosure of a defence of alibi or exclusion of mental 
responsibility was a common feature at the end of the 20th century, this comes as a 
surprise. However, as was briefly mentioned, the discussions in the PrepCom were far 
from easy, and indeed it seems that delegations at times demonstrated a dogmatism 
which they would probably not have had regarding their own national system.1136  
Obviously, defence disclosure can conflict with the accused’s rights to remain silent and 
his privilege against self-incrimination (Articles 67 (1)(g), 55 (1)(a), (2)(b) ICCSt). 
Since the Statute is higher in rank than the Rules, the latter must be read subject to the 
former (Art. 51 (5) ICCSt). The same holds true for Regulations, which are even lower 
in rank than the Rules (Regulation 1 (1) RegCt) – nevertheless, Regulation 54 RegCt at 
the face of it widens the potential disclosure and notification duties of the defence 
                                                 
1134  To be sure, this terminology stems from the Anglo-American tradition and is (intentionally) not 
used by the Statute; compare Ambos, Der Allgemeine Teil des Völkerstrafrechts: Ansätze einer 
Dogmatisierung, pp. 825 et subs. with further references. See, however, the footnote concerning draft 
Rule 69 of the Australian proposal of 26 February 1999, fn. 996 supra. 
1135  See Brady, Disclosure of Evidence, p. 414. 
1136  See also Fernández de Gurmendi, The Elaboration of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 
pp. 253 et subs. 
333 
 
extremely.1137 Generally, the ICC Chambers have emphasised that, given the fact that 
the person concerned has the right to remain silent and he cannot be forced to disclose 
evidence even in his favour,1138 disclosure can only be required in limited 
circumstances.1139  
Apart from that, it has already been mentioned that, even though the Rules do not 
contain reciprocal disclosure duties of the defence, the conduct of the defence during 
disclosure, particularly the lack of notification of lines of defence, may have 
consequences regarding the disclosure of evidence by the prosecution.1140 
                                                 
1137  “Status conferences before the Trial Chamber 
 At a status conference, the Trial Chamber may, in accordance with the Statute and the Rules, issue 
any order in the interests of justice for the purposes of the proceedings on, inter alia, the following 
issues: 
 (a) The length and content of legal arguments and the opening and closing statements; 
 (b) A summary of the evidence the participants intend to rely on; 
 (c) The length of the evidence to be relied on; 
 (d) The length of questioning of the witnesses; 
 (e) The number and identity (including any pseudonym) of the witnesses to be called; 
 (f) The production and disclosure of the statements of the witnesses on which the participants propose 
to rely; 
 (g) The number of documents as referred to in article 69, paragraph 2, or exhibits to be introduced 
together with their length and size; 
 (h) The issues the participants propose to raise during the trial; 
 (i) The extent to which a participant can rely on recorded evidence, including the transcripts and the 
audio- and video-record of evidence previously given; 
 (j) The presentation of evidence in summary form; 
 (k) The extent to which evidence is to be given by an audio- or videolink; 
 (l) The disclosure of evidence; 
 (m) The joint or separate instruction by the participants of expert witnesses; 
 (n) Evidence to be introduced under rule 69 as regards agreed facts; 
 (o) The conditions under which victims shall participate in the proceedings; 
 (p) The defences, if any, to be advanced by the accused. 
1138  To enforce the disclosure of incriminating material would obviously additionally infringe upon 
the accused’s privilege against self-incrimination. 
1139  See, e.g. Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, ICC Case No. 01/04-01/06, Decision on disclosure by the 
defence, Trial Chamber I, 20 March 2008, paras. 27 et subs., as well as Prosecutor v. Bemba Gombo, 
ICC Case No. 01/05-01/08-55, Decision on the Evidence Disclosure System and Setting a Timetable 
for Disclosure between the Parties, Pre-Trial Chamber III, 31 July 2008, paras. 30 et subs. 
1140  See 6.4.4 supra. 
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6.5.1 Rule 78: Inspection of material in possession or control of the 
defence 
Rule 78 currently provides as follows: 
Rule 78: Inspection of material in possession or control of the defence 
The defence shall permit the Prosecutor to inspect any books, documents, 
photographs and other tangible objects in the possession or control of the 
defence, which are intended for use by the defence as evidence for the purposes 
of the confirmation hearing or at trial. 
As was just mentioned, Rule 78 represents a parallel provision vis-à-vis Rule 77 which 
contains the corresponding disclosure duty of the Prosecutor. In contrast to Rule 77, 
however, was not included in the Australian proposal. While the latter did cover the 
question of defence notice of ‘special defences’,1141 it did not foresee reciprocal 
disclosure duties of the defence concerning “Rule 77 material”. This is surprising, given 
that at the time of the Australian proposal Rule 67 RPE-ICTY contained a reciprocal 
disclosure duty of the defence;1142 and also the above mentioned joint proposal of 
Australia and the Netherlands of 1996 had contained this feature.1143 The Australian 
proposal, to be sure, did mention the issue, but decided against it.1144 Starting with the 
following discussion paper, however, the contemplation of introducing a disclosure 
obligation of the defence regarding “Rule 77 material” was contained in a footnote of 
the respective draft.1145 Apparently, once again, considerations of fairness for the 
prosecution played a decisive role during the negotiations.1146 
                                                 
1141  See section 6.5.2 infra. 
1142  See section 5.3.1 supra. 
1143  See Rule 83 (C) of the Joint Proposal, note 977 supra. 
1144  See the nota bene concerning draft Rule 68 of the Australian proposal (note 996 supra): “N.B. 
Sub-rule (a) closely follows rule 66 (B) of the ICTY Rules. The rule does not adopt the approach 
taken in rule 67 (C) of the ICTY Rules, which permits the Prosecutor, when a request to inspect has 
been received from the defence, to inspect material within the custody or control of the defence which 
it intends to use as evidence at trial. The issue of disclosure by the defence is dealt with in rule 69.” 
1145  See footnote to Rule 5.16 in Discussion Paper 2 (note 1030 supra): “This rule relates only to the 
inspection of material held by the Prosecutor. The issue of whether the Prosecutor should have access 
to material held by the defence also needs consideration.” and the corresponding provisions in the 
subsequent drafts. 
1146  Brady, Disclosure of Evidence, pp. 415 et seq. 
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The substantial content of the later Rule 78 was finally included in the Discussion Paper 
of 23 June 2000 regarding disclosure.1147 Since then, it has remained unaltered, which is 
why there is no need to present a synopsis. 
Substantially, Rule 78 relates to the same material as Rule 77 (books, documents, 
photographs and other tangible objects). In contrast to Rule 77, there is no “materiality” 
test, which is understandable, given the fact that the defence is not bound to present or 
“rely on” any evidence during the confirmation hearing or the trial.1148 From our point of 
view, this is conclusion is actually imperative, since, as we have seen several times 
already, there can be no equality of arms in favour of the prosecution.  
In contrast to the disclosure regime of the Ad Hoc Tribunals at the time,1149 the 
disclosure obligation by the defence was always conceived of as independent from the 
corresponding one of the Prosecutor, so there was no reciprocity intended. The only 
‘trigger’ of Rule 78 is thus the fact that the defence is planning to use the material “as 
evidence for the purposes of the confirmation hearing or the trial”. 
As regards the wording “for the purposes of the confirmation hearing or at trial”, it has 
already been stated regarding Rule 77 that it could be understood to be wider than 
‘evidence which the defence intends to rely on at the hearing’.1150 Since, in contrast to 
Rule 77, Rule 78 contains no materiality test, the view that the wording might comprise 
material which would only be used for cross-examination may, in contrast to Rule 78, 
gain significance. 
 
6.5.2 Rules 79 (1)-(3): Notice of alibi/grounds for excluding criminal 
responsibility according to Art. 31 (1) 
As was previously mentioned, even though there were fundamental discussions about 
defence disclosure at the beginning of the negotiations, the notion of the obligatory of 
defence notice and disclosure concerning, in the Anglo-American terminology, ‘special 
defences’1151 was contained in the respective drafts of the Rules from the very 
beginning. The first three sub-rules of Rule 79 resemble Rule 67 (A)(ii)(a) RPE-ICTY 
                                                 
1147  Rule 5.29 bis, PCNICC/2000/WGRPE(5)/RT.2, note 1039 supra. 
1148  See also Prosecutor v. Bemba Gombo, note 1139 supra, ibid. 
1149  14th revision of the RPE-ICTY, 4 December 1998. 
1150  6.4.3 supra. In a similar manner as in the context of Rule 77, Swoboda, The ICC Disclosure 
Regime (see note 1107 supra) at pp. 456 et seq. appears to apply Rule 78 exclusively to pre-trial and 
not pre-confirmation disclosure; there is in our opinion no apparent reason for this limitation. 
1151  See note 1134 supra. 
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of the time; the fact that the Australian proposal based the idea of disclosure by the 
defence on considerations of fair trial for the Prosecutor has already been mentioned.1152 
The overall development of Rule 79 can be visualised in the following way: 
                                                 
1152  See also the already partially quoted  nota bene concerning draft Rule 68 of the Australian 
proposal of 26 February 1999:  
 “N.B. This rule addresses the requirements placed on the defence to disclose material and information. 
 Sub-rule 69 (i) is identical to rule 67 (A) (ii) (a) of the ICTY Rules. Clearly, the Prosecutor needs to 
be given an adequate opportunity to investigate evidence offered in support of an alibi. Sub-rule 69 
(ii) draws on rule 67 (A) (ii) (b) of the ICTY Rules. That provision requires the defence to notify the 
Prosecutor of any "special defence" it intends to offer. The term "special defence" is defined to 
include that of "diminished or lack of mental responsibility". The argument in support of the defence 
being required to notify its intent to offer such a defence is that it would be unfair for the Prosecutor to 
meet these defences on the run. If a defence relating to the mental state of the accused is raised, a 
psychiatrist must examine the accused.” 
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RPE-ICC 
Rule 69 
Disclosure by the 
defence regarding the 
defence of alibi and 
certain grounds for 
excluding criminal 
responsibility 
recognized under article 
31, paragraph 1 
 
The defence shall notify 
the Prosecutor of its intent 
to: 
 
(i) Plead the existence of 
an alibi; in which case the 
notification shall specify 
the place or places at 
which the accused claims 
to have been present at 
the time of the alleged 
crime and the names and 
addresses  
 
of witnesses and any 
other evidence upon 
which the accused intends 
to rely to establish the 
alibi; or 
 
(ii) Raise a ground for 
excluding criminal 
responsibility provided 
for in article 31,  
 
paragraph 1 (a) or (b);  
 
in which case the 
notification shall specify 
the names  and addresses  
 
of witnesses and any 
other evidence upon 
which the accused intends 
to rely to establish the 
ground.  
 
 
 
 
 
This shall be done  
 
sufficiently in advance of 
the commencement of the 
trial  
 
to enable the Prosecutor 
to prepare adequately for 
trial. 
 
Rule 5.17.  
Disclosure by the 
defence regarding the 
defence of alibi and 
certain grounds for 
excluding criminal 
responsibility 
recognized under article 
31, paragraph 1 
 
(a) The defence shall 
notify the Prosecutor of 
its intent to: 
 
(i) Plead the existence of 
an alibi; in which case the 
notification shall specify 
the place or places at 
which the accused claims 
to have been present at 
the time of the alleged 
crime and the names  
 
 
of witnesses and any 
other evidence upon 
which the accused intends 
to rely to establish the 
alibi; or 
 
(ii) Raise a ground for 
excluding criminal 
responsibility provided 
for in article 31,  
 
paragraph 1 (a) or (b);  
 
in which case the 
notification shall specify 
the names  
 
of witnesses and any 
other evidence upon 
which the accused intends 
to rely to establish the 
ground.  
 
 
 
 
 
This shall be done  
 
sufficiently in advance of 
the commencement of the 
trial  
 
to enable the Prosecutor 
to prepare adequately for 
trial. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(b) Failure of the defence 
to provide notice under 
this rule shall not limit the 
right of the accused to 
testify on the matters 
dealt with in paragraph 
(a). 
Rule 5.30 
Disclosure by the 
defence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(a) The defence shall 
notify the Prosecutor of 
its intent to: 
 
(i) Plead the existence of 
an alibi; in which case the 
notification shall specify 
the place or places at 
which the accused claims 
to have been present at 
the time of the alleged 
crime and the names  
 
 
of witnesses and any 
other evidence upon 
which the accused intends 
to rely to establish the 
alibi; or 
 
(ii) Raise a ground for 
excluding criminal 
responsibility provided 
for in article 31,  
 
paragraph 1;  
 
in which case the 
notification shall specify 
the names  
 
of witnesses and any 
other evidence upon 
which the accused intends 
to rely to establish the 
ground. 
 
(b) With due regard to 
time limits set forth in 
other rules, notification 
under paragraph (a) of 
this rule shall be given  
 
sufficiently in advance  
 
 
 
to enable the Prosecutor 
to prepare adequately and 
to respond.  
 
The Chamber of the Court 
dealing with the matter 
may grant the Prosecutor 
an adjournment to address 
the issue raised by the 
defence. 
 
(c) Failure of the defence 
to provide notice under 
this rule shall not limit its 
right to raise matters dealt 
with in paragraph (a) and 
to present evidence. 
 
Rule 5.30 
Disclosure by the 
defence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. The defence shall 
notify the Prosecutor of 
its intent to: 
 
(a) Raise the existence of 
an alibi, in which case the 
notification shall specify 
the place or places at 
which the accused claims 
to have been present at 
the time of the alleged 
crime and the names  
 
 
of witnesses and any 
other evidence upon 
which the accused intends 
to rely to establish the 
alibi; or  
 
(b) Raise a ground for 
excluding criminal 
responsibility provided 
for in article 31,  
 
paragraph 1,  
 
in which case the 
notification shall specify 
the names  
 
of witnesses and any 
other evidence upon 
which the accused intends 
to rely to establish the 
ground. 
 
2. With due regard to time 
limits set forth in other 
rules, notification under 
sub-rule 1 shall be given  
 
 
sufficiently in advance  
 
 
 
to enable the Prosecutor 
to prepare adequately and 
to respond.  
 
The Chamber dealing 
with the matter may grant 
the Prosecutor an 
adjournment to address 
the issue raised by the 
defence. 
 
3. Failure of the defence 
to provide notice under 
this rule shall not limit its 
right to raise matters dealt 
with in sub-rule 1 and to 
present evidence. 
 
Rule 79 
Disclosure by the 
defence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. The defence shall 
notify the Prosecutor of 
its intent to: 
 
(a) Raise the existence of 
an alibi, in which case the 
notification shall specify 
the place or places at 
which the accused claims 
to have been present at 
the time of the alleged 
crime and the names  
 
 
of witnesses and any 
other evidence upon 
which the accused intends 
to rely to establish the 
alibi; or  
 
(b) Raise a ground for 
excluding criminal 
responsibility provided 
for in article 31,  
 
paragraph 1,  
 
in which case the 
notification shall specify 
the names  
 
of witnesses and any 
other evidence upon 
which the accused intends 
to rely to establish the 
ground. 
 
2. With due regard to time 
limits set forth in other 
rules, notification under 
sub-rule 1 shall be given  
 
 
sufficiently in advance  
 
 
 
to enable the Prosecutor 
to prepare adequately and 
to respond.  
 
The Chamber dealing 
with the matter may grant 
the Prosecutor an 
adjournment to address 
the issue raised by the 
defence. 
 
3. Failure of the defence 
to provide notice under 
this rule shall not limit its 
right to raise matters dealt 
with in sub-rule 1 and to 
present evidence. 
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(d) This rule does not 
prevent a Chamber of the 
Court  
 
from ordering disclosure 
of any other evidence. 
 
4. This rule does not 
prevent a Chamber  
 
 
from ordering disclosure 
of any other evidence. 
 
4. This rule does not 
prevent a Chamber  
 
 
from ordering disclosure 
of any other evidence. 
 
During the drafting process, Rule 79 changed quite considerably. First and foremost, the 
inclusion of sub-rule 4 altered the substantial scope of the provision to a large extent; 
however, since sub-rule 4 systematically does not belong to the first three paragraphs of 
Rule 79, it will be dealt with below.1153 
Sub-rule 1 (a) deals with the “existence of an alibi”. Similar to the question of ‘special 
defences’1154, the term “defence” is not used by the Rome Statute in this meaning, the 
Statute rather speaks of “grounds for excluding criminal responsibility” in order to 
avoid difficulties arising from different conceptions of criminal responsibility rooted in 
diverging legal traditions.1155 The term “defence of alibi” was, however, still contained 
in the heading of the provision until the summary of the first session of the PrepCom.1156 
This issue is most probably in some parallel with the replacement of the term “plead” by 
the term “raise”, which came with the Mont Tremblant Meeting, and is more neutral. 
Alibi as a legal concept is not contained in the Statute; however, the drafters of the 
Rules, following the tradition of the Anglo-American jurisdictions and, of course, the 
Ad Hoc Tribunals, chose to include it in the Rules. The wording of the original 
Australian proposal follows Rule 67 (A)(ii)(a) RPE-ICTY almost verbatim, with the 
exception that the RPE-ICTY speak of the “defence” of alibi, and utilize the term 
“offer” instead of “plead”.  
Substantially, the scope of application of Rule 79 was first of all, and in parallel to the 
other disclosure provisions we have looked at until now, widened by dropping the 
notion of “sufficiently in advance of the commencement of the trial”, meaning that the 
provision applies to the pre-confirmation disclosure as well. In fact, however, the 
wording may also be interpreted as allowing the defence to raise the ground at a later 
stage, since the mere notion of “in advance” lacks a reference point.  
                                                 
1153  6.5.4 infra. 
1154  See Ambos, Der Allgemeine Teil des Völkerstrafrechts: Ansätze einer Dogmatisierung, p. 825, 
note 1134 supra, with further references,. 
1155  Ibid. 
1156  In fact, it is occasionally used even by the ICC Chambers, see, e.g., Prosecutor v. Lubanga 
Dyilo, ICC Case No. 01/04-01/06, Decision on disclosure by the defence, Trial Chamber I, 20 March 
2008, par. 29 (a). 
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Another significant amplification of the provision, at the expense of the defence, lies in 
the dropping of the reference and limitation to sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of Art. 31 (1), 
making Rule 79 (1) applicable to all of Art. 31 (1), thus including not only mental 
disease and intoxication, as originally envisaged, but also self-defence and duress. Here, 
the law of the ICC could be narrower than that of the Ad Hoc Tribunals, which require 
the notification concerning “any special defence” (Rule 67 (B)(i)(b) RPE-ICTY). In 
accordance with the example of the Ad Hoc Tribunals, however, sub-rule (3) makes 
clear that the defence will on no account lose its right to raise the named grounds for 
excluding criminal responsibility for lack of notice. This notion was not contained in the 
Australian proposal, but introduced by the Second Discussion Paper; at first closely 
following the wording of Rule 67 (B) RPE-ICTY1157, and later adapted to the ICC 
nomenclature. The consequences of non-compliance with disclosure obligations will be 
dealt with more generally below.1158 
A substantial amendment can also be seen in the dropping of the obligation to disclose 
the addresses of witnesses in addition to their names. This is in complete parallel to the 
development of prosecution disclosure concerning witnesses according to Rule 76.1159 In 
contrast to the latter, however, the defence need not provide the Prosecutor with the 
statements of the witnesses.1160 
With the revised discussion paper came an amendment regarding the timing of 
disclosure, in that the phrase “with due regard to time limits set forth in other rules” was 
introduced, as well as the possibility for an adjournment in favour of the prosecution 
was created. 
Rule 79 (1)-(3) have as yet not been specifically applied by the ICC, for none of the 
accused have invoked any grounds for excluding criminal responsibility up to now. 
 
                                                 
1157  Now: sub-rule (C). 
1158  6.10 infra. 
1159  See 6.4.1 supra. 
1160  Notwithstanding, chambers have asked the defence to provide the Chamber (and the Prosecutor) 
with a short summary of the issues which the defence witnesses may testify upon; see, for example, 
Prosecutor v. Ruto, Kosgey and Sang, ICC Case No. 01/09-01/11, Decision Requesting the Parties to 
Submit Information for the Preparation of the Confirmation of Charges Hearing, Pre-Trial Chamber 
II, par. 29 June 2011, as well as the according Order to the Defence to Reduce the Number of 
Witnesses to Be Called to Testify at the Confirmation of Charges Hearing and to Submit an Amended 
List of Viva Voce Witnesses, Pre-Trial Chamber II, 25 July 2011, in which the Chamber asked the 
defence to submit a witness list “indicating their names and the scope and subject-matter of their 
proposed questioning”. 
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6.5.3 Rule 80: Grounds for excluding criminal responsibility under 
Art. 31 (3) 
Rule 80 determines the procedure to be followed when a ground for excluding mental 
responsibility according to Art. 31 (3) is to be considered. In contrast to Art. 31 (1) 
ICCSt, Art. 31 (3)1161 deals with grounds for excluding criminal responsibility which are 
not contained in the Statute but may be derived from the sources of law as contained in 
Art. 21.  
Interestingly, this provision not only provides the substantive information that the Court 
is free to derive grounds for excluding criminal responsibility from national systems, 
but also contains a procedural twist in that it specifically states that these grounds can 
only be considered by the Court at trial. This is surprising, not only for the fact that one 
would not necessarily expect a clearly procedural norm in the middle of provisions 
regarding criminal liability of persons, but it is also unclear why the Pre-Trial Chamber 
should be banned from considering grounds for excluding criminal responsibility 
outside of the Rome Statute, and the issue be left to the Trial Chamber only. To be sure, 
the scope of the confirmation hearing is far smaller than that of the trial, as the Pre-Trial 
Chamber according to Art. 61 (7) ICCSt only needs to find that there are “substantial 
grounds to believe” that the accused has committed the crimes with which he is 
charged; and the same provision also states that the thresholds concerning the evidence 
to be presented are lower than at trial.1162 However, this cannot sufficiently explain why 
grounds for excluding criminal responsibility according to Art. 31 (1) and those 
according to Art. 31 (3) should be treated so differently.  
A provision similar to Art. 31 (3) ICCSt was not covered by the 1994 ILC Draft, but 
contained in both the 1996 PrepCom Report1163 and in the 1998 PrepCom Draft.1164 Both 
                                                 
1161  “At trial, the Court may consider a ground for excluding criminal responsibility other than those 
referred to in paragraph 1 where such a ground is derived from applicable law as set forth in article 
21. The procedures relating to the consideration of such a ground shall be provided for in the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence.” 
1162  “[…] The Prosecutor may rely on documentary or summary evidence and need not call the 
witnesses to testify at the trial.” 
1163  1996 PrepCom Report Vol. II, note 915 supra, pp. 103 et seq.:  
 “Article S 
 Exhaustive or enumerative list of defences 
 Proposal 1 
 Other defences 
 1. At trial the Court may consider a defence not specifically enumerated in this chapter if the defence: 
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wordings are equal to Art. 31 (3) ICCSt, as far as the beginning (“[a]t trial, the Court 
may […]”) is concerned. As we have seen above, the procedural architecture of the 
1998 PrepCom Draft already contained the notion of a separation between the 
confirmation hearing and the trial hearing; the structure in the 1996 version is less clear, 
even though it does contain thoughts and proposals for implementing a hearing for the 
“confirmation of the indictment” by a Pre-Trial Chamber or “Indictment Chamber”.1165 
It does not appear impossible that the wording “at trial” was introduced at a time when a 
confirmation hearing as now contained in the Statute was not concretely contemplated – 
which could mean that the notion of “trial” as contained in Art. 31 (3) ICCSt was rather 
meant in a general sense, and not as opposed to the confirmation hearing.1166 After all, 
                                                                                                                                               
 (a) Is recognized [in general principles of criminal law common to civilized nations] [in the State with 
the most significant contacts to the crime] with respect to the type of conduct charged; and  
 (b) Deals with a principle clearly beyond the scope of the defences enumerated in this chapter and is 
not otherwise inconsistent with those or any other provisions of the Statute. 
 2. If an accused wishes to raise such a defence, he must notify the Court and the Prosecutor a 
reasonable time prior to trial. The Court shall give the Prosecutor the opportunity to be heard and shall 
issue an order deciding the matter. An accused who has failed to provide adequate notice shall be 
precluded from asserting the defence at trial; except that, where compelling circumstances exist, the 
Court may instead grant the Prosecutor a reasonable postponement to prepare for the issue at trial. 
[Footnote: The Rules of Procedure could provide further clarification regarding the conduct of any 
hearings required by the Court prior to ruling. The Statute or Rules might also permit interlocutory 
appeal by the Prosecutor of an adverse ruling.] 
 3. Denial of a request under this article shall not preclude an accused from seeking consideration of 
the basis of the asserted defence as a grounds for mitigation of punishment to the extent otherwise 
permitted by this Statute.”, footnotes partially omitted. 
1164  1998 PrepCom Draft, note 917 supra: 
 “Article 34: Other grounds for excluding criminal responsibility 
 1. At trial the Court may consider a ground for excluding criminal responsibility not specifically 
enumerated in this part if the ground: 
 (a) is recognized [in general principles of criminal law common to civilized nations] [in the State with 
the most significant contacts to the crime] with respect to the type of conduct charged; and 
 (b) deals with a principle clearly beyond the scope of the grounds for excluding criminal responsibility 
enumerated in this part and is not otherwise inconsistent with those or any other provisions of the 
Statute. 
 2. The procedure for asserting such a ground for excluding criminal responsibility shall be set forth in 
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.” 
1165  See proposal concerning Art. 27 (2) of the ILC Draft, 1996 PrepCom Report Vol. II, note 915 
supra, pp. 120 et seq. 
1166  Compare also the heading of Rule 76 (“Pre-trial disclosure relating to prosecution witnesses”), 
which undisputedly refers to disclosure prior to the confirmation hearing as well. 
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the drafters of the Statute could have easily used the expression “the Trial Chamber” 
instead of “the Court” to avoid any ambiguities. The wording of Art. 31 (3) ICCSt could 
thus well be based on a redactional error. However, the drafters of the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence obviously took the wording at face value, which is why 
Rule 80 only mentions the Trial Chamber. Synoptically, its development can be 
visualized as follows: 
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Procedures for raising a 
ground for excluding 
criminal responsibility 
under article 31, 
paragraph 3 
 
(a) The defence shall give 
notice to both the Trial 
Chamber and the 
Prosecutor during the trial  
 
if it intends to raise a 
ground for excluding 
criminal responsibility 
under article 31, 
paragraph 3, which has 
not previously been 
recognized in the 
jurisprudence of the 
Court. 
 
 
 
 
(b) Following notice 
given under sub-rule (a),  
 
 
the Trial Chamber shall 
hear both parties  
 
 
before deciding whether 
the defence can  
 
plead the ground for 
excluding criminal 
responsibility.  
 
The Trial Chamber may 
permit an appeal in 
accordance with article 
82, paragraph 1 (d), from 
its decision on whether 
the ground can be 
pleaded. 
 
(c) If the defence is 
permitted to plead the 
ground either by the Trial 
Chamber or, following an 
appeal under article 82, 
paragraph 1 (d), by the 
Appeals Chamber,  
 
the Trial Chamber may 
grant the Prosecutor an 
adjournment to prepare to 
address the ground raised 
by the defence. 
Rule 5.18.  
Procedures for raising a 
ground for excluding 
criminal responsibility 
under article 31, 
paragraph 3 
 
(a) The defence shall give 
notice to both the Trial 
Chamber and the 
Prosecutor  
 
if it intends to raise a 
ground for excluding 
criminal responsibility 
under article 31, 
paragraph 3.  
 
This shall be done 
sufficiently in advance of 
the commencement of the 
trial to enable the 
Prosecutor to prepare 
adequately for trial.  
 
(b) Following notice 
given under sub-rule (a),  
 
 
the Trial Chamber shall 
hear both parties  
 
 
before deciding whether 
the defence can  
 
plead the ground for 
excluding criminal 
responsibility.  
 
The Trial Chamber may 
permit an appeal in 
accordance with article 
82, paragraph 1 (d), from 
its decision on whether 
the ground can be 
pleaded. 
 
(c) If the defence is 
permitted to plead the 
ground either by the Trial 
Chamber or, following an 
appeal under article 82, 
paragraph 1 (d), by the 
Appeals Chamber,  
 
the Trial Chamber may 
grant the Prosecutor an 
adjournment to prepare to 
address the ground raised 
by the defence. 
 
(d) Where a ground for 
excluding criminal 
responsibility under 
article 31, paragraph 3, 
was not raised prior to the 
trial, the Trial Chamber 
may grant the Prosecutor 
an adjournment to prepare 
to address the ground 
raised by the defence. 
Rule 5.31 
Procedures for raising a 
ground for excluding 
criminal responsibility 
under article 31, 
paragraph 3 
 
(a) The defence shall give 
notice to both the Trial 
Chamber and the 
Prosecutor  
 
if it intends to raise a 
ground for excluding 
criminal responsibility 
under article 31, 
paragraph 3.  
 
This shall be done 
sufficiently in advance of 
the commencement of the 
trial to enable the 
Prosecutor to prepare 
adequately for trial. 
 
(b) Following notice 
given under paragraph (a) 
of this rule,  
 
the Trial Chamber shall 
hear both parties  
 
 
before deciding whether 
the defence can  
 
plead the ground for 
excluding criminal 
responsibility. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(c) If the defence is 
permitted to plead the 
ground,  
 
 
 
 
 
the Trial Chamber may 
grant the Prosecutor an 
adjournment to address 
the ground raised by the 
defence. 
Rule 5.31 
Procedures for raising a 
ground for excluding 
criminal responsibility 
under article 31, 
paragraph 3 
 
1. The defence shall give 
notice to both the Trial 
Chamber and the 
Prosecutor  
 
if it intends to raise a 
ground for excluding 
criminal responsibility 
under article 31, 
paragraph 3.  
 
This shall be done 
sufficiently in advance of 
the commencement of the 
trial to enable the 
Prosecutor to prepare 
adequately for trial. 
 
2. Following notice given 
under sub-rule 1,  
 
 
the Trial Chamber shall 
hear both parties  
 
 
before deciding whether 
the defence can  
 
raise a ground for 
excluding criminal 
responsibility. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. If the defence is 
permitted to raise the 
ground,  
 
 
 
 
 
the Trial Chamber may 
grant the Prosecutor an 
adjournment to address 
that ground. 
Rule 80 
Procedures for raising a 
ground for excluding 
criminal responsibility 
under article 31, 
paragraph 3 
 
1. The defence shall give 
notice to both the Trial 
Chamber and the 
Prosecutor  
 
if it intends to raise a 
ground for excluding 
criminal responsibility 
under article 31, 
paragraph 3. 
 
This shall be done 
sufficiently in advance of 
the commencement of the 
trial to enable the 
Prosecutor to prepare 
adequately for trial. 
 
2. Following notice given 
under sub-rule 1,  
 
 
the Trial Chamber shall 
hear both the Prosecutor 
and the defence  
 
before deciding whether 
the defence can  
 
raise a ground for 
excluding criminal 
responsibility. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. If the defence is 
permitted to raise the 
ground,  
 
 
 
 
 
the Trial Chamber may 
grant the Prosecutor an 
adjournment to address 
that ground. 
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First of all, we note that the timing of disclosure changed from “during the trial” to 
“sufficiently in advance of the commencement of the trial to enable the Prosecutor to 
prepare adequately for trial”. This wording is similar to Rule 79 (2), and reminiscent of 
the notion of “equality of arms for the prosecution”; in any case, it removes an element 
of surprise and is in the interest of a better trial management. However, in contrast to 
Rule 79 (2) there is a specific point of reference: “the commencement of the trial”, 
which is straightforward. And unlike Rule 79, the defence is apparently not allowed to 
raise the ground at a later stage, a provision which would state that the failure of notice 
does not prevent the defence from raising the ground is lacking. This is compatible with 
the wording of Art. 31 (3) which says that the Trial Chamber “may consider” the 
ground “at trial”, albeit subject to a procedure as provided by the Rules. This point may 
be related to draft sub-rule (d) as contained in Discussion Paper 2 and the summary of 
the first session of the PrepCom, which apparently (and arguably in contradiction to the 
last sentence of sub-rule (a)) envisaged the ground to be raised at a later stage, but 
which, however, soon disappeared. 
The next change is the dropping of the line “which has not previously been recognized 
in the jurisprudence of the Court”, as only contained in the original Australian proposal; 
this wording was just reiterating the text of Art. 31 (3) ICCSt and could thus be dropped 
without a substantial consequence. Paragraph (2) provides that both parties shall be 
heard. Paragraph (3) allows the Trial Chamber to grant an adjournment for further 
preparation of the prosecution, in the case that it permits the defence to raise the ground; 
this is in parallel with Rule 79 (2). 
Until the end of the first PrepCom session, the draft had also contained the possibility of 
an appeal in accordance with Art. 82 (1)(d) ICCSt; this was dropped, which is probably 
due to the fact that Rule 155, which requires leave to appeal, was contemplated at this 
point as embracing all interlocutory appeals, making the specific notion in draft 
Rule 5.18 obsolete. 
Just like the Rule 79 (1)-(3), Rule 80 has apparently not been applied by the ICC up to 
now. 
 
6.5.4 Rule 79 (4): Other Evidence as ordered by the Chamber 
Rule 79 (4) RPE-ICC provides that “[t]his rule does not prevent a Chamber of the Court 
from ordering disclosure of any other evidence”. As can be seen from the synopsis 
regarding Rule 791167 the provision was introduced with the Revised Discussion Paper of 
                                                 
1167  See 6.5.2 supra. 
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5 August 1999 and remained unaltered. Even though Rule 79 (4) does not explicitly 
contain a reference as to defence evidence, the heading of Rule 79 and the location of 
the provision make clear that it refers to evidence in the hands of the defence. 
On the face of it, Rule 79 is in obvious conflict with the above-mentioned rights of the 
person concerned to remain silent and his privilege against self-incrimination 
(Articles 67 (1)(g), 55 (1)(a), (2)(b) ICCSt); this holds true especially with the flanking 
provision of the already mentioned Regulation 54 RegCt1168. As mentioned, the ICC has 
had opportunity to make general remarks on defence disclosure in general and 
Rule 79 (4) in particular. In the proceedings against Lubanga, Trial Chamber I is 
apparently trying to implement a sort of ‘proportionality approach’, which has elements 
of reciprocal disclosure duties, stating, however, that it reserves the right to ask for 
more: 
At all times the Chamber has an absolute duty to ensure that any discretionary 
order it makes regarding defence disclosure does not derogate from the 
accused's right to a fair and impartial hearing in which his rights are fully 
safeguarded. 
There is often likely to be a link between the disclosure obligations to be 
imposed on the defence, on the one hand, and the proximity of the start date of 
the trial and the extent to which the prosecution has fulfilled its own disclosure 
obligations, on the other.[…] 
In order to ensure the trial process is fair, only proportionate disclosure 
obligations should be imposed on the accused in relation to the evidence he 
intends to advance. In the circumstances, the Chamber will reflect in any order 
it makes on defence disclosure that a material element of the prosecution's 
evidence is still outstanding (along, potentially, with evidence that is helpful to 
the accused)[…]. The Chamber is of the view that the obligations of disclosure 
on the accused, for these reasons, should be of an appropriately restricted 
nature. 
[…] In Rule 79(1)(a) and (b), the expression "any other evidence" is used when 
imposing the obligation on the accused to give advance notice of those two 
defences and it would have been wholly superfluous for the drafters of the 
Statute thereafter to include a further provision empowering the court to order 
the disclosure of "any other evidence" relating to the same defences. It follows 
that Rule 79(4) reveals the Chamber has the power to order advance disclosure 
                                                 
1168  Note 1137 supra. 
346 
 
of any evidence outwith those defences that the accused intends to rely on. This 
interpretation is supported by the provisions of Regulation 54.1169 
The Chamber is struggling hard to find its way through the thicket of the ICC’s 
procedural framework. Systematically, especially the last argument of the Chamber 
must be criticized – the Regulations, being lower in rank, can never serve to interpret 
the Rules and the Statute. As we have seen regarding national jurisdictions, defence 
disclosure does not per se infringe upon the rights of the accused; however, “to order 
advance disclosure of any evidence outwith those defences that the accused intends to 
rely on” must be considered as infringing upon his right to silence – read in this way, 
Rule 79 would be incompatible with the Statute.  
In essence, however, the said ‘proportionality approach’ appears to be the only way to 
make Rule 79 (4) work within the procedural architecture of the ICC. As long as the 
defence is thus willing to present evidence during the trial, it may, in a proportional way 
which indeed also involves the fulfilment of disclosure duties of the prosecution, and in 
the interests of the efficacy of justice, be obliged to disclose part of its evidence which 
is related to its line of evidence in advance. If the defence, however, chooses to remain 
silent, Rule 79 should have no scope of application. 
 
6.6 Exceptions and Limitations to Disclosure 
The applicable provisions of the ICC know the same basic categories of exceptions and 
limitations to disclosure as the Ad Hoc Tribunals. Most of them are contained in 
Rule 81, which refers to different provisions of the Rome Statute; additionally, there is 
the highly important exception to disclosure of confidential material according to 
Rule 54 (3)(e), to which Rule 82 refers. Finally, privileged communication according to 
Rule 73 represents an exception to disclosure which is not contained in Section II 
(“Disclosure”) of Chapter 4 of the Rules, but in Section 1 (“Evidence”). 
Generally, the ICC Chambers have affirmed the principle that disclosure must be 
considered the rule, non-disclosure the exception.1170 Any non-disclosure of evidence 
must thus be based on a specific ground.1171 
                                                 
1169  Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, ICC Case No. 01/04-01/06, Decision on disclosure by the defence, 
Trial Chamber I, 20 March 2008, paras. 33-35, paragraph numbers omitted. 
1170  Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, ICC Case No. 01/04-01/06, Judgment on the Prosecutor's appeal 
against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I entitled "Decision Establishing General Principles 
Governing Applications to Restrict Disclosure pursuant to Rule 81 (2) and (4) of the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence", Appeals Chamber, 13 October 2006, par. 39; Prosecutor v. Katanga, ICC 
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6.6.1 Rule 81 RPE-ICC: Restrictions on Disclosure 
Rule 81, together with the provisions of the Rome Statute to which it refers, represents 
the basic overall provision concerning restrictions on disclosure. Apparently there was 
“relatively little debate” during the drafting process;1172 and substantially the changes are 
quite few; even though the superficial structure of the provision was changed 
considerably. Originally, what are now Rules 81 and 82 was contained in one large 
single provision (draft Rule 5.32); with the Mont Tremblant meeting, this draft Rule 
was divided into two separate provisions (draft Rules 5.32 and 5.32 bis), the 
predecessors of Rules 81 and 82. Furthermore, as previously mentioned, Rule 81 was, in 
contrast to all other disclosure provisions, amended once more between the discussion 
paper of 23 June 2000 and the Working Group report of 27 June, which is why we have 
to distinguish six instead of five different versions.1173 Partially due to the said separation 
of the original draft into two separate provisions at the Mont Tremblant meeting, the 
order of the sub-rules was altered, which makes it more difficult to create a synoptical 
overview. We have therefore attempted to visualise the drafting history additionally by 
means of different colours: 
                                                                                                                                               
Case No. 01/04-01/07 (OA), Judgment on the appeal of the Prosecutor against the decision of Pre-
Trial Chamber I entitled "First Decision on the Prosecution Request for Authorisation to Redact 
Witness Statements" Judgment on the appeal of the Prosecutor against the decision of Pre-Trial 
Chamber I entitled "First Decision on the Prosecution Request for Authorisation to Redact Witness 
Statements", Appeals Chamber, 13 May 2008, par. 70. 
1171  See also Kuschnik, International Criminal Due Process in the Making: New Tendencies in the 
Law on Non-Disclosure in the Proceedings of the ICC, p. 166. 
1172  Brady, Disclosure of Evidence, p. 418. 
1173  See 6.3.2.3.1 supra. 
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Rule 71 
Restrictions on 
disclosure 
 
(a) Reports, 
memoranda or other 
internal documents 
prepared by a party, 
its assistants or 
representatives in 
connection with the 
investigation or 
preparation of the 
case are not subject 
to disclosure. 
 
(b) Where material 
or information is in 
the possession or 
control of the 
Prosecutor,  
 
 
 
the disclosure of 
which may prejudice 
further or ongoing 
investigations, the 
Prosecutor may 
apply to the 
Chamber  
 
dealing with the 
matter at the time for 
a ruling on whether 
the material  
 
must be disclosed to 
the defence. The 
matter shall be heard 
on an ex parte basis 
by the Chamber.  
 
If the Chamber rules 
against disclosure, 
the Prosecutor may 
not subsequently  
 
introduce such 
material or 
information into 
evidence during the 
trial  
 
 
without adequate 
prior disclosure to 
the accused. 
 
(c) Where material 
or information is in 
the possession or 
control of the 
Prosecutor which is 
withheld under 
article 68, paragraph 
5, such material or 
information may not 
be subsequently 
introduced into 
evidence during the  
 
 
 
trial without 
adequate prior 
Rule 5.19 
Restrictions on 
disclosure 
 
(a) Reports, 
memoranda or other 
internal documents 
prepared by a party, 
its assistants or 
representatives in 
connection with the 
investigation or 
preparation of the 
case are not subject 
to disclosure. 
 
(b) Where material 
or information is in 
the possession or 
control of the 
Prosecutor,  
 
 
 
the disclosure of 
which may prejudice 
further or ongoing 
investigations, the 
Prosecutor may 
apply to the 
Chamber  
 
dealing with the 
matter for a ruling on 
whether the material  
 
 
must be disclosed to 
the defence. The 
matter shall be heard 
on an ex parte basis 
by the Chamber.  
 
If the Chamber rules 
against disclosure, 
the Prosecutor may 
not subsequently  
 
introduce such 
material or 
information into 
evidence during the 
confirmation hearing 
or the trial  
 
without adequate 
prior disclosure to 
the accused. 
 
(c) Where material 
or information is in 
the possession or 
control of the 
Prosecutor which is 
withheld under 
article 68, paragraph 
5, such material or 
information may not 
be subsequently 
introduced into 
evidence during the 
confirmation hearing 
or the  
 
trial without 
adequate prior 
Rule 5.32 
Restriction on 
disclosure 
 
(a) Reports, 
memoranda or other 
internal documents 
prepared by a party, 
its assistants or 
representatives in 
connection with the 
investigation or 
preparation of the 
case are not subject 
to disclosure. 
 
(b) Where material 
or information is in 
the possession or 
control of the 
Prosecutor which 
must be disclosed in 
accordance with the 
Statute,  
but disclosure may 
prejudice further or 
ongoing 
investigations, the 
Prosecutor may 
apply to the 
Chamber of the 
Court  
dealing with the 
matter for a ruling as 
to whether the 
material or 
information 
must be disclosed to 
the defence. The 
matter shall be heard 
on an ex parte basis 
by the Chamber.  
 
 
 
However, the 
Prosecutor may not  
 
introduce such 
material or 
information into 
evidence during the 
confirmation hearing 
or the trial  
 
without adequate 
prior disclosure to 
the accused. 
 
(c) Where material 
or information is in 
the possession or 
control of the 
Prosecutor which is 
withheld under 
article 68, paragraph 
5, such material and 
information may not 
be subsequently 
introduced into 
evidence during the 
confirmation hearing 
or the  
 
trial without 
adequate prior 
Rule 5.32 
Restrictions on 
disclosure 
 
1. Reports, 
memoranda or other 
internal documents 
prepared by a party, 
its assistants or 
representatives in 
connection with the 
investigation or 
preparation of the 
case are not subject 
to disclosure. 
 
2. Where material or 
information is in the 
possession or control 
of the Prosecutor 
which must be 
disclosed in 
accordance with the 
Statute,  
but disclosure may 
prejudice further or 
ongoing 
investigations, the 
Prosecutor may 
apply to the 
Chamber  
 
dealing with the 
matter for a ruling as 
to whether the 
material or 
information  
must be disclosed to 
the defence. The 
matter shall be heard 
on an ex parte basis 
by the Chamber.  
 
 
 
However, the  
Prosecutor may not  
 
introduce such 
material or 
information into 
evidence during the 
confirmation hearing 
or the trial  
 
without adequate 
prior disclosure to 
the accused. 
 
3. Where steps have 
been taken to ensure 
the confidentiality of 
information, in 
accordance with 
articles 54, 57, 64, 
72 and 93, and, in 
accordance with 
article 68, to protect 
the safety of 
witnesses and 
victims and members 
of their families, 
such information 
shall not be 
disclosed, except in 
accordance with 
Rule 5.32 
Restrictions on 
disclosure 
 
1. Reports, 
memoranda or other 
internal documents 
prepared by a party, 
its assistants or 
representatives in 
connection with the 
investigation or 
preparation of the 
case are not subject 
to disclosure. 
 
2. Where material or 
information is in the 
possession or control 
of the Prosecutor 
which must be 
disclosed in 
accordance with the 
Statute,  
but disclosure may 
prejudice further or 
ongoing 
investigations, the 
Prosecutor may 
apply to the 
Chamber  
 
dealing with the 
matter for a ruling as 
to whether the 
material or 
information  
must be disclosed to 
the defence. The 
matter shall be heard 
on an ex parte basis 
by the Chamber.  
 
 
 
However, the 
Prosecutor may not  
 
introduce such 
material or 
information into 
evidence during the 
confirmation hearing 
or the trial  
 
without adequate 
prior disclosure to 
the accused. 
 
3. Where steps have 
been taken to ensure 
the confidentiality of 
information, in 
accordance with 
articles 54, 57, 64, 
72 and 93, and, in 
accordance with 
article 68, to protect 
the safety of 
witnesses and 
victims and members 
of their families, 
such information 
shall not be 
disclosed, except in 
accordance with 
Rule 81 
Restrictions on 
disclosure 
 
1. Reports, 
memoranda or other 
internal documents 
prepared by a party, 
its assistants or 
representatives in 
connection with the 
investigation or 
preparation of the 
case are not subject 
to disclosure. 
 
2. Where material or 
information is in the 
possession or control 
of the Prosecutor 
which must be 
disclosed in 
accordance with the 
Statute,  
but disclosure may 
prejudice further or 
ongoing 
investigations, the 
Prosecutor may 
apply to the 
Chamber  
 
dealing with the 
matter for a ruling as 
to whether the 
material or 
information  
must be disclosed to 
the defence. The 
matter shall be heard 
on an ex parte basis 
by the Chamber.  
 
 
 
However, the  
Prosecutor may not  
 
introduce such 
material or 
information into 
evidence during the 
confirmation hearing 
or the trial  
 
without adequate 
prior disclosure to 
the accused. 
 
3. Where steps have 
been taken to ensure 
the confidentiality of 
information, in 
accordance with 
articles 54, 57, 64, 
72 and 93, and, in 
accordance with 
article 68, to protect 
the safety of 
witnesses and 
victims and members 
of their families, 
such information 
shall not be 
disclosed, except in 
accordance with 
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disclosure to the 
accused. 
 
(d) Where material 
or information is in 
the possession or 
control of the 
defence which is 
subject to disclosure, 
it may be withheld in 
circumstances which 
would allow the 
Prosecutor to rely on 
article 68, paragraph 
5, and a summary 
thereof submitted 
instead. Such 
material or 
information may not 
be subsequently 
introduced into 
evidence during the  
 
 
 
trial without 
adequate prior 
disclosure to the 
Prosecutor.  
 
(e) Where material 
or information is in 
the possession or 
control of the 
Prosecutor which 
falls within the scope 
of article 72, its 
treatment shall be 
governed by the 
provisions of that 
article. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[…] 
disclosure to the 
accused. 
 
(d) Where material 
or information is in 
the possession or 
control of the 
defence which is 
subject to disclosure, 
it may be withheld in 
circumstances which 
would allow the 
Prosecutor to rely on 
article 68, paragraph 
5, and a summary 
thereof submitted 
instead. Such 
material or 
information may not 
be subsequently 
introduced into 
evidence during the 
confirmation hearing 
or the  
 
trial without 
adequate prior 
disclosure to the 
Prosecutor. 
 
(e) Where steps have 
been taken to ensure 
the confidentiality of 
information, in 
accordance with 
articles 54, 57, 64, 
72 and 93, and, in 
accordance with 
article 68, to protect 
the safety of 
witnesses and 
victims and members 
of their families, 
such information 
shall not be 
disclosed, except in 
accordance with 
those articles. 
 
[…] 
 
[Rule 5.13. 
Restrictions on 
disclosure 
The Pre-Trial 
Chamber  
 
 
shall, on its own 
motion, or at the 
request of the 
Prosecutor, the 
person concerned  
or any State, take the 
necessary steps to 
ensure the 
confidentiality of 
information, in 
accordance with 
articles 54, 72 and 
93, and, in 
accordance with 
article 68, to protect 
the safety of 
witnesses and 
victims and members 
of their families, 
particularly by 
authorizing the non-
disclosure of their 
identity.] 
disclosure to the 
accused. 
 
(d) Where material 
or information is in 
the possession or 
control of the 
defence which is 
subject to disclosure, 
it may be withheld in 
circumstances which 
would allow the 
Prosecutor to rely on 
article 68, paragraph 
5, and a summary 
thereof submitted 
instead. Such 
material and 
information may not 
be subsequently 
introduced into 
evidence during the 
confirmation hearing 
or the  
 
trial without 
adequate prior 
disclosure to the 
Prosecutor. 
 
(e) Where steps have 
been taken to ensure 
the confidentiality of 
information, in 
accordance with 
articles 54, 57, 64, 
72 and 93, and, in 
accordance with 
article 68, to protect 
the safety of 
witnesses and 
victims and members 
of their families, 
such information 
shall not be 
disclosed, except in 
accordance with 
those articles. 
 
[…] 
 
 
 
 
(k) The Chamber of 
the Court dealing 
with the matter  
 
shall, on its own 
motion or at the 
request of the 
Prosecutor, the 
accused  
or any State, take the 
necessary steps to 
ensure the 
confidentiality of 
information, in 
accordance with 
articles 54, 72 and 
93, and, in 
accordance with 
article 68, to protect 
the safety of 
witnesses and 
victims and members 
of their families, 
particularly by 
authorizing the non-
disclosure of their 
identity. 
those articles. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. The Chamber 
dealing with the 
matter shall, on its 
own motion or at the 
request of the 
Prosecutor, the 
accused or any State, 
take the necessary 
steps to ensure the 
confidentiality of 
information, in 
accordance with 
articles 54, 72 and 
93, and, in 
accordance with 
article 68, to protect 
the safety of 
witnesses and 
victims and members 
of their families, 
particularly by 
authorizing the non-
disclosure of their 
identity. 
 
 
 
5. Where material or 
information is in the 
possession or control 
of the Prosecutor 
which is withheld 
under article 68, 
paragraph 5, such 
material and 
information may not 
be subsequently 
introduced into 
evidence during the 
confirmation hearing 
or the trial without 
adequate prior 
disclosure to the 
accused. 
 
6. Where material or 
information is in the 
possession or control 
of the defence which 
is subject to 
disclosure, it may be 
withheld in 
circumstances 
similar to those 
which would allow 
the Prosecutor to 
rely on article 68, 
paragraph 5, and a 
summary thereof 
submitted instead. 
Such material and 
information may not 
be subsequently 
introduced into 
evidence during the 
confirmation hearing 
or the  
 
trial without 
adequate prior 
disclosure to the 
Prosecutor. 
those articles.  
 
When the disclosure 
of such information 
may create a risk to 
the safety of the 
witness, the Court 
shall take measures 
to inform the witness 
in advance. 
 
4. The Chamber 
dealing with the 
matter shall, on its 
own motion or at the 
request of the 
Prosecutor, the 
accused or any State, 
take the necessary 
steps to ensure the 
confidentiality of 
information, in 
accordance with 
articles 54, 72 and 
93, and, in 
accordance with 
article 68, to protect 
the safety of 
witnesses and 
victims and members 
of their families, 
including by 
authorizing the non-
disclosure of their 
identity prior to the 
commencement of 
the trial. 
 
5. Where material or 
information is in the 
possession or control 
of the Prosecutor 
which is withheld 
under article 68, 
paragraph 5, such 
material and 
information may not 
be subsequently 
introduced into 
evidence during the 
confirmation hearing 
or the trial without 
adequate prior 
disclosure to the 
accused. 
 
6. Where material or 
information is in the 
possession or control 
of the defence which 
is subject to 
disclosure, it may be 
withheld in 
circumstances 
similar to those 
which would allow 
the Prosecutor to 
rely on article 68, 
paragraph 5, and a 
summary thereof 
submitted instead. 
Such material and 
information may not 
be subsequently 
introduced into 
evidence during the 
confirmation hearing 
or the  
 
trial without 
adequate prior 
disclosure to the 
Prosecutor. 
those articles.  
 
When the disclosure 
of such information 
may create a risk to 
the safety of the 
witness, the Court 
shall take measures 
to inform the witness 
in advance. 
 
4. The Chamber 
dealing with the 
matter shall, on its 
own motion or at the 
request of the 
Prosecutor, the 
accused or any State, 
take the necessary 
steps to ensure the 
confidentiality of 
information, in 
accordance with 
articles 54, 72 and 
93, and, in 
accordance with 
article 68, to protect 
the safety of 
witnesses and 
victims and members 
of their families, 
including by 
authorizing the non-
disclosure of their 
identity prior to the 
commencement of 
the trial. 
 
5. Where material or 
information is in the 
possession or control 
of the Prosecutor 
which is withheld 
under article 68, 
paragraph 5, such 
material and 
information may not 
be subsequently 
introduced into 
evidence during the 
confirmation hearing 
or the trial without 
adequate prior 
disclosure to the 
accused. 
 
6. Where material or 
information is in the 
possession or control 
of the defence which 
is subject to 
disclosure, it may be 
withheld in 
circumstances 
similar to those 
which would allow 
the Prosecutor to 
rely on article 68, 
paragraph 5, and a 
summary thereof 
submitted instead. 
Such material and 
information may not 
be subsequently 
introduced into 
evidence during the 
confirmation hearing 
or the  
 
trial without 
adequate prior 
disclosure to the 
Prosecutor. 
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6.6.1.1 Rule 81 (1): Internal Documents 
Rule 81 (1) was obviously not modified during the drafting process of the Rules. It is 
modelled after Rule 70 (A) RPE-ICTY.1174  
In the jurisprudence of the ICC, the provision has appeared on two occasions. For once, 
Rule 81 (1) has been brought in connection with the “table of incriminating evidence” 
or “in-depth analysis chart”.1175 As we will see in a little more detail when we look at the 
role and involvement of the ICC Chambers in the disclosure proceedings, the respective 
Chambers have increasingly asked the Prosecutor to provide the accused and the 
Chambers themselves not only with the evidence itself, but also with more or less 
sophisticated “in-depth analysis charts” or “tables of incriminating evidence” in which 
the evidentiary material is disclosed by the Prosecutor in an organised and structured 
manner.1176 In the proceedings against Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui, Trial Chamber II 
held that the said table of incriminating evidence “is nothing more than a procedural 
tool to make clear and accessible to the Defence and the Chamber the exact evidentiary 
basis of the Prosecution's case”,1177 and that “the impugned order does not oblige the 
Prosecution to provide the Chamber or the Defence with any internal work product 
relating to the internal analysis by the Prosecution of the evidence listed in the 
Table.”1178 In Bemba, Trial Chamber III approved this holding, stating that  
in the view of the Chamber this document does not involve any of the 
prosecution's internal documents: to the contrary, it is based on material that 
has been filed as part of the prosecution's disclosure obligations; furthermore, it 
is a necessary and proportionate procedural tool that assists in revealing the 
                                                 
1174  See the nota bene contained in the Australian draft: “Sub-rule (a) closely follows rule 70 (A) of 
the ICTY Rules. It is appropriate to exclude internal working documents of the prosecution and 
defence from disclosure.” 
1175  See Prosecutor v. Katanga & Ngudjolo Chui, ICC Case No. 01/04-01/07, Prosecution’s 
Application for Leave to Appeal the “Order concerning the Presentation of Incriminating Evidence 
and the E-Court Protocol”, Office of the Prosecutor, 23 March 2009, par. 25; Prosecutor v. Bemba, 
ICC Case No. 01/05-01/08, Prosecution's Submissions on the Trial Chamber's 8 December 2009 Oral 
Order Requesting Updating of the In-Depth-Analysis Chart, Office of the Prosecutor, 15 December 
2009, par. 9. 
1176  See 6.8 infra. 
1177  Prosecutor v. Katanga & Ngudjolo Chui, ICC Case No. 01/04-01/07, Decision on the 
"Prosecution's Application for Leave to Appeal the 'Order concerning the Presentation of 
Incriminating Evidence and the E-Court Protocol'" and the "Prosecution's Second Application for 
Extension of Time Limit Pursuant to Regulation 35 to Submit a Table of Incriminating Evidence and 
related material in compliance with Trial Chamber II 'Order concerning the Presentation of 
Incriminating Evidence and the E-Court Protocol'", Trial Chamber II, 1 May 2009, par. 24. 
1178  Ibid., par. 33. 
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prosecution's case against the accused, notwithstanding the resources that will 
be necessary for its completion.1179  
This reasoning must be endorsed. One might also say that the analysis chart was not a 
pre-existing internal document that would need to be disclosed, but indeed, as in the 
Katanga ruling, a procedural tool. It is not even known whether a similar document 
previously existed at all with the Prosecutor and his staff. Whether the Chambers of the 
ICC can ask the Prosecutor to perform a task as creating such a chart in the procedural 
framework of the ICC is a justified question – but certainly not one which is related to 
the exceptions to disclosure according to Rule 81 (1). 
Other than that, the Prosecution apparently also tried to persuade the Court that the so-
called pre-assessment interviews conducted before an actual witness interrogation1180 
were internal documents according to Rule 81 (1); this was, rightly, denied by the 
Chamber.1181  
 
6.6.1.2 Rule 81 (2): Possible Prejudice of Ongoing Investigations 
Rule 81 (2) deals with non-disclosure for reasons of protecting further or ongoing 
investigations. Oftentimes, particularly in the investigation of macro-criminality, it may 
be necessary to keep part of the investigation secret for some time. Rule 81 (2) also 
describes how such a situation should be dealt with procedurally, namely by an ex parte 
hearing of the Prosecutor. This entails a judicial ‘check’ of the Prosecutor’s 
investigation by a Chamber of the Court.1182  
Rule 81 (2), which clearly originates from Rule 66 (C) RPE-ICTY,1183 did not change to 
a large extent during the drafting process. The first modification was the inclusion of the 
confirmation hearing in the last sentence; this goes along with the general tendency of 
                                                 
1179  Prosecutor v. Bemba, ICC Case No. 01/05-01/08, Decision on the "Prosecution's Submissions 
on the Trial Chamber's 8 December 2009 Oral Order Requesting Updating of the In-Depth -Analysis 
Chart", Trial Chamber III, 29 January 2010, par. 26. 
1180  See 6.4.3 supra. 
1181  Prosecutor v. Bemba, ICC Case No. 01/05-01/08, Public redacted version of "Decision on the 
Defence Request for disclosure of pre-interview assessments and the Consequences of non-
disclosure"(ICC-01/05-01/08-750-Conf), Trial Chamber III, 9 April 2010, par. 35. 
1182  See Brady, Disclosure of Evidence, pp. 418 et seq. 
1183  See also the nota bene contained in the Australian proposal: “Sub-rule (b) draws, in part, on rule 
66 (C) of the ICTY Rules. It seeks to protect the interests of the accused by requiring the Court to rule 
on disclosure and obliging the Prosecutor to disclose previously undisclosed material to the accused if 
he or she wishes to introduce it as evidence.” 
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the drafters to make most disclosure provisions of the Rules applicable to both pre-
confirmation and pre-trial disclosure, which we have seen in most of the provisions we 
have looked at until now. Other than that, we note the inclusion of the phrase “which 
must be disclosed in accordance with the Statute”. As it would have been easy to 
include a wording such as “in accordance with the Statute and the Rules”, it is not quite 
clear why the wording is limited to the Statute. To be sure, as we have said above, the 
Rules mainly shape and refine the disclosure rights and obligations emanating from the 
Statute. In any case, in the jurisprudence of the ICC, this specific point has apparently 
not been an issue up to now. Rule 82 (2) per se, in turn, has proved to be of 
considerable practical importance, a fact which, however, has been extensively analysed 
elsewhere.1184  
Obviously, according to the interpretation of the provision, Rule 81 (2) RPE can be a 
very powerful tool of the Prosecutor to reach non-disclosure. Crucial issues in the 
practice of the ICC appear to be the general capability of Rule 81 (2) to provide for 
redactions in material which must be otherwise disclosed, as well as ‘potential 
prosecution witnesses’. As to the first issue, it has been briefly mentioned above that 
most of the Judges of the ICC agree on the fact that Rule 81 (2) provides a legal basis 
for redactions in material which must be disclosed, even though the provision does not 
explicitly state so. The Judges thus do not necessarily determine, as the wording of 
Rule 81 (2) suggests, whether certain material must be disclosed, but rather how much 
of it.1185 Judge Pikis, in turn, is of the opinion that Rule 81 (2) necessitates full disclosure 
of the respective material, or non-disclosure, in which case the material may not be used 
by the Prosecutor.1186 While one may conclude that Judge Pikis’ opinion is closer to the 
wording of the Rule, it must be observed that the accused is usually served better with a 
                                                 
1184  Kuschnik, International Criminal Due Process in the Making: New Tendencies in the Law on 
Non-Disclosure in the Proceedings of the ICC, pp. 168 et subs. 
1185  See only Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, ICC Case No. 01/04-01/06 (OA 5), Judgment on the 
appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I entitled "First 
Decision on the Prosecution Requests and Amended Requests for Redactions under Rule 81" as well 
as Judgment on the appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I 
entitled "Second Decision on the Prosecution Requests and Amended Requests for Redactions under 
Rule 81", Appeals Chamber, both dated 14 December 2006; as well as Prosecutor v. Katanga, ICC 
Case No. 01/04-01/07 (OA), Judgment on the appeal of the Prosecutor against the decision of Pre-
Trial Chamber I entitled "First Decision on the Prosecution Request for Authorisation to Redact 
Witness Statements", and Judgment on the appeal of Mr Germain Katanga against the decision of Pre-
Trial Chamber I entitled "First Decision on the Prosecution Request for Authorisation to Redact 
Witness Statements", Appeals Chamber, both dated 13 May 2008. 
1186  See separate and/or dissenting opinions of Judge Pikis attached to all decisions cited in note 
1185. 
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redacted piece of evidence than with no evidence at all. According to the Rule, the 
Prosecutor must make an ex parte to the Chamber dealing with the matter, which allows 
or disallows the requested redactions. This, as a matter of course, means that the 
Chamber in any case gets to see the unredacted version of the respective evidence. 
Whether the fact that an ex parte application has been made needs to be disclosed to the 
defence, must, according to the ICC Appeals Chamber, be decided on a case-by-case 
basis.1187 
The test whether and to what extent redactions can be granted according to Rule 81 (2) 
applied by the ICC Appeals Chamber is one of proportionality; the Chamber 
emphasizes that the defence must be given the right to be heard, and that redactions 
must be strictly necessary to prevent possible prejudice of further or ongoing 
investigations.1188 As usual, the Appeals Chamber refuses to take a definitive position, 
and rather retains its case-by-case approach. 
 
6.6.2 Confidentiality provisions of the Rome Statute in conjunction with 
Rule 81 (3)/(4) RPE-ICC 
Sub-rules (3) and (4) of Rule 81 deal with restrictions on disclosure on reasons of 
confidentiality. However, both sub-rules do not constitute the basis for non-disclosure 
but rather refer to confidentiality grounds as provided for in the Rome Statute. Sub-
rule (3) relates to protective measures which are already in place; sub-rule (4), in turn, 
refers to protective measures which are about to be taken. In the jurisprudence of the 
ICC, sub-rule (4) has been applied in a large number of instances, whereas it appears 
that sub-rule (3) has not gained much significance.1189 
As with most other sub-rules of Rule 81, the amendments during the drafting process 
were few. The Australian proposal exceptionally did not provide the predecessors of 
                                                 
1187  Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, ICC Case No. 01/04-01/06, Judgment on the Prosecutor's appeal 
against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I entitled "Decision Establishing General Principles 
Governing Applications to Restrict Disclosure pursuant to Rule 81 (2) and (4) of the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence", Appeals Chamber, 13 October 2006, par. 67. 
1188  Prosecutor v. Katanga, ICC Case No. 01/04-01/07 (OA), Judgment on the appeal of the 
Prosecutor against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I entitled "First Decision on the Prosecution 
Request for Authorisation to Redact Witness Statements", Appeals Chamber, 13 May 2008, paras. 68-
73. See for more Kuschnik, International Criminal Due Process in the Making: New Tendencies in the 
Law on Non-Disclosure in the Proceedings of the ICC, pp. 168 et subs. 
1189  It appears in some of the mentioned separate/dissenting opinions of Judge Pikis, see note 1185 
supra. 
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sub-rules (3) and (4). Both appear for the first time in discussion paper 2 of 25 February 
1999. Whereas sub-rule (3) was always part of the general provision on restrictions to 
disclosure (draft Rule 5.19), sub-rule (4) originally related to the confirmation stage 
only (draft Rule 5.13), and was only later included in draft Rule 5.19; at the same time, 
the specific reference to the Pre-Trial Chamber was given up. As previously mentioned, 
Rule 81 (3) was the only disclosure provision which was modified once more after the 
discussion paper of 23 June 2000, by the inclusion of the phrase “when the disclosure of 
such information may create a risk to the safety of the witness, the Court shall take 
measures to inform the witness in advance”.  
Both sub-rules refer to those Articles of the Rome Statute that relate to the protection of 
confidential information: Articles 54 (the fact that confidentiality agreements according 
to Art. 54 (3)(e) are covered by Rule 82 suggests that sub-rules (3) and (4) refer to 
Art. 54 (3)(f) only), 72 (national security information) and 93 (confidentiality issues 
arising with the cooperation of national states), as well as witness protection according 
to Art. 68. Additionally, sub-rule (3) refers to confidentiality measures (already) taken 
by a Chamber according to Articles 57 and 64 (functions and powers of the respective 
Pre-Trial and Trial Chambers).  
In the practice of the ICC, particularly sub-rule (4) has become relevant, oftentimes in 
connection with sub-rule (2); as with the latter sub-rule, sub-rule (4) has been regularly 
applied as a basis of redactions, with the same dispute between Judge Pikis and the rest 
of the Judges involved.1190 The Appeals Chamber maintains that the test to be applied to 
Rule 81 (4) is the same as for Rule 81 (2);1191 and indeed, in most of the mentioned 
decisions sub-rules (2) and (4) appear to overlap. Issues of practical relevance in this 
regard have mostly been related to the protection of different categories of (in the end, 
any category of) persons, including identity protection of prosecution staff,1192 
“potential/prospective prosecution witnesses”,1193 ‘victims’, which, while not being 
                                                 
1190  See references cited in notes 1185 and 1186 supra. 
1191  Prosecutor v. Katanga, ICC Case No. 01/04-01/07 (OA), Judgment on the appeal of Mr 
Germain Katanga against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I entitled "First Decision on the 
Prosecution Request for Authorisation to Redact Witness Statements", Appeals Chamber, 13 May 
2008, par. 59. 
1192  Prosecutor v. Katanga, ICC Case No. 01/04-01/07 (OA), Judgment on the appeal of the 
Prosecutor against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I entitled "First Decision on the Prosecution 
Request for Authorisation to Redact Witness Statements", Appeals Chamber, 13 May 2008, paras. 89 
et subs. 
1193  Prosecutor v. Katanga, 13 May 2008, supra note 1191, paras. 45 et subs. The Appeals Chamber 
based its decision in this regard (also) on Rule 81 (2); in any case, as mentioned, it applies the same 
test under sub-rule (2) and sub-rule (4). 
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victims of the alleged crime with which the accused is charged, appear in statements of 
witnesses, but are not witnesses themselves, nor take part in the proceedings as 
participating victims,1194 or ‘innocent third parties’.1195 Once more, the Appeals Chamber 
proves its flexible approach to restrictions on disclosure.1196 In any case, and in contrast 
to the Ad Hoc Tribunals, sub-rule 4 makes clear that non-disclosure of the identity of 
witnesses during trial is impossible. 
 
6.6.3 Art. 68 (5) ICCSt, Rules 81 (5)/(6) RPE-ICC 
Rule 81 (5) shapes the application of Art. 68 (5) ICCSt, which deals with witness 
protection for prosecution witnesses; sub-rule (6) is concerned with the same protection 
for defence witnesses.1197 As with sub-rule 4, the genuine provision for non-disclosure 
concerning sub-rule (5) remains Art. 68 (5) ICCSt.1198 Both sub-rule (5) and (6) did not 
change during the drafting process, with the exception of the fact that the phrase “at the 
confirmation hearing” was included, to make clear that the application of these 
provisions is not confined to the trial proceedings. 
We have briefly sketched the development of Art. 68 (5) above. The according 
provision in the 1998 PrepCom draft was as follows: 
Article 68: Protection of the [accused], victims and witnesses [and their 
participation in the proceedings]  
[6. Notwithstanding paragraph 1 of article 58, if disclosure of any evidence 
and/or any of the particulars referred to in that paragraph will probably lead to 
the security of any witness or his/her family being gravely endangered, the 
Prosecutor may, for purposes of these proceedings, withhold such particulars 
                                                 
1194  Prosecutor v. Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui, ICC Case No. 01/04-01/07 (OA 5) Judgment on the 
appeal of Mr Mathieu Ngudjolo against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I entitled "Decision on the 
Prosecution Request for Authorisation to Redact Statements of Witnesses 4 and 9", Appeals Chamber, 
27 May 2008, par. 34. 
1195  Prosecutor v. Katanga, 13 May 2008, supra note 1192, paras. 43 et subs. 
1196  See for more, once again, Kuschnik, International Criminal Due Process in the Making: New 
Tendencies in the Law on Non-Disclosure in the Proceedings of the ICC, pp. 171 et subs. 
1197  See the nota bene contained in the Australian proposal: “Sub-rule (d) recognizes that the defence 
may need to protect information which, if disclosed prior to trial, may lead to the grave endangerment 
of a witness or his or her family.” 
1198  See, once again the nota bene contained in the Australian proposal: “Sub-rule (c) provides a link 
to article 68, paragraph 5, which deals with the nondisclosure of material or information which 
threatens the security of a witness or his or her family. The sub-rule requires that, if the material or 
information is to be introduced as evidence, it must be disclosed to the accused.” 
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and submit a summary of such evidence. Such a summary shall, for purposes of 
any later trial proceedings before the Court, be deemed to form part of the 
particulars of the indictment.] 
Today, Art. 68 (5) provides: 
Where the disclosure of evidence or information pursuant to this Statute may 
lead to the grave endangerment of the security of a witness or his or her family, 
the Prosecutor may, for the purposes of any proceedings conducted prior to the 
commencement of the trial, withhold such evidence or information and instead 
submit a summary thereof. Such measures shall be exercised in a manner which 
is not prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the accused and a fair and 
impartial trial. 
Draft Art. 68 (6) of the PrepCom Draft made explicit reference to Art. 58 (1) of the 
draft.1199 It is in this light in which the references in draft Art. 68 (6) to the “particulars 
of the indictment” must be seen. We note that the scope of the provision was widened: 
whereas draft Art. 68 (6) required that the security of the witness or his family be 
probably gravely endangered, Art. 68 is applicable if the witness or his family may be 
gravely endangered. Other than that, Art. 68 (5) makes, in contrast to its predecessor, 
explicit reference to the fact that the rights of the accused must be safeguarded at all 
times.1200 Also, the notion of the confirmation hearing is missing. 
Art. 68 (5) specifically applies to any point in time “prior to the commencement of the 
trial”, thus chiefly the confirmation hearing, and basically enables the Prosecutor to 
submit summaries of evidence instead of the evidence itself; the provision appears to be 
connected with Art. 61 (5), which also allows the Prosecutor to rely on documentary or 
                                                 
1199  Article 58. Commencement of prosecution 
 1. If upon investigation [in the course of an investigation] the Prosecutor, having regard to the matters 
referred to in article 15, concludes that [the case is admissible, and] [a case does exist against one or 
more persons named,] [there is a prima facie case] [there is sufficient evidence that could justify a 
conviction of a suspect, if the evidence were not contradicted at trial,] [which the accused could be 
called on to answer and that is desirable in the interests of justice that the case should proceed], the 
Prosecutor shall file with the Registrar an indictment containing a concise statement of the allegations 
of fact and of the crime or crimes with which the suspect is charged in respect of each of the persons 
referred to, their name and particulars, a statement of the allegations of fact against them, and the 
characterization of these facts within the jurisdiction of the Court and shall be accompanied by 
[relevant] [sufficient] evidence collected by the Prosecutor for the purposes of confirmation [of the 
indictment] by the [Presidency] [Pre-Trial Chamber]. 
1200  N.B.: This wording proves that the notion of ‘accused’ may be used as a general term to refer to 
the person against whom criminal proceedings are taking place, since Art. 68 (5) is applicable 
specifically at the confirmation stage (“prior to the commencement of the trial”, and thus before the 
confirmation of the charges). 
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summary evidence at the confirmation hearing.1201 The fact that, in turn, Rule 81 (5) 
refers to both the confirmation hearing and the trial, may be regarded as superfluous, 
since from Art. 68 (5) we can conclude e contrario that in any case material can be 
retained only until the commencement of the trial. In any case, it appears possible that 
adequate disclosure according to Rule 81 (5) entails that disclosure must actually take 
place at a point in time sufficiently before the trial. 
Rule 81 (6), as stated, basically states the same thing as Rule 81 (5) regarding disclosure 
by the defence; in contrast to the latter, however, it also, in and of itself, conveys to the 
defence a right to temporary non-disclosure, which is necessary because Art. 68 (5) 
refers to prosecution witnesses only.1202 
 
6.6.4 Art. 54 (3)(e) ICCSt, Rule 82 RPE-ICC: Confidentiality Agreements 
As is the case with Rule 81 (3) to (5), the basis of non-disclosure is actually not 
Rule 82, but Art. 54 (3)(e) directly. We have pointed various times already to the fact 
that the latter provision has caused considerable controversy up to now.  
The drafting history of Rule 82 can be visualized as follows: 
                                                 
1201  As will be pointed out below (6.8.1), this fact is used as an argument to demonstrate the 
‘subordinate’ significance of the confirmation hearing vis-à-vis the trial. 
1202  See for more, once again, Kuschnik, International Criminal Due Process in the Making: New 
Tendencies in the Law on Non-Disclosure in the Proceedings of the ICC, pp. 180 et subs. 
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(f) Where material or 
information is in the 
possession or control of 
the Prosecutor which is 
protected under article 54, 
paragraph 3 (e), the 
Prosecutor may not 
subsequently introduce 
such material or 
information into evidence 
during the trial without  
 
 
 
 
 
adequate prior disclosure 
to the accused. 
 
(g) If the Prosecutor 
introduces material or 
information protected 
under article 54, 
paragraph 3 (e), into 
evidence,  
 
the Trial Chamber  
 
 
may not order the 
production of additional 
evidence received from 
the provider of the initial 
material or information, 
nor may  
 
the Trial Chamber  
 
for the purpose of 
obtaining such additional 
evidence itself summon 
the provider or a 
representative of the 
provider as a witness or 
order their attendance. 
 
(h) If the Prosecutor calls 
a witness to introduce in 
evidence any material or 
information which has 
been protected under 
article 54, paragraph 3 
(e),  
 
the Trial Chamber  
 
 
may not compel that 
witness to answer any 
question relating to the 
material or information or 
its origin, if the witness 
declines to answer on 
grounds of 
confidentiality. 
 
(i) The right of the 
accused to challenge 
evidence which has been 
protected under article 54, 
paragraph 3 (e), shall 
remain unaffected subject 
only to the limitations 
Rule 5.19. Restrictions 
on disclosure 
 
 
[…] 
 
 
(f) Where material or 
information is in the 
possession or control of 
the Prosecutor which is 
protected under article 54, 
paragraph 3 (e), the 
Prosecutor may not 
subsequently introduce 
such material or 
information into evidence 
without  
 
 
 
 
 
adequate prior disclosure 
to the accused. 
 
(g) If the Prosecutor 
introduces material or 
information protected 
under article 54, 
paragraph 3 (e), into 
evidence,  
 
the Chamber dealing with 
the matter  
 
may not order the 
production of additional 
evidence received from 
the provider of the initial 
material or information, 
nor may  
 
that Chamber  
 
for the purpose of 
obtaining such additional 
evidence itself summon 
the provider or a 
representative of the 
provider as a witness or 
order their attendance. 
 
(h) If the Prosecutor calls 
a witness to introduce in 
evidence any material or 
information which has 
been protected under 
article 54, paragraph 3 
(e),  
 
the Chamber dealing with 
the matter  
 
may not compel that 
witness to answer any 
question relating to the 
material or information or 
its origin, if the witness 
declines to answer on 
grounds of 
confidentiality. 
 
(i) The right of the 
accused to challenge 
evidence which has been 
protected under article 54, 
paragraph 3 (e), shall 
remain unaffected subject 
only to the limitations 
Rule 5.32 
Restriction on disclosure 
 
[…] 
 
 
 
(f) Where material or 
information is in the 
possession or control of 
the Prosecutor which is 
protected under article 54, 
paragraph 3 (e), the 
Prosecutor may not 
subsequently introduce 
such material or 
information into evidence 
without  
 
the prior consent of the 
provider of the material or 
information and  
 
adequate prior disclosure 
to the accused. 
 
(g) If the Prosecutor 
introduces material or 
information protected 
under article 54, 
paragraph 3 (e), into 
evidence,  
 
the Chamber of the Court 
dealing with the matter  
 
may not order the 
production of additional 
evidence received from 
the provider of the initial 
material or information, 
nor may  
 
that Chamber  
 
for the purpose of 
obtaining such additional 
evidence itself summon 
the provider or a 
representative of the 
provider as a witness or 
order their attendance. 
 
(h) If the Prosecutor calls 
a witness to introduce in 
evidence any material or 
information which has 
been protected under 
article 54, paragraph 3 
(e),  
 
the Chamber of the Court 
dealing with the matter  
 
may not compel that 
witness to answer any 
question relating to the 
material or information or 
its origin, if the witness 
declines to answer on 
grounds of 
confidentiality. 
 
(i) The right of the 
accused to challenge 
evidence which has been 
protected under article 54, 
paragraph 3 (e), shall 
remain unaffected subject 
only to the limitations 
Rule 5.32 bis 
Restrictions on 
disclosure of material 
and information 
protected under article 
54, paragraph 3 (e) 
 
1. Where material or 
information is in the 
possession or control of 
the Prosecutor which is 
protected under article 54, 
paragraph 3 (e), the 
Prosecutor may not 
subsequently introduce 
such material or 
information into evidence 
without  
 
the prior consent of the 
provider of the material or 
information and  
 
adequate prior disclosure 
to the accused. 
 
2. If the Prosecutor 
introduces material or 
information protected 
under article 54, 
paragraph 3 (e), into 
evidence,  
 
the Chamber dealing with 
the matter  
 
may not order the 
production of additional 
evidence received from 
the provider of the initial 
material or information, 
nor may  
 
that Chamber  
 
for the purpose of 
obtaining such additional 
evidence itself summon 
the provider or a 
representative of the 
provider as a witness or 
order their attendance. 
 
3. If the Prosecutor  calls 
a witness to introduce in 
evidence any material or 
information which has 
been protected under 
article 54, paragraph 3 
(e),  
 
the Chamber dealing with 
the matter  
 
may not compel that 
witness to answer any 
question relating to the 
material or information or 
its origin, if the witness 
declines to answer on 
grounds of 
confidentiality. 
 
4. The right of the 
accused to challenge 
evidence which has been 
protected under article 54, 
paragraph 3 (e), shall 
remain unaffected subject 
only to the limitations 
Rule 82 
Restrictions on 
disclosure of material 
and information 
protected under article 
54, paragraph 3 (e) 
 
1. Where material or 
information is in the 
possession or control of 
the Prosecutor which is 
protected under article 54, 
paragraph 3 (e), the 
Prosecutor may not 
subsequently introduce 
such material or 
information into evidence 
without  
 
the prior consent of the 
provider of the material or 
information and  
 
adequate prior disclosure 
to the accused. 
 
2. If the Prosecutor 
introduces material or 
information protected 
under article 54, 
paragraph 3 (e), into 
evidence,  
 
a Chamber  
 
 
may not order the 
production of additional 
evidence received from 
the provider of the initial 
material or information, 
nor may  
 
a Chamber  
 
for the purpose of 
obtaining such additional 
evidence itself summon 
the provider or a 
representative of the 
provider as a witness or 
order their attendance. 
 
3. If the Prosecutor  calls 
a witness to introduce in 
evidence any material or 
information which has 
been protected under 
article 54, paragraph 3 
(e),  
 
a Chamber  
 
 
may not compel that 
witness to answer any 
question relating to the 
material or information or 
its origin, if the witness 
declines to answer on 
grounds of 
confidentiality. 
 
4. The right of the 
accused to challenge 
evidence which has been 
protected under article 54, 
paragraph 3 (e), shall 
remain unaffected subject 
only to the limitations 
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contained in sub-rules (g) 
and (h). 
 
 
(j) The Trial Chamber  
 
 
 
may order upon an 
application by the defence 
that,  
in the interests of justice, 
material or information in 
the possession of the 
accused, which has been 
provided to the accused 
 
under the same conditions 
as those set down in 
article 54, paragraph 3 
(e), and is to be 
introduced into evidence, 
shall be subject  
 
 
to sub-rules (f), (g) and 
(h).  
 
contained in sub-rules (g) 
and (h). 
 
 
(j) The Chamber dealing 
with the matter  
 
 
may order upon an 
application by the defence 
that,  
in the interests of justice, 
material or information in 
the possession of the 
accused, which has been 
provided to the accused  
 
under the same conditions 
as those set down in 
article 54, paragraph 3 
(e), and is to be 
introduced into evidence, 
shall be subject mutatis 
mutandis  
 
to sub-rules (f), (g) and 
(h).  
contained in paragraphs 
(g) and (h) of the present 
rule. 
 
(j) The Chamber of the 
Court dealing with the 
matter  
 
may order an application 
[sic] by the defence that,  
 
in the interest of justice, 
material or information in 
the  possession of the 
accused which has been 
provided to the accused  
 
under the same conditions 
as set forth in article 54, 
paragraph 3 (e), and is to 
be introduced into 
evidence, shall be subject 
mutatis mutandis  
 
 
to paragraphs (f), (g) and 
(h) of the present rule.  
 
contained in sub-rules 2 
and 3. 
 
 
5. The Chamber dealing 
with the matter  
 
 
may order, upon 
application by the 
defence, that,  
in the interests of justice, 
material or information in 
the possession of the 
accused, which has been 
provided to the accused  
 
under the same conditions 
as set forth in article 54, 
paragraph 3 (e), and 
which is to be introduced 
into evidence, shall be 
subject mutatis mutandis  
 
 
to sub-rules 1, 2 and 3. 
contained in sub-rules 2 
and 3. 
 
 
5. A Chamber dealing 
with the matter  
 
 
may order, upon 
application by the 
defence, that,  
in the interests of justice, 
material or information in 
the possession of the 
accused, which has been 
provided to the accused  
 
under the same conditions 
as set forth in article 54, 
paragraph 3 (e), and 
which is to be introduced 
into evidence, shall be 
subject mutatis mutandis  
 
 
to sub-rules 1, 2 and 3. 
 
As previously mentioned, Rules 81 and 82 were originally contained in a single 
provision. Once again, the Australian proposal drew much of the content of what is now 
Rule 82 from the ICTY Rules, which is also expressly stated in the draft.1203 Originally, 
the provision merely stated that the introduction of the confidential evidence was not 
allowed without prior disclosure; since the revised discussion paper of 5 August 1999, 
the provision states that the Prosecutor is also bound by the confidentiality agreement, 
in that the evidence may not be introduced, i.e. it is inadmissible; this statement has, as 
we will see instantly, contributed to the controversy regarding the interpretation of 
Art. 54 (3)(e). 
Furthermore, as usual, the reference to the Trial Chamber was deleted, and instead 
reference was made to the “Chamber dealing with the matter”; since the discussion 
paper of 23 June 2000, however, the provision merely speaks of “a Chamber”, 
                                                 
1203  Australian proposal concerning draft Rule 71:  
 “Sub-rule (f) provides a link to article 54, paragraph 3 (e), which deals with the protection of 
confidential information. As with material withheld under article 68, paragraph 5, this sub-rule 
requires the Prosecutor to disclose previously undisclosed material to the accused if be or she wishes 
to introduce it as evidence. Article 54, paragraph 3 (e), reflects the approach taken to confidential 
information in rule 70 (B) of the ICTY Rules. Sub-rules 70 (C) to (F) of the ICTY Rules are linked to 
rule 70 (B), but are not reflected in article 54, paragraph 3 (e). 
 Sub-rule (g) reflects much of the substance of rule 70 (C). 
 Sub-rule (h) closely follows rule 70 (D). 
 Sub-rule (i) closely follows rule 70 (E). 
 Sub-rule (j) draws upon rule 70 (F).)” 
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presumably meaning that confidentiality agreements and the ensuing inadmissibility of 
the evidence are to be observed by any Chamber of the Court, also in other cases. In 
sub-rule (5), which relates to confidentiality agreements of the defence, the wording “a 
Chamber dealing with the matter” was chosen; a reason for this is not apparent. 
The current wording of Art. 54 (3)(e) is the following: 
The Prosecutor may: […] 
Agree not to disclose, at any stage of the proceedings, documents or information 
that the Prosecutor obtains on the condition of confidentiality and solely for the 
purpose of generating new evidence, unless the provider of the information 
consents. 
As previously mentioned, the confidentiality agreements of the Prosecutor with 
numerous international organizations in the situation of the DRC caused considerable 
debate. The Prosecutor had, as a matter of standard procedure, acquired large amounts 
of evidence, among which there were many documents containing exculpatory 
evidence. Since these agreements also forbade the Prosecutor to disclose these 
documents to the Trial Chamber, the latter was unable to exercise its functions under, 
among other provisions, Art. 67 (2) ICCSt. Finally, after a long see-saw regarding 
whether the Prosecutor would get the consent of the information providers to disclose 
the evidence or not, Trial Chamber I stayed the proceedings: 
The Chamber's overall conclusions can be shortly described: 
i) The disclosure of exculpatory evidence in the possession of the prosecution is 
a fundamental aspect of the accused's right to a fair trial; 
ii) The prosecution has incorrectly used Article 54(3) (e) when entering into 
agreements with information-providers, with the consequence that a significant 
body of exculpatory evidence which would otherwise have been disclosed to the 
accused is to be withheld from him, thereby improperly inhibiting the 
opportunities for the accused to prepare his defence; and 
iii) The Chamber has been prevented from exercising its jurisdiction under 
Articles 64(2), Article 64(3) (c) and Article 67(2), in that it is unable to 
determine whether or not the non-disclosure of this potentially exculpatory 
material constitutes a breach of the accused's right to a fair trial. 
Adapting the language of the Appeals Chamber, the consequence of the three 
factors set out in the preceding paragraph has been that the trial process has 
been ruptured to such a degree that it is now impossible to piece together the 
constituent elements of a fair trial. 
361 
 
In consequence a stay is imposed on these proceedings.1204  
It may be noted that, while the stay of proceedings is grounded on the accused’s right to 
a fair trial, the Chamber is particularly unsatisfied also with the fact that the relevant 
evidence was kept secret from itself as well. 
The decision was upheld by the ICC Appeals Chamber,1205 and has been analysed by 
legal scholarship extensively.1206 It may, however, contribute to the discussion to take a 
short look at the drafting history of Art. 54 (3)(e).  
Trial Chamber I understands Art. 54 (3)(e) in such a way that it refers to evidence which 
is obtained by the Prosecutor solely for the purposes of generating new evidence (so-
called ‘lead-‘ or ‘springboard’-evidence).1207 The Prosecutor, in turn, interpreted 
Art. 54 (3)(e) ICCSt to not refer to the kind of evidence, but to the use of it. Reading 
Art. 54 (3)(e) in conjunction with Art. 93 (8)(b)1208 and Rule 82 (1), it held that 
oftentimes, at the moment of the reception of the evidence, the prosecution will not 
know exactly whether the material itself has evidentiary value or will only provide lead 
evidence. The Prosecutor was, according to his interpretation, thus free to receive any 
kind of material, but restricted regarding the use of it.1209 The Appeals Chamber did 
apparently not want to follow the interpretation of the Trial Chamber that Art. 54 (3)(e) 
may only be invoked to obtain lead evidence, and resorted to the fundamental notion 
that the Chamber must have the opportunity to rule on the issue, and that this may not 
                                                 
1204  Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, ICC Case No. 01/04-01/06, Decision on the consequences of non-
disclosure of exculpatory materials covered by Article 54(3)(e) agreements and the application to stay 
the prosecution of the accused, together with certain other issues raised at the Status Conference on 10 
June 2008, Trial Chamber I, 13 June 2008, paras. 92 et subs., paragraph numbers omitted. 
1205  Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, ICC Case No. 01/04-01/06 OA 13, Judgment on the appeal of the 
Prosecutor against the decision of Trial Chamber I entitled "Decision on the consequences of non-
disclosure of exculpatory materials covered by Article 54(3)(e) agreements and the application to stay 
the prosecution of the accused, together with certain other issues raised at the Status Conference on 10 
June 2008", Appeals Chamber, 21 October 2008. 
1206  See, e.g., Ambos, Confidential Investigations (Article 54(3)(e) ICC Statute) vs. Disclosure 
Obligations; Swoboda, The ICC Disclosure Regime; Kuschnik, International Criminal Due Process in 
the Making: New Tendencies in the Law on Non-Disclosure in the Proceedings of the ICC; Whiting, 
Lead Evidence and Discovery Before the International Criminal Court: The Lubanga Case. 
1207  Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, 13 June 2008, note 1204 supra, par. 71 et subs. 
1208  “The requested State may, when necessary, transmit documents or information to the Prosecutor 
on a confidential basis. The Prosecutor may then use them solely for the purpose of generating new 
evidence.” 
1209  Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, ICC Case No. 01/04-01/06 OA 13, Prosecution's Document in 
Support of Appeal against Decision to Stay Proceedings, 24 July 2008, paras. 6 et subs. 
362 
 
be prevented by confidentiality agreements.1210 Ambos, like the prosecution, wants to 
differentiate between the confidentiality and the use of the evidence. At the same time, 
he holds that the information provider may not decide over the use of the information, 
but that Art. 54 (3)(e) makes clear that the only use which can be made of the evidence 
is to gather new evidence, because the interest of the information provider is not in the 
specific use of the material, but only in the confidentiality of it.1211  
As mentioned above,1212 we find one predecessor in the 1998 PreCom Draft; there is, 
however, also one related provision in the Prep-Com Report of 1996. 
Art. 51. Cooperation and Judicial Assistance 
[…] 
F. Confidentiality 
[…] 
The requested State may, when it deems it to be in its interest, transmit 
documents, papers, files or information to the Prosecutor on a confidential 
basis. The Prosecutor may then use them only for the purpose of collecting new 
evidence. 
The State may automatically or at the request of the Prosecutor subsequently 
authorize the publication of such documents, papers, files or information. They 
may then be used as evidence, provided that they are previously communicated 
to the accused. 1213 
The wording of the 1998 PrepCom Draft was the following: 
Art. 54. Investigation of alleged Crimes 
[…] 
4. The Prosecutor may 
[…](g) where documents or information have been obtained by the Prosecutor 
upon a condition as to their confidentiality, which are, or are intended to be, 
used solely for the purposes of generating new evidence, agree that such 
documents or information will not be disclosed at any stage of the proceedings 
unless the provider of the information consents.1214 
                                                 
1210  Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, 21 October 2008, note 1205 supra. 
1211  Ambos, Confidential Investigations (Article 54(3)(e) ICC Statute) vs. Disclosure Obligations, 
p. 554. 
1212  6.3.1.3 supra. 
1213  1996 PrepCom Report Vol. II, note 915 supra, p. 259. 
1214  PrepCom Draft Art. 54 (4)(g) [option 2], p. 77. 
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Originally a similar provision was thus not contained in the powers of the Prosecutor, 
but rather related to state cooperation. Part of why this was changed may have had to do 
with the fact that confidentiality of information should not only refer to states, but other 
entities as well. We note immediately that both ‘predecessors’ of Art. 54 (3)(e) were 
more straightforward than the latter. Both clearly differentiate between the obtaining of 
the material and the use of it. Originally, it appears that rather a right of a state was 
granted to submit material to the Prosecutor on a confidential basis. This changed, in 
that now and in the 1998 draft the right of states to provide material on a confidential 
basis only is apparently taken for granted; and the Prosecutor, in turn, is conveyed the 
authority to decline disclosure. The 1998 draft contains the notion that the evidence has 
already been obtained by the Prosecutor. However, the interpretation difficulties we 
have today with Art. 54 (3)(e) are already apparent: the notion that the materials “are, or 
are intended to be, used solely for the purposes of generating new evidence” already 
suggests a differentiation according to the kind of material which was also performed by 
Trial Chamber I. The current wording, however, complicates the issue even more in that 
the assurance of confidentiality and the obtaining of the evidence happen all together 
(“that the Prosecutor obtains”); at the same time, the notion of the ‘use’ of the material 
was deleted. This shows, however, that apparently it was indeed the intention of the 
drafters to tie the question of confidentiality to the use of the evidence, i.e. that, as a 
matter of fact, the Prosecutor is only allowed to receive the material on a confidential 
basis if he is planning to use it as lead evidence only, and that only in exceptional cases 
it can be introduced in the trial, according to Rule 82. This is in line with the 
interpretation of Trial Chamber I. The consequences, however, are impressively shown 
by the course of the events in the Lubanga case. Taken seriously, this interpretation 
makes Art. 54 (3)(e) dysfunctional in its application; the practical arguments brought 
forward by the Prosecutor are certainly right. The only solution appears to be more or 
less along the lines of the decision of the Appeals Chamber: the Prosecutor must use 
Art. 54 (3)(e) cautiously, and at all times ensure that the confidentiality agreements do 
not cover the Chamber dealing with the matter, so that it can exercise its controlling 
functions, particularly as far as Art. 67 (2) is concerned. 
In any case, the warning shot of Trial Chamber I did not go unheard; the providers of 
the confidential information were ultimately persuaded to consent to the disclosure of 
the material to the Chamber; and the Prosecutor has become more cautious.1215 
                                                 
1215  Compare Prosecutor v. Bemba, ICC Case No. 01/05-01/08, Status Conference 7 October 2009, 
Transcript, ICC-01/05-01/08-T-14-ENG ET WT 07-10-2009, p. 21, l. 16 – p. 22, l. 1: 
 “PRESIDING JUDGE FULFORD: […] Article 54(3)(e), an article with [sic] Judge Odio Benito and 
myself and Judge Blattmann will never forget. Now have all of the issues on Article 54(3)(e) now 
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6.6.5 Rule 73 RPE-ICC: Privileged communications and information 
The ICC recognizes the necessity of protecting the confidentiality interests which form 
part of the relationships between clients and lawyers as well as other groups where 
communication can reasonably be expected to be confidential. This notion is already 
contained in the Rome Statute (Art. 69 (5) ICCSt), and recognized in most national 
jurisdictions; it has also been endorsed by the European Court of Human Rights.1216 At 
the Rome Conference, it was apparently impossible to reach a consensus as to the 
content and scope of privileged communications, which is why the issue was left to be 
discussed in the context of the Rules.1217 
As previously mentioned,1218 Rule 73 was not covered by the discussions on disclosure, 
but rather in context with the trial proceedings. However, the privilege of certain 
communication has obvious repercussions on disclosure. 
The genesis of Rule 73 can be visualised as follows: 
                                                                                                                                               
been resolved? We are aware that there have been four reports provided to the Chamber, the last of 
which was on 12 November 2008, in which at paragraph 10 it was suggested that all of the relevant 
information providers had consented to lift the redactions on all the relevant material. Now, that 
therefore seems to make Article 54(3)(e) a non-issue, but I wish to make sure that that is truly the 
position. 
 MS. KNEUER: Your Honour, that reflects the situation correctly. All items were disclosed and no 
further items under Article 54(3)(e) were collected. 
 PRESIDING JUDGE FULFORD: That demonstrates that no two trials are the same, Ms. Kneuer.” 
1216  Campbell v. UK, Application No. 13590/88, Judgment, 25 March 1992, par. 46: “It is clearly in 
the general interest that any person who wishes to consult a lawyer should be free to do so under 
conditions which favour full and uninhibited discussion. It is for this reason that the lawyer-client 
relationship is, in principle, privileged. Indeed, in its S. v. Switzerland judgment of 28 November 
1991 the Court stressed the importance of a prisoner’s right to communicate with counsel out of 
earshot of the prison authorities. It was considered, in the context of Article 6 (art. 6), that if a lawyer 
were unable to confer with his client without such surveillance and receive confidential instructions 
from him his assistance would lose much of its usefulness, whereas the Convention is intended to 
guarantee rights that are practical and effective.” 
1217  See Piragoff, Evidence, pp. 358 et seq. 
1218  See 6.3.2.3.2 supra. 
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Rule 102 
Lawyer-client privilege 
 
 
 
 
 
All communications between 
lawyer and client  
 
 
 
shall be regarded as privileged, 
and consequently not subject to 
disclosure at trial, unless: 
 
(i) The client consents to such 
disclosure; or 
 
(ii) The client has voluntarily 
disclosed the content of the 
communication to a third party, 
and that third party then gives 
evidence of that disclosure. 
Rule 6.4 Privileges 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(a) Communications between a 
person and his or her legal 
counsel  
 
 
shall be regarded as privileged, 
and consequently not subject to 
disclosure, unless: 
 
(i) The person consents to such 
disclosure; or 
 
(ii) The person voluntarily 
disclosed the content of the 
communication to a third party, 
and that third party then gives 
evidence of that disclosure; or 
 
(iii) The Chamber is satisfied that 
the communication was not for 
the purpose of giving or receiving 
legal advice. 
 
(b) Having regard to rule 6.1 (d), 
 
the Court shall treat  
 
other communications as 
privileged  
 
 
 
 
 
 
under the same terms as 
subparagraphs (i) and (ii) of 
paragraph (a), if a Chamber of 
the Court  
decides that: 
 
 
(i) Such communications were  
 
 
 
made in the course of a 
confidential relationship 
producing a reasonable 
expectation of privacy and non-
disclosure; 
 
(ii) Confidentiality is essential to 
the nature and type of 
relationship between the person 
and the confidant; and 
(iii) Recognition of the privilege 
would further the objectives of 
the Statute and the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence. 
Rule 6.4 
Privileged communications and 
information 
 
(a) Without prejudice to 
paragraph 1 (b) of article 67,  
 
communications made in the 
context of the professional 
relationship between a person and 
his or her legal counsel  
 
shall be regarded as privileged, 
and consequently not subject to 
disclosure, unless: 
 
(i) The person consents in writing 
to such disclosure; or 
 
(ii) The person voluntarily 
disclosed the content of the 
communication to a third party, 
and that third party then gives 
evidence of that disclosure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(b) Having regard to rule 6.1 (e),  
 
 
 
communications made in the 
context of a class of professional 
or other confidential relationships 
shall be regarded as privileged, 
and consequently not subject to 
disclosure,  
 
 
under the same terms as 
subparagraphs (i) and (ii) of 
paragraph (a), if a Chamber of 
the Court  
decides in respect of that class 
that: 
 
(i) Communications occurring 
within that class of relationship 
are  
 
made in the course of a 
confidential relationship 
producing a reasonable 
expectation of privacy and non-
disclosure; 
 
(ii) Confidentiality is essential to 
the nature and type of 
relationship between the person 
and the confidant; and 
(iii) Recognition of the privilege 
would further the objectives of 
the Statute and the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence.  
 
In making a decision, 
 
the Court shall give particular 
regard to recognizing as 
privileged those communications 
made in the context of the 
professional relationship between 
a person and his or her medical 
doctor, psychiatrist, psychologist 
or counsellor, in particular those 
Rule 6.4 / Rule 73 
Privileged communications and 
information 
 
1. Without prejudice to article 67, 
paragraph 1 (b), 
 
communications made in the 
context of the professional 
relationship between a person and 
his or her legal counsel  
 
shall be regarded as privileged, 
and consequently not subject to 
disclosure, unless: 
 
(a) The person consents in 
writing to such disclosure; or 
 
(b) The person voluntarily 
disclosed the content of the 
communication to a third party, 
and that third party then gives 
evidence of that disclosure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Having regard to rule 63, sub-
rule 5,  
 
 
communications made in the 
context of a class of professional 
or other confidential relationships 
shall be regarded as privileged, 
and consequently not subject to 
disclosure,  
 
 
under the same terms as in sub-
rules 1 (a) and 1 (b) if a Chamber  
 
 
decides in respect of that class 
that: 
 
(a) Communications occurring 
within that class of relationship 
are  
 
made in the course of a 
confidential relationship 
producing a reasonable 
expectation of privacy and non-
disclosure; 
 
(b) Confidentiality is essential to 
the nature and type of 
relationship between the person 
and the confidant; and 
(c) Recognition of the privilege 
would further the objectives of 
the Statute and the Rules. 
 
 
3. In making a decision under 
sub-rule 2,  
the Court shall give particular 
regard to recognizing as 
privileged those communications 
made in the context of the 
professional relationship between 
a person and his or her medical 
doctor, psychiatrist, psychologist 
or counsellor, in particular those 
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related to or involving victims, or 
between a person and a member 
of a religious clergy; and in the 
latter case, the Court shall 
recognize as privileged those 
communications made in the 
context of a sacred confession 
where it is an integral part of the 
practice of that religion. 
(c) The Court shall regard as 
privileged, and consequently not 
subject to disclosure, including 
by way of testimony of any 
present or past  
ICRC official or employee,  
 
 
any information, documents or 
other evidence which  
 
came into the possession of the 
International Committee of the 
Red Cross (ICRC)  
 
in the course, or as a consequence 
of, the performance by the  
 
ICRC of its functions under the 
Statutes of the International Red 
Cross and Red Crescent 
Movement, unless: 
(i) After consultations undertaken 
pursuant to paragraph (e), the  
 
 
ICRC does not object in writing 
to such disclosure, or otherwise 
has waived this privilege; or  
(ii) Such information, documents 
or other evidence is contained in 
public statements and documents 
of the ICRC. 
 
(d) Nothing in paragraph (c) shall 
affect the admissibility of the 
same evidence obtained from a 
source other than  
the  
ICRC and its officials or 
employees when such evidence 
has also been acquired by this 
source independently of  
the  
ICRC and its officials or 
employees. 
(e) If the Court determines that 
ICRC information, documents or 
other evidence are of great 
importance for a particular case, 
consultations shall be held 
between the Court and  
the  
ICRC in order to seek to resolve 
the matter by cooperative means, 
bearing in mind the 
circumstances of the case, the 
relevance of the evidence sought, 
whether the evidence could be 
obtained from a source other than 
the  
ICRC, the interests of justice and 
of victims, and the performance 
of the Court’s and the  
ICRC’s functions. 
related to or involving victims, or 
between a person and a member 
of a religious clergy; and in the 
latter case, the Court shall 
recognize as privileged those 
communications made in the 
context of a sacred confession 
where it is an integral part of the 
practice of that religion. 
4. The Court shall regard as 
privileged, and consequently not 
subject to disclosure, including 
by way of testimony of any 
present or past  
official or employee of the 
International Committee of the 
Red Cross (ICRC),  
any information, documents or 
other evidence which  
it 
came into the possession of  
 
 
 
in the course, or as a 
consequence, of the performance 
by  
ICRC of its functions under the 
Statutes of the International Red 
Cross and Red Crescent 
Movement, unless: 
(a) After consultations 
undertaken pursuant to sub-rule 
6,  
 
ICRC does not object in writing 
to such disclosure, or otherwise 
has waived this privilege; or 
(b) Such information, documents 
or other evidence is contained in 
public statements and documents 
of ICRC. 
 
5. Nothing in sub-rule 4 shall 
affect the admissibility of the 
same evidence obtained from a 
source other than  
 
ICRC and its officials or 
employees when such evidence 
has also been acquired by this 
source independently of  
 
ICRC and its officials or 
employees. 
6. If the Court determines that 
ICRC information, documents or 
other evidence are of great 
importance for a particular case, 
consultations shall be held 
between the Court and  
 
ICRC in order to seek to resolve 
the matter by cooperative means, 
bearing in mind the 
circumstances of the case, the 
relevance of the evidence sought, 
whether the evidence could be 
obtained from a source other than  
 
ICRC, the interests of justice and 
of victims, and the performance 
of the Court’s and  
ICRC’s functions. 
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The history of the drafting process of Rule 73 has been described in detail elsewhere.1219 
Summing it up, we note that Rule 73 was heavily amended during the drafting process. 
The Australian draft was worded verbatim according to Rule 97 RPE-ICTY; however, 
the draft already contained a nota bene which envisaged widening the provision as to 
contain other groups apart from lawyers.1220 The text of the Australian proposal and thus 
that of Rule 97 RPE-ICTY, has made its way into the sub-rule (1), with the sole 
amendments that the term “lawyer” was replaced by the broader term “legal counsel”1221 
and that the consent to disclosure must be in writing. It appears, however, that it was 
contemplated to narrow the provision, by including a phrase that would limit the scope 
of applicability to the actual purpose of legal advice, which could be controlled by the 
Chamber, by including sub-rule (iii) in the Discussion Paper of 1 July 1999.1222 With the 
Revised and Corrected Discussion Paper of 11 August, this limitation was given up 
again and an explicit reference to Art. 67 (1)(b) ICCSt included, to express that the right 
of the accused to freely communicate with his counsel not be infringed upon.1223 
The bulk of the amendments obviously relates to the inclusion of relationships apart 
from that of a person and his legal counsel; whereas at first, these relations were 
described in the abstract only, eventually examples of certain professional groups, such 
as doctors and clerical persons were included.1224 
Sub-rules (4) and (5) refer specifically to information obtained by the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which required a special role in order to protect its 
employees and its role as an actor in the field in international humanitarian law issues. 
The initiative came from the ICRC itself, which took part in the PrepCom sessions; the 
compromise reached foresees that, in principle, information originating from the ICRC 
is privileged, unless the Court determines that the material is “of great importance for a 
                                                 
1219  Piragoff, Evidence, pp. 359 et subs. 
1220  “(N.B. This is the text of rule 97 of the ICTY Rules. It is reproduced to provide a starting point 
for discussions. 
 Article 69, paragraph 5, provides for privileges on confidentiality to be addressed in the Rules. There 
was debate in the Preparatory Committee and the Diplomatic Conference about which relationships 
should be afforded such a privilege. ICTY rule 97 deals only with the lawyer-client relationship. 
Strong support was expressed for other relationships to be afforded a privileged status, such as those 
between medical practitioners and patients and those of a religious nature. Consideration also needs to 
be given to the psychiatric counsellor-patient relationship.)”, Australian Proposal, note 996 supra, 
p. 51. 
1221  See Piragoff, Evidence, p. 359. 
1222  See also Piragoff, Evidence, ibid. 
1223  Piragoff, Evidence, pp. 360 et subs. 
1224  Piragoff, Evidence, ibid. 
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particular case” (Rule 73 (6)). In this case, the Court must consult with the ICRC in 
order to reach a compromise. If no compromise is reached, the Court has the right to 
order disclosure, unless the ICRC objects in writing or the information is contained in 
public statements or documents of the ICRC (Rule 73 (4)).1225 
In the judicial practice of the ICC, Rule 73 has apparently not gained importance up to 
now. The only time that it actually appeared in a decision of an ICC Chamber, appears 
to have been the already mentioned issue of pre-assessment interviews,1226 which 
according to the Chamber and against the argument of the Prosecutor, do not fall under 
Rule 73 (2), as the relationship between the Prosecutor and a potential witness is not 
one in which the potential witness can expect that the communication to remain 
confidential, in fact, quite the opposite is the case.1227 Indeed, this line of argument of 
the Prosecutor is entirely absurd. 
 
6.7 Continuing requirement to disclose and Rule 84 
As we have seen in the chapter on the Ad Hoc Tribunals, disclosure obligations have 
usually been regarded as ongoing throughout different phases of the proceedings; in 
fact, Rule 67 (D) RPE-ICTY expressly stated this fact from the beginning. During the 
drafting process of the ICC-RPE, all drafts contained an according provision; however, 
the draft Rule was deleted after the Mont Tremblant meeting: 
                                                 
1225  See Piragoff, Evidence, pp. 365 et subs., 368. 
1226  6.4.1 supra. 
1227  Prosecutor v. Bemba, ICC Case No. 01-05/01-08, Public redacted version of "Decision on the 
Defence Request for disclosure of pre-interview assessments and the Consequences of non-
disclosure"(ICC-01/05-01/08-750-Conf), Trial Chamber III, 9 April 2010, par. 36 
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Australian Proposal, 
26 January 1999 
PrepCom First Session 
Summary, Annex 1, 
2 March 1999 
PrepCom Second Session 
Summary, Appendix, 
18 August 1999 
Mont Tremblant meeting 
outcome, 24 May 2000 
Discussion Paper, 23 June 
2000 / Final Draft 
Rule 73 
Continuing requirement 
to disclose 
 
If either party  
 
discovers  
 
additional evidence or 
material  
 
 
 
 
which should have been 
disclosed earlier pursuant 
to the Statute or the 
Rules, 
 
 
that party shall promptly 
notify the other party and 
the Chamber  
 
dealing with the matter at 
the time  
 
of the existence of the 
additional evidence or 
material. 
Rule 5.21.  
Continuing requirement 
to disclose 
 
If either party  
 
intends to present  
 
additional evidence or 
material,  
 
whether previously or 
newly discovered,  
 
which should have been 
disclosed earlier pursuant 
to the Statute or the 
Rules,  
 
 
that party shall promptly 
notify the other party, and 
the Chamber  
 
dealing with the matter,  
 
 
of the existence of the 
additional evidence or 
material. 
Rule 5.34 
Continuing 
requirements to disclose 
 
If either party  
 
intends to present  
 
additional evidence or 
material,  
 
whether previously or 
newly discovered,  
 
which should have been 
disclosed earlier pursuant 
to the Statute or the Rules 
on Procedure and 
Evidence,  
 
that party shall promptly 
notify the other party, and 
the Chamber of the Court  
 
dealing with the matter,  
 
 
of the existence of the 
additional evidence or 
material. 
 
Rule 5.34 
Continuing 
requirements to disclose 
 
If either party  
 
intends to present  
 
additional evidence or 
material,  
 
whether previously or 
newly discovered,  
 
which should have been 
disclosed earlier pursuant 
to the Statute or the Rules 
of Procedure and 
Evidence,  
 
that party shall promptly 
notify the other party, and 
the Chamber of the Court  
 
dealing with the matter,  
 
 
of the existence of the 
additional evidence or 
material. 
 
 
- 
 
 
 
As usual, the Australian proposal was drafted according to the ICTY precedent 
(Rule 67 (D) RPE-ICTY).1228 During the drafting process, the draft rule was amended, in 
that it was clarified that not only evidence which would be discovered later, but simply 
that all evidence which the parties intended to rely on would have to be disclosed, 
regardless of the time of discovery. On the other hand, the notion that only such 
evidence would have to be disclosed which the parties actually intended to present, 
meant a strong limitation of the scope of the rule – in fact, exculpatory evidence which 
the Prosecutor would not intend to present, would not have had to be disclosed 
according to that rule, notwithstanding Art. 67 (2). Additionally, the provision did not 
stricto sensu cover disclosure, but only an obligation to inform the other party of the 
existence of the other evidence or material (even though, as we have seen, the ICTY 
jurisprudence concludes an actual disclosure obligation from this wording).1229 
From 1 July 1999, however, the respective drafts concerning the trial phase also 
contained the predecessor of Rule 84: 
                                                 
1228  See footnote in the Australian proposal: “N.B. This rule closely follows rule 67 (D) of the ICTY 
Rules.” 
1229  See section 5.2.3.1 supra. 
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Australian 
Proposal, 
26 January 
1999 
Discussion Paper 1 July 1999 Revised Discussion Paper, 6 August 1999 until final RPE-ICC 
- Rule 6.20  
Disclosure and additional evidence 
 
In order to enable the parties to prepare for trial and to facilitate 
the fair and expeditious conduct of the proceedings, the Trial 
Chamber shall, in accordance with article 64, paragraphs 3 (c) 
and 6 (d), and article 67, paragraph (2),  
 
 
make any necessary orders for the disclosure of documents or 
information not previously disclosed and for the production of 
additional evidence. To avoid delay and  
 
ensure that the trial commences on the set date, any such orders 
shall include strict time limits which shall be kept under review 
by the Trial Chamber. 
Rule 6.20/84 
Disclosure and additional evidence (for trial) 
 
In order to enable the parties to prepare for trial and to facilitate 
the fair and expeditious conduct of the proceedings, the Trial 
Chamber shall, in accordance with article 64, paragraphs 3 (c) 
and 6 (d), and article 67, paragraph (2), and subject to article 68, 
paragraph 5,  
 
make any necessary orders for the disclosure of documents or 
information not previously disclosed and for the production of 
additional evidence. To avoid delay and to  
 
ensure that the trial commences on the set date, any such orders 
shall include strict time limits which shall be kept under review 
by the Trial Chamber. 
 
As we see, with the exception of the explicit subjection to Art. 68 (5) ICCSt and the 
addition of the words “for trial” in the heading, which came with the Working Group 
Report of 27 June 2000, Rule 84 remained unaltered. The draft rule concerning the 
continuing requirement to disclose and the predecessor of Rule 84 were thus contained 
in the respective drafts simultaneously for quite some time, albeit in different chapters 
(“investigation and prosecution” vs. “the trial”). The substantial content of both 
provisions is limited, as they appear to be mostly declaratory. At the fifth session of the 
PrepCom, Rule 5.34 was deleted, as it was held that its substance “was implicit” in 
Rule 84.1230 
In any case, the ICC Chambers, rightly and without much ado, came to the same 
conclusion, i.e. that disclosure obligations within the ICC framework are continuing.1231 
 
6.8 The Role of the Chamber 
As was mentioned many times in the course of this thesis, the ever growing influence of 
the respective courts within the disclosure proceedings both on the national as well as 
                                                 
1230  Brady, Disclosure of Evidence, p. 422. 
1231  See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, ICC Case No. 01/04 – 01/06, Judgment on the 
Prosecutor's appeal against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I entitled "Decision Establishing 
General Principles Governing Applications to Restrict Disclosure pursuant to Rule 81 (2) and (4) of 
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence", Appeals Chamber, 13 October 2006, par. 55; 
Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, ICC Case No. 01/04 – 01/06, Decision Regarding the Timing and 
Manner of Disclosure and the Date of Trial, Trial Chamber I, 9 November 2007, par. 28; 
Prosecutor v. Bemba, ICC Case No. 01/05 – 01/08, Public redacted version of "Decision on the 
Defence Request for disclosure of pre-interview assessments and the Consequences of non-
disclosure"(ICC-01/05-01/08-750-Conf), Trial Chamber III, 9 April 2010, par. 34. 
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the international level appears to be a key feature of the modern concept of disclosure of 
evidence as a whole. We have already hinted to the fact that the French delegation at the 
PrepCom intended to implement a sort of dossier approach en miniature.1232 While this, 
as we have already seen, did not work out completely, the role of the Chamber in the 
disclosure proceedings at the ICC is stronger than in any other international criminal 
court or tribunal.  
While almost all of the technical disclosure provisions we have looked at until now are 
applicable both to pre-confirmation and pre-trial disclosure, the roles of the respective 
Chambers vary according to the phase of the proceedings. As previously said, the 
French proposals put particular emphasis on the preparation of the confirmation hearing 
and the disclosure process before the confirmation. This has resulted in a very strong 
involvement of the Pre-Trial Chamber in the disclosure process, and, most particularly, 
a high level of information of the Pre-Trial Chamber regarding the material which is 
disclosed between the parties; this notion is also contained in the Rules, particularly 
Rule 121. As concerns disclosure in preparation of the trial proceedings and during trial, 
the involvement of the Trial Chamber is less apparent from the Rules; however, the ICC 
Chambers have already produced a considerable amount of jurisprudence in this regard. 
This said, it appears sensible to analyse the roles of the Pre-Trial and Trial Chambers 
separately.  
 
6.8.1 Pre-confirmation disclosure 
The concept and purpose of the confirmation proceedings under the Rome Statute is far 
from clear. This is already shown by the first proposals from Australia and France, 
which, as we have seen, had entirely different concepts regarding when the bulk of 
disclosure should take place, and what evidence the Pre-Trial Chamber should get to see 
– the French position was that most of the disclosable evidence would have to be 
disclosed and communicated to the Chamber before the confirmation hearing, whereas 
the Australian proposal initially did not even see a need to regulate pre-confirmation 
disclosure beyond the content of Art. 61 (3) ICCSt. In this regard, it should be 
remembered that one of the main purposes, if not the main purpose for the creation of 
the confirmation hearing and the Pre-Trial Chamber as a procedural institution of the 
ICC was the control of the Prosecutor’s proprio motu investigation and prosecution 
                                                 
1232  See 6.3.2.2 supra. 
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powers. As poignantly explained by David Scheffer, head of the U.S. delegation at the 
Rome conference1233: 
Knowing that the proprio motu prosecutor had become a fait accompli in the 
negotiations, we knew that we needed to create an oversight mechanism to 
ensure that the Prosecutor would have to act responsibly and within well-
defined limits. The US position morphed into strong support for a Pre-Trial 
Chamber that would regulate the Prosecutor's efforts […]. In Rome, US 
negotiators seized every opportunity to strengthen the PTC's oversight powers of 
the Prosecutor. The PTC essentially would be the brake on Prosecutor's 
accelerator. […] 
The PTC was never intended to be the trial chamber, where all relevant 
evidence is examined. The PTC has a limited but vital purpose that demands 
professional due diligence by the Prosecutor. The PTC stands primarily as a 
defendant-friendly chamber and a watchdog for compliance with due process 
requirements. The best-case scenario would have the Prosecutor using his or 
her discretion cautiously and responsibly and within the parameters set by the 
PTC, which itself acts within its statutory boundaries.1234 
This is in line with some of the provisions contained in the Statute: the charges must be 
confirmed as soon as there are “substantial grounds to believe” that the suspect has 
committed the crime with which he is charged (Art. 67 (7) ICCSt); at the confirmation 
hearing, the Prosecutor (and accordingly also the Pre-Trial Chamber) “may rely on 
documentary or summary evidence and need not call the witnesses expected to testify at 
the trial” (Art. 67 (5) ICCSt). Also, whereas the Trial Chamber, according to 
Art. 64 (6)(b) and (d), may call witnesses and order the production of evidence, a 
parallel empowerment of the Pre-Trial Chamber is missing in Articles 57 and 61. The 
fact that the Pre-Trial Chamber according to Art. 61 (7)(c)(i) ICCSt may “request the 
Prosecutor to consider providing further evidence” speaks e contrario against any such 
powers of the Pre-Trial Chamber. Notwithstanding, the Statute’s framework is not 
entirely unequivocal – the accused can, according to Art. 61 (6), challenge the 
incriminating evidence, present evidence of his own, raise grounds for excluding 
criminal responsibility etc.; furthermore, Art. 69 (3) ICCSt provides that “[t]he Court 
                                                 
1233  Who, according to Haq, ICC and its Power of Prosecution, coined the expression of an 
unchecked ICC Prosecutor being comparable to a “Master of the Universe”. 
1234  Scheffer, A review of the experiences of the Pre-Trial and Appeals Chambers of the International 
Criminal Court regarding the disclosure of evidence, pp. 152 et seq. See also Ambos/Miller, Structure 
and Function of the Confirmation Procedure before the ICC from a Comparative Perspective, pp. 340 
et seq.: “Indeed, the primary function of the confirmation procedure is to check and balance the 
Prosecutor.”, emphasis in original. 
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shall have the authority to request the submission of all evidence that it considers 
necessary for the determination of the truth”, and thus is apparently not restricted to the 
Trial Chamber. Additionally, the overall procedural architecture in this regard was 
significantly altered by the Rules. As noted by Helen Brady concerning the discussions 
during the PrepCom: 
Mixed views were expressed […] at the Preparatory commission, mainly arising 
from different conceptions of the nature of the confirmation proceedings. Some 
viewed the confirmation hearing as a relatively short procedure – a “filter” to 
ensure that only cases reaching a certain standard or significance go to trial – 
namely, those where the Prosecutor put forward sufficient evidence to establish 
substantial grounds to believe that the persons committed the crime or crimes 
charged.[…] The opposing camp saw the confirmation hearing as a more 
lengthy procedure, pointing to the fact that the person could challenge the 
evidence presented by the Prosecutor and could present his own evidence. They 
also noted that article 61, paragraph 7, gave the Pre-Trial Chamber significant 
powers to request the Prosecutor to conduct further investigations or to amend 
the charges1235. 
These difficulties, as we will see, have also made their way into the jurisprudence of the 
Court, as evidenced by different approaches of different Chambers. In any case, it can 
be noted that all of the Pre-Trial Chambers took their task in confirming the charges, i.e. 
submitting their cases to trial quite seriously – the confirmation hearings took between 
four and 22 days; the confirmation decisions range between 103 and 226 pages. It is 
doubtful whether this level of scrutiny is desirable – and whether the ICC can uphold it 
with a growing caseload. 
At any rate, the central norm for the involvement of the Chamber regarding pre-
confirmation disclosure is Art. 61 (3) in conjunction with Rule 121. As was previously 
said, Rule 121 is strongly based on the two French proposals of 25 February 1999; and 
has indeed increased the significance of the confirmation hearing. The following 
synopsis shows, for a complete reference, the drafting process of Rule 121 as a whole; 
in our analysis, we will limit ourselves to the role of the Chamber in the disclosure 
process, particularly as regards the access of the Chamber to evidence before the 
confirmation hearing.1236 
                                                 
1235  Brady, Disclosure of Evidence, pp. 422 et seq., footnotes omitted. 
1236  As far as Rule 121 makes reference to victims participating in the proceedings and their access to 
the record, see 6.9.1 infra. 
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2nd French Proposal, 
12 February 1999 
Discussion Paper 1, 25 
February 1999 / 
PrepCom First Session 
Summary, Annex 1, 
2 March 1999 
Revised Discussion 
Paper, 5 August 1999 / 
PrepCom Second Session 
Summary, Appendix, 
18 August 1999 
Mont Tremblant meeting 
outcome, 24 May 2000 
Discussion Paper, 23 
June 2000/Workng 
Group Report, 27 June 
2000/Final Draft, 30 June 
2000/RPE-ICC 
Rule 61. Confirmation 
proceedings (in the 
presence of the person) 
 
Rule 61.1. Preparation of 
the hearing on 
confirmation of charges 
 
(a) A person subject to a 
warrant of arrest or a 
summons to appear under 
article 58 shall appear 
before the Pre-Trial 
Chamber, in the presence 
of the Prosecutor,  
upon arriving at the Court.  
 
 
Upon his or her initial 
appearance before the Pre-
Trial Chamber and 
throughout the course of 
the proceedings,  
 
the person shall enjoy the 
rights set forth in article 
67. 
 
In accordance with article 
60, paragraph 1, the 
President of the Pre-Trial 
Chamber shall satisfy 
himself or herself that the 
person has been informed 
of the crimes which he or 
she is alleged to have 
committed, and of his or 
her rights under the 
Statute.  
 
At the end of this first 
appearance,  
 
the Pre-Trial Chamber 
shall set the date on which 
it intends to hold a hearing 
to confirm the charges,  
 
in accordance with article 
61, paragraph 1.  
 
It shall ensure that this 
date, and any 
postponements under 
paragraph (d) of this rule, 
are adequately publicized.  
Between this first 
appearance and the 
hearing on confirmation of 
charges, evidence shall be 
exchanged in accordance 
with rules 58 (1) to 58 (3). 
 
 
 
[Rule 58.1, 1st French 
Proposal 12 February 
1999 
In accordance with article 
61, paragraph 3, the Pre-
Trial Chamber shall take 
the necessary decisions 
regarding disclosure 
between the Prosecutor 
and the person in respect 
of whom a warrant of 
arrest or a summons to 
appear has been issued. 
 
 
 
 
Rule 5.9 
 
 
 
(a) A person subject to a 
warrant of arrest or a 
summons to appear under 
article 58 shall appear 
before the Pre-Trial 
Chamber, in the presence 
of the Prosecutor,  
promptly upon arriving at 
the Court.  
 
Subject to the provisions 
of Article 60 and 61,  
 
 
 
 
the person shall enjoy the 
rights set forth in article 
67.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
At this first appearance,  
 
 
the Pre-Trial Chamber 
shall set the date on which 
it intends to hold a hearing 
to confirm the charges.  
 
 
 
 
It shall ensure that this 
date, and any 
postponements under 
paragraph (d) of this rule, 
are made public.  
Between this first 
appearance and the 
confirmation hearing, 
evidence shall be disclosed 
in accordance with rules x 
to xx. 
 
[Rule 5.11 Disclosure for 
the purposes of the 
confirmation hearing, 
Discussion Paper 2, 25 
February 1999 
In accordance with article 
61, paragraph 3, the Pre-
Trial Chamber shall take 
the necessary decisions 
regarding disclosure 
between the Prosecutor 
and the person in respect 
of whom a warrant of 
arrest or a summons to 
appear has been issued.  
 
 
 
 
Rule 5.18 
Proceedings before the 
confirmation hearing 
 
(a) A person subject to a 
warrant of arrest or a 
summons to appear under 
article 58, shall appear 
before the Pre-Trial 
Chamber, in the presence 
of the Prosecutor,  
promptly upon arriving at 
the Court.  
 
Subject to the provisions 
of articles 60 and 61,  
 
 
 
 
the person shall enjoy the 
rights set forth in article 
67.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
At this first appearance,  
 
 
the Pre-Trial Chamber 
shall set the date on which 
it intends to hold a hearing 
to confirm the charges.  
 
 
 
 
It shall ensure that this 
date, and any 
postponements under 
paragraph (e) of this rule, 
are made public. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(b) In accordance with 
article 61, paragraph 3, the 
Pre-Trial Chamber shall 
take the necessary 
decisions regarding 
disclosure between the 
Prosecutor and the person 
in respect of whom a 
warrant of arrest or a 
summons to appear has 
 
 
 
 
Rule 5.18 
Proceedings before the 
confirmation hearing 
 
1. A person subject to a 
warrant of arrest or a 
summons to appear under 
article 58, shall appear 
before the Pre-Trial 
Chamber, in the presence 
of the Prosecutor,  
promptly upon arriving at 
the Court.  
 
Subject to the provisions 
of articles 60 and 61,  
 
 
 
 
the person shall enjoy the 
rights set forth in article 
67.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
At this first appearance,  
 
 
the Pre-Trial Chamber 
shall set the date on which 
it intends to hold a hearing 
to confirm the charges.  
 
 
 
 
It shall ensure that this 
date, and any 
postponements under sub-
rule 7, are made public.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. In accordance with 
article 61, paragraph 3, the 
Pre-Trial Chamber shall 
take the necessary 
decisions regarding 
disclosure between the 
Prosecutor and the person 
in respect of whom a 
warrant of arrest or a 
summons to appear has 
 
 
 
 
Rule 5.18 / Rule 121 
Proceedings before the 
confirmation hearing 
 
1. A person subject to a 
warrant of arrest or a 
summons to appear under 
article 58 shall appear 
before the Pre-Trial 
Chamber, in the presence 
of the Prosecutor,  
promptly upon arriving at 
the Court.  
 
Subject to the provisions 
of articles 60 and 61,  
 
 
 
 
the person shall enjoy the 
rights set forth in article 
67.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
At this first appearance,  
 
 
the Pre-Trial Chamber 
shall set the date on which 
it intends to hold a hearing 
to confirm the charges.  
 
 
 
 
It shall ensure that this 
date, and any 
postponements under sub-
rule 7, are made public. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. In accordance with 
article 61, paragraph 3, the 
Pre-Trial Chamber shall 
take the necessary 
decisions regarding 
disclosure between the 
Prosecutor and the person 
in respect of whom a 
warrant of arrest or a 
summons to appear has 
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This person shall enjoy the 
rights provided for in 
article 67.  
In particular, during 
disclosure  
the person concerned may 
be assisted or represented 
by the counsel of his or her 
choice or by counsel 
assigned to him or her. 
 
The Pre-Trial Chamber 
shall hold status 
conferences to ensure that 
disclosure takes place 
under satisfactory 
conditions. For each case a 
pre-trial judge  
 
 
shall be appointed to 
organize such status 
conferences, which shall 
be held at least once every 
three months, and as the 
need arises within these 
intervals, at the request of 
the Prosecutor or the 
person concerned, or of 
the judge of his own 
motion.] 
 
[Rule 58.2, 1st French 
Proposal, 12 February 
1999 
All evidence disclosed 
between the Prosecutor 
and the person concerned  
 
 
shall be communicated to 
the Pre-Trial Chamber.] 
 
Rule 61.1 [continued] 
(b) The Prosecutor shall  
 
make a list of the evidence 
which he or she has 
gathered and shall  
 
provide it to the Pre-Trial 
Chamber no later than 30 
days before the date of the 
hearing on confirmation of 
charges.  
 
A precise description of 
the charges on which he or 
she intends to seek trial 
shall be attached to this 
list.  
 
 
The Pre-Trial Chamber, by 
virtue of article 61, 
paragraph 3, shall take the 
necessary steps to notify 
the person of the charges 
on which the Prosecutor 
intends to bring him or her 
to trial, and to transmit to 
him or her the list of the 
evidence gathered by the 
Prosecutor. This 
notification and this 
transmittal shall take place 
no later than 21 days 
before the date of the 
hearing on confirmation of 
charges.  
 
In accordance with article 
61, paragraph 4, the 
Prosecutor may amend the 
charges or bring new 
 
 
 
 
During disclosure  
the person concerned may 
be assisted or represented 
by the counsel of his or her 
choice or by counsel 
assigned to him or her. 
 
For that purpose, the Pre-
Trial Chamber shall hold 
status conferences to 
ensure that disclosure 
takes place under 
satisfactory conditions. 
For each case, a pre-trial 
judge  
 
shall be appointed to 
organize such status 
conferences, on his or her 
own motion, or at the 
request of the Prosecutor 
or the person concerned.] 
 
 
 
[Rule 5.12 
Communication of the 
disclosed evidence to the 
Pre-Trial Chamber, 
Discussion Paper 2, 25 
February 1999 
All evidence disclosed 
between the Prosecutor 
and the person concerned  
for the purposes of the 
confirmation hearing  
shall be communicated to 
the Pre-Trial Chamber.] 
 
Rule 5.9 [continued] 
(b) The Prosecutor shall  
 
 
 
 
 
provide to the Pre-Trial 
Chamber and to the person 
no later than 30 days 
before the date of the 
confirmation hearing  
 
a detailed description of 
the charges together with a 
list of the evidence which 
he or she intends to present 
at that hearing.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Where the Prosecutor 
intends to amend the 
charges pursuant to article 
been issued.  
 
 
 
During disclosure  
the person concerned may 
be assisted or represented 
by the counsel of his or her 
choice or by a counsel 
assigned to him or her.  
 
For that purpose, the Pre-
Trial Chamber shall hold 
status conferences to 
ensure that disclosure 
takes place under 
satisfactory conditions. 
For each case, a pre-trial 
judge  
 
shall be appointed to 
organize such status 
conferences, on his or her 
own motion, or at the 
request of the Prosecutor 
or the person concerned.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All evidence disclosed 
between the Prosecutor 
and the person concerned  
for the purposes of the 
confirmation hearing  
shall be communicated to 
the Pre-Trial Chamber. 
 
 
(c) The Prosecutor shall  
 
 
 
 
 
provide to the Pre-Trial 
Chamber and to the person 
no later than 30 days 
before the date of the 
confirmation hearing,  
 
a detailed description of 
the charges together with a 
list of the evidence which 
he or she intends to present 
at the hearing.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Where the Prosecutor 
intends to amend the 
charges pursuant to article 
been issued.  
 
 
 
During disclosure: 
(a) The person concerned 
may be assisted or 
represented by the counsel 
of his or her choice or by a 
counsel assigned to him or 
her; 
(b)  
The Pre-Trial Chamber 
shall hold status 
conferences to ensure that 
disclosure takes place 
under satisfactory 
conditions. For each case, 
a judge of the Pre-Trial 
Chamber  
shall be appointed to 
organize such status 
conferences, on his or her 
own motion, or at the 
request of the Prosecutor 
or the person; 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(c) All evidence disclosed 
between the Prosecutor 
and the person  
for the purposes of the 
confirmation hearing  
shall be communicated to 
the Pre-Trial Chamber. 
 
 
3. The Prosecutor shall  
 
 
 
 
 
provide to the Pre-Trial 
Chamber and to the 
person, no later than 30 
days before the date of the 
confirmation hearing,  
 
a detailed description of 
the charges together with a 
list of the evidence which 
he or she intends to present 
at the hearing. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Where the Prosecutor 
intends to amend the 
charges pursuant to article 
been issued.  
 
 
 
During disclosure: 
(a) The person concerned 
may be assisted or 
represented by the counsel 
of his or her choice or by a 
counsel assigned to him or 
her; 
(b)  
The Pre-Trial Chamber 
shall hold status 
conferences to ensure that 
disclosure takes place 
under satisfactory 
conditions. For each case, 
a judge of the Pre-Trial 
Chamber  
shall be appointed to 
organize such status 
conferences, on his or her 
own motion, or at the 
request of the Prosecutor 
or the person; 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(c) All evidence disclosed 
between the Prosecutor 
and the person  
for the purposes of the 
confirmation hearing  
shall be communicated to 
the Pre-Trial Chamber. 
 
 
3. The Prosecutor shall  
 
 
 
 
 
provide to the Pre-Trial 
Chamber and the person, 
no later than 30 days 
before the date of the 
confirmation hearing,  
 
a detailed description of 
the charges together with a 
list of the evidence which 
he or she intends to present 
at the hearing. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Where the Prosecutor 
intends to amend the 
charges pursuant to article 
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evidence, but such 
amendments and new 
evidence must always be 
brought to the knowledge 
of the person and 
transmitted to the Pre-Trial 
Chamber no later than two 
weeks before the date of 
the hearing.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(c) The person shall also 
make a list of the evidence  
 
 
which he or she has 
gathered and  
 
shall provide it to the Pre-
Trial Chamber no later 
than two weeks before the 
date of the hearing on 
confirmation of charges.  
The list shall be 
transmitted to the 
Prosecutor no later than a 
week before the hearing.  
 
The two-week time-limit 
set in the preceding 
paragraph shall be reduced 
to one week if the 
Prosecutor amends the 
charges or brings new 
evidence under paragraph 
(b) of this rule. The 
transmittal provided for in 
the preceding paragraph 
shall then take place no 
later than the day before 
the hearing. 
 
(d) The Prosecutor and the 
person may ask the Pre-
Trial Chamber to postpone 
the date of the hearing on 
confirmation of charges.  
 
 
The Pre-Trial Chamber 
may also, of its own 
motion, decide to postpone 
the hearing.  
The other time-limits set in 
paragraphs (b) and (c) of 
this rule may not, 
however, be changed.  
 
The Pre-Trial Chamber 
shall not take into 
consideration charges and 
evidence presented after 
the time-limit has expired.  
 
 
Moreover, when 
notification under 
paragraphs (b) and (c) of 
this rule is given after the 
time-limits set in these 
rules have expired, the 
date of the hearing shall be 
automatically deferred by 
61, paragraph 4, he or she 
shall notify the Pre-Trial 
Chamber and the person 
no later than 15 days 
before the date of the 
hearing.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Where the Prosecutor 
intends to present new 
evidence at the hearing he 
or she shall provide the 
Pre-Trial chamber and the 
person with a list of that 
evidence. 
 
 
 
 
(c) If the person intends to 
present evidence under 
article 61, paragraph 6, the 
person  
 
 
 
 
shall provide a list of that 
evidence to the Pre-Trial 
Chamber no later than 15 
days before the date of the 
hearing.  
The Pre-Trial Chamber 
shall transmit the list to the 
Prosecutor without delay.  
 
The person shall provide a 
list of evidence that he or 
she intends to present in 
response to any amended 
charges or a new list of 
evidence provided by the 
Prosecutor. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(d) The Prosecutor and the 
person may ask the Pre-
Trial Chamber to postpone 
the date of the 
confirmation hearing.  
 
 
The Pre-Trial Chamber 
may also, of its own 
motion, decide to postpone 
the hearing.  
 
 
 
 
 
The Pre-Trial Chamber 
shall not take into 
consideration charges and 
evidence presented after 
the time-limit, or any 
extension thereof, has 
expired. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
61, paragraph 4, he or she 
shall notify the Pre-Trial 
Chamber and the person 
no later than 15 days 
before the date of the 
hearing.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Where the Prosecutor 
intends to present new 
evidence at the hearing, he 
or she shall provide the 
Pre-Trial Chamber and the 
person with a list of that 
evidence. 
 
 
 
 
(d) If the person intends to 
present evidence under 
article 61, paragraph 6, he 
or she  
 
 
 
 
shall provide a list of that 
evidence to the Pre-Trial 
Chamber no later than 15 
days before the date of the 
hearing.  
The Pre-Trial Chamber 
shall transmit the list to the 
Prosecutor without delay.  
 
The person shall provide a 
list of evidence that he or 
she intends to present in 
response to any amended 
charges or a new list of 
evidence provided by the 
Prosecutor. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(e) The Prosecutor or the 
person may ask the Pre-
Trial Chamber to postpone 
the date of the 
confirmation hearing.  
 
 
The Pre-Trial Chamber 
may also, on its own 
motion, decide to postpone 
the hearing. 
 
 
 
 
 
The Pre-Trial Chamber 
shall not take into 
consideration charges and 
evidence presented after 
the time limit, or any 
extension thereof, has 
expired. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
61, paragraph 4, he or she 
shall notify the Pre-Trial 
Chamber and the person 
no later than 15 days 
before the date of the 
hearing. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. Where the Prosecutor 
intends to present new 
evidence at the hearing, he 
or she shall provide the 
Pre-Trial Chamber and the 
person with a list of that 
evidence. 
 
 
 
 
6. If the person intends to 
present evidence under 
article 61, paragraph 6, he 
or she  
 
 
 
 
shall provide a list of that 
evidence to the Pre-Trial 
Chamber no later than 15 
days before the date of the 
hearing.  
The Pre-Trial Chamber 
shall transmit the list to the 
Prosecutor without delay.  
 
The person shall provide a 
list of evidence that he or 
she intends to present in 
response to any amended 
charges or a new list of 
evidence provided by the 
Prosecutor. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7. The Prosecutor or the 
person may ask the Pre-
Trial Chamber to postpone 
the date of the 
confirmation hearing.  
 
 
The Pre-Trial Chamber 
may also, on its own 
motion, decide to postpone 
the hearing. 
 
 
 
 
 
8. The Pre-Trial Chamber 
shall not take into 
consideration charges and 
evidence presented after 
the time limit, or any 
extension thereof, has 
expired. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
61, paragraph 4, he or she 
shall notify the Pre-Trial 
Chamber and the person 
no later than 15 days 
before the date of the 
hearing  
of the amended charges 
together with a list of 
evidence that the 
Prosecutor intends to bring 
in support of those charges 
at the hearing. 
 
5. Where the Prosecutor 
intends to present new 
evidence at the hearing, he 
or she shall provide the 
Pre-Trial Chamber and the 
person with a list of that 
evidence  
no later than 15 days 
before the date of the 
hearing. 
 
6. If the person intends to 
present evidence under 
article 61, paragraph 6, he 
or she  
 
 
 
 
shall provide a list of that 
evidence to the Pre-Trial 
Chamber no later than 15 
days before the date of the 
hearing.  
The Pre-Trial Chamber 
shall transmit the list to the 
Prosecutor without delay.  
 
The person shall provide a 
list of evidence that he or 
she intends to present in 
response to any amended 
charges or a new list of 
evidence provided by the 
Prosecutor. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7. The Prosecutor or the 
person may ask the Pre-
Trial Chamber to postpone 
the date of the 
confirmation hearing.  
 
 
The Pre-Trial Chamber 
may also, on its own 
motion, decide to postpone 
the hearing. 
 
 
 
 
 
8. The Pre-Trial Chamber 
shall not take into 
consideration charges and 
evidence presented after 
the time limit, or any 
extension thereof, has 
expired. 
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a month. 
 
(e) The Prosecutor or the 
person may lodge written 
submissions with the Pre-
Trial Chamber, on points 
of fact and of law,  
 
 
 
 
 
no later than three days 
before the date of the 
hearing. A copy of these 
submissions shall be 
transmitted immediately to 
the Prosecutor or the 
person, as the case may be.  
 
Such submissions may 
concern, inter alia, issues 
related to the jurisdiction 
of the Court or the 
admissibility of the case, 
as well as the application 
of the grounds for 
excluding criminal 
responsibility set forth in 
article 31, paragraph 1. 
 
(f) The Registry shall put 
together the  
 
record of the proceedings 
before the Pre-Trial 
Chamber.  
 
This record shall consist of 
all documents transmitted 
to the Pre-Trial Chamber 
pursuant to paragraphs (a) 
to (e) of this rule.  
 
 
 
 
 
It may be consulted by the 
Prosecutor and by the 
person. 
 
(g) Victims and their legal 
representatives, who shall 
have access to the 
proceedings by virtue of 
article 68 of the Statute 
and in accordance with the 
conditions laid down in 
rules (x) to (xx), shall be 
notified of the date of the 
hearing on confirmation of 
charges and of any 
postponements.  
They may consult the 
record of the proceedings 
put together in accordance 
with paragraph (0 of this 
rule. They may lodge 
written submissions with 
the Pre-Trial Chamber no 
later than 
 
 
two weeks before the 
beginning of the hearing. 
Such submissions shall be 
added to the record of the 
proceedings and 
transmitted to the 
Prosecutor and the person. 
They may also ask to 
intervene during the 
hearing, by addressing a 
written request to that 
 
 
(e) The Prosecutor or the 
person may lodge written 
submissions with the Pre-
Trial Chamber, on points 
of fact and of law, 
including grounds for 
excluding criminal 
responsibility set forth in 
article 31, paragraph 1,  
 
no later than three days 
before the date of the 
hearing. A copy of these 
submissions shall be 
transmitted immediately to 
the Prosecutor or the 
person, as the case may be. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(f) The Registry shall 
create and maintain a  
 
record of the proceedings 
before the Pre-Trial 
Chamber,  
 
including all documents 
transmitted to the Pre-Trial 
Chamber pursuant to this 
Rule.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
The record may be 
consulted by the 
Prosecutor and by the 
person. 
(g) Victims and their legal 
representatives, who shall 
have access to the 
proceedings by virtue of 
article 68 of the Statute 
and in accordance with the 
conditions laid down in 
rules (x) to (xx), shall be 
notified of the date of the 
confirmation hearing and 
any postponements 
thereof.  
They may consult the 
record of the proceedings 
put together in accordance 
with paragraph (f) of this 
Rule. They may lodge 
written submissions with 
the Pre-Trial Chamber no 
later than  
 
 
15 days before the date of 
the hearing.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(f) The Prosecutor and the 
person may lodge written 
submissions with the Pre-
Trial Chamber, on points 
of fact and on law, 
including grounds for 
excluding criminal 
responsibility set forth in 
article 31, paragraph 1,  
 
no later than three days 
before the date of the 
hearing. A copy of these 
submissions shall be 
transmitted immediately to 
the Prosecutor or the 
person, as the case may be. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(g) The Registry shall 
create and maintain a  
 
record of the proceedings 
before the Pre-Trial 
Chamber,  
 
including all documents 
transmitted to the Chamber 
pursuant to this rule.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The record may be 
consulted by the 
Prosecutor and by the 
person. 
(h) Victims and their legal 
representatives, who have 
been given access to the 
proceedings by virtue of 
article 68 and in 
accordance with the 
conditions laid down in 
rules X to XX, shall be 
notified of the date of the 
confirmation hearing and 
of any postponement 
thereof.  
They may consult the 
record of the proceedings 
put together in accordance 
with paragraph (g) of this 
rule. They may lodge 
written submissions with 
the Pre-Trial Chamber no 
later than  
 
 
15 days before the date of 
the hearing.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9. The Prosecutor and the 
person may lodge written 
submissions with the Pre-
Trial Chamber, on points 
of fact and on law, 
including grounds for 
excluding criminal 
responsibility set forth in 
article 31, paragraph 1,  
 
no later than three days 
before the date of the 
hearing. A copy of these 
submissions shall be 
transmitted immediately to 
the Prosecutor or the 
person, as the case may be. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10. The Registry shall 
create and maintain a  
 
record of the proceedings 
before the Pre-Trial 
Chamber,  
 
including all documents 
transmitted to the Chamber 
pursuant to this rule.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The record may be 
consulted by the 
Prosecutor and by the 
person. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
They may consult the 
record of the proceedings 
put together in accordance 
with paragraph (g) of this 
rule. They may lodge 
written submissions with 
the Pre-Trial Chamber no 
later than  
 
 
15 days before the date of 
the hearing.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9. The Prosecutor and the 
person may lodge written 
submissions with the Pre-
Trial Chamber, on points 
of fact and on law, 
including grounds for 
excluding criminal 
responsibility set forth in 
article 31, paragraph 1,  
 
no later than three days 
before the date of the 
hearing. A copy of these 
submissions shall be 
transmitted immediately to 
the Prosecutor or the 
person, as the case may be. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10. The Registry shall 
create and maintain a  
full and accurate  
record of all proceedings 
before the Pre-Trial 
Chamber,  
 
including all documents 
transmitted to the Chamber 
pursuant to this rule.  
 
Subject to any restrictions 
concerning confidentiality 
and the protection of 
national security 
information,  
 
the record may be 
consulted by the 
Prosecutor, the person and 
victims or their legal 
representatives 
participating in the 
proceedings pursuant to 
rules 89 to 91. 
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effect to the Pre-Trial 
Chamber no later than two 
weeks before the date of 
the hearing.  
 
The Pre-Trial Chamber 
shall rule on the request 
after receiving the 
observations of the 
Prosecutor and the person. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(h) States wishing to 
challenge the jurisdiction 
of the Court or the 
admissibility of the case 
before the Pre-Trial 
Chamber at the time of the  
 
hearing on confirmation of 
charges  
 
shall make a written 
request to that effect no 
later than 30 days before 
the date of the hearing. 
States may request the Pre-
Trial Chamber to postpone 
the date of the hearing, in 
accordance with the 
conditions laid down in 
paragraph (d) of this rule.  
They shall lodge their 
written submissions with 
the Registry no later than  
 
two weeks  
 
before the hearing.  
 
Such submissions shall be 
joined to the record of the 
proceedings and 
transmitted to the 
Prosecutor, the person and 
the victims or their legal 
representatives, in 
accordance with the 
conditions laid down in 
rules (x) to (xx). 
 
 
 
 
 
The Pre-Trial Chamber 
shall rule on the request 
after receiving the 
observations of the 
Prosecutor and the person. 
 
They may also ask to 
intervene during the 
hearing, by addressing a 
written request to that 
effect to the Pre-Trial 
Chamber no later than 15 
days before the date of the  
hearing. The Pre-Trial 
Chamber shall rule on the 
request after receiving the 
observations of the 
Prosecutor and the person. 
 
(h) States wishing to 
challenge the jurisdiction 
of the Court or the 
admissibility of the case 
before the Pre-Trial 
Chamber at the time of the  
 
confirmation hearing  
 
 
shall make a written 
request to that effect no 
later than 30 days before 
the date of the hearing. 
States may request the Pre-
Trial Chamber to postpone 
the date of the hearing, in 
accordance with the 
conditions laid down in 
paragraph (d) of this rule.  
They shall lodge their 
written submissions with 
the Registry no later than  
 
15 days  
 
before the hearing.  
 
Such submissions shall be 
joined to the record of the 
proceedings and 
transmitted to the 
Prosecutor, the person and 
the victims or their legal 
representatives, in 
accordance with the 
conditions laid down in 
rules (x) to (xx). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
They may also ask to 
intervene during the 
hearing, by addressing a 
request to that effect to the 
Pre-Trial Chamber no later 
than 15 days before the  
hearing. The Pre-Trial 
Chamber shall rule on the 
request after receiving the 
observations of the 
Prosecutor and the person. 
 
 
(i) States wishing to 
challenge the jurisdiction 
of the Court or the 
admissibility of the case 
before the Pre-Trial 
Chamber at the time of the 
 
confirmation hearing  
 
 
shall make a request to that 
effect no later than 30 days 
before the date of the 
hearing. States may 
request the Pre-Trial 
Chamber to postpone the 
date of the hearing.  
 
 
 
They shall lodge their 
written submissions with 
the Registry no later than  
 
15 days  
 
before the date of the 
hearing.  
Such submissions shall be 
joined to the record of the 
proceedings and be 
transmitted to the 
Prosecutor, the person and 
the victims or their legal 
representatives, in 
accordance with rules X to 
XX. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
They may also ask to 
intervene during the 
hearing, by addressing a 
request to that effect to the 
Pre-Trial Chamber no later 
than 15 days before the  
hearing. The Pre-Trial 
Chamber shall rule on the 
request after receiving the 
observations of the 
Prosecutor and the person. 
 
 
We see that quite a few of the notions contained in the original French proposals, at first 
contained in different draft provisions, merged into one draft Rule with the revised 
discussion paper of 5 August 1999, and finally ended up in the Rules. As pointed out 
above,1237 the French proposals contained a ‘down-sized’ dossier approach, with 
disclosure taking place inter partes, albeit via the Chamber (which may already be seen 
as paradox). The Chamber would accordingly have acted like a ‘hub’ for disclosure, 
receiving all evidence disclosed between the parties (Rule 58.2 of the first French 
                                                 
1237  6.3.2.2 supra. 
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proposal), and a list of all evidence gathered by the parties (Rule 61.1 (b) and (c) of the 
second French proposal). Furthermore, the French proposals envisaged a “record of the 
proceedings” which would have consisted of all documents transmitted to the Pre-Trial 
Chamber according to draft Rule 61.1, and hence all evidence disclosed between the 
parties – the Rome Statute envisages the creation of a record of the proceedings as an 
obligatory document only for the Trial Chamber (Art. 64 (10) ICCSt).  
In a modified way, all three of these central elements were finally included in the Rules. 
The communication of evidence disclosed between the parties to the Pre-Trial Chamber, 
was, somewhat surprisingly, agreed on between the negotiators at an early stage; we 
learn from the synopsis that it was in fact contained in discussion paper 1 already, 
which was predominantly based on the Australian proposal rather than on the French 
one. The delegates apparently saw the advantages for better trial management (or 
‘management of the confirmation proceedings’, for that matter) if the Chamber was 
informed of the evidence beforehand.1238 A central point in this regard appears to have 
been the very fact that, especially by the negotiators with an Anglo-American legal 
background, the confirmation of the charges was seen as a swift procedural step, in 
which there would be no decision on guilt or innocence of the accused and thus possible 
bias of the Pre-Trial Chamber because of their previous knowledge of the evidence was 
not seen as much of a problem.1239 Furthermore, the envisaged lists of evidence of the 
parties are now contained in Rule 121 (3) and (6). Third, the record of the proceedings 
comprising all evidence communicated to the Pre-Trial Chamber is now regulated in 
Rule 121 (10). 
However, all three elements, i.e. the communication of evidence to the Chamber, the 
lists of evidence and the record of the proceedings, were altered.  
First of all, the lists of evidence now do not comprise all of the evidence gathered by the 
parties, but only the evidence on which they intend to rely (sub-rules (3) and (6)). 
Furthermore, Rule 121 (6) makes clear that the accused is only obliged to provide a list 
of evidence if he in fact intends to present evidence, as otherwise his rights to silence, 
and quite possibly, his privilege against self-incrimination, might have been infringed.  
As regards the evidence which must be communicated to the Chamber, as we have seen, 
the French draft envisaged that “all evidence disclosed between the Prosecutor and the 
person concerned shall be communicated to the Pre-Trial Chamber” (draft Rule 58.2 
first French proposal). However, already with discussion paper 2 (25 February 1999), 
                                                 
1238  Brady, Disclosure of Evidence, p. 424; Brady, Setting the Record Straight: A Short Note on 
Disclosure and 'the Record of the Proceedings', p. 267. 
1239  Ibid. 
380 
 
this wording was revised and now read “all evidence disclosed between the Prosecutor 
and the person concerned for the purposes of the confirmation hearing shall be 
communicated to the Pre-Trial Chamber”. This was obviously meant to narrow the 
scope of the provision. We have come across the phrase “for the purposes of the 
confirmation hearing” two times already.1240 Once again, its content is unclear. As 
mentioned at the beginning of this section, taking the wording of Rule 121 (2)(c) 
literally, the “purpose” of the confirmation hearing as such is in dispute. Had the 
drafters meant to limit the scope of Rule 121 (2)(c) to evidence on which the parties 
intend to rely at the confirmation hearing, they could have easily said so, as they did 
concerning the lists of evidence. Obviously, there may be cases in which parties do not 
wish to rely on evidence which has been disclosed to them at an early stage; this may 
also be the case with exculpatory evidence. The Chamber would not get to see this 
evidence, if Rule 121 (2)(c) is understood to encompass only such evidence on which 
the parties intend to rely. Once again, it can only be concluded that “all evidence for the 
purposes of the confirmation hearing” is certainly narrower than “all evidence”, but 
probably wider than “evidence on which the parties intend to rely”. In fact, this may 
well be one of those provisions which were left “constructively ambiguous”, to be 
clarified and determined by the jurisprudence of the Court.1241 The latter, however, as we 
will see instantly, has not presented a uniform approach to the matter.  
Thirdly, the concept of the record of the proceedings might also have changed. Whereas 
the French proposal had envisaged that the record of the proceedings consist of all 
documents transmitted to the Pre-Trial Chamber (i.e. all the evidence as well as 
submissions from the parties, Rule 61.1 (f) of the draft), this was amended to provide 
that the record should include all of those documents (Rule 5.9 (f)). This amendment 
may have repercussions concerning the question who should have access to the record 
of the proceedings. According to the French proposal and all following drafts, as well as 
the RPE-ICTY, this should have been the defence and the Prosecution as well as the 
victims. The Pre-Trial Chamber itself, however, is not enumerated in Rule 121 (10). In 
the case that the record consists of all documents communicated to the Chamber, one 
would logically have to assume that the Chamber must have access to the entire record 
as well, since there is no difference between the record and what the Chamber already 
has. If the record, in turn, only includes the disclosed material, it may theoretically 
contain material not previously communicated to the Chamber. It is quite possible that 
this line of argument is overly captious. Nevertheless, the negotiators of the PrepCom 
left the Chamber out of the text of Rule 121 (10). The same issue, though more 
                                                 
1240  See 6.4.3 as well as 6.5.1 supra. 
1241  See Brady, Disclosure of Evidence, passim; this particular issue, however, is not addressed. 
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‘explosive’, arises from Rule 131, which deals with the fate of the record of the pre-trial 
proceedings after it has been transmitted to the Trial Chamber – it must be noted 
Rule 131 (2) has the same wording as Rule 121 (10) and thus also does not mention the 
Chamber. Regarding Rule 131 (2), however, the Trial Chamber was left out 
intentionally, making Rule 131 (2) yet another “constructively ambiguous” provision.1242 
Be that as it may, the Pre-Trial Chambers of the Court assume that, as elucidates from 
their decisions, they themselves may consult the record of the proceedings before them. 
In the first (preliminary) disclosure decision in Lubanga, the Single Judge of Trial 
Chamber I, being somewhat reminiscent of the original French proposal, decided that 
disclosure should actually take place via the record of the proceedings; i.e. that the 
Registry of the Court would receive the evidence, file it in the record, and give the other 
party access to it.1243 The parties, however, rejected this approach, and an inter partes 
disclosure regime was implemented.1244 The Single Judge held that whereas pre-
confirmation disclosure serves protecting the rights of the accused, communication of 
the evidence to the Chamber serves trial management purposes.1245 Furthermore, she 
held that the “communication to the Pre-Trial Chamber” in fact consists of filing the 
evidence with the record of the proceedings.1246 As regards the question of the scope of 
Rule 122 (2)(c), the Single Judge decided that only material which would be relied on 
by the parties should be communicated to the Pre-Trial Chamber: 
In the view of the single judge, if all materials disclosed by the Prosecution 
before the confirmation hearing, on which neither party intends to rely, were 
filed in the record of the case and presented thereat, the nature of the 
confirmation hearing would be significantly altered and the right of the Defence 
to decide whether to rely on such materials at the hearing would be infringed 
on.[…] 
In the opinion of the single judge, it is not the role of the Pre-Trial Chamber to 
find the truth concerning the guilt or innocence of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, but 
                                                 
1242  Brady, Setting the Record Straight: A Short Note on Disclosure and 'the Record of the 
Proceedings', p. 271, see also Lewis, Trial Procedure, p. 540. 
1243  Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC Case No. 01-04/01/06, Decision Requesting Observations of the 
Prosecution and the Duty Counsel for the Defence on the System of Disclosure and Establishing an 
Interim System of Disclosure, Pre-Trial Chamber I (Single Judge), 23 March 2006, p. 4 et seq. 
1244  Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC Case No. 01-04/01/06, Decision on the Final System of Disclosure 
and the Establishment of a Timetable, Pre-Trial Chamber I (Single Judge), 15 May 2006, par. 64. 
1245  Ibid., paras. 29 et seq. 
1246  Ibid., par. 33. The Rules, however, envisage the procedure to go the other way round: the 
evidence is transmitted to the Chamber (Rule 121 (2)(c)); and (only) the evidence which is 
communicated to the Chamber becomes part of the record (Rule 121 (10)). 
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to determine whether sufficient evidence exists to establish substantial grounds 
to believe that he is criminally liable for the crimes alleged by the Prosecution. 
The single judge considers that it would be contrary to the role of the Pre-Trial 
Chamber to file in the record of the case and present at the confirmation hearing 
potentially exculpatory and other materials disclosed by the Prosecution before 
the hearing, if neither party intends to rely on those materials at that hearing. 
[A]ccording to their teleological interpretation, rules 121 (2) and 122 (1) of the 
Rules serve several purposes. These include enabling the Pre-Trial Chamber to 
properly organise and conduct the confirmation hearing; ensuring that the 
parties will have access to the evidence to be presented at the confirmation 
hearing before it commences, regardless of problems arising during the 
disclosure process; and enabling the victims to properly exercise their 
procedural rights during that hearing. In the view of the single judge, these 
goals will be achieved if, following the literal and contextual interpretation of 
rules 121 (2) and 122 (1) of the Rules referred to above, only the evidence on 
which the parties intend to rely at the confirmation hearing is communicated to 
the Pre-Trial Chamber by filing it in the record of the case.1247 
This reasoning is certainly maintainable. 
In the Bemba case, however, Pre-Trial Chamber III took an entirely different approach, 
based on a different view of the confirmation procedure. The Chamber sweeps away the 
argument of Pre-Trial Chamber I that the confirmation proceedings do not have the 
function of truth-finding, and declares Art. 69 (3) (even though in a ‘restricted’ manner) 
applicable to the Pre-Trial Chamber, holding: 
The Chamber notes that, pursuant to rule 122(9) of the Rules, article 69 of the 
Statute shall apply mutatis mutandis at the confirmation hearing, subject to the 
provisions of article 61 of the Statute. Thus, the rules concerning evidence in 
article 69 of the Statute, including the authority of the Chamber to request the 
submission of further evidence, apply at the pre-trial stage of the proceedings, 
taking into account the specific purpose and limited scope of the confirmation of 
the charges. To that end, it needs to be noted that the application of article 69(3) 
of the Statute at the confirmation phase is restricted since, in contrast to the trial 
phase, the Chamber does not have to determine the guilt of the person 
prosecuted beyond reasonable doubt. It has simply to determine whether there 
are substantial grounds to believe that the person prosecuted committed the 
crimes charged. Finally, the Chamber considers that the authority it derives 
from article 69(3) of the Statute at the pre-trial phase is crucial for the 
determination of the scope of the charges to be retained if the case is sent to 
trial.  
                                                 
1247  Ibid., paras. 41-43, paragraph numbers and footnotes omitted. 
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The Chamber further emphasises that the search for truth is the principal goal 
of the Court as a whole. In contributing to this ultimate goal, the Pre-Trial 
Chamber, in particular, shall prevent cases which do not meet the threshold of 
article 61(7) of the Statute to proceed to the trial stage. In order to fulfil its duty, 
the Chamber considers it vital not only to conduct properly the confirmation 
hearing but to organise meaningfully the disclosure proceedings.1248 
The Chamber further holds that it has an important function in shaping the scope of the 
later truth-finding process at the trial, since the scope of the trial is defined by the 
charges as confirmed by the Pre-Trial Chamber.1249 In consequence, Pre-Trial 
Chamber III finds that “it should not be confined to the evidence which the parties 
intend to rely on for the purposes of the confirmation hearing”1250, for a proper 
assessment of the case before it, ensuring that the rights of the accused are not infringed 
upon, and an efficient management of the trial.1251 We note that these points are exactly 
those which we have identified as the purposes of disclosure in the introduction. The 
Chamber also puts forward an historical argument in favour of its view: 
The Chamber notes that under rule 121(2)(c) of the Rules "all evidence 
disclosed between the Prosecutor and the person for the purposes of the 
confirmation hearing shall be communicated to the Pre-Trial Chamber". The 
reference to "all evidence" in rule 121(2)(c) of the Rules implies that 
communication to the Chamber comprises all the evidence disclosed between the 
parties and that it is not limited to the evidence which the parties intend to rely 
on or to present at the confirmation hearing. The travaux préparatoires" of that 
rule indicate that it was first placed in the section of disclosure as draft rule 
5.12, preceding rules concerning both disclosure stricto sensu and inspection 
which have now become rules 76 to 79 of the Rules. However, delegations 
decided that draft rule 5.12 would be better placed in the rule concerning the 
confirmation hearing. Without any modification, that draft rule was then 
transferred and incorporated into the present rule 121 of the Rules. In the 
Chamber's view, this is a further indication that the drafters intended rule 
121(2)(c) of the Rules to cover all elements of disclosure referred to in what are 
now rules 76 to 79 of the Rules.1252 
                                                 
1248  Prosecutor v. Bemba, ICC Case No. 01/05-01/08, Decision on the Evidence Disclosure System 
and Setting a Timetable for Disclosure between the Parties, Pre-Trial Chamber III, 31 July 2008, 
paras. 10 et seq. 
1249  Ibid., par. 15. 
1250  Ibid., par. 16. 
1251  Ibid., paras. 17-25. 
1252  Ibid., par. 43. 
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While the statement of the Chamber as to the drafting history of the provision is correct, 
it appears that the Judges do not sufficiently take into account the fact that Rule 5.12, as 
its predecessor in the French proposal, Rule 58.2, as we have seen, always referred to 
the confirmation hearing. The actual ‘key point’ of the provision, as it were, is thus not 
the notion of “all evidence”, but that of “all evidence for the purposes of the 
confirmation hearing”, the interpretation of which, as pointed out, is difficult. 
The same dispute arose in the proceedings against Abu Garda, where the majority of 
Pre-Trial Chamber I followed its previous approach taken in Lubanga, while Judge 
Tarfusser dissented on similar arguments as put forward by Pre-Trial Chamber III in 
Bemba.1253 
It must be asked whether at the confirmation stage as envisaged by the drafters of the 
Statute, as already said, the level of scrutiny as shown in Bemba as well as in Judge 
Tarfusser’s dissent is justified. On the other hand, the Pre-Trial Chambers of the ICC 
have occasionally also declined to confirm the charges, meaning that a certain intensity 
of enquiry is desirable in order for the Pre-Trial Chamber to serve as an efficient 
filter.1254 In any case, the ICC should develop a standard procedure for this issue. 
The Bemba decision is interesting also for another reason, namely regarding the form of 
submission of the disclosed material. Not only did the Chamber ask the parties to 
submit all evidence disclosed (including also Rule 77 material)1255, but also to submit it 
by way of an “in-depth analysis chart”, which we have already briefly mentioned in the 
context of Rule 81 (1).1256 The Chamber essentially requested that the Prosecutor file a 
chart concerning each and every piece of evidence communicated to the Chamber, 
stating what it is, whether it is incriminating, (potentially) exculpatory or mixed, and in 
what way it is relevant to the case and the charges, i.e. which element of crime is to be 
proved by it.1257 The Chamber held: 
                                                 
1253  Prosecutor v. Abu Garda, ICC Case No. 2/05-02/09, Second Decision on issues relating to 
Disclosure, Pre-Trial Chamber I, 15 July 2009, and attached Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cuno 
Tarfusser, ibid., pp. 21 et subs. 
1254  Prosecutor v. Abu Garda, ICC Case No. 2/05-02/09, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 
8 February 2010. 
1255  Prosecutor v. Bemba, note 1248, par. 49. 
1256  See 6.6.1.1 supra. 
1257  Prosecutor v. Bemba, note 1248, paras. 64 et subs, see in this regard also the Annex to the 
decision: “Case "The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo", Technical protocol ("e-Court 
Protocol") for the provision of evidence, material and Witness Information in electronic form for the 
confirmation of charges”, ICC-01/05-01/08-55-Anx 31-07-2008. 
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In the Chamber's opinion, the most important factor in both safeguarding the 
rights of the defence and enabling the Chamber to exercise its functions is not 
for the Prosecutor to disclose the greatest volume of evidence, but to disclose the 
evidence which is of true relevance to the case, whether that evidence be 
incriminating or exculpatory. In fact, disclosure of a considerable volume of 
evidence for which it is difficult or impossible to comprehend the usefulness for 
the case merely puts the defence in a position where it cannot genuinely exercise 
its rights, and serves to hold back the proceedings. 
The Chamber considers that disclosure of truly relevant evidence presupposes 
an in-depth analysis by the Prosecutor of each piece of evidence prior to its 
disclosure, whether that evidence is incriminating or exculpatory.1258 
Furthermore, the Chamber took a step backwards to the very first preliminary decision 
of Pre-Trial Chamber I,1259 in that it held that the disclosure should be “facilitated 
through the Registry”. A request for leave to appeal by the Prosecutor was denied by the 
Chamber.1260  
Obviously, this practice serves the needs and rights of the accused as well as the 
preparation of the Chamber. After all, it is certainly in the interest of justice to force the 
Prosecutor to prepare his case in such a way that the trial can be conducted efficiently, 
with the side effect that the defence can prepare its case more easily. It may even be in 
the interest of the Prosecutor himself to be forced to work diligently and use his 
resources effectively and in a co-ordinated manner. In fact, it appears that the 
Prosecutor is not entirely unhappy with the practice anymore.1261  
In a later decision, however, the Chamber apparently meant the in-depth analysis to 
refer only to incriminating evidence.1262 
Meanwhile, the practice of demanding an in-depth analysis chart has been taken over in 
the trial proceedings in the Katanga case using the term “table of incriminating 
                                                 
1258  Ibid., paras. 67 et seq. 
1259  See note 1243 supra. 
1260  Prosecutor v. Bemba, ICC Case No. 01/05-01/08, Decision on the Prosecutor's application for 
leave to appeal Pre-Trial Chamber Ill's decision on disclosure, Pre-Trial Chamber III, 25 August 2008. 
1261  Prosecutor v. Bemba, ICC Case No. 01/05-01/08, Prosecution's Submissions on the Trial 
Chamber's 8 December 2009 Oral Order Requesting Updating of the In-Depth -Analysis Chart", 
Office of the Prosecutor, 15 December 2009. 
1262  Prosecutor v. Bemba, ICC 01/05-01/08, Decision on the Submission of an Updated, 
Consolidated Version of the In-depth Analysis Chart of Incriminatory Evidence, Pre-Trial Chamber 
III, 10 November 2008. 
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evidence”,1263 and, as already mentioned regarding the question whether the in-depth 
analysis chart falls into Rule 81 (1), in the trial proceedings against Bemba as well.1264 
This section shows that the principle of early information of the Chamber in the interest 
of trial management and truth-finding was envisaged for the ICC proceedings from the 
beginning. The ICC Pre-Trial Chambers have, in addition, developed a relatively active 
approach regarding disclosure; however, the level of information they demand from the 
parties, especially the Prosecutor, varies. 
 
6.8.2 Pre-trial disclosure 
The question whether the Trial Chamber should get to see any evidence before the trial 
itself, basically divided the PrepCom in two – those coming from an Anglo-American 
procedural tradition spoke out against it, fearing that the Chamber might be biased, and 
perhaps influenced by evidence which it had seen beforehand, but which was ultimately 
not presented at trial. Those coming from a Continental-European background stressed 
that prior and ongoing knowledge of the evidence would enable the Chamber to better 
fulfil its functions under the Statute, regarding orders for disclosure between the parties, 
asking appropriate questions to witnesses and thus ultimately contribute to the truth-
finding process. 1265 As Brady points out, intents to resolve the issue failed, which 
ultimately led the delegations to resort to the technique of “constructive 
ambiguousness”:  
The exact contents of 'the record of the proceedings,' and the question of what 
the Trial Chamber should see prior to trial, proved to be complex issues on 
which delegations expressed widely divergent and strongly held views. This 
divergence of views was shaped by differing views on the nature and scope of 
confirmation proceedings and trial proceedings, and the respective roles of the 
Pre-Trial and Trial Chambers. The final approach in the Rules harmonizes the 
                                                 
1263  See Prosecutor v. Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui, ICC Case No. 01/04-01/07, Order concerning the 
Presentation of Incriminating Evidence and the E-Court Protocol, Trial Chamber II, 13.3.2009, 
par. 11: “In order to better assist the Chamber and to enable each Defence Counsel to prepare their 
case effectively, the Prosecution is hereby ordered to submit an analytical table of all the evidence it 
intends to use during the trial. The table shall be based on the charges confirmed and follow the 
structure of the Elements of crimes. An example is attached in Annex A to this decision. This table 
will be referred to as the 'Table of Incriminating Evidence'.” 
1264  Prosecutor v. Bemba, ICC Case No. 01/05-01/08, Decision on the "Prosecution's Submissions 
on the Trial Chamber's 8 December 2009 Oral Order Requesting Updating of the In-Depth -Analysis 
Chart", Trial Chamber III, 29 January 2010; see also 6.8.2 infra. 
1265  Brady, Disclosure of Evidence, pp. 424 et seq. 
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various approaches in an 'open' manner. This ambiguity in the text is quite 
intentional and reserves to the future Court scope to further develop procedures 
best suited to hearing cases while maintaining the highest standards of due 
process and fairness under international law.1266 
Notwithstanding, however, as regards the record of the proceedings before the Pre-Trial 
Chamber, the Rules are unequivocal. Rules 129 and 130 provide that, after the charges 
are confirmed, the record of the proceedings is submitted to the Presidency, which, after 
having established a Trial Chamber, for its part submits the record to the latter. Despite 
of this fact, however, the principle that the record of the pre-trial proceedings, including 
all of the evidence disclosed to the Pre-Trial Chamber, should be submitted to the Trial 
Chamber, was envisaged from the beginning throughout the sessions of the PrepCom. 
The drafting history of Rules 129 and 130 has been outlined above.1267 Visualised by a 
synoptical overview, it looks as follows: 
                                                 
1266  Brady, Setting the Record Straight: A Short Note on Disclosure and 'the Record of the 
Proceedings', p. 272 
1267  See 6.3.2.3.3 supra. 
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1999 
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meeting outcome, 24 
May  
Discussion Paper, 23 
June / Working Group 
Report, 27 June 2000, 
Final Draft, 30 June 
2000, RPE-ICC 
Rule 66.1. Notification 
of the Presidency 
 
 
The decision taken by the 
Pre-Trial Chamber under 
rule 64  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
shall be communicated to 
the Presidency.  
The record of the 
proceedings of the Pre-
Trial Chamber shall 
accompany this 
notification. 
 
Rule 66.2. Constitution 
of the Trial Chamber 
 
Upon receipt of the 
decision of the Pre-Trial 
Chamber and the record 
of the proceedings, the 
Presidency shall 
constitute the Trial 
Chamber and shall refer 
the case to it. 
 
 
 
The Presidency may also 
refer the case to a 
previously constituted 
Trial Chamber. 
 
The decision of the Pre-
Trial Chamber and the 
record of the proceedings 
shall be transmitted to the 
Trial Chamber.  
Rule 65.1. Notifications 
 
 
 
The decision of the Pre-
Trial Chamber on the 
confirmation of the 
charges and the 
 
commitment of the person  
to the Trial Chamber shall 
be notified  
 
 
 
to all those who have 
participated in the hearing 
on the confirmation of the 
charges. 
 
 
 
 
 
Such decision and  
the record of the 
proceedings of the Pre-
Trial Chamber shall be 
notified to the Presidency. 
 
 
 
Rule 65.2. Constitution 
of the Trial Chamber 
 
When the Presidency 
constitutes  
the Trial Chamber  
and refers the case to the 
Trial Chamber,  
the Presidency shall 
notify  
the decision of the Pre-
Trial Chamber and the 
record of the proceedings 
to the Trial Chamber. 
The Presidency may also 
refer the case to a 
previously constituted 
Trial Chamber. 
Rule 5.26 Notification of 
the decision on the 
confirmation of charges 
 
The decision of the Pre-
Trial Chamber on the 
confirmation of charges 
and the  
 
committal of the accused 
to the Trial Chamber shall 
be notified, if possible,  
 
 
 
to the person concerned 
and his or her counsel 
and, if applicable, to the 
victims or their legal 
representatives. 
 
 
 
 
Such a decision and  
the record of the 
proceedings of the Pre-
Trial Chamber shall be 
transmitted to the 
Presidency. 
 
 
Rule 5.27 Constitution 
of the Trial Chamber 
 
When the Presidency 
constitutes  
 
and refers the case to the 
Trial Chamber,  
the Presidency shall 
transmit  
the decision of the Pre-
Trial Chamber and the 
record of the proceedings 
to the Trial Chamber.  
The Presidency may also 
refer the case to a 
previously constituted 
Trial Chamber.. 
Rule 5.26 Notification of 
the decision on the 
confirmation of charges 
 
The decision of the Pre-
Trial Chamber on the 
confirmation of charges 
and the  
 
committal of the accused 
to the Trial Chamber shall 
be notified, if possible,  
 
 
 
to the person concerned 
and his or her counsel 
and, if applicable, to the 
victims or their legal 
representatives. 
participating in the 
proceedings pursuant to 
rules 6.30 to rule 6.30 ter.  
 
Such a decision and ´ 
the record of the 
proceedings of the Pre-
Trial Chamber shall be 
transmitted to the 
Presidency.  
 
 
Rule 5.27 Constitution 
of the Trial Chamber 
 
When the Presidency 
constitutes  
a Trial Chamber  
and refers the case to it,  
 
the Presidency shall 
transmit  
the decision of the Pre-
Trial Chamber and the 
record of the proceedings 
to the Trial Chamber.  
The Presidency may also 
refer the case to a 
previously constituted 
Trial Chamber. 
 
Rule 5.26/129 
Notification of the 
decision on the 
confirmation of charges 
The decision of the Pre-
Trial Chamber on the 
confirmation of charges 
and the  
 
committal of the accused 
to the Trial Chamber shall 
be notified, if possible,  
 
to the Prosecutor,  
 
the person concerned and 
his or her counsel.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Such decision and  
the record of the 
proceedings of the Pre-
Trial Chamber shall be 
transmitted to the 
Presidency. 
 
 
Rule 5.27/130 
Constitution of the Trial 
Chamber 
When the Presidency 
constitutes  
a Trial Chamber  
and refers the case to it,  
 
the Presidency shall 
transmit  
the decision of the Pre-
Trial Chamber and the 
record of the proceedings 
to the Trial Chamber.  
The Presidency may also 
refer the case to a 
previously constituted 
Trial Chamber. 
 
We note that substantially, Rules 129 and 130 have not changed very much during the 
drafting process, maybe except for the notion that it was temporally envisaged to let the 
victims participating in the proceedings be formally informed of the outcome of the 
confirmation hearing; in the end, however, the victims were left out and the Prosecutor 
included.  
Following the transmittal of the record to the Trial Chamber, the Registrar, according to 
Rule 131 (1) “shall maintain the record of the proceedings transmitted by the Pre-Trial 
Chamber, pursuant to Rule 121 (10)”, presumably meaning that the record shall be 
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maintained along the lines of the confirmation hearing. What happens then, is 
(intentionally, as we have seen) left uncertain by the Rules. As briefly mentioned above, 
Rule 130 (2), which, like Rule 121 (10), enumerates the participants which may consult 
the record – the Trial Chamber, however, is purposely not mentioned. One is tempted to 
think that if the record is transmitted to the Trial Chamber, the latter must logically be 
entitled to look into it. However, this is not entirely clear. According to Rule 137, an 
extra record of the trial proceedings must be created; and it is unclear whether the pre-
trial record becomes part of the trial record. On the other hand, once the pre-trial phase 
is over, it is not clear why the record should be maintained by the Registrar, and not just 
kept. If one assumes that the Trial Chamber gets to see the record, it of course gets to 
see all of the evidence that came before the Chamber, whether by communication from 
the parties or by their presentation during the hearing. As pointed out in the previous 
section, these two classes of evidence may vary according to the approach taken by the 
Pre-Trial Chamber regarding the interpretation of Rule 121 (2)(c).  
However, while assuming that disclosure obligations are ongoing for the whole duration 
of the proceedings, the Rules do not contain a provision equal to Rule 121 (2)(c) for the 
trial proceedings. It is thus unclear whether the evidence disclosed between the parties 
after the end of the confirmation proceedings must also be communicated to the Trial 
Chamber and become part of the record. Also a provision like Rule 122, which makes 
the record of the proceedings the basis for conducting the confirmation hearing, is 
missing for the trial stage – Rule 140, which would be the corresponding provision for 
the trial proceedings, gives very little guidance on the conduction of the trial hearing in 
general, and certainly does not mention the record of the proceedings.1268  
The Trial Chambers of the ICC, however, generally appear to follow a more or less 
generous approach. As seen above, starting with Lubanga, the Pre-Trial Chambers 
went, as it were, the opposite way vis-à-vis the provisions of the Rules: whereas the 
Rules provide that the disclosed evidence is to be communicated to the Pre-Trial 
Chamber and afterwards filed with the record of the proceedings (Rules 121 (3)(c) and 
(10)), the Pre-Trial Chambers had the parties file the evidence with the Registry into the 
record, and the communication to the Chamber happens by the Chamber consulting the 
record. In practice, it thus appears that the Registry is in charge of the communication 
procedure, and not the Chamber, even though it naturally supervises the Registry. The 
practice established in the Pre-Trial Chambers apparently, absent a specific decision of 
the Trial Chambers modifying this practice, simply went on during the trial stage. 
                                                 
1268  Rule 140 has been described as “one of the most controversial of all the Rules”, Lewis, Trial 
Procedure, p. 547. 
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For Lubanga and Katanga, this would mean that the Trial Chamber, after having 
received the record of the pre-trial proceedings, gets to see the only the evidence on 
which the Prosecutor intends to rely. In the Katanga Case, however, this was 
significantly modified, as mentioned, in the way that the evidence must be submitted 
together with the “table of incriminating evidence”, structured by the elements of 
crimes. The Chamber, in its decision, made explicit reference to the record of the pre-
trial proceedings and the need for specific information of the Chamber for its truth-
finding function: 
The Chamber notes that, in accordance with Rule 121 (10), it already has access 
to the record of all the proceedings before the Pre-Trial Chamber, including all 
the evidence that was submitted during those proceedings. However, since the 
end of the pre-trial proceedings, the Prosecution has continued to disclose 
evidence to the accused on an inter partes basis. At the same time, the Chamber 
observes that the Prosecution continued to release further evidence to the 
Chamber in Ringtail1269 on an ex parte basis, without providing any metadata. As 
a result, the Chamber has an incomplete overview of the incriminating evidence 
in the present case. This is an undesirable situation, which hampers the 
Chamber in fulfilling its responsibilities and obligations regarding the 
preparation of the trial. 
In order to remedy this situation, the Prosecution shall, when submitting the 
Table of Incriminating Evidence, file all the evidence referred to in the Table 
with the Registry. There is no need to re-file any particular item of evidence that 
was filed during the pre-trial phase. However, if a particular item of evidence 
has previously been disclosed in a format (e.g. summary or redacted versions) 
other than the one the Prosecution intends to use at trial, the Prosecution shall 
file the evidence in the format it intends to use at trial.1270  
As seen above, the Bemba Pre-Trial Chamber originally had taken the most extensive 
view as to what should be communicated to the Chamber, and ordered that all evidence 
disclosed should be filed with the Registry. Additionally, the Prosecutor was, as we 
have seen, to provide an in-depth analysis chart, at first, regarding all evidence, 
including exculpatory evidence and Rule 77 material. This, however, later changed in 
that the in-depth analysis chart was only to refer to incriminating evidence.1271 It is 
unclear how this change of mind came about. As with the above mentioned cases of 
                                                 
1269  Ringtail is a trademark of a company producing trial management software, which is used by the 
ICC. 
1270  Prosecutor v. Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui, 13.3.2009, note 1263 supra, paras. 24 and 25, 
footnotes and paragraph numbers omitted. 
1271  Prosecutor v. Bemba, 10 November 2008, note 1262 supra, par. 8. 
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Lubanga and Katanga, this practice apparently continued after the confirmation of the 
charges, meaning that the order once put in place by the Pre-Trial Chamber, and the 
‘work instructions’ given to the Registry and the parties, just went on, absent any new 
order of the Trial Chamber which was now in charge of the matter. This means that 
evidence apart from incriminating evidence would be disclosed inter partes only, with 
the Chamber, however, being notified of the transaction between the parties: 
PRESIDING JUDGE FULFORD: […] Now, the next question, Ms. Kneuer, is 
whether it would be either convenient or helpful for us at this stage to review the 
disclosure regime which did not follow the disclosure regime which Trial 
Chamber I established and which has been followed by Trial Chamber II, or 
whether it would be unhelpful to do so and to no effect to do so at this stage? 
MS. KNEUER: The Prosecution proposes that we follow the procedure that was 
established in the Bemba case, meaning that we disclose the incriminatory 
evidence inter partes with the Defence and file it to the record and the 
potentially exculpatory material and the Rule 77 material to the Defence, 
notifying the Chamber. 
PRESIDING JUDGE FULFORD: But not entering it into the Court documents 
system so that each and every item is given a number by the Registry? 
MS. KNEUER: That is correct. 
PRESIDING JUDGE FULFORD: Thank you.1272 
It thus appears that the Trial Chambers take similar approaches as the respective Pre-
Trial Chambers concerning the question of what material enters the record of the 
proceedings. In the Bemba case, however, the original far-reaching approach of the Pre-
Trial Chamber, that also exculpatory evidence and Rule 77 material should become part 
of the record and entered into the in-depth analysis chart, was given up half-way, still at 
the pre-trial stage, so that this ‘attenuated’ record regime went on during the trial phase. 
The Trial Chambers are thus, in any case, informed of at least the incriminating 
evidence beforehand.  
 
6.9 Disclosure and Victims 
The active participation of victims in international criminal proceedings was an entirely 
new feature when the ICC was created.1273 Even though the participating victims are not 
                                                 
1272  Prosecutor v. Bemba, ICC Case No. 01/05-01/08, Status Conference Transcript, 7 October 2009, 
p. 17, lines 10-22. 
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a party, their influence on the proceedings has generally increased. It is therefore not 
surprising that victims’ issues have also impacted on the disclosure regime of the ICC. 
 
6.9.1 ‘Disclosure to Victims’ 
As was said concerning the involvement of the Chamber in the disclosure process, in 
the nomenclature of the ICC, disclosure stricto sensu only takes place between the 
parties; as far as other participants of the proceedings are involved, this happens by 
“communication” in the sense of Rule 121 (2)(c) RPE-ICC, as well as by 
“consultation”, as in the meaning of Rule 121 (10). Materially, however, as soon as 
victims get to see the evidence which is disclosed between the parties, we can speak of 
‘disclosure to the victims’. 
As far as the confirmation proceedings are concerned, we note that Rule 121 (10) 
indeed confers upon the victims the right to consult the record of the proceedings, 
which, as we have seen, contains at least the evidence on which the parties intend to 
rely at the confirmation hearing. For the trial proceedings, Rule 131 confers the same 
right upon the victims. 
As to the historical development of Rule 121 (10), it has been visualized above.1274 In 
this regard, we note that a right to consultation of the record of the proceedings was 
envisaged already in the Second French Proposal of 25 February 1999 (draft 
Rule 61.1 (g)). The provision remained unaltered at first; however, its first sentence was 
marked as deleted in the report of the outcome of the Mont Tremblant meeting (draft 
Rule 5.18 (10)). It is quite probable that this was a redactional mistake, since the 
remainder of the provision would not have made sense on its own (the phrase “[t]hey 
may also ask to intervene during the hearing” would be nonsensical if it referred to the 
prosecution and the defence). These rights of the victims to intervention were eventually 
deleted from Rule 121; they can now be found in the general provisions regarding 
witness participation (Rules 89 et subs. RPE-ICC). 
                                                                                                                                               
1273  See generally on victims’ participation at the ICC Bitti/Friman in Lee, The International 
Criminal Court: Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence, as well as Safferling, Das 
Opfer völkerrechtlicher Verbrechen: Die Stellung der Verbrechensopfer vor dem Internationalen 
Strafgerichtshof. Nowadays, we find victims’ participation in other international or hybrid tribunals as 
well, such as in the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, see Rules 23 et subs. of the 
Internal Rules of the ECCC. 
1274  See 6.8 supra. 
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In the relevant jurisprudence of the ICC, Trial Chamber I stated that generally the 
victims should have access only to the public filings contained in the record, that, 
however, if their personal interests are related to specific confidential material contained 
in the record and this material is relevant to their participation, “consideration shall be 
given to providing this information to the relevant victim or victims, so long as it will 
not breach other protective measures that need to remain in place.”1275 As regards 
inspection according to Rules 77 and 78, the Chamber also went quite far: 
Turning to inspection, the Trial Chamber agrees with the prosecution that 
inspection, as provided for in Rules 77 and 78 of the Rules relates only to the 
prosecution and the defence. However, as a matter of general principle, and in 
order to give effect to the rights accorded to victims under Article 68(3) of the 
Statute, the prosecution shall, upon request by the victims' legal representatives, 
provide individual victims who have been granted the right to participate with 
any materials within the possession of the prosecution that are relevant to the 
personal interests of victims which the Chamber has permitted to be investigated 
during the proceedings, and which have been identified with precision by the 
victims in writing. The participating victims should also be provided with the 
public evidence listed in the prosecution's annexes 1 and 2 to its "summary of 
presentation of evidence" subject to a demonstration of relevance to their 
personal interests as stated above. If part of a document in this context is 
confidential, the document should be made available in a suitably redacted 
form.1276 
It is quite clear that the victims should not be able to inspect material in the possession 
or control of the defence. However, also to grant the victims access to material in 
possession of the Prosecutor and to lift the confidentiality of certain material does not 
appear necessary. Given the fact that the material in the possession of the Prosecutor 
will generally be incriminating, providing this material to the victim may result in the 
accused facing two prosecutors. 
 
                                                 
1275  Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, ICC Case No. 01/04-01/06, Decision on victims’ participation, 
Trial Chamber I, 18 January 2008, par. 106. 
1276  Ibid., par. 111, footnote omitted. 
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6.9.2 Disclosure by Victims 
The far-reaching participation rights granted to victims before the ICC have led to the 
question whether the participating victims should also be under an obligation to disclose 
(exculpatory) material to the accused on fairness grounds.1277 
To be sure, the procedural framework of the ICC does not foresee such a duty, which is 
also the main reason why the Chambers of the Court have answered this question in the 
negative. The Trial Chamber in Katanga & Ngudjolo Chui pointed out that there can be 
no duty of the victims to disclose evidence, because there is no specific right for them to 
present evidence, either.1278  
In the appeals judgment, the Chamber held that victims can only ‘present’ evidence via 
a request of the Chamber and that it is up to the latter, during trial, to ensure that the 
accused receives adequate disclosure: 
The Appeals Chamber underlines once again that victims do not have the right 
to present evidence during the trial; the possibility of victims being requested to 
submit evidence is contingent on them fulfilling numerous conditions. Firstly, 
their participation is always subject to article 68 (3) of the Statute, which 
requires that they demonstrate that their personal interests are affected by the 
evidence they request to submit. Secondly, when requesting victims to submit 
evidence, the Trial Chamber must ensure that the request does not exceed the 
scope of the Trial Chamber's power under article 69 (3) of the Statute. In 
addition, the Trial Chamber will "ensure that [the] trial is fair and expeditious 
and is conducted with full respect for the rights of the accused", which includes 
the right to "have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of the 
defence".1279 
As specifically regards exculpatory information, the Chamber, quite consequently, also 
rests the responsibility on the prosecution and, ultimately, the Trial Chamber: 
[U]nder article 54 (1) (a) of the Statute, the Prosecutor has a duty to investigate 
exonerating and incriminating circumstances equally. Under article 54 (3) (b) of 
                                                 
1277  See Prosecutor v. Katanga & Ngudjolo Chui, ICC Case No. 01/04-01/07, Defence for Germain 
Katanga’s Additional Observations on Victims’ Participation and scope thereof, Defence, 
10 November 2009, par. 3. 
1278  Prosecutor v. Katanga & Ngudjolo Chui, ICC Case No. 01/04-01/07, Decision on the Modalities 
of Victim Participation at Trial, Trial Chamber II, 22 January 2010, par. 105. 
1279  Prosecutor v. Katanga & Ngudjolo Chui, ICC Case No. 01/04-01/07 O A 11, Judgment on the 
Appeal of Mr Katanga Against the Decision of Trial Chamber II of 22 January 2010 Entitled 
"Decision on the Modalities of Victim Participation at Trial", Appeals Chamber, 16 July 2010, 
par. 48, footnotes omitted. 
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the Statute, the Prosecutor may, with respect to his investigations "[r]equest the 
presence of and question persons being investigated, victims and witnesses". The 
Appeals Chambers therefore considers that it is reasonable that, in particular 
where the submissions in the victims' applications for participation indicate that 
victims may possess potentially exculpatory information, the Prosecutor's 
investigation should extend to discovering any such information in the victims' 
possession. Such information would then be disclosed to the accused pursuant to 
article 67 (2) of the Statute and rule 77 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. 
[…] 
[t]he Appeals Chamber recalls that article 69 (3) of the Statute provides the 
Trial Chamber with the authority to request the submission of all evidence that 
the Trial Chamber considers necessary for the determination of the truth. This 
decision is within the Trial Chamber's discretion. Thus, even if the Trial 
Chamber decides that it is satisfied that the personal interests of the Victims 
have been demonstrated and that it will request the Victims to submit 
incriminating evidence, nothing precludes the Trial Chamber from then 
requesting that any exculpatory evidence in the possession of the Victims is also 
submitted, in order to ensure that the Trial Chamber does not receive the 
evidence in a distorted manner. 
Secondly, in relation to victim participation in particular, the Trial Chamber has 
broad authority under article 68 (3) of the Statute and rules 91 (3) and 93 of the 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence to determine the conduct of the proceedings, 
and retains the authority to order the production of exculpatory or mitigating 
evidence itself, if and when it considers that such information would be 
necessary for the determination of the truth. This is also the case where it is 
specifically brought to the attention of the Trial Chamber by one of the parties 
or participants that potentially exculpatory information exists and is in the 
possession of a participating victim. Finally, the Appeals Chamber recalls that 
the Trial Chamber also has the authority to take any measures necessary to 
ensure the accused's rights to a fair trial, if and when a request to present 
evidence is granted.1280 
This puts the victims into a quite comfortable position. Nevertheless, the approach of 
the Appeals Chamber appears reasonable. It would be asking too much from the victims 
to disclose exculpatory evidence; this might also raise their significance in the 
proceeding to such an extent that they could in fact play the role of a second prosecutor, 
which would be unacceptable. It is indeed the role of the Prosecutor to investigate 
exculpatory circumstances. Other than that, the Chambers should use utmost care when 
                                                 
1280  Ibid., paras. 81, 85 et seq., footnotes and paragraph numbers omitted. 
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requesting evidence from the victims, both in the interest of truth finding and trial 
management. 
 
6.9.3  ‘Disclosure of Victims’ 
Finally, one could also speak of a ‘disclosure of victims’, in the sense of whether the 
identity of participating victims must be revealed to the accused. In the light of the risk 
that victims participating in the proceedings may in essence mean the accused facing a 
second prosecutor, “faceless” victims in the proceedings should be avoided. In the 
above-mentioned decision in Lubanga, the Chamber would not commit itself to a clear 
statement: 
[T]he Trial Chamber is of the view that extreme care must be exercised before 
permitting the participation of anonymous victims, particularly in relation to the 
rights of the accused. While the safety and security of victims is a central 
responsibility of the Court, their participation in the proceedings cannot be 
allowed to undermine the fundamental guarantee of a fair trial. The greater the 
extent and the significance of the proposed participation, the more likely it will 
be that the Chamber will require the victim to identify himself or herself. 
Accordingly, when resolving a request for anonymity by a victim who has 
applied to participate, the Chamber will scrutinise carefully the precise 
circumstances and the potential prejudice to the parties and other participants. 
Given the Chamber will always know the victim's true identity, it will be well 
placed to assess the extent and the impact of the prejudice whenever this arises, 
and to determine whether steps that fall short of revealing the victim's identity 
can sufficiently mitigate the prejudice.1281 
The participation of victims can thus influence the disclosure proceedings of the ICC 
from several angles. It remains to be seen how this new feature of international criminal 
law develops in the future. 
 
6.10 Sanctions for non-compliance 
The ICC provisions are silent regarding possible sanctions for non-compliance with 
disclosure obligations by the parties, with the exception of Rule 79, which provides that 
a failure of the defence to provide prior notice of certain grounds for excluding criminal 
responsibility may not be sanctioned by non-admission of raising the ground or 
                                                 
1281  Decision on victims’ participation, note 1275 supra, par. 131. 
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presenting evidence. Other than that, the legal provisions are silent; even a norm which 
would be comparable to Rule 68 bis RPE-ICTY does not exist. 
In the relevant chapter regarding the Ad Hoc Tribunals, we have made some general 
remarks regarding what possible sanctions might be desirable.  
As at the Ad Hoc Tribunals, there is the possibility to exclude evidence according to 
Art. 67 (7), which, however, would oftentimes not be in the interest of truth-finding and 
therefore problematic; after all, the inadmissibility of evidence not previously disclosed 
had been contemplated, but was not kept.1282 In any case, the complete withholding of 
evidence, i.e. non-disclosure followed by non-presentation, is even worse from a truth-
finding perspective. Delaying the proceedings, as proposed in the scholarship,1283 may 
indeed be of use only when the action desired by the Prosecutor is a certain warrant or 
the confirmation of proceedings – delaying the trial is usually detrimental to the 
interests of the accused, whereas the Prosecutor’s interests are virtually untouched by a 
delay. 
As was already mentioned in the Chapter on the Ad Hoc Tribunals, the ICC has, for two 
times, by ordering a stay of proceedings and threatening to release the accused, meaning 
the most drastic sanction for non-disclosure of evidence by the Prosecutor. As was 
previously mentioned, in Lubanga, the Prosecutor had, in the view of Trial Chamber I, 
abused its power under Art. 54 (3)(e) ICCSt, which ultimately led to his inability to 
disclose exculpatory material according to Art. 67 (2). Since the Prosecutor also saw 
himself unable to disclose the material to the Chamber in order to obtain a ruling under 
Art. 67 (2) in connection with Rule 83 (in fact, the Prosecutor also refused to disclose to 
the Chamber the identity of most of the providers of information), the Chamber stayed 
the proceedings, holding: 
The Chamber's overall conclusions can be shortly described: 
i) The disclosure of exculpatory evidence in the possession of the prosecution is 
a fundamental aspect of the accused's right to a fair trial; 
ii) The prosecution has incorrectly used Article 54(3) (e) when entering into 
agreements with information-providers, with the consequence that a significant 
body of exculpatory evidence which would otherwise have been disclosed to the 
accused is to be withheld from him, thereby improperly inhibiting the 
opportunities for the accused to prepare his defence; and 
                                                 
1282  See, once again, Art. 10 (b)(Option 2) the 1998 PrepCom Draft, section 6.3.1.3 supra. 
1283  Scheffer, A review of the experiences of the Pre-Trial and Appeals Chambers of the International 
Criminal Court regarding the disclosure of evidence, at p. 162 proposes, in addition to taking 
disciplinary action, delaying the approval of warrants of arrest and the confirmation of charges. 
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iii) The Chamber has been prevented from exercising its jurisdiction under 
Articles 64(2), Article 64(3) (c) and Article 67(2), in that it is unable to 
determine whether or not the non-disclosure of this potentially exculpatory 
material constitutes a breach of the accused's right to a fair trial. 
Adapting the language of the Appeals Chamber, the consequence of the three 
factors set out in the preceding paragraph has been that the trial process has 
been ruptured to such a degree that it is now impossible to piece together the 
constituent elements of a fair trial. 
In consequence a stay is imposed on these proceedings. 1284 
The Appeals Chamber endorsed this holding;1285 in the end, the material could be 
disclosed to the Trial Chamber and the proceedings continued. 
The second decision to stay the proceedings also, though indirectly, had to do with non-
disclosure of potentially exculpatory or material evidence. As mentioned above, the 
disclosure of the identity of intermediaries, which serve as contact persons between the 
actual witnesses and Court personnel, must be disclosed under certain conditions.1286 In 
one instance, the Prosecutor refused to follow an order of the Trial Chamber to disclose 
the identity of an intermediary;1287 whereupon the Court stayed the proceedings again. 
Nominally, the reason for the stay of proceedings was thus the refusal of the Prosecutor 
to follow an order of the Chamber; however, the trigger for this situation was, once 
more, the non-disclosure of evidence. In the same procedural situation, the Chamber 
                                                 
1284  Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, ICC Case No. 01/04-01/06, Decision on the consequences of non-
disclosure of exculpatory materials covered by Article 54(3)(e) agreements and the application to stay 
the prosecution of the accused, together with certain other issues raised at the Status Conference on 
10 June 2008, Trial Chamber I, 13 June 2008, paras. 92 et seq. 
1285  Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, ICC Case No. 01/04-01/06 OA 13, Judgment on the appeal of the 
Prosecutor against the decision of Trial Chamber I entitled "Decision on the consequences of non-
disclosure of exculpatory materials covered by Article 54(3)(e) agreements and the application to stay 
the prosecution of the accused, together with certain other issues raised at the Status Conference on 10 
June 2008", Appeals Chamber, 21 October 2008.  
1286  See 6.4.3 supra. 
1287  Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, ICC Case No. 01/04-01/06, Redacted Decision on the 
Prosecution's Urgent Request for Variation of the Time-Limit to Disclose the Identity of Intermediary 
143 or Alternatively to Stay Proceedings Pending Further Consultations with the VWU, Trial 
Chamber I, 8 July 2010. This decision, however, was quashed by the Appeals Chamber, for non-
observance of the Chamber’s margin of appreciation, see Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, ICC Case 
No. 01/04-01/06 OA 18, Judgment on the appeal of the Prosecutor against the decision of Trial 
Chamber I of 8 July 2010 entitled "Decision on the Prosecution's Urgent Request for Variation of the 
Time-Limit to Disclose the Identity of Intermediary 143 or Alternatively to Stay Proceedings Pending 
Further Consultations with the VWU", Appeals Chamber, 18 October 2010. 
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also issued a warning regarding sanctions for misconduct according to Art. 71 and 
Rule 171 towards the Prosecutor and the Deputy Prosecutor.1288 In the end, however, 
apparently no fines or other disciplinary measures were imposed.1289  
As previously said in the context of the Ad Hoc Tribunals, the Court should not be too 
hesitant to impose sanctions for personal misconduct, given that the sanctions foreseen 
by Rule 171 (exclusion from the courtroom for a maximum of 30 days and a fine up to 
2000 €) do not appear particularly high.1290  
 
6.11 Conclusion 
The development of the procedural law of the ICC, as well as its whole procedural 
framework is very special. In contrast to the Ad Hoc Tribunals, the statutory framework 
(Rome Statute, Rules and Regulations) is very detailed, and took a lot of time to draft. 
Also, we find many ‘inquisitorial’ elements of the Roman-Germanic procedural 
tradition realized in the procedure, whereas the Ad Hoc Tribunals have still retained a 
widely adversarial system. This is exemplified particularly with the ‘neutral’ role of the 
Prosecutor, and the numerous explicit hints to truth finding, both concerning the 
Prosecutor and the Court.  
As regards inter partes disclosure technicalities, the ICC’s disclosure regime is widely 
comparable with the one of the Ad Hoc Tribunals. The systematization of disclosure 
duties by parties and the contents of disclosure duties was actually borrowed from the 
Rules of the ICTY; the same holds true for restrictions to disclosure. The jurisprudence 
of the ICC is hesitant to be too definitive in the application of the respective provisions. 
In any case, disclosure is considered to be the rule, non-disclosure the exception; further 
than that, however, particularly the ICC Appeals Chamber decides on a case-by-case 
basis whenever it can. 
A new feature is the involvement of victims in the disclosure process, who get access to 
the evidence via the record of the proceedings. This evokes questions of possible 
specific disclosure duties of the victims, which, however, have been rightly denied by 
the ICC Chambers. 
                                                 
1288  See Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, ICC Case No. 01/04-01/06, Trial Transcript of 8 July 2010, 
ICC-01/04-01/06-T-313-ENG ET WT 08-07-2010, p. 2, line 18 – p. 5, line 1. 
1289  See Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, ICC Case No. 01/04-01/06, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 
of the Statute, 14 March 2012, paras. 119 through 123. 
1290  Notwithstanding, some authors argue that sanctions for personal misconduct should be reserved 
for the most serious cases, see Swoboda, The ICC Disclosure Regime, p. 454. 
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What is new also is the particularly strong involvement of the respective Chamber. This 
development can also be observed at the Ad Hoc Tribunals, but at the ICC, it was 
envisaged from the beginning. The Pre-Trial Chambers get to see a considerable amount 
of the evidence disclosed between the parties; and the development shows that also the 
Trial Chambers are provided at least with the material on which the parties intend to 
rely beforehand. Furthermore, the Chambers have forced the Prosecutor to provide by 
electronic means a preliminary analysis of the evidence. The fact that the Chambers are 
taking their task seriously and are willing to get involved is also evidenced by the 
proceedings in Lubanga, where the Prosecutor had agreed to keep large amounts of 
(potentially exculpatory) evidence secret not only from the public and the accused, but 
from the Trial Chamber as well. The latter showed by its decision to halt the 
proceedings that it is indeed not willing to sacrifice the rights of the accused and its own 
role and responsibility in the truth-finding process on considerations of convenience for 
the Prosecutor and his sources of investigation, among others, the United Nations, 
which, however apparently heard the warning shot. The involvement of the Chamber in 
the disclosure process, in our opinion, shows a general tendency in both national and 
international procedure, which allows some conclusions regarding disclosure and its 
relation with truth finding, in connection with the specific functional roles of the 
participants of the trial; we will elaborate a little more on this point in our overall 
conclusion. 
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7 Conclusion 
The development of the disclosure of evidence in criminal proceedings both on the 
national and international level in the 20th century is remarkable. It is characterized by a 
strong increase of disclosure obligations for both parties.  
Whereas an accused in the United States was, until the middle of the 20th century, 
occasionally legally prevented from even receiving his own prior statement in a case 
where his life was at stake, we can now state that the rights of the accused on both sides 
of the Atlantic are much better protected than before – which does not mean that they 
are always sufficiently protected; this is shown by the considerable amount of 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR on the matter, oftentimes, though by far not always, 
involving the United Kingdom.1291 However, the human rights aspect is only one of at 
least three purposes of disclosure. The second one, enhanced trial management and 
judicial economy, which was given more and more importance over time, has resulted 
in wider disclosure obligations not only on the side of the prosecution but also of the 
defence, a fact which, in turn, may run counter to the interests and rights of the accused. 
Thirdly, the truth-finding function of the criminal trial, regardless of the criminal justice 
system, has become increasingly important, a factor which has also contributed to a 
widening of disclosure obligations of both parties. Both trial management and truth 
finding are closely related with an ever growing influence of the court in the disclosure 
proceedings. 
On the international level, we can observe a similar development, especially as concerns 
the Ad Hoc Tribunals. It is interesting to note that particularly defence disclosure 
obligations at the Ad Hoc Tribunals were very limited at the beginning, and have 
significantly widened during the existence of the Tribunals. This gives us the 
impression that the drafters of the relevant provisions were particularly aware of the 
necessity to protect the rights of the accused, trying to lay out the regulatory framework, 
on the one hand, in an ‘ideal’ way to keep up with the fair trial rights of the accused. 
After all: we know of no national code of criminal procedure which would contain a 
general provision, solely laying down, in an abstract way, the procedural rights of an 
accused in the like in Articles 21/20 of the ICTY/ICTR Statutes, or Article 67 of the 
                                                 
1291  As said previously on the occasion of the differentiation between disclosure in the formal and 
disclosure in the material sense, the issues underlying disclosure (fair trial, judicial economy and truth 
finding) arise in any jurisdiction; the relevant ECtHR cases more often than not originate from 
Continental-European jurisdictions as well. 
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Rome Statute. Admittedly, this regulatory technique is probably necessary in the way 
that, as pointed out in the introduction, none of the international criminal courts and 
tribunals are technically bound by the relevant international human rights treaties. 
Nevertheless, it appears that the drafters of the respective rules at the beginning wanted 
to ‘do everything right’, and not commit the same mistakes concerning fairness as were, 
from a modern viewpoint, made in Nuremberg. On the other hand, if we look at the 
highly controversial discussions at the Rome Conference, and later in the Preparatory 
Committee for the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, we can conclude that oftentimes 
all which could be agreed on regarding criminal procedure without endless discussions 
were fair trial rights of the accused, as contained in the relevant human rights 
documents. At the Ad Hoc Tribunals, there was no time for in-depth discussions on the 
matter. And indeed, the fair trial rights of the accused must form the basis of any kind of 
international proceedings, in order to reach acceptance of the international community, 
which is the basis of positive general prevention. Furthermore, however, many of the 
early judges at the international criminal courts and tribunals were (and some are still) 
not experienced practitioners, but rather academics, politicians or diplomats. The 
judges, with a rudimentary set of rules, were soon ‘caught up with’ by the reality of 
criminal proceedings, which forced them to find pragmatic solutions for the problems 
posed in the proceedings – some of these problems immediately concerned disclosure. 
One important development in this regard is quite directly related to truth-finding: the 
protection of confidential information, be it on the grounds of (national) security 
interests or witness protection. In many cases, relevant evidence can only be obtained 
on the assurance of confidentiality; this is even more true in an international than in a 
national setting. The protection of confidentiality interests obviously restricts the fair 
trial rights of the accused. At the same time, however, the chambers of the international 
tribunals, which is a development we have also observed in the national jurisdictions, 
have acquired a more active role in monitoring the non-disclosure processes; indeed, the 
Lubanga case shows that the judges are not willing to accept secret evidence to a major 
extent – even though the first decision to halt the proceedings was based on fair trial 
rights of the accused, it is obvious that the Chamber was dismayed by the behaviour of 
the Prosecutor, keeping the evidence secret from the Chamber itself, so it could not 
fulfil its tasks properly. This development is certainly partially due to the growing 
influence of the Continental-European tradition in international criminal proceedings, in 
which the judges traditionally acquire a more active role. However, the fact that the 
stronger involvement of the respective chambers happens on the national level as well, 
shows that this phenomenon cannot be fully explained with the ‘mix’ of adversarial and 
inquisitorial elements which is inherent in international criminal proceedings, regardless 
of a possible ‘convergence’ of the systems. Instead, it appears that the judges 
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increasingly take a pragmatic approach to criminal proceedings, having in mind the 
rights of the accused, however, balanced with considerations of judicial economy, and 
truth-finding, which some of the judges, as we have seen, regard as the foremost goal of 
the proceedings. 
From a functional perspective, it appears that the judges take a more active part in this 
truth-finding process, by demanding the submission or communication of evidence 
which is to be presented in advance. At the Ad Hoc Tribunals, this started with 
Dokmanović and resulted in the Pre-Trial and Pre-Defence Conferences and the pre-trial 
briefs which must be submitted to the chambers before the trial. It is meant to facilitate 
a better preparation of the trial by the Chamber; however, the involvement of the 
Chamber with, admittedly, not the evidence itself, but lists of evidence, has a direct 
bearing on the truth-finding procedure as well. At the ICC, this is even more true. The 
Rules themselves provide that the Pre-Trial Chamber receives not only lists of evidence, 
but copies of the evidence disclosed between the parties. Even though the exact scope of 
the evidence which must be communicated to the Pre-Trial Chamber is in dispute 
between the ICC Chambers, the fact that this principle is ‘officially’ laid down in the 
Rules is remarkable. As we have seen, this agreement was only possible based on the 
assumption of the drafters that the Pre-Trial Chamber does not decide over the guilt of 
the accused. However, the complete record of the Pre-Trial proceedings is 
communicated to the Trial Chamber; with the bulk of disclosure taking place before the 
confirmation hearing and not the trial, this is a remarkable level of involvement of the 
chamber. And not only that: while the Rules are intentionally silent on disclosure during 
the trial phase, the practice of some of the Pre-Trial Chambers to involve the Registry in 
the disclosure process has led to a situation where ‘automatically’ at least a large part of 
the evidence ends up in the record of the proceedings; and this practice has at times 
simply continued during trial. This means that also the Trial Chambers get to see part of 
the evidence in advance – if they wish to, that is; it appears, of course, possible that 
some of the judges, as a matter of principle, refrain from inspecting the record. 
It elucidates from what we have seen, that disclosure (in the material sense) takes place 
between those participants in the trial which are responsible for conducting the truth-
finding procedure. In an adversarial procedure, where truth is found by a ‘dumb’ jury on 
evidence presented by two parties, the evidence will be disclosed between the parties. 
With ‘ideal’ parties strictly following the procedural rules, one would not even need a 
judge. In an inquisitorial proceeding, in turn, it is essential that the inquisitorial judge 
gets to see the evidence beforehand, so that he can sensibly conduct the truth-finding 
process, in which parties, apart from the accused, are not needed at all, if the judge does 
everything right. These ideal pictures, however, as we have seen, are not reality 
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anywhere in the world – in fact, in such an ideal world disclosure would not be required 
at all: The protection of fair trial rights of the accused can, regardless of the legal 
system, only work within a framework of checks and balances. This is why the 
described ideal systems are not functional in a legal system committed to the rule of 
law, and this is also why disclosure is essential. The ideal picture of the adversarial 
process is based on the assumption that both parties have ‘the same chance of winning’; 
this sportsmanship element is also the reason why we can speak of the ‘fairness’ of the 
proceedings at all. If this were true, we would need no disclosure (as was the general 
practice in the United States until less than 70 years ago). This assumption, however, is 
false, since the prosecution will at all times be in a stronger position to investigate the 
case than the defence. This structural disadvantage of the defence must be compensated 
by giving the defence (in principle) the same level of information (‘equality of arms’). 
In an adversarial trial, the prosecutor must thus provide the defence with the necessary 
information. The fulfilment of this obligation by the prosecutor, however, must be 
controlled by some authority. In practice, this is nowadays, both at the national as at the 
international level, accomplished by the judicial body dealing with the matter. And this 
control mechanism can only work if, at least in a case of dispute between the parties, the 
court gets access to the matter in dispute: the evidence. In an inquisitorial trial, the 
situation is a little more straightforward. Here also, in an ideal world, no ‘disclosure’ 
will be needed, since the inquisitorial judge will have collected the evidence himself in 
a purely objective manner. For the obvious disadvantages of this system, it has been 
abolished in most parts of the world – either the investigating judge will not be the same 
as the one who decides over the guilt of the accused, or the investigation and 
prosecution is performed by a ‘neutral’ prosecutor. The judge, in any case, retains the 
prior access to the collection of evidence, to enable him to investigate the matter in 
court properly. The prosecution will play a double role: in addition to its prosecutorial 
function, it performs a controlling function over the court. The same holds true for the 
defence, who will be allowed to play, in certain limits, a more partisan role. Both of the 
latter participants, however, are also called upon to be part of the truth-finding process 
in controlling the court. For the fulfilment of these tasks, they must have knowledge of 
the evidence beforehand, which means nothing but disclosure in the material sense. The 
system of disclosure is therefore dependent on the distribution of the procedural roles 
within the proceedings as a whole.  
For the question what must be disclosed, we must also put the three purposes of 
disclosure into relation. 
The human rights aspect, i.e., generally speaking, the right to a fair trial, is the only 
‘fixed’ parameter within the system of disclosure. While there is certainly a certain 
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margin of ‘fairness’, the red line to ‘unfairness’ must not be crossed. This is in contrast 
to the other two aspects, judicial economy and truth-finding. While they can be 
balanced against the right to a fair trial, the trial must, as a whole, remain fair at all 
times. If the only way to keep the trial fair is at the expense of truth-finding or judicial 
economy, the fairness aspect must prevail. 
This fairness aspect, as we have seen, works solely in favour of the accused. Regarding 
disclosure, we can thus state that fairness demands as much prosecution disclosure as 
possible, whereas it limits defence disclosure as much as possible. 
Judicial economy will usually also be enhanced by disclosure. However, this is only 
true as long as the quantity of the material remains manageable. This has apparently 
been recognized particularly be the Chambers of the ICC, when they demanded that the 
Prosecutor provide an analysis of the incriminating evidence prior to trial, which must 
be updated by the Prosecutor on a continuous basis.  
The truth-finding aspect is also ambiguous. Generally, one will naturally have to say 
that liberal disclosure leads to better truth-finding. However, as we have seen, some 
actors, particularly in the international field, are extremely hesitant to disclose 
information if they do not get a guarantee that it will remain confidential. As stated, 
truth-finding and judicial economy can be balanced, fair trial rights cannot. 
For a reasonable access to disclosure of evidence in international criminal proceedings, 
we must look at the purpose(s) of an international criminal justice system as a whole. 
Up to now, there appears to be no comprehensive definition or even collection of these 
purposes – it has rightly been held that there is an “overabundance” of (irrealistic) 
perceived goals of international criminal justice by different groups.1292  
In any case, we can assume that, as stated in the introduction concerning criminal 
justice in general, the acceptance of the respective criminal justice system by the 
society in which it operates is a key factor for an effective criminal justice system. This 
means, as stated previously, that first and foremost the fair trial rights of the accused 
must be observed, as an overarching element on which, in principle, general consensus 
has been reached. Looking at the context of international criminal justice, it appears fair 
to assume that also truth-finding is a decisive factor in this regard – many post-conflict 
societies going through transitional justice processes, like, e.g., South Africa or 
Rwanda, work not, or not only, with criminal justice to come to terms with their past, 
but (also) with truth- and reconciliation commissions and similar institutions. In the 
pursuit of this goal, as history shows, disclosure can play a key role. 
                                                 
1292  Damaška, Problematic Features of International Criminal Procedure, at pp. 177 et subs. 
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The history of disclosure in international criminal justice demonstrates that, while there 
are drawbacks like some unfortunate decisions of the Ad Hoc Tribunals, the judges of 
the international criminal courts and tribunals have increasingly understood that 
pragmatic solutions are needed, keeping the fundamental prerequisite of a fair trial in 
mind. Particularly at the ICC, there are some encouraging developments in this regard. 
While it is important for an analysis of the law to look at its history and analyse its roots 
in different national legal systems, we may not stop at this point. Instead, we must 
accept the statutory framework of the existing international criminal procedure and, 
most of all, develop a new legal thinking that goes beyond the ‘common law’-‘civil law’ 
dichotomy, but accepts that international criminal procedure is a reality that exists and 
is operational as a sui generis procedural system. It appears that, despite of some 
setbacks, the international criminal practice is, overall, on the right track.1293  
                                                 
1293  See already Büngener, Die Entwicklung der Disclosure of Evidence in internationalen 
Strafverfahren - Annäherung der Traditionen? p. 232 et seq. 
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